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Abstract
The structure/agency dilemma remains one of the most contentious issues in modem 
sociology. This thesis examines the relationship between these concepts in the light of theories 
of revolutions. The types of revolution analysed are socialist revolutions, defined as Marxist- 
inspired regime transformations accompanied by widespread revolt from below.
The argument advanced is that the origins and development of socialist movements to the 
position of state power is more complex than the dominant structuralist paradigm assumes. No 
model of socialist revolutions can be adequate without combining long-term structuralist 
considerations of social process with short-to-medium purposive factors such as political 
mobilisation, organisation and ideology.
This thesis adopts a comparative historical analysis to support this claim. Using two 
apparently dissimilar cases, the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia and the Sandinista Revolution 
in Nicaragua, it is argued that despite spatial and temporal differences a generalisable set of 
factors can be advanced which explain the occurrence of socialist revolutions.
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1Chapter 1
THEORIES OF REVOLUTIONS
1.1. INTRODUCTION
Between January 1978 and July 1979 the Somoza dictatorship in Nicaragua encountered an 
unprecedented challenge to its authority. Despite concerted efforts from domestic and 
international groups to retain the underlying structure of the social system which had been 
maintained for over forty years, all social indicators pointed towards an acute and heightening 
revolutionary crisis of the regime. These indicators included an increase in levels of political 
violence, in organised opposition to the dictatorship, growing adherence to an alternative 
structure of authority demanding the armed overthrow of the dictatorship, the inability of the 
regime to suppress organised discontent and massive disruption to the normalcy of everyday 
life. The qualitative transformation of this situation was achieved on July 19, 1979 when the 
Sandinista National Liberation Front entered the capital city proclaiming victory over the forces 
of the dictatorship. Recognising the inevitable, Somoza had fled to Miami two days before, 
leaving his coercive instrument, the National Guard, in disarray.
The Sandinista victory signalled a sharp break from the nations' past. Latin America had not 
witnessed such a rapid and fundamental socio-political transformation since the Cuban 
Revolution twenty years beforehand. The extent of this socio-political break, combined with the 
high level of mass mobilisation, clearly distinguished the Nicaraguan event from most forms of 
regime transformation.
This thesis examines the phenomenon of modem social revolutions. Instances of this 
phenomenon (such as that described above in Nicaragua during 1978 and 1979) are relatively 
rare social occurrences. The fact that the term 'revolution' is so widespread in political and 
everyday vocabulary demonstrates the emotional charge the issue generates. Depending upon 
one's perspective, or social situation, revolution is either abhorred and feared, or exalted and 
celebrated. The task of the sociologist, however, is to understand howr and why revolutions 
come about.1 This thesis will explore the social and political conditions which give rise to 
modern revolutionary situations, and will attempt to understand the conditions under which 
particular challengers succeed in radically transforming states and social structures. The types 
of regime transformation which will be examined are those which have been inspired by
^ee A.S. Cohan, Theories of Revolution: An Introduction, N«A boa 1975, pp. 36-7.
2Marxist movements, and accompanied by widespread mobilisation of classes previously 
alienated from the established polity. These will be labelled socialist revolutions. Using a 
historical comparative perspective, this thesis argues that despite temporal and spatial 
differences a generaiisable set of factors can be advanced which explain the occurrence of 
modern socialist revolutions. In addressing contemporary approaches to the study of 
revolutions the thesis argues that no model can be complete unless it combines long-range' 
structuralist considerations of social process with 'short-range' purposive considerations of 
political mobilisation and organisation.
The Nicaraguan revolution provides social scientists with an opportunity to test the validity 
of the models of revolution which have flourished within the discipline over the previous 
twenty years. In an influential article published in 1965 Harry Eckstein had lamented the 
underdevelopment of definitions and models of 'internal wah (of which revolutions were but a 
species).2 3 Fifteen years later the same author could reflect that; "Early on, the problem was a 
lack of considered definitions. Now we suffer from overabundance and too much diversity."0
Any attempt to achieve consensus upon the definition of 'revolution' is hindered by the 
variety, scope and purposes of the models and theories which have been constructed. However, 
T.H. Greene believes that:
It is the almost unanimous opinion of the writers on the subject that 'revolution'...means an 
alteration in the personnel, structure, supporting myths, and functions of government by 
methods which are not sanctioned by prevailing constitutional means. These methods almost 
invariably involve violence or the threat of violence against political elites, citizens, or both. And 
it is the opinion of a majority of scholars that 'revolution' means a relatively abrupt and 
significant change in the distribution of wealth and social status.4
This definition has the merit of contrasting revolution with other, less fundamental, forms of
regime and social transformations. Samuel Huntington, who clearly operates within the
framework outlined above, notes that revolutions are "to be distinguished from insurrections,
rebellions, revolts, coups and wars of independence."5 While one of the latter, or a combination
of them, may be present in a revolution, they are clearly not sufficient to attach the label
'revolution' to a given situation. If the term is to retain any usefulness at all, then its usage must
be restricted to the fundamental changes outlined in Greene's definition.
Theda Skocpol has further refined the term through incorporating Marx's stress on the role of
2H. Eckstein, "On the Etiology of Internal Wars", in G.A. Kelly & C.W. Brown Jr (eds), Struggles in the State: Sources and 
Patterns of World Revolution, J. Wiley & Sons, N X , 1970, p. 172.
3H. Eckstein, "Theoretical Approaches to Explaining Collective Political Violence", in T.R. Gurr (ed), Handbook of 
Political Violence, Free Press, N-Y- , 1980, pp. 136-7. Isaac Kramnick's observation in 1972 still retains validity; "The view 
from the academy is expressed in no single voice; it is a confused, complicated, and untidy set of observations." 
I. Kramnick, "Reflections on Revolution: Definition and Explanation in Recent Scholarship", Historu and Theory, Vol. 2, 
1972, p. 26.
‘T.H. Greene, Comparative Revolutionary Movements, Prentice-Hall, N.J., 1974, p. 8.
sS.P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, Yale, New Haven, 1968, p. 264.
3class conflict. Mass participation 'from below76 becomes an essential characteristic of what 
Skocpol labels 'social revolutions'. While political revolutions involve a transformation in the 
mechanisms and channels of political participation, they do not involve basic social structural 
changes. In contrast, social revolutions;
are rapid, basic transform ations o f a society's state and class structures; and they are accompanied 
and in part carried through by class-based revolts from below. Social revolutions are set apart from  
other sorts of conflicts and transform ative processes above all by the com bination of tw o  
coincidences: the coincidence of societal structural change w ith class upheaval; and the 
coincidence of political w ith social transform ation.6 7
As Skocpol concedes, this limits the term to "relatively few historical instances".8 However, the 
advantage resulting from this rigour is that such instances can be analysed in their historical 
complexity; a feature which is lost if revolutions are subsumed under more 'general' categories 
(such as 'political conflict7, 'internal war7 or 'collective violence7) which tend to abstract events 
from their preconditions in order to increase the frequency of a phenomenon.
One further amendment to the definition of revolution is necessary in order to clarify the 
focus of this thesis. The definitions presented above all tend to stress the outcomes of 
revolutions, rather than the processes which lead to these outcomes. While it is generally correct 
to regard revolutions as processes, there is a danger that such a sweeping generalisation can 
lapse into the realm of meaninglessness. Much depends upon how rigorously one defines the 
rapid and fundamental social change involved in the revolutionary process. There are 
convincing grounds for arguing that the changes which distinguish modem revolutionary 
societies from their pre-revolutionary predecessors were only implemented after revolutionaries 
assumed control over the central administration.9 In other words, the seizure of power was 
only a precondition for the transformation of society. If this is the case, then the definition faces 
the problem of periodising revolutions. When does a revolution begin? And when does it end? 
The dilemma is illustrated in Trotsky's concept of 'permanent revolution7 and Mao's 
'uninterrupted revolution7. The understanding of post-revolutionary development derived 
from Marx (from the German Ideology to The Critique of the Gotha Programme) is unequivocal in 
presenting this development as a continual trancendence of existing social relations. While the 
study of the dynamics of post-revolutionary social change and development remains an 
exciting and controversial field of study in its own right, the focus of this thesis will concentrate 
upon the process and events leading to the assumption of power by the revolutionary 
movement. This helps delineate the universe of discourse. A revolutionary situation emerges 
when an alternative centre of authority challenges the established governmental centre of 
authority, and when this alternative structure possesses sufficient resources and respect from
6The term 'revolution from below' has been employed also by Isaac Deutscher. See I. Deutscher, The Great Conquest, 
Oxford, London, 1960. See also, J. Krejd, Great Revolutions Compared: The Search For A Theory, VVheatsheaf, ,
1983, p. 7.
7T. Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China, Cambridge, N 't , 1979, 
p. 4. (My emphasis)
8Ibid., p. 5.
9See R. Aya, "Popular Intervention in Revolutionary Situations", in C. Bright & S. Harding (eds), Statemaking and Social 
Movements, University of Michigan Press, k»W- , 1984.
4significant sections of the population to threaten the existence of the old regime. A 
revolutionary situation ends once the existing polity successfully undermines this threat, or 
when the alternative challenger succeeds in overthrowing the old regime and establishes a new 
administrative monopoly over the state and means of coercion.
The principle objective of this thesis is to explain why socialist revolutions occur. In other 
words, the object of analysis here is the causes rather than the consequences of social 
revolutions. Taxonomically speaking then, this thesis deals with a species of social revolution 
as defined above; namely socialist revolutions. Morphologically speaking, it deals with the 
period which culminates in the overthrow of old regimes. Etiologically defined, the thesis will 
analyse the contribution of structural and purposive factors to the overthrow of regimes. The 
discussion will now concentrate upon this etiology.
1.2. THEORIES A N D  MODELS OF REVOLUTIONS
The overabundance of theories and models of revolution which have inundated the discipline 
over the previous quarter of a century require classification in order to trace their 
epistemological underpinnings. Chronologically, it is possible to chart the development of 
theories of revolutions by highlighting the dominant trends within the field of study over time. 
In Kuhnian terms, the field has witnessed a succession of paradigms, each replacing a 
previously dominant conceptual model, and each, in time, failing to deal with awkward new 
data, conflicting observations and 'anomalies' . 10
1.2.1. Natural, General and Structural Approaches
Jack Goldstone has argued that the development of theories of revolutions has progressed 
through three 'generations'; the natural, the general and the structural.11 Natural theories have 
also been labelled 'stage' theories of revolutions, due to their attempt to construct a morphology 
of revolution based upon a common sequential pattern through which all cases proceed. The 
most representative work of the natural approach is Crane Brinton's The Anatomy of 
Revolution} 2 Drawing from evidence from the English, American, French and Russian 
revolutions, Brinton identified four stages each case underwent; the rule of the moderates, the 
accession of the extremists, the reign of terror and finally, Thermidor. As the analogy of a fever 
infecting an organism suggests, the theory presents a cyclical progression of stages culminating 
in the re-establishment of normalcy or order.13 Analysis of case studies focuses upon
10See T.H. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago U .P .^ .^ o , 1970.
n See J. Goldstone, "The Comparative and Historical Study of Revolutions", in Annual Review of Sociology, 1982, 8. See 
also J. Goldstone, "Theories of Revolution: The Third Generation", in World Politics, 3 2 ,1980.
12C  Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution, Vintage, N.X , 1965. See also R.D. Hopper, "The Revolutionary Process: A 
Frame of Reference For The Study Of Revolutionary Movements", Social Forces, 28, 1950. For a more recent 
morphological account, see Krejd, op. dt.
r3!t)id., pp. 16-8.
5identifying the stages of the revolutionary process and fitting events into the typology. As 
Greene has observed, this often results "in an unneccessarily artificial arrangement of the 
data."14 Particular revolutions have rarely approximated closely to the ideal type. Furthermore, 
attention is unevenly focused upon post-revolutionary developments, leaving the approach 
open to the attack that "stage theories...have failed to explain why revolutions occur."13 Thus, 
natural theories are ill-suited to the purpose of this work, which explores the causes, rather than 
the consequences, of revolution.16
The second generation of theories identified by Goldstone are labelled general approaches. 
Their origins can be traced to the rather broad framework of 'modernisation' and 'diffusionist' 
theories which dominated U.S. social science during the 1950's and 1960's, and to the empirical 
observation that the process of modernisation in the 'developing7 world was often accompanied 
by acute social conflict. General theories attempted to explain this phenomenon. The 
approaches which are collapsed under this category occupy a wide spectrum of sociological 
perspectives, including socio-psychological approaches of 'relative deprivation', structural 
approaches of 'systems disequilibrium', and political approaches of 'resource mobilisation'.
Relative deprivation (RD) theories begin with the observation that throughout history misery 
and poverty have been an endemic condition for at least some sectors of society. As revolution 
and violence are only episodic features of most societies explanation must transcend the 
common-sense generalisation that 'misery breeds revolt'. Proponents of RD, such as Ted Gurr 
and James Davies, argue that frustration and aggression are likely to be activated under 
conditions of changing expectations.17
For example, contact with other cultures and social systems, or rapid economic change, tend 
to raise peoples expectations. If these expectations remain unfulfilled, for whatever reason, then 
the gap between expectation and fulfillment will increase the propensity of frustration and 
aggression, leading to a potentially violent conflict between elites and non-elites, or authorities 
and their subjects.
According to Davies, the crucial determining factor in explaining revolutions are expectations, 
rather than "the actual state of socio-economic development".18 Yet, as Kramnick observes, 
most attempts to operationalise RD must infer this psychological state from objective, economic
14Greene, op. dt., p. 11.
1SJ~A. Booth, The End and the Beginning: The Nicaraguan Revolution, Westview, Boulder, 1982, p. 3.
I6For a critical application of the Brintonian model to the Cuban and Nicaraguan Revolution, see M. Azird, ’’A Cuban 
Perspective on the Nicaraguan Revolution", in T. Walker (ed), The Nicaraguan Revolution, Praeger, ti .Y. , 1982. pp. 
350-8.
17T.R. Gurr, Why Men Rebel, Princeton, N.J., 1970; J. Davies, ’Towards a Theory of Revolution", American Sociological 
Review, 27, 1962. In Davies terminology, a revolutionary situation emerges when an intolerable gap emerges between 
expected need satisfaction and actual need satisfaction, or between what people want and what people get.
18Davies, op. d t ,  p. 6. As Charles Tilly notes, "...Gurr concentrates upon experiences which happen to individuals, 
and then culminate into mass action" rather than analysing the social processes that activate RD. G Tilly, From 
Mobilization to Revolution, Addison-Wesley, H<i»A.^ l^978, p. 22.
6and political, indicators due to the fact that the approach can rarely produce the empirical 
evidence to validate the existence and significance of individual or widespread feelings of 
deprivation.19 This is admitted by J.A. Booth in his employment of the theory to the 
Nicaraguan Revolution.-0 Booth can merely infer or imply RD from the effect which social, 
economic and political changes must have had upon sections of the community. It is Booth's 
detailed long-range narrative which marks his text as one of the best histories thus far produced 
on the Nicaraguan Revolution, rather than its application of RD theory. Furthermore, as 
Greene argues, RD theory tends towards tautology and non-falsifiability.21 Relative 
deprivation (whether political or economic) does seem to be characteristic of revolutionary 
situations. Yet this simply describes that which needs explanation. Why, for instance, is relative 
deprivation mobilised into revolutionary channels? As Greene notes, aggression against 
authorities is only one possible form RD could assume. Alternative channels of expression or 
'outlets' can include "religious zeal, artistic creation, athletic competition, criminal activity, drug 
or alcohol addiction, and even psychd^ical withdrawal and passivity.”22
Goldstone identifies the 'systems disequilibrium' approach as another sub-species of general 
theories of revolution. This approach is characterised by the work of Chalmers Johnson, who 
adapts the Parsonian, structural-functionalist framework to revolution.23 Johnson argues that a 
social system maintains its stability, or equilibrium, when its matrix of roles, norms and values 
function in a mutually supporting and interactive manner. For the systems (dis)equilibrium 
approach the "point of departure in analysing social change is the model of a functionally 
integrated social system - a system whose members co-operate with each other by 'playing' 
various 'roles' that, taken together, permit the whole system to 'function'."24 Revolutions are a 
response to value disorientation and institutional imbalance between components of the social 
system. In other words, revolutions occur under conditions where various parts of a social 
system are in a state of disequilibrium, or are dysfunctional to the maintenance of order.
Dysfunctional conditions are caused by pressures...that compel the members of a substructure 
to do their work, or view their roles, or imagine their potentialities differently from the way that 
they did under equilibrium conditions.25
For example, periods of rapid economic growth, expanding educational opportunities or 
cultural diffusion, may alter components of a social system. Unless corresponding change 
occurs within the other sub-systems, value-disorientation and institutional disequilibrium will 
generate pressure, raising the potential for conflict between competing value-orientations, or
19See Kramnick, op. d t ,  p. 43.
20Booth, op. dt., p. 218.
^Greene, op. dt., pp. 148-52.
^Ibid., p. 149. See also Kramnick, op. dt., p. 56.
a C  Johnson, Revolution and the Social System, The Hoover Institution , 1964.
24Ibid., p. 4.
^Ibid., p. 5.
7the delegitimation of 'intransigent elites' . 26 Revolutions are a resyncronisation of institutions 
and values through violent change. Thus, in contrast to the RD model, the focus of Johnson's 
work is macro-cosmic rather than micro-cosmic, although much attention is devoted to the 
governing elites who 'operate' the 'social machine' . 27 While he argues that equilibrium is not a 
"real condition" but an "ideal-type construct" used as a reference for measuring change, the 
underlying Durkheimian emphasis upon consensus leads to a radical dichotomy between 
routine and non-routine forms of action and stresses social homeostatic equilibrium.28 While 
sharing many similarities with the Marxian emphasis upon structure, the Johnsonian model 
assumes conflict to be an abnormal, or pathological, condition.29 Following Jaroslav Krejd, the 
explanation of revolution in this thesis will acknowledge as a point of departure "the fact of 
social change", rather than any mentally constructed "societal equilibrium" and its 
disturbance.30
Rod Aya has pointed to the neo-Durkheimian influence behind both RD theory and systems 
disequvhlx’ium theory, and has criticised both on three other counts. Firstly, the 'state' is 
insufficiently distinguished from 'society', leaving the political processes of revolutionary 
mobilisation in obscurity. Power relations, control over state institutions and political 
mobilisation are conspicuously absent in these 'volcanic' theories of revolutionary eruptions. 
Secondly, and relatedly, there is a tendency to reify society, leading to "the strange case of the 
absconded actor”. Relatively little importance is attached to the investigation or identification of 
the specific groups and classes which are frustrated by change, and which mobilise to defend or 
represent their collective interests. Both approaches tend to ignore the social composition of the 
revolutionary mass. Thirdly, there is a "two-fold leap of faith" underlying both approaches; 
"from social change to mass anger, and from mass anger to collective violence". Unless these
26The equation reads "Multiple dysfunction plus elite intransigence plus X equals revolution", where X equals 
'accelerators'. Ibid., p. 12. "Social violence is the appropriate response to intransigent resistance; it occurs because 
known methods of non-violent change are blocked by the ruling elite....Of course, if the elite is not intransigent, simple 
change will occur, dysfunction will be relieved, and no revolution will take place." Ibid., p. 6.
27On this point Bill Brugger and Kate Hannan make the following observation. "Stripped of its bare essentials, 
Johnson's account is not a theory of revolution at all. It is an elaborate, and at times highly sophisticated, taxonomy of 
factors one needs to take into account if one is to explain revolution, assuming of course that the basic axiom about 
social function holds. Such a taxonomy could only become a theory if one was told what determines the successful or 
unsuccessful response of the governing elite. Alas, all we have is a blueprint for the social machine and the hope that the 
engineer will be intelligent enough to know how to operate it. Presumably the modernisation which engenders multiple 
dysfunctions also improves the ability of an elite to overcome them. The trouble arises when one considers that the 
engineer is, in fact, part of the blueprint.” B. Brugger &c K. Hannan, Modernisation and Revolution, Croom Helm, London, 
1983, p.34. (My emphasis).
^Ibid, p. 92. Both RD theory and systems disequilibrium theory reflect Merton's influential argument in "Social 
Structure and Anomie". The stability of a social structure requires a conformity to both cultural goals and institutional 
means. An imbalance in this relationship will lead to a variety of deviant behaviour, the most acute being "rejection and 
substitution of new goals and standards", or "rebellion". Although Merton's paper was not primarily concerned with 
this form of adjustment, its application can be discerned in both the theories examined above. See R. Merton, "Social 
Structure and Anomie", American Sociological Review, Vol. 3, 1938. For Durkheim's influence on RD theory, see 
K. Thomson, Emile Dürkheim, Tavistock, London, 1982, p. 85.
23See L. Stone, "Theories of Revolution", World Politics, Vol. 18, 1965, pp. 160-1, pp. 166-7, and Kramnick, op. dt., for 
critiques. For an interesting attempt to combine the Marxian model with the concept of 'equilibrium' see F. Parkin, 
"System Contradiction and Political Transformation", Archives Enropeennes de Sociologie, 13,1972.
30Krejd, op. dt., p. 3.
8leaps can be made intelligible, the approaches are reduced to tautology.31
An attempt to overcome these problems is provided by the third sub-species of general theory 
identified by Goldstone. A representative example of the approach is Charles Tilly's work From 
Mobilization to Revolution. This approach focuses attention upon political factors, primarily the 
balance of power between an established 'polity7 and one or more 'contenders'. In opposition to 
the systems disequilibrium approach, Tilly's epistemological underpinnings borrow heavily 
from Marx rather than Dürkheim.32 Conflict is viewed as an integral and logical feature of a 
social system. However, a revolutionary situation can only arise under conditions where 
challengers are able to mobilise a significant section of the population under a competing claim 
for control over the state, and where the existing polity is unwilling or unable to suppress this 
claim effectively. Tilly refers to this condition of 'multiple sovereignty' as the "identifying 
feature of revolutionary situations."33 This begins when "...a government previously under the 
control of a single, sovereign polity becomes the object of effective, competing, mutually 
exclusive claims on the part of two or more distinct polities. It ends when a single sovereign 
polity regains control over the government."34 Tilly's concentration upon political mobilisation 
and organisation distinguishes his approach from theories of relative deprivation and systems 
disequilibrium alike. He claims that:
Despite the many recent attempts to psychologize the study of revolutions by introducing ideas 
of anxiety, alienation, raising expectations, and the like, and to sociologize it by emphasizing 
notions of disequilibrium, role conflict, structural strain, and so on, the factors which hold up 
under close scrutiny are, on the whole political ones. The structure of power, alternative 
conceptions of justice, the organization of coercion, the conduct of war, the formation of 
coalitions, the legitimacy of the state - these traditional concerns of political thought provide the 
main guides to the explanation of revolutions.35
Consequently, Tilly succeeds in transcending the problems of RD theory through introducing 
political mobilisation and organisation, yet still tends to abstract the process of revolution from 
Johnson's emphasis upon social structure.
While Tilly's approach may seem at odds with those of Gurr and Johnson, all three share a set 
of commonalities when viewed through the theoretical lens of the third generation of theories 
of revolutions identified by Goldstone; the structuralist approach. For example, Theda Skocpol, 
in States and Social Revolutions, has criticised all the above three approaches for overemphasizing
31R. Aya, "Theories of Revolution Reconsidered: Contrasting Models of Collective Violence", Theory and Society, 8, 
1979, pp. 65-6, 75.
32A s Tilly states, his approach is "doggedly anti-Durkheimian, resolutely pro-Marxist, but sometimes indulgent to 
Weber and sometimes reliant on Mill." Tilly, op. dt., p. 48. However, Lynn Hunt has argued that Tilly's long-standing 
battle with 'the ghost of Dürkheim' is more complex, and that his agenda is 'fundamentally similar' to Durkheim's. 
L. Hunt, "Charles Tilly's Collective Action", in T. Skocpol (ed), Vision and Method in Historical Sociology, Cambridge, 
• W  , 1985. pp. 249-50.
^Ibid., p. 191. Similarly, Peter Amann defines revolution in terms of 'competing power blocs'. Revolutions "may be 
said to be a breakdown, momentarily or prolonged, of the state's monopoly of power, usually accompanied by a 
lessening of the habit of obedience." P. Amann, "Revolution: A Redefinition", Political Sconce Quarterly, 77, 1962. p. 38. 
Rod Aya's works dted above also fall within the 'political mobilisation' framework.
^Ibid., p. 191.
35C. Tilly, "Does Modernization Breed Revolution?", Comparative Politics, No. 3, 1973, p. 47. See also, Tilly, From 
Mobilization to Revolution, p. 201.
9'purposive' factors in their explanations of revolution. Revolutions, she argues, cannot be 
accounted for in terms of values, motivations, and the mobilisation of actors conscious of their 
collective self-interest. Revolutions are not made by revolutionary agents; they emerge. Adopting 
an "impersonal and non-subjective viewpoint"36 she attempts to locate the causes of social 
revolutions in certain patterned relationships between structurally related classes and the state. 
De-emphasising value disorientation, relative deprivation and resource mobilisation as over- 
voluntaristic, Skocpol's level of analysis stresses deeper social processes involving the 
international structure of nation-states, and internal rural relationships between peasants, 
landed propertied elites and the state. Skocpol thus questions Marxist and non-Marxist 
approaches alike, although her analysis retains Marx's concern with class conflict. She presents 
two important challenges to Marxist theories of revolution. Firstly, she rejects the notion that 
revolutions are the result of the self-conscious activity of rising social classes. Secondly, she 
argues that state structures are potentially autonomous from class interests. This goes beyond 
structural Marxist positions, such as that of Poulantzas, which argue that the state is relatively 
autonomous, mediating among social classes in order to ensure the reproduction of a given set 
of social relations.
A comprehensive critique of Skocpol will be undertaken below. The fundamental question 
which must be asked is whether or not a non-purposive, structuralist approach is sufficient to 
provide an understanding of the causes and nature of socialist revolutions. To begin with, this 
thesis questions the notion that third generation theories of revolution are necessarily 
incompatible with some of the second generation theories. In particular, it argues that Skocpol's 
and Tilly's approaches are not mutually exclusive. Their apparent differences can be 
understood, to a large extent, through the different research problems which inform their 
analysis. As Daniel Bell observed, "One's purpose dictates one's perspective”.37 While Skocpol 
is concerned with the question "Why do old orders break down?", Tilly is primarily concerned 
with asking "How do challengers mobilise, and why are they able to succeed?" Both questions 
are legitimate problems for theorists of revolution.
Despite this difference, a similar methodological thread runs through both Skocpol's and 
Tilly's analysis, distinguishing them from RD and systems disequilibrium theories. This is the 
central role assigned to class conflict and the role of the state as a centre for mobilising 
resources. Relating to Goldstone's chronological analysis of theories of revolution, this thesis 
will suggest that by taking one generational step backwards, it is possible to take two steps 
forward.
S k ocp o l, op. dt., p. 18.
37D. Bell, 'Ten Theories in Search of Reality: The Prediction of Soviet Behaviour”, in Trie End of Ideology, Free Press, 
N.Y., 1962, p. 339.
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1.2.2. Inherency and Contingency
Before engaging in a critique of the structuralist perspective, one reservation must be 
registered concerning attempts to chart the development of theories of revolutions. This form of 
classification tends to obscure a range of fundamental differences which exist within 
generations. For instance, general theories only appear as a single species when viewed through 
the lens of the structuralist perspective. The range of concepts operationalised in the literature 
suggests that, depending upon the approach adopted, the theoretical debate could revolve 
around any number of sets of conflicting key variables. According to the purpose, this "fateful 
choice"38 will determine the framework of the debate. Thus, following Weber, an 
acknowledgement must be made that according to the value-reference adopted,39 the fundamental 
problem in the study of revolutions will proceed along only one of a number of possible courses.
For instance, while there appears to be a contradiction between Skocpol's structuralism and 
Tilly's more purposive approach of collective action, both share similarities when examined 
against Gun's or Johnson's approach. This latter theoretical dichotomy can be illustrated by 
employing Harry Eckstein's concept of 'problemation'. He defines problemation as "the 
discovery of the most fundamental problem requiring solution if a progressive development of 
theory about a subject is to occur."40 According to Eckstein, the "branch point", or problemation, 
in theorising revolutions lies in the choice between contingency and inherency in political life. 
According to Eckstein:
Something is contingent if its occurrence depends upon the presence of unusual (we might say 
aberrant) conditions that occur accidently - conditions that involve a large component of chance... 
Contingency implies 'non-routine', something out of the ordinary, something not understood 
without special explanation.
On the other hand:
... something is inherent either if it will always happen (e.g., entropy) or if the potentiality for it 
always exists and actuality can only be obstructed.41
An example of the contingency/inherency problemation within the social sciences is the debate 
between Paul Sweezy and Maurice Dobb over the transition from feudalism to capitalism.42 
While Dobb places primary emphasis upon internal contradictions between direct producers 
and their overlords in order to explain the breakdown of feudalism, Paul Sweezy argues that 
Dobb "mistakes for immanent trends certain historical developments which in fact can only be 
explained as arising from causes external to the (feudal) system."43 The contingent factor which 
Sweezy points to is the growth of trade and markets, a feature which was not inherent within 
the system. In other words, does social change originate within 'the womb of the old'
•^Eckstein, op. d t ,  p. 138.
39For a discussion on wertbeziehung see R. Aron, Main Currents in Sociological Thought: 2, Pelican, 1974, pp.
193-202.
^Eckstein, op. dt., p. 135.
41 Ibid., pp. 138-9.
42See P. Sweezy, M. Dobb et al., The Transition From Feudalism to Capitalism, Kenion, London, 1954.
"Ibid., p. 7.
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(inherency), or is it a consequence of factors imposed from outside the logic of the system 
(contingency)?
This tension between inherency and contingency can be found within the framework of 
general theories of revolutions. Thus Eckstein identifies Gurr's approach as a contingency 
perspective and Tilly's as an inherency approach.44 Most theories which operate with the 
concept of modernisation or cultural and economic diffusion can also be classified as 
contingency approaches. In these cases the emphasis is placed upon contact with exogenous 
forces, which are viewed as principal factors promoting disequilibrium, value disorientation 
and relative deprivation. In other words, revolution is not viewed primarily as part of the logic 
of the social system.
While these 'sociological' theories examine revolution as a particular response arising from 
the problems of rapid social change generated by modernisation, there are more simplistic 
contingency approaches which stress the role of external political actors. For example, 'domino' 
theories, by their very analogy, suggest that a society will remain homeostatic unless an 
impetus is provided from external sources. A contemporary version of the thesis (described by 
a critic, Allan Naim, as the 'umbilical cord' theory of revolutions45) has been applied to 
revolutionary developments in Central America and the Caribbean. According to this approach, 
revolutions are the result of external ("extra-hemispheric'’) influences centred on Moscow. The 
theory views the Cuban Revolution as the dependent child of the Soviet Union, which, in time, 
nurtures the Nicaraguan Revolution, and so on. The foreign policy implications of the theory 
are clear. If the spread of revolution is to be halted, then the umbilical cord of arms supply, 
sanctuary and external subversion must be cut before Nicaragua gives birth to a totalitarian El 
Salvador. Thus while some sociological theories of revolution stress abstract, impersonal, 
contingent processes and forces, more simplistic political contingency theorists stress external 
actors. For Jeanne Kirkpatrick, the deeper historical forces emphasised by modernisation 
theorists such as Samuel Huntington in reality "look alot like Russians and Cubans."46
The contingency/inherency framework is also implicit in A.S. Cohan's attempt to categorise 
theories of revolution. Cohan devotes his attention to four approaches; the Marxist, the 
Functionalist, Mass Society and Psychological. However, Cohan observes that the latter three 
all share one fundamental similarity in relation to the Marxist approach. While Marxism 
analyses revolutions as normal developments of societal transformation ("because they resolve 
the basic contradictions that are inbuilt into social arrangements"47), the remaining perspectives 
reject the notion of the inevitability of revolution and that inbuilt contradictions are contained
^Eckstein, op. dt., pp. 144-9.
45See A. Naim, "Endgame", NACLA'S Report on the Americas, May/June 1984.
^J. Kirkpatrick, "Dictatorships and Double Standards", Commentary, Nov. 1979, p. 40. Other examples which apply 
this form of contingency approach can be found in G. Fauriol (ed), Latin American Insurgencies, N.D.U., U.S.A., 1985; and 
D.L. Bark (ed),77ie Red Orchestra, The Hoover Institution,^ ^ ^ ^  1986.
4'Cohan, op. dt., p. 1.
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within social systems.45 The contingency/inherency framework can also be understood as a 
manifestation of the consensus/conflict controversy within social philosophy. The sociological 
origins of the former can be traced to Dürkheim, while the latter can be traced to Marx. In terms 
of the theories of revolution examined above, Gurr's approach can be viewed as a contingency 
theory, derived from Dürkheim, while Skocpol and Tilly's approaches are inherency theories, 
derived from Marx. Theorists can either stress the inherent stability of a social system, or its 
inherent instability. This in turn will influence whether or not revolutionary causation appears 
inherent or contingent.49
However, while Eckstein's problemation demonstrates that certain theoretical positions cross­
cut Goldstone's chronological account of theories of revolution, there are difficulties in 
employing inherency and contingency as the fundamental antithetical variables. Firstly, even 
within paradigms, it is possible to discover differences over the relative merits of inherent and 
contingent factors (even through the <k\>ates are not framed in these terms). For example, while 
Marxism has been classified above as an inherency perspective, controversy has been generated 
within the paradigm periodically over the role of contingent forces. For instance, during the 
Russian Civil War, the Bolshevik Tukhachevsky constructed the theory of 'revolution from 
without'. However, the disastrous end to the Bolsheviks' Polish campaign in 1920 robbed his 
thesis of any appeal.50 The debate which emerged within the Fourth International after the 
Second World War over the status of the Soviet 'buffer' states can also be traced to the question 
of 'revolution from without'.01 Furthermore, the controversy which Che Guevara's foco strategy 
aroused during the 1960's also revolved around the contingency/inherency problemation.02
Chalmers Johnson's approach is also difficult to categorise using Eckstein's problemation. He 
records four factors contributing to revolution, two which are inherent and two contingent. 
These are exogenous and endogenous value-changing sources, and exogenous and endogenous 
environment-changing sources.53 In addition, he also includes 'accelerators', events which 
provide added impetus to underlying causes of revolution.54
" I^bid., pp. 1-3.
49Colin Leys has phrased the debate in the following way. "For historical materialism, the question of whether a 
revolution can or will occur in a given society at a given moment, and what its significance or historical 'content' may 
be, is always a problem of analysing the development of the contradictions to which the existing mode of production 
gives rise, and their expression in class struggles; whereas for Huntington, revolutions are merely pathological modes 
of restoring order." C. Leys, "Samuel Huntington and the End of Classical Modernization Theory", in H. Alavi & 
T. Shanin (eds), Introduction to the Sociology of 'Developing Societies', Macmillan, v.«k\<W>1982, p. 346.
3°See M. Tukhachevsky, "Revolution From Without", New Left Review, 55,1969, pp. 91-7.
3lSee P. Beilis, Marxism and the USSR: The Theory of Proletarian Dictatorship and the Marxist Analysis of Soviet Society, 
Macmillan, London, 1979.
32This debate will be dealt with in greater detail in Chapter 5.
53See C  Johnson, Revolutionary Change, Little Brown,'BofAotx, 1966, p. 27.
^ ’The metaphor which best describes our present understanding of accelerators is the heart patient who 
unexpectedly contracts pneumonia - a disease that a healthy man can normally survive - and who then succumbs from 
the combined effects of the two." Johnson, Revolution and the Social System, p. 13.
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Another problem which arises from employing Eckstein's problemation concerns the 
parameters of the social system under investigation. Different approaches adopt varving 
systemic units of analysis. For example, while modernisation approaches focus upon the nation­
state, Skocpol speaks of an 'international states' system.05  Certain events originating outside 
the nation-state can still be inherent, according to Skocpol's approach. Thus inherency becomes 
a very 'flexible' concept, conditioned by the approach adopted. In this sense, Skocpol is closer to 
World Systems Analysis than modernisation theory. World Systems Analysis, which emerged 
as a response to the modernisation approach,56 criticizes the atomistic use of the nation-state as 
a unit of analysis for development, replacing it with the broader, world-holistic concept of the 
world capitalist system. Given this focal theoretical shift, many international factors which 
would be considered contingent by modernisation theorists, become inherent from the 
perspective of Skocpol and World Systems Analysts due to their broader systemic unit of 
analysis.
To conclude, while Eckstein's problemation helps explain a range of theoretical differences, its 
utility is restricted by the 'flexibility' of the concept of inherency. In the next section, an 
alternative problemation for theories of revolutions will be advanced, namely structure versus 
agency. Skocpol's work can be seen as representative of the structural approach and Tilly's the 
purposive. For this reason, the following discussion will focus upon their work.
1.2.3. Structure and Agency
Throughout all areas of social science the structure/agency problemation has generated 
theoretical controversy. As Eckstein noted in an early article this controversy can be found 
within approaches to revolutionary causation.37 However, as noted above, it was the 
structuralist paradigm which elevated the structure/agency problemation to the fundamental 
issue, through its conscious rejection of purposive factors in its model of revolution. Charles 
Tilly (accused by Skocpol of representing a purposive approach) also identifies the 
structure/agency problemation as fundamental to theories of revolution in his book From 
Mobilisation to Revolution.
Tilly posed the problem in the following terms:
In the realm of collective action, it is hard to build causal models which give serious attention to 
the interests, grievances and aspirations of actors. It is also hard to build purposive models 
which specify the constraints limiting the pursuit of interests, grievances and aspirations.
So why not try a synthesis? Why not combine causal models of constraints with purposive 
models of choices among competing courses of action? The synthesis is surprisingly difficult.38
^Skocpol, op. dt., p. 23.
s6See I. Wallerstein, The Modem World System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World System in the 
Sixteenth Century, Academic Press, N.Y., 1974.
j7Eckstein, "Etiology...", p. 181.
^Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution, p. 6.
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Tilly attempts this synthesis in his book, but only partially succeeds. However, this is due, not 
to any fundamental flaw in his approach, but in the 'short-to-medium' time-span he adopts. 
Skocpol, on the other hand, attempts to purge purposive factors in an endeavour to build a 
structural model of revolution. This can only be accomplished through adopting a longer' 
time-scale than Tilly.09
The strength of the structuralist framework lies in its emphasis upon the long-term' processes 
which generate a revolutionary crisis. However, Skocpol has little to say concerning 'short­
term' processes and events which lead from the crises of regimes to their overthrow by a 
particular challenger. To employ an incendiary analogy (which, along with disease and 
obstetrics, dominates the literature on revolution) Booth has located the moment at which a 
structuralist perspective must give way to purposive considerations.
A warehouse full of cardboard does not become a four-alarm fire until flame touches paper. 
Indeed, many warehouses full of cardboard or even more flammable items never burn at all 
because nothing sets them off. Likewise, many societies have experienced intensely the 
preconditions or basic stresses that create great revolutionary potential, but they have not 
undergone a revolution or even an attempted revolt.60
Poking through the ashes, the 'purposive investigator' is suspicious of spontaneous
combustion, while the 'structuralist investigator' dismisses arson.
Tilly is conscious of this tension, yet concentrates his analysis upon the short-to-medium 
time-span. As the title of his book suggests, he begins with the process of challenger 
mobilisation, for, as he explicitely states, "we are assuming interests and dealing with the 
political processes which lead from organized and conflicting interests to revolution."61 
Skocpol, on the other hand, is able to illuminate the longer-term objective conditions upon 
which these interests are based.
Tilly's discussion of time-span is informative, and deserves to be quoted in full, due to the 
opportunity it provides to synthesize structural and purposive factors into a rounded 
understanding of modem revolutions.
In general, how does the displacement of one set of power holders by another happen? The 
answer depends in part on the time perspective we adopt. In the short run, the answer concerns 
tactics and balance of forces... In the medium run, we arrive at the considerations which have 
dominated this book: the presence of mobilized contenders in effective coalitions... It is in the 
medium run that the creation or emergence of a revolutionary situation contributes to - and may 
be essential to - a revolutionary outcome. Without the appearance of multiple sovereignty a 
significant transfer of power is either impossible or highly unlikely.
In the long run, interests and organization begin to tell. In this book, we have faced the 
challenge of long-run analysis only intermittently, through quick glimpses of proletarianization,
39While Tilly's purposive model stresses predpitants, Skocpol's model stresses preconditions. Eckstein's own analogy 
to describe the distinction between the two options is revealing, in that it demonstrates the underlying 
structure/agency dilemma. "A 'precipitant' of internal war is an event which actually starts the war (occasions it) much 
as turning the flintwheel of a cigarette lighter ignites the tlame. 'Preconditions' of internal war, on the other hand, are 
those circumstances which make it possible for the participants to bring about political violence, as the general structure 
of the lighter makes it possible to produce a flame by turning the flintwheel.” Eckstein, op. dt., p. 175. (My emphasis). 
Note the use of an active verb in describing predpitants.
^Booth, op. dt., p. 5.
61Tilly, op. dt., p. 200. This tension between structure and agency in Tilly's work is noted by Hunt, op. dt., pp. 246-8.
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the development of capitalism, state-making, urbanization, and industrialization. The quick 
glim pses have, however, been graphic enough to communicate the fundamental importance of 
threatened class interests. Over the long run, the reorganization of production creates the chief 
historical actors, the main constellation of interests, the basic threat to those interests, and the 
principal conditions for transfers of power.62
Tilly dearly does not ignore the role of structural factors in generating revolutionary 
situations. However, his value-orientation concerns how forms of collective action are 
manifested, and this necessarily abstracts "away from structural transformation", as Skocpol 
observes.63 This thesis argues that these concerns highlighted by Tilly and Skocpol are not 
mutually exdusive. In order to grasp the dynamics and nature of modem revolutions it is 
essential that the structure, constraint and the internal contradictions of polities and 
international relations be complemented with agency, choice and the mobilisation and 
organisation of contenders for power.64
Through the sodology of comparative historical analysis, it is possible to grasp the dynamics 
of particular revolutionary processes in all their unfolding complexity while constructing a 
more abstract model of the factors which contribute to sodalist revolutions. This involves a 
perspective which recognises the mutual interaction of preconditions and precipitants, 
insurgents and incumbents, and inherent social process with contingent circumstances. These, it 
will be argued, can best be rendered intelligible, through constantly retaining an awareness of 
the dialectical relationship between structure and agency. In this manner, it is possible to fulfil 
Skocpol's intention of "developing explanations of revolutions that are at once historically 
grounded and generalizable beyond unique cases."60
1.3. A CRITIQUE OF SKOCPOL'S STRUCTURALISM
This review of the theoretical literature on revolutions highlights the underlying tensions 
between the range of theories. Furthermore, in terms of the value-reference of this thesis, it has 
been argued that the structural/purposive dilemma (which has been emphasized by 
Goldstone's third generation of theories) can be understood in terms of the questions which are 
posed and the time-frames utilised in the approaches. Tilly and Skocpol, who both operate 
within an inherency perspective, represent the tension which can be found within Marx's 
famous statement in the 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte that: "Men make their own history, but 
they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by
“ Ibid., pp. 19S4.
“ Skocpol, op. cit., p. 13. See also p. 5 (fn6). See also, Tilly, op. dt., p. 229.
^Aya makes a similar point after acknowledging the valuable contribution Skocpol's structuralism makes to the 
understanding of the collapse of the old regime. He argues that her structuralism requires two 'supplements'; namely 
"...a careful trace of the various pathways to multiple sovereignty - in particular, the intricate rivalries, maneuvers, and 
realignments of governing groups whose failed consensus opened the door the revolutionaries ran through; and 
systematic analysis of the power struggles that intercede between the crackup of the old and the establishment of a new 
regime." He condudes, "Doubtless enlightened by sodological scrutiny, these political processes do not submit to 
sociological reduction." Aya, op. dt., p. 78. See also Aya, "Popular Intervention...", pp. 332-3.
“ Skocpol, op. dt., p. 6.
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themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the 
past."66 The development of a model of modem social revolutions must remain sensitive to the 
questions posed, and the time-frames adopted, by both Tilly and Skocpol.
If this is accepted, then theoretical progress can be accomplished through modifying the 
models developed by structuralists such as Skocpol and Ellen Trimberger.67 Modification will 
involve stepping back a generation in order to incorporate purposive variables into a historical 
comparative analysis of modem revolutions. This will inject meaning into the structuralists' 
process. Apart from the introduction of agency into the model, addition problems will be raised 
in examining Skocpol's model, including the 'weighting7 she attaches to specific variables, such 
as the autonomous role of the state, rural class relations and the international scenario.
1.3.1. The Structuralist Framework
Skocpol's structuralism places primacy upon the emergence of a revolutionary crisis, rather 
than its m a k i n g Consequently, focus is directed towards the inherent processes of social 
change which contribute to the disintegration of old regimes. A healthy scepticism is clearly 
demonstrated towards voluntaristic and free will accounts of revolution.
Skocpol identifies three main weaknesses in purposive explanations.69 These, she argues, can 
be dicovered within the 'general' theories of Gurr, Johnson and Tilly. Furthermore, she observes 
that purposive tendencies are apparent in the various forms of modem Marxism. The first 
weakness concerns the underlying assumption that a societal order rests upon the maintenance 
of consensus by a majority of the population, and that a sufficient condition for revolution is the 
withdrawal of this consensual support. This assumption, argues Skocpol, is naive if one 
considers the proliferation throughout history of regimes which rest their basis of domination 
upon coercion and repression. A second weakness with purposive explanations involves their 
focus upon the activity of revolutionary movements and revolutionary classes. However, the 
reality of historical revolutions has involved the participation of multiple classes, rather than a 
single class. Skocpol argues that analysis should be focused upon conflict between elites as well 
as between elites and non-elites. Revolutions are far more complex than a single, determinant 
conflict between a contradictory set of 'fundamental' classes.
Thirdly, vanguards and revolutionary movements have never created the crises which they 
have eventually exploited. These situations have "developed due to the emergence of politico- 
military crises of state and class domination. And only because of the possibilities thus created
^K. Marx & F. Engels, Selected Works: Vol. 1, Progress, Moscow, 1969, p. 398.
67VVhile the first chapter of States and Social Revolutions is a cogent presentation of the stucturalist position, attention 
should also be drawn to the shorter description in T. Skocpol & E.K. Trimberger, "Revolutions: A Structuralist 
Analysis", in J.A. Goldstone (ed), Revolutions: Theoretical, Comparative, and Historical Studies, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 
itoOucy. 1986.
S k ocp o l, op. cat., p. 18. 
^Ibid., pp. 14-8.
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have revolutionary leaderships and rebellious masses contributed to the accomplishment of 
revolutionary transformations."/0 Skocpol goes one step further, arguing that "rebellious masses 
have quite often acted on their own, without being directly organized or ideologically inspired 
by avowedly revolutionary leaders or goals."71 This contentious issue in theories of modem 
socialist revolutions will be examined below.
However, the outlines of Skocpol's approach are clearly structural and anti-purposive. She 
refers to Hobsbawm's statement that "the evident importance of the actors in the drama does 
not mean that they are also dramatist, producer and stage-designer." It is the stage-design that 
Skocpol's stucturalism highlights. In fact, the elaborate stage-design tends to obscure the actors 
on the stage. As Hobsbawm concludes, "theories which overstress voluntaristic or subjective 
elements in revolution, are to be treated with caution."72 The operative word here is overstress. 
Skocpol deals with the stuctural/agency controversy within the social sciences through 
minimising or rejecting agency as a crucial factor in her account of social revolution.
This thesis will demonstrate that purposive factors are essential components of any adequate 
understanding of the causes of socialist revolutions. A dialectic between structure and agency 
must be reintroduced into a theoretical model of revolution. While purposive factors cannot be 
reduced to structural factors, structure is implicated in the purposive. In other words, 
voluntarism and free will should not be substituted for Skocpol's structuralism. As Michael 
Taylor has pointed out in his critique of Skocpol, to deny all explanatory power to the 
structuralist position does not automatically involve embracing methodological 
individualism.73 However, the cognition, perception and praxis of social actors must be 
constantly interrelated with the structural constraints and openings found within a social system 
at any given time. These purposive factors are never as unproblematic as Skocpol would like 
them to appear.74 As Skocpol observes, revolutionary outcomes have usually been at odds with 
the intentions of successful revolutionary parties. However, to stress unintended consequences 
is to miss the point in explaining revolutions. This phenomenon should not obscure the
70Ibid„ p. 17.
71 Ibid., p 17.
^Ibid., p. 18.
73M. Taylor, "Rationality and Revolutionary Collective Action", in M. Taylor (ed), Rationality and Revolution, 
Cambridge, U.K., 1988, pp. 93-6. On the question of methodological individualism and its relationship to Marxism, see 
A. Przeworski, "Marxism and Rational Choice", Politics and Society, 14, No. 3,1985, esp., p. 400.
74Andrew Metcalfe has recently provided a useful analogy to describe the relationship between structure and agency. 
"Considered historically, social structures are more like the banks and sandbars of a river than a buildings foundations 
or a body's skeleton. Built up and cut out by the rivers daily flow, they nontheless shape and divert the flow. At any 
moment the river must contend with the fixed obstacles (though it is not necessarily forced by them into one channel), 
but the structures are simultaneously altered by the rivers flow. At any time the flow and the structure have certain 
characteristics which can be described and analysed, but the river can only be understood if the flow and structure are 
considered historically and dialectically.” A. Metcalfe, For Freedom and Dignity, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1988, p. 13.
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problem of explaining what moves people to act in the first place/ 3
An adequate understanding of the causes and nature of socialist revolutions can best be 
advanced through recognising that social forces operate on a number of different levels. A 
degree of synchronicity between structural and purposive factors is required for the success of 
any revolution. Structural factors have contributed to each profound social revolution. 
However, in order to render intelligible the success of socialist movements from these revolutionary 
crises it is imperative to explore social forces on the purposive level. As James Petras notes, 
socialist revolutions "in the twentieth century have unfolded as complex processes decisively 
dependent upon the emergence and growth of a revolutionary political organisation." '6 As 
Skocpol argues, the demise of old regimes is not an automatic response to the withdrawal of 
legitimacy or hegemony (if such ever existed). While this may be an important contributing 
factor, the emergence and growth of a contender is crucial. As Przeworski points out:
What matters for the stability of any regime is not the legitimacy of this particular system of 
domination but the presence or absence of preferable alternatives. A regime does not collapse 
until some alternative is organised in such a way as to present a real choice for isolated 
individuals.77
Given this, greater attention must be placed upon the conditions promoting the emergence of 
the contending partner in a situation of 'multiple sovereignty', or what Peter Amann has called 
competing 'power blocs'.78 The revolutionary party or movement must discover and exploit 
space within a given series of political relationships before harnessing and accumulating social 
forces within social classes in accordance with an understanding of the dynamics of, and 
contradictions within, a social system.
The 'purposive' social movement or party must operate upon two interrelated levels. These 
will be labelled throughout this thesis as the ideological and the organisational. Ideologically, the 
movement must develop an understanding of the peculiarities of the dynamics of social 
development within the social structure and delineate between the forces with an interest in 
maintaining the existing system, and those with an interest in transcending the system. Social 
actors are not merely hearers' or 'carriers' of structural change. Nor should structure be viewed
75Skocpol, op. dt., p. 171. Max Weber ends his classic work with a similar observation. See M. Weber, The Protestant 
Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Allen and Unwin, 1978, pp. 18Q-3. Lenin's last writings are full of
observations on the unintended consequences of revolution, while retaining the important role of agency in creating the 
revolution. See M. Lewin, Lenin's Last Struggle, Faber and Faber, Lo.-^c-ix, 1969; and V.I. Lenin, "Our Revolution: 
Notes Apropos Sukkanov", in V.I. Lenin, Collected Works: Vol. 33, Progress, Moscow, 1977, p. 476-9.
76J. Petras, "dass Components of Sodalist Revolutions, New Left Review, 111, 1978. See also J. Petras, "Towards a 
Theory of Twentieth Century Sodalist Revolutions”, in Journal of Contemporary Asia, Vol. 8, No. 2,1978.
"^Quoted in H-W. Krumwiede, "Regimes and Revolution in Central America", in W. Grabendorff et. al. (eds), Political 
Change in Central America: Internal and External Dimensions, Westview, Boulder, 1984, p. 17.
/8See Amann, op. dt. As Charles Tilly comments, ’’In order to produce multiple sovereignty, and thus become 
revolutionary, commitments to some alternative daimant must be activated in the face of prohibitions or contrary 
directives from the government...The presence of a coherent revolutionary organization makes a great difference at 
exactly this point. An organization facilitates the initial seizure of control, spreads the news, activates the commitments 
already made by specific men." Tilly, op. dt., p. 208.
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simply as a factor of constraint determining the limits or parameters of action. '9 The success of 
a revolution is premised upon the ability of a social movement or party to organise and channel 
the activity of structurally located groups and classes towards its social Vision' . 80 This must be 
achieved in conjunction with the ability to exploit any structural contraditions within a 
hegemonistic bloc.81 Structural revolutionary crises do not always, in fact rarely, result in 
profound revolutionary outcomes. In order to explain the success of modem socialist 
movements it is necessary to view revolution not only as a social process generated by inherent 
structural contradictions, but also as an art, derived from an understanding drawn by 
revolutionary organisations of the balances of political and military power.82 This feature of 
revolutionary situations was stressed by both Lenin and Trotsky.83 As Carlos Vilas points out; 
"It is the articulation of the masses into a revolutionary political organisation that opens up the 
possibility of effective struggle, and provides a transformational potential to popular rebellions 
and protests."84 Himmelstein and Kimmel have pointed to Skocpol's minimisation of these 
factors, and its consequence for her model of revolution:
...even if Skocpol is correct about the relationship between structural conditions and 
revolutionary outcomes, her analysis is incomplete. She ignores the mediating factors - human 
consciousness and action - that are always part of the story and sometimes crucial to it. Or more 
precisely, she simply assumes that the appropriate actors are always there, waiting to perform 
the role required by structural conditions - peasants ever ready to make massive uprisings and 
marginal elites ever ready to consolidate power. She rarely regards their response to structural 
conditions as problematic, and thus she systematically undervalues the role of ideology, political
79This corresponds with Giddens rejection of "the identification of structure with constraint" "...(S)tructure is both 
enabling and constraining, and it is one of the specific tasks of social theory to study the conditions in the organisation 
of social systems that govern the interconnections between the two.... Structure is thus not to be conceptualised as a 
barrier to action, but as essentially involved in its production..." A. Giddens, Central Problems in Social Theory: Action, 
Structure and Contradiction in Social Analysis, MacMillan, l o t i o n . , 1979, pp. 69-70.
30As Kramnick notes: "In the great historical revolutions...one finds a sustained and self-conscious effort to
reconstruct society along theoretical principles provided by some vision of an ideal order, an ideology." Kramnick, op. 
dt., p. 31.
81 In his explanation for the success and failure of revolutionary movements in Latin America Robert H. Dix stresses 
this factor of anti-government, or negative, coalition-building. "The most plausible explanation, one that best accords 
with the facts, is that revolutions are only likely to succeed where suffident regime narrowing takes place to push 
otherwise non-radical elements of sodety into a loose negative coalition with a core or revolutionary militants." 
R. H. Dix, "Why Revolutions Succeed and Fail", Polity, 16,1984.
^As Eckstein argues; "Internal wars do not always have a dear aim, a tight organization, a distind shape and 
tendency from the outset. Many seem to be characterized in the early stages by nothing so much as amorphousness. 
They are formless matter waiting to be shaped, and if there is an art of revolution, it involves, largely at least, not 
making or subduing it, but capitalizing on the unallocated political resources it provides." Eckstein, "Etiology...", pp. 
174-5.
^In September 1917 Lenin, chastising his hestitant fellow Bolsheviks, argued that "at the present moment it is 
impossible to remain loyal to marxism, to remain loyal to the revolution unless unless insurrection is treated as an art." 
V.I. Lenin, Collected Works: 26, Progress, Moscow, 1977, p. 27. See also L. Trotsky, "The Art of Insurrection", in The 
Russian Revolution, Anchor, N Y. , 1959. Attention should also be drawn towards Trotsky's Lessons of October. While 
this essay is afforded historical importance as Trotsky's opening volley in his struggle against the emerging triumvarate 
of Stalin, Zinoviev and Kamenev, it remains a brilliant exposition of the importance of the 'purposive' role of the 
revolutionary organisation in revolutionary situations. L  Trotsky, Lessons of October, New Park, London, 1973.
^C M . Vilas, The Sandinista Revolution: National Liberation and Social Transformation in Central America, Monthly 
Review, N l ,  1986, p. 122. Aya makes the same point, arguing that "there must be some kind of organisation in hand 
to orchestrate discontent and galvanise it into retributive action." Aya, op. dt., p. 77.
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organization, and self-conscious social action.35
Clemenceau once stated that ''Everything that lives resists; that which does not resist allows 
itself to be cut up piecemeal."86 The forms of resistance employed by classes and movements 
must form a crucial component of any model attempting to understand the causes and the 
nature of social revolutions. Such forms cannot be reduced to structural forces. As this thesis 
will demonstrate, the adoption of particular forms of resistance is always problematic, and 
fraught with ideological and organisational tension. If it were not, then a higher correlation 
would exist between revolutionary situations and revolutionary outcomes.
1.3.2. The Role of the State
A second feature of Skocpol's model which must be addressed is her discussion of the state. 
The strength of her conceptualisation of the state lies in the avoidance of any reductionism, 
whereby the state appears as a mere instrument of a dominant class or an epiphenomenon of a 
given set of social relationships.87 The state is a powerful independent variable in Skocpol's 
analysis, on both the domestic and international plane. However, in analysing and explaining 
socialist revolution on the periphery or semi-periphery of the world capitalist system, the role 
of the pre-revolutionary state in promoting capitalist relations must be afforded primary 
attention. While the relationship between the state and capitalist development has been the 
object of sociological attention for some time88 it requires reiteration due to Skocpol's emphasis 
upon the international prestige and military aspects of the state in accounting for revolution. 
Regardless of the degree of autonomy which a state possesses in relation to the dominant 
classes, and regardless of the reasons why a state may choose to pursue a policy of 
modernisation, industrialisation and capitalist expansion, the consequences of adopting this 
path will invariably produce a given series of objective conditions, or 'structural imperatives'89, 
regardless of intentions. State-sponsored programmes of capitalist development in the age of 
imperialism have had one essential consequence crucial for the understanding of class conflict 
and socialist revolution on the periphery and semi-periphery of the international economic 
order. They create the potential for an alliance of 'popular classes' which have borne the cost of 
programmes of capitalist development. The central role of the state in promoting this 
development has precluded the possibility that the state be perceived by these classes as an
^J.L. Himmelstein & M.S. Kimmel, "Review Essay: States and Social Revolutions: The Implications and Limits of 
Skocpol's Structuralist Model", American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 86, No. 5, p. 1153. This criticism applies to structuralist 
models of history in general. For example, see Poster's comments on Althusser's structuralism in M. Poster, "Althusser 
on History Without Man", Political Theory, Vol. 2, No. 4,1974.
^Quoted in G. Sorei, Reflections on Violence, Collier, H X  , 1974, p. 78.
87Skocpol develops this argument of the state in her articles in P. Evans, T. Skocpol and Ruechemeyer (eds), Bringing 
the State Back In, Cambridge, N.Y., 1985.
^See Alexander Gershenkron's discussion of state 'substitutionism' under conditions of late-development' in 
A. Gershenkron, "Problems and Patterns of Russian Economic [Development", in CE. Black (ed), The Transformation of 
Russian Society, Harvard, Cambridge, 1960.
89The term 'structural imperatives' is borrowed from H. Alavi, "State and Class Under Peripheral Capitalism", in 
Alavi & Shanin (eds), see esp. pp. 293-6.
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arbiter above social and economic conflict. The consequence has been that class struggle has 
often assumed a more overtly political form far more rapidly than it has under liberal regimes 
in the core nations of the world economic order. It is this aspect of the political economy of the 
state which must be stressed in explaining modem socialist revolutions.
1.3,3. The Rural-Urban Controversy
A third, related, feature of Skocpol's analysis is her concentration upon rural social relations 
and land ownership. As Zimmermann notes, on the internal side of the revolutionary equation, 
the important question for Skocpol is "what makes for peasant mobilization".90 In this respect, 
Skocpol follows the tradition of Barrington Moore and Eric Wolf.91 In her discussion of the 
causes of the Russian Revolution she devotes barely half a page to urban class relations and 
urban-based political movements, despite her assertion that:
...the most important domestic change during the last decades of the Old Regime was the rapid 
formation of the industrial proletariat... And the conditions they faced...certainly provided 
reasons enough for the industrial workers to become, as they did after 1890, increasingly prone to 
strike and receptive to the anti-autocratic and anti-capitalist ideas of radical political parties. 
Rapid industrialisation thus created a formidible popular force capable of opposing both the 
imperial state and the capitalist captains of industry whose activities the state so fervently 
encouraged.92
Given the strength of this statement it would not be unreasonable to expect Skocpol to devote 
more attention to "the most important domestic change" in her account of the causes of the 
revolution.
Despite the proportional weakness of the popular urban classes, the dominant role of 
capitalist development placed them in an operative position out of proportion to their 
numerical weight.93 Being in the vortex of the articulation of the various forms of production 
operating in Russia, the industrial proletariat were in a more advantageous position than any 
other class to harness the discontent which resulted from the nation's crises during 1905 and 
1917. Notwithstanding the importance of peasant revolt, the manner in which the urban classes 
channelled their praxis must remain central to the understanding of the nature of the Russian 
revolution.
This thesis will present a more urban-centred model of modem revolutions. While rural 
social conflict may contribute enormously to the generation of revolutionary situations, the 
urban arena and urban-based movements have invariably succeeded in providing the 
organisational focus for, and shaping the nature of, the revolutionary outcome. In a recent 
evaluation of modem revolutions Josef Gugler has also argued for a more urban-centred
^E. Zimmermann, Political Violence, Crisis and Revolution: Theories and Research, Schinkman, Cambridge, 1983, p. 334.
91See B. Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, Peregrin, Aylesbury, 1979; and E. Wolf, Peasant Wars of the 
Twentieth Century, Faber, L o tio n . „ 1973.
^Skocpol, op. cit., p. 92.
93See Roy Medvedev's discussion of majorities and minorities in revolutions, in R. Medvedev, Leninism and Western 
Marxism, Verso, L and©  rv, 1981, Ch. 6.
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approach, rebutting Skocpol and Trimberger's claim that the successful occurrence of social 
revolutions "has not been determined by the struggle of proletarians against capitalists, but 
rather by the class struggles of peasants against dominant landed classes and/or colonial or 
neo-colonial states".94 Gugler concludes his examination of three modem revolutions by stating 
that "the largely urban character of contemporary revolutions merits consideration, not only 
because it contradicts widely held views but because it suggests a new perspective on 
revolutionary movements and their adversaries."95
In his study of the Petrograd working class, David Mandel has also reversed Skocpol's rural 
emphasis, placing the urban working class at the centre of his analysis of the Russian 
Revolution.
Soldiers, peasants, national groups all played their role, but it was in the last analysis a basically 
negative or passive one in relation to the major antagonists. Their principle contribution to the 
revolution and the victory in civil war lay in their failure to support the old regime, the 
Provisional Government, and later the Whites. It remained for the workers to give the revolution 
direction, organization and the major part of its active forces.96
This also supports Lenin's analysis of the 'social geography' of modem revolutions.97
More generally, the argument presented in this thesis is that modern socialist revolutions are 
primarily urban, in base, organisation, orientation and ideology.98
1.3.4. The Role of External Forces
Another distinguishing aspect of Skocpol's structuralist model is the emphasis placed upon 
the international and world-holistic dimension in social revolutions. Skocpol argues that social 
revolutions have been the direct result of states' participation in external adventures and wars. 
In other words, social, economic and political crises of old regimes have been generated by the 
problems encountered in promoting and undertaking external conflicts. These international
S kocpol &c Trimberger, op. dt., p. 61.
9SJ. Gugler, "The Urban Character of Contemporary Revolutions", Studies in Contemporary International Development, 
Summer, 1982, p. 70.
96D. Mandel, The Petrograd Workers and the Fall of the Old Regime: From the July Days 1917 to July 1918, Macmillan, Lon­
d o n  , 1984, p. 418.
^Lenin's discussion of the Bolshevik success still remains relevant today. "The Bolsheviks were victorious, first of all, 
because they had behind them the vast majority of the proletariat, which included the most class-conscious, energetic 
and revolutionary section, the real vanguard, of that advanced class." Lenin then discusses the "economic and political 
fact of the inequality between town and country". "That fact is inevitable under capitalism.... The town cannot be equal to 
the country. The country cannot be equal to the town under the historic conditions of this epoch. The town inevitably 
leads the country. The country inevitably follows the town. The only question is which class, of the 'urban' classes, will 
succeed in leading the country, will cope with the task, and what forms will leadership by the town assume.... An 
overwhelming superiority of forces at the decisive point at the decisive moment - this Taw' of military success is also 
the law of political success, especially in that fierce seething class war which is called revolution. Capitals, or, in general 
big commercial and industrial centres...to a considerable degree decide the political fate of a nation, provided, of course, 
the centres are supported by sufficient local, rural forces, even if that support does not come immediately. Lenin, op. 
dt., Vol. 30, pp. 257-8.
98As Robin Cohen argues, ’While the impetus, organization, ideology, and leadership of a revolutionary struggle 
might be in the urban areas, the success of revolution in the periphery seems to depend on its linking with the bulk of 
social forces located in the countryside. R. Cohen, ’Workers in Developing Sodeties”, in Alavi & Shanin (eds), op. dt., p. 
285.
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pressures "have been more effective", Skocpol and Trimberger argue, "in determining the 
outcome of revolutions than internal pressures for equality, participation and 
decentralization."99
The problem with this emphasis is related to the general critique of stucturaiism outlined 
earlier. While international factors may contribute to the demise of old regimes, this does not 
render intelligible the material and ideological content of the conflict between competing 
domestic classes and the state. International events may precipitate or accelerate a 
revolutionary crisis, but the underlying dynamics of the crisis must be located primarily in 
terms of the relations between classes and states within the social formation. If this focus is not 
retained, then the danger exists that revolutions lose their meaning for those who actively 
participate in them. Thus Skocpol's attempt to replace Tilly's short-range variables with 
international factors is unable to overcome the difficulty in locating the social project at the base 
of the revolution. No matter how effective international variables are in crippling old regimes, 
this cannot be abstracted from the internal relational aspect of economic and political 
domination which orients and mobilises classes, and determines the interests promoted by 
conflicting power blocs in a revolutionary crisis.
In order to retain the emphasis upon the interests represented by competing power blocs 
under the condition of multiple sovereignty, the approach adopted in this thesis deals with 
international variables as precipitants or accelerators, rather than the underlying generators of 
revolutionary crises. In other words, while external factors may heighten or promote the onset 
of a revolutionary crisis, by themselves they cannot render the nature of the crisis intelligible. 
The underlying generator of such a crisis (and the potential socialist form resulting from it) 
must be located within the social formation itself, and manifested in the competing class 
interests represented through competing power blocs. The emphasis will be placed upon the 
conflict between social classes, organised groups and their relation to the state. This conflict is 
ultimately determined by the specific form taken by local capitalist development, and the 
matrix of social relations this development promotes and shapes. To return to Eckstein's 
problemation, external wars and international crises will be viewed primarily as contingent 
factors, which heighten the inherent contradictions within specific social formations.
In order to avoid misunderstanding, one reservation must be made. As Dependency and 
World Systems Analysis has forcefully argued, the genesis of capitalist development in the 
periphery, and the retarded form it assumes, is part of the logic of core capitalist development. 
Peripheral capitalism assumes core capitalism, and thus, peripheral development must be 
analysed in terms of its articulation within the world capitalist system. However, if revolutions 
are to be explained in terms of class conflict, then the only realistic assumption from which to 
proceed is the recognition that organised class confrontation has had as its focal objective the 
seizure of the state.
"Skocpol &c Trimberger, op. dt., p. 64.
24
On the other hand, certain World Systems Analysts studying socialist transitions, such as 
Christopher Chase-Dunn, have argued that the unintended consequence of the seizure of the 
(semi)peripheral state by socialist movements is that the logic of the revolution inevitably 
becomes subverted by the requirements of competing economically and militarily with the 
stronger, hostile world capitalist system, leading to the eventual reemergence of the 'socialist' 
state as a functional component of the system it initially rebelled against.100 Whether this 
argument is accepted or not the point remains that this concentration upon unintended 
consequences ignores "the peculiarities of the class project at the base of the socialist revolutions 
and transitions and the fact that these conflicts are not over the distribution of world surplus 
but over the conditions under which this surplus is produced and for whom."101 Once more, 
attention to the consequences of revolutions should not eclipse the understanding of their 
causes. While the movement of units of capital throughout the world capitalist system provides 
the 'setting' within which modem socialist revolutions have emerged, they cannot be made 
intelligible unless the effect of the specific form of capitalist penetration is analysed, and the 
effect this has upon the dynamics of the social formation and corresponding relationship 
between classes and the state. These internal relations, rather than the external relations 
between states within the world capitalist system, is the determining factor in explaining the 
nature of a revolutionary process.
The disjunction between the reality of imperialism as an interconnected world system and the 
seizure of the nation-state by socialist movements must realistically be appraised as a given 
constraint of any socialist transformation and cannot be wished away through rhetoric of 
simultaneous world revolution.102 However limited socialist revolutions may appear, or no 
matter how much they may disappoint idealists, or provide comfort to the cynics, an 
understanding of revolutionary praxis must remain as important in understanding 
revolutionary process as structural constraints and unintended consequences. This historical 
comparative analysis will not attempt to assign priority to either 'structural constraint' or 
'purposive choice', but rather, it will attempt to understand the complex interrelations between 
the two.
This brief digression from Skocpol was necessary in order to clarify the position which will be 
adopted in this thesis. Skocpol herself rejects the economic reductionism inherent within 
Wallersteinian World Systems Analysis, arguing that the transnational context involves both a
10flSee C. Chase-Dunn, "Socialist States in the World Capitalist System", Social Problems, 27,1980.
101F. Fitzgerald, "Sociologies of Development”, in P. Limqueco & B. McFarlane (eds), Neo-Marxist Theories of 
Development, Croom Helm, London > 1983, pp. 21-2.
102Michael Lowy has noted this problem in the works of Marx, and later Trotsky. "Although this type of formulation 
had the unquestionable merit of posing the problem of the international dimension of the revolutionary process, it also 
underestimated....the unequal character of this process, and, thus, the actual autonomy of the crisis and the mass 
movement in each country." M. Lowy, The Politics of Combined and Uneven Development, New Left Books, p. 21.
See also pp. 104-5.
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world-holistic economic system and an 'international states' system' . 103 This is consistent with 
her position that the state is an important independent variable in explaining social revolutions. 
However, as pointed out in the beginning of this section, she retains the emphasis upon 
international pressures as more effective than the interests of contending power blocs in 
determining revolutionary outcomes. If this is the case, then Skocpol merely modifies the 
Wallersteinian approach, with its tendency to reify the world structure(s), where the 'grand 
logic7 of the 'system' mechanically dictates purpose and meaning. The actors turn around, and 
the stage-design has changed!
The purpose of this critique of Skocpol (and structuralist approaches to revolution in general) 
has been to highlight the anomalies within the paradigm, and thus to direct attention to the 
limits of structuralist explanations. The thread which runs through this critique corresponds 
most closely with the 'political' or 'resource mobilisation' argument, characterised by Charles 
Tilly. Skocpol's analysis fails to account for certain aspects of the politics of revolution, 
especially the context of multiple sovereignty or competing power blocs. Insufficient attention 
is paid to the mobilisation and organisation of contenders. As the above critique suggests, this 
thesis will attempt to correct this deficiency, through greater sensitivity to the politics of mass 
mobilisation and the struggle between the polity and contenders.
The above argument can be summarised in four points. Firstly, Skocpol's insightful structural 
account of the demise of old regimes needs to be integrated with an analysis of the emergence 
and development of the revolutionary alternative. This development is not unproblematic. It is 
not an automatic response to (although it is conditioned by) structural relations. A more 
sensitive approach to the organisation and ideology of revolutionary movements is required. 
The purposive component of revolutionary explanation needs to be made explicit. Secondly, 
Skocpol's rejection of the state as an epiphenomenon of social relations is a useful antidote to 
economic reductionism. However, the state must be viewed within the context of its role in 
promoting capitalist development. This circumscribes the role of the state in class conflict, both 
in terms of its relations to the interests of domestic capital and the direct producers. Thirdly, 
while agrarian revolts usually accompany (and heighten) the demise of old regimes, a more 
urban-centred approach to revolution is required in order to determine the conflict 
characteristic of multiple sovereignty in modem revolutions. Finally, the key to understanding 
the interests and meaning of a revolutionary crisis must be sought at the level of control over 
the state by conflicting classes and groups within the social formation, rather than the position 
of the nation-state within the international order. While this order may provide an 'accelerating' 
influence upon a revolutionary crisis, its underlying dynamics must be located within the social 
formation itself.
103For a comprehensive critique, see T. Skocpol, "Wallerstein's World Capitalist System: A Theoretical and Historical 
Critique", American journal of Sociology, Vol. 82, 5, 1977.
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1.4. A COMPARATIVE HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF SOCIALIST 
REVOLUTIONS
This critique of the Skocpolian structuralist model points towards the need to pay greater 
attention to purposive factors in theoretical explanations of revolution. This thesis will examine 
and compare two instances of socialist revolution with the objective of demonstrating that an 
adequate explanation requires analysing variables on both the structural and purposive level. 
This concentration upon socialist revolutions necessarily restricts the universe of discourse to a 
greater extent than Skocpol, who analyses not only the (Bolshevik) Russian Revolution and the 
(Communist) Chinese Revolution, but also the French Revolution of 1789. The latter, while 
clearly falling under the rubric of a social revolution, can by no stretch of the imagination be 
classified as a socialist revolution. As the analysis below will demonstrate, there are specific 
features characteristic of socialist revolutions which demarcate than as a specific form of social 
revolution.
Marxian analysis (from which both Skocpol and Tilly claim to derive) proceeds from the 
assumption that revolutions must be understood in terms of the contradictions inherent within 
a given mode of production. The key feature in identifying the nature of a revolution is 
contained in the antagonisms generated between the owners of the means of production and 
the direct producers. The nature of the revolution is thus dependent upon the dominant 
relations of production "which correspond to a definite stage of development of (the) material 
productive forces."104 Skocpol and Trimberger point out that this distinguishes Marxism from 
other theories which attempt to construct a model of revolution applicable to all historical 
cases.105
In her analysis of the French, Russian and Chinese Revolutions, Skocpol concentrates upon 
three structural variables leading to the demise of the old regimes; agrarian social relations, the 
state, and the international system of nation-states. Through overlooking the purposive 
components and underemphasising other structural variables, she is able to highlight certain 
similarities between these revolutions. However, if the conditions for the development of 
capitalism are compared with conditions for the development of socialism, it becomes apparent 
that there are crucial structural and purposive differences between the overthrow of feudalists 
relations compared with capitalistic relations.
The principal ground for such a claim lies in the genesis of capitalist property relations and 
capitalist culture, compared with socialistic relations. As Kovel notes, capitalism in Western 
Europe was able to develop spontaneously within the framework of feudal relations as private
104K. Marx and F. Engels, "Preface to a Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy", in Pre-Capitalist 
Socio-Economic Formations, Progress, Moscow, 1979, p. 137.
10S"Marx did not try to create a general theory of revolutions relevant to all kinds of societies at all times. Instead, he 
regarded revolutions as specific to certain historical circumstances and to certain types of societies." Skocpol and 
Trimberger, op. dt., p. 59.
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property formed the foundation of both capitalism and feudalism. 106 In this manner, primitive 
capital accumulation advanced while the bourgeoisie accumulated social power within the 
framework of the old mode of production. In contrast, socialist relations and socialist 'human 
nature' cannot emerge spontaneously within capitalism. Only the organisation of the direct 
producers for the task of overthrowing the capitalist order can create the preconditions for 
transforming the world 'after their own image'. The overthrow'of the feudal order and the 
bourgeois revolution was the culminating moment in the establishment of capitalist society. The 
socialist revolution only marks the beginning of the transformation of social and productive 
relations along socialist lines.107
The practice of socialist politics in the twentieth century has tempered the somewhat 
optimistic statements in the writings of Marx and Engels on the spontaneous development of 
socialist class consciousness. The emergence and growth of a purposive organisational focus 
has been a crucial determinant in the success of socialist revolutions to date. It was this 
distinction between spontaneity and organisation which Nikolai Bukharin stressed in his 
contrast of the two periods of transition:
When the bourgeoisie was overthrowing the feudal lords and the capitalist mode of production 
- based in its early days on the private economic cell - was blazing itself a trail, the economic 
process took place almost completely spontaneously; for there was no organised collective, no 
class subject at work, only scattered, through highly active, 'individuals'. It is small wonder that 
the slogan of the time was that of laissez-faire, laissez passer. They did not build capitalism, but it 
was built. The proletariat, as an organised collective subject, is building socialism as an organised 
system. If the creation of capitalism was spontaneous, the building of communism is to a marked 
degree, a conscious, ie., organized, process.108
Bukharin's statement applies not only to the dynamics of post-revolutionary development, but 
to the overthrow of the capitalist state. Skocpol is only able to obscure this fundamental 
distinction between the French and the Russian and Chinese Revolutions through de­
emphasizing the importance of the organisation of the revolutionary subjects. The 
transformational project characteristic of socialist revolutions requires a form of class activity 
and organisation which departs radically from that of the bourgeoisie during its corresponding 
period of ascendancy.
The choice of comparative analysis is therefore necessarily circumscribed by theoretical 
presuppositions. To deny this is to perform an act of 'theoretical ventriloquism' . 109 The 
assumptions adopted in analysis, and the questions posed, inevitably restrict the range of 
appropriate comparative cases. In this case, the position adopted suggests that general models 
of social revolution should be replaced with a specific model of socialist revolutions.
106J. Kovel, "Class, Power, and the State", in Monthly Review, January 1986, p. 35.
107See P. Sweezy, "The Transition to Socialism", in C. Bettelheim & P. Sweezy (eds), On the Transition to Socialism, 
Monthly Review Press, M.Y 1972.
108N. Bukharin, The Politics and Economics of the Transition Period, RKP, London, 1979, pp. 98-9. See also Lenin Quoted 
in Serge, Year One of the Russian Revolution, Allen Lane, London, 1972, p. 202.
109Aya, "Theories...", p. 42.
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The emergence of socialist states from revolutionary situations has occurred only infrequently 
throughout the twentieth century. Furthermore, where these have occurred, they have been 
restricted to nations outside the core industrialised states. While socialist-oriented parties have 
succeeded in forming governments within Western parliamentary democracies, rarely, if ever, 
have they attempted to dismantle the underlying structure of capitalist relations.110 The frame 
of reference for this thesis is therefore restricted by the lack of success of social-democratic and 
communist parties in implementing their projected vision of 'the good society' in the West.
However, a number of nations outside the core industrialised nations have fundamentally 
restructured their state and economy under the direction of Marxist-oriented parties. While this 
has only rarely and periodically happened, their impact upon the history of the twentieth 
century can hardly be overstated. Each of these revolutions must be analysed in terms of the 
balance of social forces existing within the nation and the ability of particular groups to impose 
their response upon a historically grounded crisis, whether military, political, economic or 
nationalistic. At the same time this must be placed within the world context of the nation's role 
in the international economic and state system. Within this historically grounded approach, a 
more abstract set of structural and purposive factors can be located which account for the 
success of these socialist movements.
In order to provide support for the theoretical argument outlined in this chapter an analysis 
will be undertaken of two cases where successful Marxist-oriented parties succeeded in 
assuming power during a revolutionary situation. The cases drawn from the total population of 
valid instances should be as apparently dissimilar as possible in order to maximise the scope for 
generalisation.111 The conditions of comparative analysis are determined by the objectives of 
the theoretical argument.112 The cases adopted in this instance are the 1917 Bolshevik 
Revolution in Russia and the 1979 Sandinista Revolution in Nicaragua.113
Temporally, both revolutions are clearly dissimilar. The Bolshevik Revolution is generally
u0See R. Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society: An Analysis of the Western System of Power, Quartet, Aylesbury, 1979; 
and G. Hodgson, Socialism and Parliamentary Democracy, Spokesman, Nottingham, 1977.
n iAs Teodor Shanin points out; "Social systems and economic conditions never exactly repeat themselves - but 
identity is not, of course, a condition for valid comparative analysis." T. Shanin, The Awkward Class: The Political 
Sociology of the Russian Peasantry, Qarendon, Oxford, 1972, p. 13.
112M. Freeman describes the relationship between comparison and theory by claiming that "comparison presupposes 
theory. Theory defines the subject, provides the criteria for the selection of cases, supplies concepts and hypotheses. 
These must come from 'the macro-sociological imagination,, informed by contemporary theoretical debates and 
historical evidence". M. Freeman, "Revolution as a Subject of Science", in N.K. O'Sullivan (ed), Revolutionary Theory and 
Political Reality, Wheatsheaf, , 1983, p. 36.
u3The method which has been chosen resembles that used by Robert Michels in his study Political Parties. In this 
classic study Michels attempted to demonstrate the 'iron law of oligarchy7, that is, the tendency within all complex 
modern organisations for power to become concentrated in the hands of a limited number of strategically placed 
individuals. This, he argued, resulted in the inevitable malfunctioning of ideal democratic procedures for decision­
making. In order to provide evidence of the existence of this law, Michels limited his study to a single organisation, the 
German Social Democratic Party, which claimed to express the greatest commitment to the democratisation of society. 
As Seymour Martin Upset explains, the logic of the argument was that if "such parties were themselves undemocratic 
in their internal structure, presumably the effort to completely democratize society must fail." See R. Michels, Political 
Parties, Collier, 1962, (with an introduction by S.M. Upset), p. 16.
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acknowledged to be the first Marxist-inspired revolution 'from below7, while the Sandinista 
Revolution is one of the latest. The intervening sixty-two years between the two revolutions 
witnessed profound political, economic and military transformations on the international scene. 
The Bolsheviks came to power towards the end of the First World War, at a time when the 
European forum was still considered the axis around which world events turned. Within three 
decades the world had witnessed the rise of the United States as the most powerful capitalist 
state, the rise and fall of fascism, a second world war and the onset of the Cold War. The Cold 
War and the spectacular development of the Soviet Union would directly or indirectly influence 
any future attempts by movements to alter their nation's position within the world capitalist 
order. During the 1950's, the Chinese Revolution drew upon the experience and assistance of 
the Soviets, while the Cuban Revolution demonstrated the lengths to which the United States 
would go to subvert any perceived challenge to its hegemony. Schisms within the international 
socialist movement, which had begun to appear during the First World War, were in an 
advanced stage by the 1960's, due to the reassessment of Stalinism, the open antagonism 
between the Soviet Union and China, and the alternative Cuban path.
It must be stressed within this temporal framework that the success of one socialist revolution 
inevitably alters the conditions for future revolutions. These changes can assume positive or 
negative forms. A predecessor may be in a position to supply arms, propaganda facilities or 
sanctuary to a fraternal movement, and a counterbalancing threat to any future foreign 
intervention or counter-revolution. On the other hand, the 'revolutionary arrogance' of a 
successful movement may be influential in altering the tactics and strategy adopted by fraternal 
organisations.114 On the side of the threatened polity, the 'lessons of history7 can be used to 
prevent its repetition through adopting appropriate measures of reform within the confines of 
the order, or more effectively targetted repression. On this point E.H. Carr once noted that: 
"One reason why history so rarely repeats itself is that the dramatis personae of the second 
performance have prior knowledge of the denouement."115 More recently Edelberto Torres 
Rivas observed the effect the Nicaraguan Revolution has had upon other movements in the 
region:
A successfu l revolution w hich underm ines the bourgeois order and its system  o f va lues in one  
country is 'contagious7 on ly  in the sense that it provokes a strong reaction to the ruling class of 
neighbouring countries. That is precisely w hat w e are observing today in the case o f N icaragua, 
and the general lesson to be learned is that revolutionary victory in one country w ill strengthen  
rather than w eaken the forces o f reaction in other countries.116
On the other hand, as Michael Lowy points out, revolutionary movements also learn from the
successes and failures of their predecessors.117
114Soviet interference in China and Spain between the wars may be dted as dassic examples. Fidel Castro recently 
admitted this tendency within the Cuban Communist Party in its relations with fraternal organisations during the 
1960's. See F.Castro, Nothing Can Stop the Course of History: An Interview With J.M. Elliot & M M . Dymally, Pathfinder, 
NY.. 1986, pp. 27-8.
ll5E.H. Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution: Volume 1, Pelican, iVwaAk 1976, p. 53.
n6E. Torres Rivas, "The Nature of the Central American Crisis”, in G. Irvin Sc X. Gorostiaga (eds), Towards an 
Alternative for Central America and the Caribbean, Allen Sc Unwin, L-o<\Aoc\ , 1985, pp. 47-8.
ll7See Lowy, op. dt., p. 105.
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Temporally then, the world-historical backdrop and the lessons of history make the Bolshevik 
and Sandinista revolutions intriguing cases for analysis. If a set of underlying structural and 
purposive factors can be discovered despite these apparent dissimilarities, then the argument 
will be strengthened.
Geographically and geo-politically both cases represent the extremes of the revolutionary 
socialist spectrum of the twentieth century. The vast Russian land-mass, the dispersal of its 
large population and extremes of climate contrast with small, sub-tropical Nicaragua. Geo- 
politically, at the turn of the twentieth century Russia was still considered an important military 
force on the international scene, despite its defeat by Japan in 1904-5 and its more primitive 
economic system relative to Western Europe. On the other hand, Nicaragua was always a 
peripheral nation subject to more direct foreign interference, first from Spain, then increasingly 
from the United States. Although both nations were independent entities at the time of the 
demise of the old regimes, the yoke of foreign domination was borne more heavily by 
Nicaragua that Russia.
This point is important to the comparative study of the causes of socialist revolutions. There is 
less disagreement over applying the term 'socialist' to the October Revolution in Russia than to 
the Sandinista Revolution. However, while nationalistic terminology and symbolism formed an 
important element of the Sandinista mobilisation, this thesis argues that 'nationalism' is too 
amorphous a concept to attach to a revolutionary incumbent. In the limited sense, a 'nationalist' 
revolution is a term which can be applied to the defeat or withdrawal of foreign economic, 
military or political dominance from a geographic area whose inhabitants consider themselves 
an independent political, religious or cultural entity- However, within this broad framework, 
the term cannot distinguish between the diverse class interests such revolutions can assume. In 
order to define the nature of a revolution it is essential to examine the interests the incumbents 
serve, the social groups and classes it represents and its ideology. It is clearly insufficient to 
collapse struggles as diverse as Greek independence from the Ottoman Empire, the Anglo-Irish 
War, the Vietnamese Revolution, the Islamic Revolution against the Shah in Iran and the 
Nicaraguan Revolution all under the single banner of struggles for national liberation. The 
definition of national liberation, and the direction of post-liberation social development, differs 
according to the perceptions and interests of the hegemonic groups within the liberation 
struggle. The usefulness of the concept of class lies in its ability to clarify these distinctions.
While this thesis explores the relationship between structural and purposive variables in the 
causes of socialist revolutions, underlying the comparison is the initial assumption that the 
Sandinista Revolution should be defined as socialist. The historical evidence drawn from the 
Nicaraguan case, and the comparison with Russia, can also be viewed as a contribution to the 
ongoing debate over the nature of the Sandinista Revolution.
Thus, in order to ensure that what is being measured is 'socialism' rather than 'nationalism', 
the comparison with Nicaragua must include a revolution without the characteristics of a war 
of national liberation. Of the total population of cases the Russian Revolution was the most
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international in outlook. Its leaders conceived of the Russian insurrection as a moment in the 
international proletarian uprising. In addition, throughout its formative period, they premised 
its continued existence upon the spread of the revolution throughout Europe.118
Related to the geographical and geo-political contexts of socialist revolutions is the question of 
their cultural setting. Once more, if the aim of the comparative analysis is to make 
generalisations about socialist (as opposed to nationalist) revolutions, then it is important to 
draw upon a sample with as much cultural diversity as possible. Therefore, the obvious 
comparison between Nicaragua and the Cuban Revolution must be excluded due to their 
shared Latin American context and their incorporation into the United States sphere of political 
and economic influence. For this reason, Peter Calvert's use of Latin America as a "laboratory of 
revolution", and the use of the region by Robert Dix as a "convenient analytical laboratory"119 
are inadequate. Once the cultural context is also controlled for, the more abstract structural and 
purposive causes of socialist revolutions can be determined with greater validity.
The temporal, spatial and cultural dissimilarities between Russia and Nicaragua offer an 
excellent opportunity to abstract these structural and purposive factors which contributed to 
the specific form of regime transformation which occurred in both nations.
There have been previous notable studies which have examined the cross-national context of 
modem socialist revolutions. For example, Michael Lowy has compared the Russian, Chinese, 
Yugoslav, Vietnamese and Cuban Revolutions in order to test the validity of Trotsky's theory of 
permanent revolution.120 Also, James Petras has examined the role of the revolutionary 
organisation in the Russian, Chinese, Vietnamese and Cuban examples.121 While both these 
works have been important in shaping the direction of the argument presented in this thesis, 
the aims and objectives of their arguments are different. This work is primarily concerned with 
the ongoing debate over the role of structure and agency in modem theories of revolutions, 
through the analysis of socialist revolutions.
In addition, neither Lowy nor Petras was able to examine the Nicaraguan case in then- 
comparative analyses. Petras's article was published as the Nicaraguan revolutionary situation 
was at its height, while Lowy only discussed the Nicaraguan case briefly as a possible extension 
of his argument. Furthermore, although numerous studies have attempted to analyse the 
Nicaraguan Revolution comparatively within its regional context,122 there has been a notable 
lack of attention to the comparative analysis of the causes and nature of the Nicaraguan
118See L. Trotsky, The Third International After Lenin, New Park, London, 1974, pp. 3-56; and M. Leibman, Leninism 
Under Lenin,]onathan Cape,LonAorv., 1975, pp. 359-65.
U9P. Calvert, "Latin America: Laboratory of Revolution", in N. O'Sullivan (ed), op. dt., pp. 139-57; Dix, op. dt.
120Lowy, op. dt.
121Petras, op. dt.
122Cf. Krumweide et al. (eds), op. dt.; P. Ross, "What Works in Central America", in J.R. Levy (ed), Crisis in Central 
America, A Collection of Conference Papers, UNSW, Sydney, 1984.
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revolution in a broader world-historical context.123 This thesis redresses this imbalance.
A historical comparative analysis of revolutions must also "study those revolutionary 
movements that have failed to capture power."124 Although this thesis focuses exclusively on 
Russia and Nicaragua, it deals with the problem of 'failure' through utilising a longer-range 
historical analysis and an examination of alternative movements. Both nations were rich in 
rebellious tradition. This allows questions to be raised such as: why did previous movements 
fail? Why did the revolutions occur when they did? and why in particular were the Bolsheviks 
and the Sandinistas successful during the revolutionary situations of 1917 and 1979?
The chapters to follow will be structured in accordance with the critique of the existing 
research literature presented in this chapter. Chapters 2 and 3 will analyse the structural 
dynamics of pre-revolutionary Russian and Nicaraguan society. Keeping in mind Eckstein's 
problemation, these two chapters will examine whether the revolutionary situations were 
caused primarily by inherent or contingent factors. Particular attention will be paid to the 
incorporation of both nations into the world capitalist system, the role of the state in promoting 
capitalist development, the consequent matrix of social relations which evolved, and the 
conflict generated by the unequal distribution of resources. Chapters 4 and 5 will concentrate 
upon the purposive components of socialist revolutions. In particular, these chapters will 
analyse the development of the Bolshevik Party and the Sandinista National Liberation Front. 
Attention will be drawn towards the origin of the revolutionary parties within their respective 
political cultures, their accumulation of social forces, the development of their ideology, and its 
relationship to revolutionary praxis. Both chapters culminate in examining the role of the 
hegemonistic party within the revolutionary movement, and the relationship between 
contender and polity during the revolutionary situation. The object of these chapters is to 
explain why particular contenders succeed in taking power. This cannot be achieved by 
reducing purposive factors to structural factors.
Chapter 6 draws together the conclusions from the two historical case studies in the light of 
the existing research literature, and examines the similarities and differences between the two 
cases. On this basis, hypotheses can be generated concerning the relationship between states, 
parties and classes in socialist revolutions.
123On the other hand, a great deal of attention has been devoted to the Sandinista's relations with the Soviet bloc, 
especially by unsympathetic commentators. See J. Valenta &c V. Valenta, "The FSLN in Power", in J. Valenta & E. Duran 
(eds), Conflict in Nicaragua: A Multi-Dimensional Perspective, Allen & Unwin,6o^ n 1987.
124Greene, op. cit. See also Dix, op. cit.; Krumwiede, op. dt.
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Chapter 2
STRUCTURAL FOUNDATIONS 
OF THE
BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION
2.1. INTRODUCTION
This chapter explores the structural dynamics of Russia's pre-revolutionary development. The 
argument advanced is that a combination of structural factors contributed to an unstable socio­
political environment by the beginning of the First World War. Returning to Eckstein's 
problemation of revolution, this chapter supports the position that the revolutionary situation 
of 1917 was a result of 'inherent' factors generated within the structure of late-Tsarist 
development, rather than 'contingent' factors external to the logic of this development. 
Throughout the chapter the assumptions and evidence of contingency theories of late-Tsarist 
society will be examined and critiqued, along with other models constructed by certain 
inherency theorists.
Alexander Gerschenkron's study of the problems of late development is an example of a 
contingency explanation of the Russian Revolution.1 According to Gerschenkron's analysis of 
the preconditions for economic development under conditions of backwardness, the problem is 
one of finding 'substitutions' for those factors which facilitated development in the more 
advanced nations but which are lacking in less developed nations.2 These substitutions 
function as factors overcoming original backwardness, and eventually become obsolete once the 
'normal' path has been reached. In the case of Tsarist Russia, the state substituted itself for 
private capital due to the scarcity of this factor in the mid-1800's. According to Gerschenkron, 
during the boom of 1909-13 this scarcity was diminishing and the function of the state-as- 
accumulator correspondingly 'withered'. The tendency was towards "the Russian government 
(leaving) the economic scene",3 and being replaced more and more by large syndicates and 
banking corporations (ie. the 'Western' path had been found). If this this tendency had been 
extrapolated into the future then the following scenario would have emerged:
Diminishing scarcity of capital, further improvements in the quality of entrepreneurship, and 
the sheer growth of industrial enterprises, in all probability would have in due time enhanced the
^ ee  A. Gerschenkron, "Problems and Patterns of Russian Economic Development”, in C. Black (ed), The 
Transformation of Russian Society, HarvardttPC b?,i ,^1960.
2Ibid, p. 46.
3Ibid, p. 58.
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position of industrial firms to the point where they no longer needed the banks' guidance.4 *
Gerschenkron's analysis resembles the economic 'stage' theory of growth developed by W.VV. 
Rostow F According to Gerschenkron, Russia had successfully proceeded down the runway of 
'economic take-off, powered by the fuel of state substitutionism, and was now beginning to 
embark upon the 'drive to maturity', along the lines of earlier Western European capitalist 
nations. Thus, he claims that "...it seems possible to say that Russia on the eve of the war was 
well on the way toward a westernisation or, perhaps more precisely, a Germanisation of its 
industrial growth. The 'old' in the Russian economic system was definitely giving way to the 
'new'."6 Through employing a modified version of modernisation theory, Gerschenkron argues 
that on the eve of the First World War Russian society was progressively moving onto the 
Western European path of development and that, consequently, class tensions were becoming 
less acute. According to Gerschenkron, the revolutionary situation of 1917 was due principally 
to the destabilising effects of the First World War, rather than inherent tension within the 
process of development.
This chapter will question both Gerschenkron's assumptions and evidence. While agreeing 
with Gershenkron's emphasis upon the role of the state in promoting Russian capitalist 
development, an alternative position will be advanced, arguing that on the eve of the war the 
process of development continued to generate acute class conflict, and that revolution remained 
an inherent feature of late-Tsarist society.
The variables which will be stressed in the inherency approach adopted below also differ 
from other inherency approaches such as Immanuel Wallerstein's World Systems Analysis and 
Skocpol's approach. This chapter will place urban, industrial conflict at the centre of the 
inherent tension within Russian society. As noted in the introductory chapter, rural class 
relations dominate Skocpol's internal side of her revolutionary equation.
With regard to Wallersteinian analysis, this chapter argues that while the World Systems 
approach is useful for 'situating' Russia, placing its form of capitalist development within the 
wider totality of the world capitalist system, this is insufficient to explain why the revolution 
possessed a socialist potential. There is a tendency within World Systems Analysis to 'reify the 
'world system' and explain all events in terms of the external constraints imposed by this 
system. For example, according to Wallerstein:
...the Russian Revolution was essentially that of a semi-peripheral country whose internal 
balance of forces had been such that as of the late-nineteenth century it began on a decline toward 
a peripheral status. This was the result of a marked penetration of foreign capital into the 
industrial sector which was on its way to eliminating all indigenous capitalist forces, the 
resistence to the mechanisation of the agricultural sector, the decline in relative military 
power....The revolution brought to power a group of state managers who reversed each one of 
these trends by using the classic technique of semi-mercantilist withdrawal from the world 
economy.
“Hbid. p. 58.
^ ee  YV.W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto, Cambridge U.P., Cambridge, 1960.
6Gerschenkron, op. dt., pp. 60-61.
35
Thus, the revolution "emerged as a reaction to the threatened further decline of Russia's 
structural position in the world economy."7 This level of analysis provides no understanding of 
the particular form which class conflict assumed in the revolutionary situation. It is this 
inherent conflict which explains the class alliances which emerged, and the interests promoted 
by the polity and its challengers. A more concrete analysis of the historical formation of the 
Russian class structure and its inherent antagonisms reveals more about the nature of the 
revolution than concentrating upon the nation's position within the international system of 
state stratification. In Wallerstein's model the revolutionär}' subject is lost and replaced with the 
reified notion of national development within the world capitalist system.
This chapter begins with a description of the origins of capitalist development in Russia, and 
points to the important role performed by the state in this development. After this, the 
relationship between the state and urban and rural class relations will be examined. Firstly, it 
will be argued that the urban proletariat emerged as the most formidable challenger to the 
Tsarist model of development. Secondly, the structural conditions which explain the weakness 
of the bourgeoisie will be examined. Lastly, rural relations will be explored in order to explain 
how the structure of late-Tsarist development contained the inherent possibility of a 
coincidence between a proletarian revolution 'flanked' by a peasant war.
2.2. STATE-SPONSORED INDUSTRIALISATION
Russia's 'downward mobility' within the European state-system was demonstrated during the 
disastrous Crimean campaign between 1854 and 1856. In the prosecution of its war aims the 
backwardness of the nation manifested itself technologically and organisationally. Alexander II 
understood that social reform was required in order to reverse the decline of Russia's 
international status. As Gerschenkron notes:
The Crimean War imparted a severe blow to the serene image of Russia's strength. It revealed 
Russian inferiority in many crucial respects.... In the minds of the emperor and the higher 
bureaucracy, the course of the war and its outcome left the feeling that once more the country 
had been allowed to lag too far behind the advanced nations of the West. Some degree of 
modemisation....was indispensible for regaining a strong military position.8 9
The form of modernisation adopted was the result of a compromise between the state and the 
gentry.^ndoubtedly, the most significant reform was the emancipation of the serfs, which 
freed the peasantry from state and gentry bondage. Alexander overrode the opposition 
generated by this measure from the gentry, declaring that it was "better to abolish serfdom from 
above than to wait until the serfs began to liberate themselves from below."10
7I. Wallerstein, "The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System: Concepts for Comparative Analysis", 
Comparative Studies in Society and History, 16,1974, p. 411.
8A. Gerschenkron, quoted in T. Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions, Cambridge, H .'f. , 1979, p. 84.
9As Schapiro notes, "the Emancipation Act of 19 February 1861 was a compromise of conflicting interests which 
satisfied no-one." L. Schapiro, 1917: The Russian Revolutions and the Origins of Present-Day Communism, Pelican, A’worth, 
1985, p. 3.
10Quoted in ibid, p. 2.
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While, as Emmons observes, the ultimate aim of the emancipation was to "fortify social and 
economic stability",11 its more profound long-term consequence was upon the transformation 
of fiscal and financial responsibilities. The state now possessed an effective mechanism for 
intervening in the economy through varying supply and demand from its various sectors. In 
particular, it could manipulate the level of exploitation of the agrarian sector through 
controlling agricultural surplus more directly.12 The stage was set for the Tsarist state to play 
the role of accumulator and planner of the nation's economic destiny.13
However, this post-Emandpation fiscal transformation was not immediately translated into a 
consdous governmental policy of industrialisation.14 From the 1860's until the 1880's the 
government encouraged a laissez-faire approach to development,15 while most government 
resources continued to be swallowed up in 'non-productive' activities.16 While progress was 
observable in the non-agricultural sector, especially light industry,17 the Emandpation did not 
transform the gentry into a class of agrarian capitalist entrepreneurs. The results of the 
Emancipation had left many features of the pre-existing agrarian class relations intact. In 
particular, the extraction of peasant surplus remained substantially pre-capitalist in character. 
As Skocpol notes:
...the peasants were left with insufficient lands subject to crushing redemption payments, which 
had to be paid to the government over many decades. And the nobles were hardly spurred to 
invest in the modernisation of agriculture, because they were left with legal possession of about 
40% of the land and with access to cheap labour, whereas most of their financial-redemption 
windfall (paid to the nobles by the state) went to pay off previously accumulated indebtness 
(mostly to the state itself).18
11T. Emmons, The Russian Landed Centn/ and the Peasant Emancipation 1861, Cambridge U.P., Cambridge, p. 414.
12A s Skocpol argues; "What the Emancipation unquestionably did accomplish was to give the imperial state a more 
direct and exclusive role in controlling the peasantry and appropriating revenues from agriculture." Skocpol, op. dt., p. 
89.
13However, as mentioned above, it should be kept in mind that the state had traditionally played an important, if not 
overbearing, role in the economy, espedally in industry and commerce. See R. Pipes, Russia Under the Old Regime, 
Peregrine,H’uiortW, 1982, pp. 193-218.
14As Emmons notes: "The reform produced no immediate, dramatic changes in the sodal and economic order.” 
Emmons, op. dt., p. 420.
15According to Vernadsky: "During the reign of Alexander II the government apparently desired to refrain from 
interference in economic matters and to allow the fullest degree of private initiative. These prindples were expressed in 
the policy stimulating the construction of railroads by private companies on the concession basis. A number of 
government-owned factories in the Urals were sold to private individuals, and the salt mines in the southeast were 
leased to private capital. At the same time a policy of free trade was instituted." G. Vernadsky, A History of Russia, Yale, 
New Haven, 1963, p. 246.
16See Skocpol, op. d t ,  p. 90.
17See M.E. Falkus, The Industrialisation of Russia: 1700-1914, Macmillan, 1977, p. 56.
18Skocpol, op. dt., p. 89. This latter point is elaborated by Emmons. "The glowing promise of the liberal abolitionists 
about the future of the gentry as commerdal farmers was never realized for most of them. The economic plight in 
which the gentry found themselves immediately after the emandpation - mainly their lack of capital to adapt to the 
'new order of things' - was not solved by the wholesale turn to redemption. Most pomeshchiki had been living on credit 
since long before the emandpation, maintained by loans from the state and the availability of 'free' labor. The 
emandpation brought them to a reckoning with their debts - preliminarily deducted from the redemption payments 
made to them - which left few of them with enough capital to set up farming on a hired-labor basis." Emmons, op. dt. p. 
421.
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Evidence concerning the durability of the peasant mode of production,19 combined with the 
lack of incentive on the part of the gentry to modernise and the low (though admittedly 
accelerating) level of industrial development, all suggest that Russia's rate of economic 
development would have remained relatively low had not an additional factor intervened in 
the socio-economic matrix as a catalyst for rapid growth. This factor was the conscious adoption 
of a policy of heavy industrialisation by the state. Under the guidance of a series of Finance 
Ministers, such as Vishnegradski and Witte, the Tsarist state not only encouraged private capital 
industrial expansion, but also became the single largest direct investor and entrepreneur.20 
Most importantly, state sponsorship of railway construction sank government resources into 
productive concerns which provided a vital boost to the development of heavy industry.21 
Furthermore, state subsidies and high tariffs for indigenous private enterprises encouraged 
investment in heavy industry.22 Foreign investment was also significant in this sector, and 
foreign loans were energetically sought by the state.
These policies were aided by numerous fortuitous conditions, both internal and external. 
Agricultural demand upon the Western European market provided an incentive for the state to 
export primary products. State accumulation from these primary exports was further 
stimulated by the onerous burdens of direct and indirect taxation applied to the peasant sector. 
Dilemmas concerning the lack of internal demand produced by these measures were short- 
circuited by the governments concern to encourage heavy industry. Furthermore, Asiatic 
expansion and Russia's size and potential wealth offered seemingly inexhaustible opportunities 
for internal colonisation and afforded bright prospects for foreign investors.
The belated timing of Russia's industrial revolution also provided the administration with the 
advantage of employing the most modern techniques of production without traversing the long 
path of technological innovation which had occurred over the previous centuries in Western 
Europe. As Gerschenkron notes:
One of the few advantages that Russia, as many other backward countries in similar conditions, 
possessed was the possibility of borrowing technology from more advanced and more 
experienced industrial countries. In this field alone, Russia could equal, if not excel, them. It 
could concentrate on modem technology so that its factory equipment, though much smaller in 
aggregate, could be much more up-to-date in its average composition.23
This opportunity helps to explain the apparent anomaly that 'backward' Russia led the world in
the contemporary trend towards increasing size of industrial plant and concentration of
19See T. Shanin, The Awkward Class, Qarendon, Oxford, 1972.
-°As Shanin notes: "The Russian state was a massive economy in two distinct senses. It was a gigantic enterprise sensu 
strictu and at the same time a powerful system of political and administrative intervention, penetrating every aspect of 
Russian society and economy.” T. Shanin, Russia as a 'Developing Society': The Roots of Otherness: Russia's Turn of the 
Century: Volume 1, Macmillan,London, 1985, p. 130.
21See A. Nove, "Russia as an Emergent Country”, in A.J. Youngson (ed), Economic Development in the Long Run, Allen 
&c Unwin, London, 1972. Another important consequence of railroad construction was the opening of internal and 
foreign markets for Russian grain. See O. Crisp, Studies in the Russian Economy Before 1914, Macmillan, Un^ocv , 1976, p. 
17.
22See Falkus, op. dt., pp. 61-74.
23A. Gerschenkron, op. dt., p. 49.
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labour.“4 Other significant trends observable in pre-revolutionary Russia were monopolisation, 
the importance of finance capital23 and the concentration of industrial activity in a few 
geographical centres (most importantly around St Petersburg, but also Russian Poland, the 
Ukraine, and more traditional light industries around Moscow).
Thus, Russia's industrialisation was stimulated by a chain of articulation which connected the 
agrarian economy with Western Europe. This articulation not only resulted in the quantitative 
expansion of the nation's industrial stock. It also began transforming the dynamics of the 
Russian economy as a whole. Leon Trotsky, recognising the importance of these sectoral 
interlinkages, argued they represented a historical tendency which he described as 'the law of 
uneven and combined development'.
Unevenness, the most general law of the historical process, reveals itself most sharply and 
complexly in the destiny of the backward countries. Under the whip of external necessity their 
backward culture is compelled to make leaps. From the universal law of unevenness derives 
another law which, for the lack of a better name, we may call the law of combined development - 
by which we mean a drawing together of the different stages of the journey, a combining of 
separate steps, an amalgam of archaic with more contemporary forms. Without this law....it is 
impossible to understand the history of Russia, and indeed of any country of the second, third or 
tenth cultural class.26
This technological diffusion, financed through heavy direct and indirect taxation upon the 
agrarian economy and an energetic search for foreign loans, resulted in a tighter integration of 
the Russian economy within the world capitalist system.27 Furthermore, a crucial factor in the 
success of governmental policy was a positive balance of payments.
According to Lyashchenko's figures, the 28% of capital which was foreign owned in 1900 had 
risen by 1913 to 33%. During this period foreign investment had increased 85% compared to a 
60% increase in domestic capital investment. Foreign ownership was most conspicuous in the 
most dynamic sectors of the economy (oil, metals, chemicals, electrical engineering). Other 
manfestations of the 'combined' nature of Russia's development were the close links which 
Russian finance formed with its European counterpart, and the fact that by 1912 57% of 
industrial equipment and capital stock was still purchased from abroad.28 The large foreign 
loans, contracted mainly with France and Britain after the formation of the Triple Entente, 
demanded increasingly regressive taxation against the agricultural sector in order to meet 
repayments. The two decades prior to the World War witnessed "a tendency for agriculture to 
be increasingly geared to the export market....”29By 1913 Russia was the largest servicer of debt 
in the world.
24See S.A. Smith, Red Petrograd: Revolution in the Factories 1917-1918, Cambridge U.P., Cambridge, 1985, pp. 10-12.
25See V.I. Lenin, "Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism", Collected Works: Volume 22, Moscow, Progress, 1977. 
26L. Trotsky, The Russian Revolution, Doubleday Anchor, U.-f 1959, p. 4.
27As Dobb remarked, not only with respect to foreign ownership "but with regard to her trade relations, Russia 
represented an economic system that was pendent on the West." Dobb, Soviet Economic Development Since 1917, R.K.P., 
\.onk,<v, 1951, pp. 36-7.
^Lyashchenko's data is reproduced in A. Nove, An Economic History of the U.S.S.R., Pelican, U '^©.AK. , 1978, pp. 
17-8.
^Dobb, op. dt., p. 38.
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Despite Russia's semi-peripheral status within the world capitalist system, Skocpol is correct 
to dismiss the notion that Russia was a semi-colony of Western Europe.30 While the Tsarist state 
was certainly constrained by the 'structural imperatives' of integration within the world 
capitalist system it still possessed sufficient leverage to determine the role which foreign capital 
would perform in the development of Russian industrialisation. As Smith observes in his 
examination of Petrograd on the eve of 1917: "The industry of Petrograd was distinguished not 
so much by its dependence on foreign capital as by its dependence on the state."31
The negative aspects of this economic linkage to the world economy and world financial 
market were most acutely felt in 1899-1900 with the contraction of the European money market. 
The Russian economy plummetted into a recession which lasted until 1907 (far longer than the 
Western European countries). The severity of the recession and its prolongation was intensified 
by the lack of internal demand resulting from the mode of industrialisation followed by the 
Tsarist state. It was during this period that Russia experienced the revolutionary 'dress 
rehearsal' of 1905, an event aggravated by the Russo-Japanese War and the slump. The insertion 
of the external market into the process of expanded reproduction would create further internal 
dislocation during the World War through starving the nation of capital replacement. By 1917 
Russia's foreign debt had doubled, relative to 1914.32
To conclude, the impressive industrial growth registered by Tsarist Russia in the decades 
prior to the revolution was the result of the rearrangement of sectoral responsibilities, 
profoundly affecting the dynamics of the Russian economy. The Russian economic formation 
on the eve of the World War can be described as an articulated duality between diverse modes of 
production. The state-sponsored 'economic miracle' (or 'induced growth stream'33) was funded 
through deepening fiscal exploitation of a peasant economy which had failed to substantially 
increase its productivity.34 Agrarian surplus, extracted through direct and indirect taxation, 
combined with foreign loans, were converted into the capital stock of the heavy industrial 
sector, which was heavily protected behind high tariff barriers, subsidies and state orders. The 
break which neo-classical economists would observe in the economic circuit (the lack of peasant 
demand) lost its significance once this demand was reduced through heavy taxation upon the 
peasantry, and heavy industry took state priority over consumer industry. As Gerschenkron 
argues:
The strategic factor in the great industrial upsurge of the 1890's must be seen in the changed 
policy of the government. The fear of industrialisation, so much in evidence in the 1860's, was 
gone. Industrial development became an accepted and in fact central goal. Once this happened, 
the problem of the peasant demand lost its previous significance, and its relation to
30Skocpol, op. dt., p. 93.
31Smith, op. dt., p. 7 
32Shanin, Awkward Class, p. 17.
^Crisp, op. dt., p. 52.
34As Paul Gregory points out, this rate of agricultural growth slowed down the overall productivity growth rate of 
the Tsarist economy. See P. Gregory, "Economic Growth and Structural Change in Tsarist Russia: A Case of Economic 
Growth?", Soviet Studies, No. 3,1972, p. 432.
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industrialisation was thoroughly reversed. It was as though a rotating stage had moved revealing 
an entirely new scenery. The growth of peasant demand for industrial goods no longer was a 
pre-requisite of successful industrialisation. On the contrary, its curtailment became the objective.
To reduce peasant consumption meant increasing the share of national output available for 
investment. It meant increased exports, stability of the currency, chances for larger and cheaper 
loans from abroad, and the availability of foreign exchange needed to service foreign loans.
While this state policy of industrial sponsorship, combined with numerous advantageous
internal and external conditions, had provided Russia with one of the highest industrial growth
rates in the world in the two decades prior to the World War, the maintenance of this growth
was dependent on the continuance of a given set of factors. These included continued access to
foreign loans, maintenance of relatively high agricultural prices relative to industrial prices on
the world market and continued access to the European market. As observed above, a break in
this economic circuit acutely affected the mode of rapid industrialisation pursued by the Tsarist
state.
This structural description of the peculiarities of Russia's pre-revolutionary capitalist 
accumulation also points to the potential strains which the developmental path engendered. 
These social tensions will be analysed in the following sections. The structural foundations of 
Tsarist industrialisation were vulnerable to sudden changes affecting its sectoral articulation. 
These 'accelerators' or precipitants such as war and changing terms of trade revealed the social 
tensions inherent within the developmental strategy. As the revolutionary events of 1905 
demonstrated, prosperity also demanded internal social peace. However, the very success of 
the state's industrialisation process had created new exploited social groups parallel to the 
intensification of the exploitation of the more traditional classes. The mobilisation of these 
forces against the autocracy and its method of industrialisation represented an ever-existent 
threat to the stability of the old regime. The outcome of any crisis of the Tsarist regime would 
be conditioned by the ability of various social groups to mobilise their resources against the 
state.36 In itself, the rate and direction of development cannot account for the alignment of 
social forces. As a precondition for understanding the political alignments within the nation on 
the eve of the revolution it is necessary to explore the particular conditions which facilitated or 
hindered the mobilisation of Russia's spectrum of social classes, and to explore their 
relationship to the state.
2.3. INDUSTRIAL CLASS CONFLICT
The restructuring process described above can be understood at a deeper level of abstraction 
by employing Charles Bettelheim's model of economic formations. According to this model:
When...we set about studying an actual economy - independently of the very idea of transition - 
we have to think of this economy as a complex structure which is 'structured in dominance'. We 
mentally grasp a structure like this as a specific combination of several modes of production of 
which one is dominant. It is this dominant mode of production that permeates the entire system 
and modifies the conditions in which the subordinate modes of production function and
^Gerschenkron, op.dt., pp. 47-8.
36As Shanin observes: " In the long run, the results of the strategies of economic intervention were to be determined 
by a confrontation in the political sphere." Shanin, Developing Society, p. 133.
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develop.37
Applied to the description presented in the last section, Russia appears as a complex economic 
formation with numerous modes of production co-existing in interaction. However, the logic of 
the various modes had been substantially modified by the dominant mode, namely capitalism. 
While each mode was infected with impurities from co-existing modes, the Tsarist economic 
formation was structured-in-dominance by capitalism. The development strategy pursued by 
the state involved an 'articulation of modes of production'38 with capitalist industrialisation as 
its motive force.
This section argues that this articulation placed the social forces within the industrial sector in 
an fundamental position out of proportion to their numerical strength. The most importance 
force within this sector was the industrial proletariat, which became the most effective 
challenger against the polity.39
By the beginning of the World War the population under Tsarist dominion had reached 164.3 
million, of which 17 million lived in urban areas.40 Of this total, three million were permanent 
industrial workers, with the highest concentration being in St Petersburg (one of the few areas 
where a substantial proportion of the proletariat had completely severed its roots from the 
village). Despite the large size and concentration of industrial production small-scale industry 
still accounted for 67% of those engaged in industry41 (although productivity in this sector was 
approximately one-quarter of that of large-scale industry).
Between 1900 and 1913 an extra four million peasants (mainly young men) had settled in the 
towns,42 while each year a further nine million peasants took out passports to work outside
37C  Bettelheim, The Transition to Socialist Economy, Harvester, / 1978, p. 16. Chapter One outlines
Bettelheim's theoretical model of complex socio-economic structures.
38See A. Foster-Carter, "The Modes of Production Controversy", New Left Review, No. 107,1978.
39It is this force which Skocpol alludes to when she notes: "Rapid industrialisation thus created a formidable popular 
force capable of opposing the Imperial state and the capitalist captains of industry whose activities the state fervently 
encouraged." Skocpol, op. dt., p. 92. However, as noted in the introductory chapter, Skocpol's rural emphasis does not 
lead to further examination of this formidable force. Mention must be made of an alternative position developed by 
Umberto Melotti, who argues that on the eve of the revolution Russia was still fundamentally 'semi-asiatic'. 
Accordingly, Melotti daims that this accounts for the rapid degeneration of the October Revolution into a form of 
'bureaucratic collectivism'. U. Melotti, Marx and the Third World, Macmillan, U n i o n .  , 1981, Chapters 14 &: 20.
However, Melotti fails to explain the nature of the 1917 revolution or the leading role of the proletariat His 
observations on the legacy of Russia's 'asiatic' features upon the post-revolutionary state, and his discussion of Lenin's 
views, could have been enhanced had he accepted the complexity of the pre-revolutionary economic formation and lack 
of coincidence between the state and the economy. Perry Anderson adopts this position, arguing that: "The Autocracy was a 
feudal State, although Russia was by the 20th century a composite social formation dominated by the capitalist mode of 
production: a dominance whose remote effects are legible in the structures of Tsarism." P. Anderson, Lineages of the 
Absolutist State, New Left Books, London, 1974, p. 358.
“^ See Shanin, Awkward Class, p. 11. Historical trends place these statistics in perspective. In 1850, 5% of the total 
population lived in towns; in 1897,13%; and in 1914,15%. See Vernadsky, op. dt., p. 242.
41Nove, op. dt., p. 17.
S h an in , op. dt., p. 12.
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agriculture.43 The articulated duality of the Russian socio-economic formation is thrown into 
relief by statistics showing that half of all peasant households in European Russia had a family 
member who had left the village for employment.44 This demographic feature was as much a 
manifestation of the mode of Tsarist industrialisation as it was a necessary response to the 
heightening crisis of Russian agricultural overpopulation, land shortage and peasant debt. As 
Dobb notes:
....in addition to the industrial proletariat proper, there existed a large rural proletariat drawn 
from families who were unable to support themselves from their holdings of land, since they 
lacked the animal-power and equipment with which to work it, and were burdened or 
dispossessed by taxation or usury. For rising industry and a kulak class to feed upon, this rural 
semi-proletariat represented a rich potential reserve.
These demographic and social statistics on Russian proletarianisation are subject to a variety 
of interpretations. The argument presented below will consider the trends of class conflict 
through the peculiarities observed in the previous section concerning the form capitalist 
development assumed in the immediate pre-revolutionary period.
Firstly, it is useful to return to Gerschenkron in order to explain how his contingency analysis 
perceives the development of industrial relations in late-Tsarist Russia. Gerschenkron argues 
that this /post-substitutionist/ epoch, which was gradually transferring Russia onto the Western 
path of development, was also characterised by a gradual institutionalisation of class conflict. 
According to Gerschenkron, the intensity of class conflict was a universal phenomenon of early 
industrialisation, "as shown by the history of European countries (such as Austria or 
Belgium)",46 and Russia's post-take-off era would reveal similar tendencies in the field of 
industrial relations. He claims that by the 1909-13 boom, "the economic position of labour was 
clearly improving. In the resurgence of the strike movement economic problems seemed to 
predominate....There is little doubt that the Russian labour movement of those years was slowly 
turning toward revisionist and trade-unionist lines".47 Using these comparative trends, 
Gerschenkron is able to conclude that "revolution, or the threat of, may reasonably be seen as an 
extraneous phenomenon." If we relate this to Eckstein's classification of theories of revolution, 
Gerschenkron's analysis can be described as a 'contingency7 theory. According to his reasoning, 
by the beginning of the First World War revolutionary class conflict had ceased to be an 
'inherent' feature of the Tsarist social structure. Thus, the events of 1917 must be regarded as 
emanating from accidental causes external to the logic of Tsarist capitalist development.
However, there are a number of theoretical and empirical grounds for questioning the validity 
of Gerschenkron's analysis of the Russian working class movement immediately prior to the
«S. Fitzpatrick, The Russian Revolution: 1917-1932, Oxford UP 0»9c.v<i, 1984, p. 13. 
44Ibid, p. 13.
“^ Dobb, op. dt., p. 45.
^Gerschenkron op. dt., p. 60.
^Ibid, p. 60.
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war. Firstly, even if one accepts his extrapolation of Russia's future, through reference to the 
historical trends of the Western European workers' movement, this would not be sufficient to 
dismiss the reality of the contemporary conflicts the working class movement was engaged in. 
Such extrapolations have little bearing upon the motivations for action or the form of action 
adopted by historical actors under concrete circumstances. John Keep, who has provided 
arguably the best social history of the revolutionary process from a modernisation perspective, 
has adopted a more realistic position on this question. Noting that by 1914 "all but a thin 
segment of Russian labour was alienated from the existing political and social order", he adds: 
"Few would have been impressed by the argument, even if it had been brought to their 
attention, that their tribulations were an inevitable but temporary concomitant of the process of 
modernising a backward country, and that in time they could look forward to a growing share 
of the material rewards bound to flow from an advanced market economy."48 While 
comparative historical hindsight provides the sociologist and historian with the opportunity for 
understanding social processes, it cannot be used to alter the perceptions and motivations of 
historically-located actors.
Secondly, Gerschenkron provides no empirical evidence in support of his claim that "there is 
little doubt" that the Russian labour movement was adopting reformist tactics in pursuit of its 
interests. All that is provided by way of evidence is the statement that, as was "true of the West, 
the struggles for general and equal franchise to the Duma, which probably would have 
occurred sooner or later, may well have accentuated this development" towards reformism.49 
Once more, extrapolation takes precedence over actuality, with the added proviso of the 
'probability' of Tsarist political reform.
While there is evidence to support the claim that "the economic position of labour was 
improving" during the period, such bland economistic statements can furnish few insights into 
the political mood of the working class. As James Petras has pointed out, statistics must be 
placed in the context of the structural, psychological and organisational pecuiiaries of the class 
under discussion.
...the broader socio-political context of class society and the exploitative relationships embodied 
in it have often proved to be more fundamental determinants of class consciousness than wage 
levels. Moreover, the degree to which certain segments of the working class are paid higher 
wages may precisely be a function of their greater militancy, and may reinforce their political 
allegiance to a revolutionary party. Hence the notion that workers, or even better-paid workers, 
are in some essence privileged strata, incapable of participating in revolutionary struggles, is 
both historically and logically incorrect.50
Without denying the necessity of constructing more general models, Petras is aware that the
^J. Keep, The Russian Revolution: A Study in Mass Mobilization, Norton, '4 N . , 1976, p. 25.
49Gerschenkron, op. dt., p. 60.
50J. Petras, "Sodalist Revolutions and their Class Components”, New Left Review, 111, p. 16. It is upon this myth, 
argues Petras, that 'Fanonism' and 'functionalism' rub shoulders. For a similar argument, see R. Cohen, "Workers in 
Developing Countries", in H. Alavi and T. Shanin (eds), An Introduction to the Sociology of 'Developing Societies", 
Macmillan,u>nAen41982. Diane Koenker, in her study of the Moscow working dass argues that: "Workers with relatively 
high wages tended to strike more often and more easily than poorly paid workers”, D. Koenker, Moscow Workers and the 
1917 Revolution, Princeton U.P., N.J., 1981, p. 358.
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revolutionary potential of classes must be related to the historical peculiarities of the social 
structure under consideration.31
Apart from these theoretical and logical objections to Gerschenkron's claim, it should also be 
emphasized that 'improving7 is a relative term and, in the case of Russia, it must be viewed 
from the perspective of the appalling austerity, low wages and sub-standard living conditions 
experienced by the working class in the 1890's.32
On an empirical level, the nature of the strikes during the period appear to have been more 
political than Gerschenkron suggests. The activities of the St Petersburg Soviet during the 1905 
Revolution certainly transcended 'economisin' or 'trade-unionism'.53 During that year over 1.1 
million workers participated in political strikes. After progressively declining to 3,800 
participants by 1910 (during the Stolypin Reaction) the number of participants in political 
strikes rose dramatically to almost one million in the first half of 1914 alone.54 One can concur 
with Fitzpatrick that "the empirical evidence of the period from the 1890's to 1914 suggests that 
in fact Russia's working class...was exceptionally militant and revolutionary. Large-scale strikes 
were frequent, the workers showing considerable solidarity against management and state 
authority, and their demands were usually political as well as economic...”33
The frequency of political strikes in pre-revolutionary Russia must also be related to the 
peculiarities of the developmental model pursued by the state. Until 1905 trade-unions 
remained illegal (apart from the Interior Ministry-sponsored unions organised by Zubatov 
between 1901 and 1903).36 This inevitably and immediately heightened any 'economic' protest 
by workers to improve their conditions into demands which included freedom of organisation. 
It is difficult to separate economic strikes from political strikes when the effectiveness of 
economic actions depend upon a transformation of the political milieu.37
The difficulty of differentiating economic from political struggles is compounded when the 
role of the Tsarist state in the economy is considered. A fundamental flaw in Gerschenkron's
3lSee T. Shanin, "Class, State and Revolution: Substitutes and Realities", in Alavi & Shanin (eds), op. dt. For the need 
to combine 'generic' models of capitalist dass structure with specific class systems see A. Giddens, "Class Structure and 
Class Consdousness", in A. Giddens & D. Held (eds), Class, Power and Conflict: Classical and Contemporary Debates, 
M a c m i l l a n , 1982, p. 161.
S2See Dobb, op. dt., p. 58-60.
^See V.E. Bonneil, Roots of Rebellion: Workers' Politics and Organizations in St Petersburg and Moscow, 1900-1914,
University of C a l i f o r n i a , 1983, Part 2; and O. Anweiler, The Soviets: The Russian Workers', Peasants' and Soldiers' 
Councils, 1905-21, Random House, N.Y., 1974, Cn. 2.
^L. Haimson, "The Problem of Sodal Stability in Urban Russia, 1905-1917", in M. Chemiavsky (ed), The Structure of 
Russian History, N.Y., 1970, p. 377. Trotsky, op. dt., p. 32,provides slightlly higher figures. Workers who partidpated in 
numerous strikes are accredited with the number of strikes in which they partidpated, therefore inflating the number of 
strikers. However, this does not alter the trends.
"Fitzpatrick, op. dt., p. 15.
a6See Pipes, op. dt., pp. 312-3.
37 A similar point is argued by Smith, op. dt., pp. 2-3: and Bonnell, op. dt., pp. 450-2.
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extrapolation of socio-economic trends (and his comparison with the West) is his failure to 
examine the effect the state's role in industrialisation had upon class conflict. In order to assure 
the success of its mode of industrialisation the state was forced to directly confront workers' 
demands. The consequence was that the Tsarist state, unlike its Western counterpart during the 
same epoch, was unable to act, or rather appear to be acting, as an arbiter in the conflict between 
capital and labour. The substitutionist links of foreign capital and the state for local capital 
required an interventionist stance on the part of the state toward industrial relations.
The state in capitalist society promotes the maintenance and reproduction of capitalist 
relations of production,08 and its development under 'classical' conditions provided grounds 
for the hegemonic liberal notion that the state exists above civil conflict. The perception is one of 
the role of the state as an arbiter of conflicting interests in the general interest of society as a 
whole, rather than serving any particular interest. The Russian mode of state-sponsored 
industrialisation precluded any such mythology of the state. Its stake in promoting state and 
private industry meant that "state authorities were quick to provide troops when strikes against 
private enterprise showed signs of getting out of hand."59 This was amply demonstrated time 
after time, notable examples being the 1905 Revolution and the Lena Goldfield massacre of 1912 
(the latter triggering a nationwide response from labour). This mobilisation of labour will be 
discussed more concretely in Chapter 4.
There are other reasons why the liberal concept of the state was inapplicable to Russian 
reality. Another, non-economic, version of the 'dual society' thesis has been employed by 
Robert Tucker in order to clarify the relationship between state and class in Russia. Tucker 
notes that the image of dual Russia had deep roots in Russian intellectual tradition.60 On the 
one hand there was the image of the 'state' or 'official Russia' (gosudarstvo, vlast'), and on the 
other hand 'popular Russia' or 'the people' (narod, obshchestvo). The 'state-for-itself was 
perceived as a manipulative instrument of change, acting upon the population at large ("the 
tool and victim of the state's designs.").61 Rather than reflecting any particular civil interest, the 
state was viewed as functioning in its own interest, above all particular classes and against all 
classes. At the end of the nineteenth century Sir Donald MacKenzie Wallace wrote that: "It was 
in the nature of things that the Government, aiming at the realization of designs which its 
subjects neither sympathized with nor understood, should have become separated from the 
nation ....The state has thus come to be regarded as an abstract entity..."62 The state was not perceived 
as bourgeois, yet neither was it viewed as the arbiter of civil conflict. It was popularly viewed as 
an instrument of naked exploitation and oppression.
58See the debate between Miliband and Poulantzas, in R Blackburn (ed), Ideology in Social Science, F o n t a n a , , 
1979.
o9Fitzpatrick, op. dt., p. 15.
60R. Tucker, The Soviet Political Mind, Norton, . , 1971, pp. 121-42.
61 Ibid, p. 122.
^Quoted in ibid, p. 125. On the same issue, Trotsky provided the hypothesis that: "The more centralized a state is, 
and the more independent from the ruling dasses, the more rapidly it is transformed into a self-contained organization 
placed above sodety." L. Trotsky, 1905, Penguin,H wor^ Vv p. 28.
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Gerschenkron's expectations that Russia was entering a Western phase of development 
neglects this peculiarity in the nature of Russian industrial conflict. He assumes a more 
disinterested role of the Russian state in the process of capital accumulation. Labour tended to 
confront the state far sooner and far more threateningly than in the West. In other words, 
conflict between labour and capital tended to become more acute due to the absence of any 
acceptable mechanism of arbitration. Political impetus tended to be generated out of any 
economic demands which the existing institutional structure failed to satisfy. Trotsky explained 
this popularity and necessity of the political strike through arguing that the Russian proletariat:
...learned its first steps in the political circumstances created by a despotic state. Strikes 
forbidden by law, illegal proclamations, street demonstrations, encounters with the police and 
with troops - such was the school created by the combination of a swiftly developing capitalism 
with an absolutism slowly surrendering its positions. The concentration of workers in colossal 
enterprises, the intense character of government persecution, and finally the impulsiveness of a 
young and fresh proletariat, brought it about that the political strike, so rare in Western Europe, 
became in Russia the fundamental method of struggle.
Structurally, a polarised choice between economic and political action made little sense under
prevailing social conditions.
The evidence presented above contradicts Gerschenkron's claim that industrial class conflict 
was abating on the eve of the war, and that revolution was extraneous to the process of social 
development. As Leopold Haimson has demonstrated in his analysis of the mobilisation of the 
St Petersburg proletariat on the eve of the First World War, there are sufficient empirical and 
theoretical grounds for arguing the contrary.64 The form which capitalist development 
assumed, and the role performed by the state in this process, ensured that urban class conflict 
remained an inherently volatile feature of Russian social relations. Furthermore, the importance 
of industrialisation (the vortex of the state's development strategy) ensured that the proletariat 
would assume a central role in any explosion of the social tensions inherent within this process.
Another question which must be addressed is the extent of social differentiation among the 
urban working class. Intra-class differentiation has often been used as an explanatory concept 
for the inability of classes to mobilise or act in their own interests. E.H. Carr has observed that a 
'labour aristocracy' (a feature characteristic of the Western, especially English, working class at 
the time) failed to emerge within the Russian working class movement.63 While status 
differentiation existed within the production process (especially between skilled craftsmen, 
masteruuye, and unskilled labourers, chernorabochii) Smith argues that it would have been 
misleading to view, for example, a skilled metal-worker as a labour aristocrat' because of the 
lack of 'social closure' to even the most prestigious industrial trades.66 A further distinction can
^Trotsky, History...., p. 31.
^Haimson, op. dt.
^Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution: 1917-1923: Vol. 1, Pelican,^ wcrtW, 1976, p. 21. For a recent critique of the use of the 
concept 'labour aristocracy', arguing that Lenin's definition differed from Engels use of the term for sections of the 
English working dass at the end of the nineteenth century see J.M. Barbarlet, "The 'Labour Aristocracy' in Context”, in 
Science and Society, Vol. 51, No. 2,1987.
66He condudes that ” the skilled metal workers of St Petersburg were thus distant from British ‘labour aristocrats', but 
neither were they yet the 'mas-production' workers of the modern assembly plant.” Smith, op. dt., pp. 28-9.
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be made between 'cadre' workers and 'peasant7 workers, the former category representing 
workers with substantial experience in industry and insignificant ties to the village, and the 
latter category describing recent migrants from the village still steeped in rural custom and 
work habits. Although there is controversy over the precision of the definitions and their 
significance, it is generally accepted that on the eve of the war only St Petersburg possessed a 
(slight) majority of cadre workers.67 However, contradictory evidence exists concerning the 
revolutionary potential of both categories. While many writers have stressed the proportion of 
cadre workers as a constituting factor to the development of revolutionary consciousness,68 
other writers have stressed the size of the peasant worker contingent in explaining the 
propensity to rebel against authority and towards revolutionary action.69 However, on either 
grounds, the differences between the composition and trends of the Western working class and 
the Russian working class are sufficient and significant enough to bring into question 
Gerschenkron's claims concerning the reformist, economistic tendencies of the Russian urban 
proletariat.70
Before concluding, it should be mentioned that Gerschenkron's argument implicitly bears all 
the hallmarks of the functionalist paradigm in sociology. Employing the jargon characteristic of 
the approach, his interpretation of the period under consideration can be translated as follows: 
The 'drive towards maturity' (Rostow) within the economy resulted in an 'institutionalisation 
of class conflict' (Dahrendorf) which manifested itself in working class depolitidsation, or an 
'end of ideology' (Bell). The psychological condition of 'relative deprivation' (Davies) was 
diminishing, and therefore the revolutionary outbursts of 1917 must be explained in terms of 
'contingent7 forces which were only tangentially related to the existing stage of 
'modernisation7.71
A different argument has been developed in this section. The spectacular and rapid growth 
promoted by the Tsarist state had been achieved at the cost of straining class tension. Even 
assuming that Russia was catching up with the West (a notion contested by R.W. Goldsmith72) 
and further assuming that the advantageous external economic conditions had been maintained
67Ibid, pp. 14-23.
68See the discussion in ibid, pp. 14-23. Koenker, op. d t ,  pp. 356-67, argues that it was the 'skilled urban cadres' rather 
than the 'unskilled peasant mass' who were the leading political actors during the revolutionary situation of 1917.
®Q., Carr, op. dt., p. 21; also Fitzpatrick, op. dt., p. 15, and Wolf, Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century, Faber, 
k e n d o  o. , 1973, p. 297.
70Johnson condudes his study of the Moscow proletariat by arguing that the "villages influence over factory life was 
subtle and complex, and does not easily match the stereotypes that historians, East and West, have often accepted". R.E. 
Johnson, Peasant and Proletarian: The Working Class of Moscow in the Late Nineteenth Century, Rutgers University Press, 
N Z . ,1979, p. 155.
71 The terminology has been borrowed from the following sources: Rostow, op. dt; R. Dahrendorf, Class and Class 
Conflict in an Industrial Society, R.K.P., London, 1959: D. Bell, The End of Ideology, The Free Press, N.Y., 1962; J. Davies, 
"Towards a Theory of Revolution", in American Sociological Review, 27 ,1962.
^See R.W. Goldsmith, "Economic Growth of Tsarist Russia: 1860 - 1913", Economic Development and Cultural Change, 
Vol. 9, 1961. "Between 1860 and 1913 Russia failed to catch up economically with the Western world and even fell 
further behind its leaders." p. 443.
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(a possibility questioned by Shanin'J) there are sufficient grounds for arguing that industrial 
relations would have remained inherently unstable. The war heightened these inherent 
tensions, acting as an accelerator, rather than an underlying cause of the revolutionary 
situation. In other words, the nature of the revolution must be discovered within the dynamics 
of pre-revolutionary capitalist development. While this does not automatically imply the 
inevitability of revolution, it does suggest that revolution remained a potential built into the 
existing social structure.
2.4. THE WEAKNESS OF THE BOURGEOISIE
The previous section highlighted the conflict between the urban working class and the state. 
As various writers have noted, and as this analysis of Tsarist development demonstrates, the 
state performs a crucial role in dependent capitalist development. Under such conditions, 
control over industry and finance is usually concentrated in a 'triple alliance' of the state, 
foreign capital and the local bourgeoisie.74 In the initial section of this chapter, the importance 
of the role of the state and foreign capital was discussed. It has been argued that the local 
bourgeoisie tends to be the junior partner in this 'holy trinity' of capitalist development. 
However, in each instance of dependent capitalist development there are specific structural and 
psychological factors affecting the relative strength of each sector. In this section the factors 
which accounted for the position of the Russian bourgeoisie will be explored.
The substitution of the state for private capital noted by Gerschenkron had its roots deep in 
the history of the patrimonial Tsarist state. This contributed to the weakness of the indigenous 
bourgeoisie. The stranglehold of the Muscovite state over trade and industry, and its 
distribution of monopolistic privileges to individuals strictly accountable to, and heavily taxed 
by, the state, inhibited the growth of a rising commercial and industrial class corresponding to 
the Western bourgeoisie. As Richard Pipes notes: "In practice, any product which entered into 
commerce became the subject of a state monopoly. It is difficult to conceive of a practice more 
fatal to the entrepreneurial spirit."75 The state-employed businessmen {gosti) had good reason 
to support monopolisation and reject free trade. Requiring the preservation of the patrimonial 
state for their livelihood, they tended to 'fawn' on authority. This divided them from the "mass 
of ordinary traders" who ekked out a living "from the scraps from the table of the Tsar."76 
Liberal ideology was thus inimical to the spirit of the gosti.77
^See Shanin, Awkward Class, Ch. 1.
/4For non-core nations in general, see B. Berberoglu, "The Nature and Contradictions of State Capitalism in the Third 
World: A Reexamination of Dominant Conceptions and an Alternative Formulation", in Social and Economic Studies, Vol. 
28, No. 2,1979, p. 343. See also Shanin, Developing Society, pp. 184-5.
^Pipes, op. dt., p. 195.
76Ibid, pp. 197-8.
77Alec Nove ironically remarks that Adam Smith's Tne Wealth of Nations "was translated into Russian on the orders of 
the minister of finance (typically this too was a state initiative)”. Nove, "Emergent Country”, p. 32.
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Furthermore, Muscovite Russia's earliest manufacturing enterprises had been established 
with Tsarist permission by foreigners (mainly Dutch, Germans and Swedes) who supplied a 
fixed quota of output to the state at cost price and freely traded the surplus on the market. 
Pipes notes that during the seventeenth century native capital "and managerial personnel were 
as conspicuous by their absence as they would have been in any western colonial 
dependency."78
Another significant difference with Western Europe which affected the rise of an independent, 
liberal-minded artisan and bourgeois class was the nature of the Russian city. Geographical and 
economic factors forced upon the Russian people a weak division of labour, which manifested 
itself in a comingling of agricultural and non-agricultural activities. As a result, "the centre of 
trade and manufacturing lay not in the city but in the countryside; the commercial and 
industrial classes did not constitute the bulk of the urban population..."79 The city remained 
essentially an administrative, bureaucratic, military outpost,80 controlling a serf-based economy 
which, with expansive frontiers, offered ample opportunity to defy bondage. Along with the 
entrepreneurial restrictions of the patrimonial state, this severely curtailed the autonomous 
growth of the Muscovite city along Western European lines. As both Marx and Weber noted in 
their accounts of the rise of capitalism, the Western European city was the incubator of the new 
mode of production within feudal society.81 The pervasiveness of Tsarism afforded few 
opportunities for the development of an independent urban culture.
Throughout the seventeenth century the state progressively relaxed trade restrictions. 
However, regulations on serf-ownership effectively delivered a coup-de-grace to the 
development of a middle class through depriving merchants and entrepreneurs from holding 
serfs. Trade and industry became concentrated in the hands of Russia's traditional estates, the 
peasantry and the gentry. "Merchants now had to watch helplessly as some of the most 
profitable branches of industry were taken over by classes based in the countryside and rooted 
in agriculture."82 Thus, prior to the Emancipation, the prospects of a rising bourgeoisie 
remained bleak. The middle estate became merely "a kind of half-way house for those moving 
up and down the social ladder."83 Nothing provides more eloquent testimony to the 
predominance of pre-capitalist relations over capitalist relations than this scenario. An 
examination of the leading industrialists at the turn of the twentieth century revealed that a
78Pipes, op. dt., p. 196.
/9Ibid, p. 198. According to Trotsky: "The crafts were not separated from agriculture nor were they concentrated in 
the towns; instead they remained in the hands of the village population, in the form of home industries scattered over 
the entire countryside." L. Trotsky, 1905, p. 30.
80See Melotti, op. dt., pp. 86-7 and pp. 93-4.
81See ibid, pp. 96-100 for Marx. For Weber, see M. Weber, General Economic History, Collier, New York, 1961, pp. 
233-49.
^Pipes, op. dt., p. 212.
83Ibid, p. 217.
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significant number had peasant backgrounds.84This situation was a direct result of post-Petrine 
policy towards industry and commerce.
Once the state had decided to 'modernise' in the mid-nineteenth century the absence of an 
independent propertied class took on a new meaning. Berch Berberoglu's description of state 
capitalism in the Third World provides a useful framework for understanding the post- 
Emancipation economic stages which Russia proceeded through.
The state gradually acquires the ownership of the major means of production and distribution 
because the national bourgeoisie is not in a position (economically) to develop these industries. 
Initially, the state in not so interested in capital accumulation (or to take on the role of 
entrepreneur per se) but rather serves an important function by aiding the national bourgeoisie to 
build and strengthen the latter7s industrial base. It is only after the failure of this initial stage does 
the state step in to take over the production process, and, in its own right, become an agent of 
capital accumulation whose top bureaucratic leaders can now be seen as a state bourgeoisie.85
This process can be seen in the specificity of post-Emancipation Russia. While the state-
sponsored industrialisation from Count Witte until the beginning of the World War gave birth
to a radical, egalitarian-oriented proletariat, its industrial antithesis (the bourgeoisie) failed to
successfully replicate the role played by its Western counterpart as a liberal challenger to the
absolutist state. Legally, Emancipation abolished labour-hiring restrictions upon the
industrialists. However, as noted above, the peasantry remained effectively tied to the land
immediately after the reforms. The two decades after the Emancipation witnessed a stimulation
in the development of light industry through low tariffs, and a continuous trade deficit.86 The
growth during this period can be attributed largely to private initiative.87 Furthermore, during
this period of liberal, laissez-faire economic policy, the growth of heavy industry remained
restricted.
Though there was an observable strengthening of sectors of the bourgeoisie immediately after 
the Emancipation, its relative economic weakness, historico-structural deficiencies and lack of 
political and cultural influence made it a highly improbable contender for the role of 'vanguard' 
in any forthcoming revolutionary movement against the autocracy. The nature of the pre­
revolutionary bourgeoisie remains a controversial feature of Russia's social structure prior to 
the October Revolution. Richard Pipes speaks of "the missing bourgeoisie", while in a similar 
vein John Keep has argued that "terms such as 'bourgeois' and 'capitalist' belonged to the 
language of revolutionary mythology; they had lost their original roots in socio-economic 
reality", and that the word burzhuaziya, "alien to the Russian tongue", functioned merely as a 
pejorative term, or a "negative symbol".88 It is possible to accept Keep's view that "the Russian
^Vernadsky, op. dt., p. 247. "Of the owners of Moscow's 50 largest industrial and trade concerns as of 1900, 29 were 
descendants of peasants; 8 of petty-merchants, and 5 of noblemen. Five were of foreign descent; the origin of 3 is 
uncertain."
^Berberoglu, op. dt., p. 352.
^Falkus, op.dt., p. 56.
87As Falkus notes, "...before the 1880's the Russian government did not play a direct role in much of the industrial 
expansion that occurred." Ibid, p. 56. Goldsmith, op. dt., provides growth figures for the period. A condensed version 
can be found in Nove, Economic History, p. 12.
^Keep, op. dt., p. 26.
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entrepreneurs differed from their eighteenth century and nineteenth century French prototypes 
in quantity and quality", without accepting the radical dismissal of the existence of a Russian 
bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie was characterised by its inability and unwillingness to promote its 
own class interests independently of the state.
In 1884, before state intervention in industrialisation had made its full impact, few Marxists 
disputed Plekhanov7 s argument, stated in Our Differences, that:
...the interests of the Russian bourgeoisie are now coming into irreconcilable contradiction to 
the interests of absolutism....Our bourgeoisie is now undergoing an important metamorphosis; it 
has developed lungs which require the fresh air of political self-government but at the same time 
its gills, with which it still breathes in the troubled waters of decaying absolutism, have not yet 
completely atrophied.89
The political tranquility of the bourgeoisie, compared to other social forces, did not disturb 
Plekhanov, for after all: "Did not the Italian bourgeoisie let the revolutionaries pick out of the 
fire the chestnuts of political emancipation and unification and are they not feeding on those 
chestnuts."90
By the time of the first congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Workers Party (R.S.D.W.P.) 
in 1898 this optimism in a replication of the Western form of historical development and class 
struggle had been tempered. The manifesto of the party read: "The further east one goes in 
Europe, the meaner, more cowardly and politically weak the bourgeoisie becomes, and the 
greater are the cultural and political tasks that fall to the proletariat."91
However, descriptive terms such as 'weaker7, 'meaner7, and 'cowardly7, tend to suggest 
psychological, subjective fears of the Russian bourgeoisie, rather than the structural 
underpinnings of their class circumstances. The barren grounds of the post-Emandpation 
period conditioned the response of an independent entrepreneurial class. From the 18807s 
onwards, Pipes notes, "Russia had missed the chance to create a bourgeoisie at a time when that 
had been possible, that is on the basis of manufacture and private capitalism."92 Pipes also 
stresses the "unpreparedness" and "unwillingness" of the Russian middle class to meet the 
challenge of rapid heavy industrialisation, arguing that "native entrepreneurship showed little 
inclination to commit itself."93 Given the scardty of private capital to undertake such an 
enormous task, Pipes is arguably unwarranted in his criticism of the bourgeoisie. The objective 
'law of uneven and combined development7 provides a more satisfactory point of departure. 
As noted in the first section of this chapter, both Trotsky and Gerschenkron point to the 
peculiar advantages of backwardness. Once the state committed itself full-heartedly to heavy 
industrialisation in the 1880's and 18907s it was offered the privilege of being able to choose
89G. Plekhanov, Selected Philosophical Works: Volume 1, Progress, Moscow, 1977, pp. 214-5.
^Ibid, p. 216.
91P. Struve, "Manifesto of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party”, in N. Harding (ed), Marxism in Russia, 
Cambridge U.P., Cambridge, 1983, p. 224.
92Pipes, op. dt., p. 218.
93Ibid, p. 218.
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between various levels of technology best suited to Russian requirements. The long path from 
"bows and arrows' to 'guns' could be telescoped through a simple decision by the state. Not 
surprisingly given the perceived urgency of industrialisation and the size of the nation, the state 
opted for the introduction of the latest technology, concentration of human resources and large 
plant size.
One important advantage size possessed for the Tsarist state was its ability to overcome the 
scarcity in management and technical skill. Foreign personnel, as well as foreign technology 
and capital, under the guidance of the Tsarist state, helped to fulfil the role which indigenous 
capital had provided in Western Europe. As Pipes notes:
The great surge in Russian industrial production in the 18907s....was not so much the outgrowth 
of Russia's own, internal economic development, as the transplantation of western money, 
technology, and above all, management. Russian capitalists - rich landowners and merchants 
alike - were too ignorant of the techniques of modem investment to be able to initiate the kind of 
financial operations which were required.94
However, Pipes appears to underemphasize the problems facing the bourgeoisie. Forced 
industrialisation, especially with an emphasis upon heavy industry, could not be undertaken 
from an underdeveloped base by private capital lacking the potential resources for large-scale 
capital accumulation. As Olga Crisp argues, the scale of capital requirements, and the risks 
involved, undermined the ability of the bourgeoisie to perform a catalystic role in the process of 
economic development.95 Only the state possessed the financial capacity to accumulate 
sufficient capital and undertake heavy industrialisation during a period when the advanced 
nations were tending towards concentration and monopolisation of production on the basis of 
more sophisticated technology. An additional factor which inhibited private capital 
accumulation was the state's policy of financing heavy industry through regressive agricultural 
taxation. This adversely affected the expansion of light industry by squeezing internal demand. 
As noted above, it was precisely this sector which had demonstrated private capital growth 
during the two decades before the state embarked on its ambitious sponsorship of heavy 
industry. Under these conditions, it is difficult to envisage any situation other than the state 
acting as the accumulator and drawing upon foreign capital in order maintain industrial 
momentum.
In addition, the early cartelisation of industry and the prominence of finance capital in the 
development of state-sponsored heavy industry produced close ties between a powerful, 
though numerically insignificant, economic elite and the political elite of the Tsarist state 
(especially within the Ministry of Finance). This group saw little advantage in promoting 
liberalism (in its political or economic form) and supported high tariffs and regressive taxation 
policies which squeezed the peasantry. According to Pipes, the political impotence of the 
Russian bourgeoisie derived from a conviction, borne through centuries of experience, that "the 
path to wealth lay not in fighting the authorities but in collaborating with them, with the
94Pipes, ibid, p. 219.
9SCrisp, op. dL, p. 25 & 51. This exacerbated what she terms 'the weakness of the autonomous forces'.
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corollary conviction that when contenders for political power were locked in combat it was 
wisest to sit tight."96
This situation was predictable, given the close ties which the state had cultivated with foreign 
and domestic capital. Despite this cooperation, Gerschenkron asserts that this period of 
"diminishing backwardness" between the 1880's and the war consisted of "two distinct yet 
connected parts", namely state-sponsored and private-banking initiated.97 However, this claim 
must be tempered by Falkus' observation that "there existed a close connection between the 
banking structure and the Russian Treasury, so that the distinction between state-finance on the 
one hand and 'private' bank finance on the other cannot be too finely drawn."98 From the class 
perspective of the bourgeoisie, it was rational to prefer state patronage, rather than stir the seas 
of revolt, when their cultural and political influence was weak, and the 'dark masses' and the 
intelligentsia were an unknown rebellious quantity.
To conclude, the lines of controversy over the status and nature of the Russian bourgeoisie 
have often been poorly drawn. Concepts such as 'the missing bourgeoisie' (or the bourgeoisie as 
a figment of the revolutionary imagination) are clearly exaggerations based upon the anomaly 
that the bourgeoisie was numerically weak in a nation with the fifth highest gross industrial 
production in the world. This situation had been promoted by the pervasive nature of the 
patrimonial state, 'late-development', the infusion of foreign capital, technology and personnel, 
and the scale of production. Each of these factors interacted to produce the structural 
'weakness' of the bourgeoisie. These underlying objective circumstances, which upon 
reflection, render the behaviour of the bourgeoisie quite rational.
Promotion of heavy industry under relative backwardness in a world of comparative costs 
required state intervention in order to extract surplus from agriculture, raise tariff barriers and 
attract foreign capital and technology. The domestic bourgeoisie was unable, rather than 
unwilling, to supply the capital for primitive capital accumulation. Furthermore, the state's 
option for heavy industry restricted the internal market which had slowly but significantly 
widened during the two decades after Emancipation.99 However, once the state had indicated
%Pipes, op. dt., p. 220.
^Gerschenkron, op. dt., p. 56.
98FaIkus, op. dt., p. 81. Crisp also argues that "right up to 1914 ther was a spedal relationship between banks and the 
State Bank and treasury." Crisp, p. 23. (see also pp. 33-4 <& 51).
"Whether this expanding cyde of production and distribution prior to the 1880's could have produced a Western- 
style bourgeoisie is a hypothetical question. However, this problem of peasant demand was to reemerge in another 
guise during the 1920's in the debates over Soviet development and the New Economic Policy. It was Nikolai Bukharin 
who argued that a slower ('snail-paced') consumer-oriented strategy would lead to optimal economic growth. See 
M. Lewin, Political Undercurrents in Soviet Economic Debates, Pluto, L o n d o n  , 1975; and A. Erlich, The Soviet 
Industrialization Debate: 1924-1928, Harvard, I960. Teodor Shanin and Alec Nove have both observed that
Russian statesmen (whether Tsarist or Bolshevik) confronted numerous problems assodated with modem 'developing' 
nations. The consequences of this situation for economic development have been noted by Alec Nove, who remarks: 
"Russian industry, particularly in consumer goods, depended to a considerable extent on the purchasing power of the 
peasants for its market This dilemma is by no means peculiar to Russia, and raises an issue of great interest in the 
economics of development." Nove, op. d t ,  p. 19. See also Gerschenkron, op. dt., p. 45 and pp. 47-8. This issue is also 
central to Shanin's Developing Society.
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its preference for heavy industry there was ample opportunity for private profit within this 
investment path, or indirect involvement through investment in Imperial government 
securities. The Tsarist state and private capital complemented rather than contradicted one 
another, and this consequently tempered any substantial anti-autocratic aspirations of the 
bourgeoisie.
Furthermore, as discussed in the last section, industrialisation had given birth to a political 
adversary of both the autocracy and capitalism; an increasingly politicised proletariat. From 
the perspective of the bourgeoisie, the stagnant waters of decaying absolutism at least afforded 
greater security than the turbulent currents of the workers' movement.100
2.5. THE 'AGRARIAN PROBLEM' AND INDUSTRIALISATION
The previous two sections explored the class relations corresponding to the structural 
description of the Russian economy outlined in the first section. The structure of late-Tsarist 
socio-economic development was described as an articulated duality of distinct yet interrelated 
social systems. The peculiarities of Russian urban social relations were then described, and it 
was argued that inherent conflict between the working class and the state remained the biggest 
threat to the maintenance of the structure. Capital remained sufficiently integrated into the 
model of development to preclude it playing a leading role in any social movement against the 
autocracy. However, it remains to examine the social relations peculiar to the agrarian sector. 
The events of 1917 have been described as a "proletarian revolution flanked by a peasant 
war."101The argument in this section is that this peasant war was also a reflection of the 
inherent conflict generated by the Tsarist state's model of capitalist development.
Reflecting upon the nature of the social forces involved in the revolutionary situation of 1917, 
Moshe Lewin has pointed to the distinct yet articulated nature of the urban/rural opposition to 
the old regime. He asks:
Did the two great currents, whose convergence had enabled the Bolsheviks to seize power, 
really form part of a single stream? Or was it merely that two streams, temporarily flowing the 
same course, had happened to converge but were destined to diverge again once their common 
primary objectives had been obtained.1“2
While this dilemma was a recurrent problem for the Bolsheviks during the 1920's, its 
significance for this thesis lies in the question: how was such a convergence possible in the first 
place? This section argues that the origins of this convergence must be sought in the structure of 
late-Tsarist development. Along with the working class movement, the peasant current was 
channelled within the banks of capitalist modernisation, and provided the coincidence of a
100At this point it is useful to remember E.H. Carr's warning on the repetition of history which was quoted in the 
introductory chapter.
101M. Lewin, Russian Peasants and Soviet Power, Allen and Unwin, London, 1963, p. 132.
102Ibid, p. 132.
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proletarian revolution and a peasant war.103
The peasant current had always been perceived as the 'backward', 'ancient7, 'archaic7, and 
'stagnant7 element of Russian society. It was exalted by the 'Slavophiles' and abhorred by the 
'westerners'. Despite the fact that the peasant mode of production persisted in a tenacious 
manner,104 it is oversimplistic to retain a strict dichotomy between 'tradition' and 'modernity7 
in the process of Tsarist capitalist development.103 Classical 'dual society7 and modernisation 
theories fail to account for the fact that the peasant economy furnished the resources for rapid 
industrialisation.106
A fundamental point of departure for understanding 'the agrarian problem7 is that the terms 
of the Emancipation secured a strengthening of pre-capitalist and non-economic forms of social 
control and land distribution. As noted above, this paved the way for state intervention in 
agrarian exploitation, and the subsequent financing of state-sponsored industrial development. 
Consequently, the traditional sector was as much a corollary of modernity as its antithesis. In 
addition, it should be stressed that the increased level of taxation was imposed upon an 
agricultural system which had barely increased its level of production, and which was 
experiencing a high rate of population growth. The agrarian crisis was triggered as much by the 
burdens imposed to finance Tsarist capitalist development as by the limitations of its pre­
capitalist dynamics. The distinct peasant and proletarian currents were channelled together by 
the imperatives of capitalist industrialisation.
Theories of development in the contemporary Third World can be usefully applied to 
conceptualise the urban/rural interlinkages in late-Tsarist Russia. In the terminology of 
'dependency7 theory an urban metropolis was conducting 'unequal exchange' with a rural 
'periphery7.107 However, the dependency paradigm requires modification. Firstly, although the
103Such a combination was not unique to Russia. Lenin, in his outline of the nature of the Russian revolution, had 
recalled Marx's comments on the events in Prussia in 1848. See Lenin, op. dt., Vol. 33, p. 479. Furthermore, reflecting 
upon the Vienna insurrection of that same year, Marx had provided a general hypothesis concerning the unstable 
nature of such combinations: "...it is the fate of all revolutions that this union of classes, which is to some degree always 
the necessary condition of any revolution, cannot subsist long. No sooner is the victory gained against the common 
enemy than the victors become divided among themselves into different camps, and turn their weapons against each 
other. It is this rapid and passionate development of dass antagonism which, in old and complicated sodal organisms, 
makes a revolution such a powerful instrument of sodal and political progress." K. Marx, Revolution and 
Counter-Revolution, Unwin, London. , 1971, p. 31.
104As Shanin notes: "This power of the essential features of peasant sodal structure to endure manifested itself time 
and time again, defying a variety of reforms, pieces of legislation, and even revolutions." Shanin has presented 
convincing evidence of the 'cyclical' nature of sodal change inherent within the Russian peasant social structure. 
Shanin, Awkward Class, p. 26.
10STalcott Parsons' five 'pattem variables' have been the most influential dualist expression of the different role 
definitions characterised by 'traditional' and 'modem' sodal structures. See T. Parsons, The Social System, Macmillan, 
New York, 1951. See also Rostow, op. dt.
106For a critique of 'dual sodety' theories applied to Russia, see Johnson, op. dt., p. 7; and Crisp, op. dt., p. 7. It is for 
reasons such as the above that writers such as Ernesto Ladau rejed the concept of 'duality'. See E. Ladau, "Feudalism 
and Capitalism in Latin America", New Left Review, No. 67, May/June 1971, p. 31. "Dualism implies that no connections 
exist between the 'modem' or 'progressive' sector and the 'dosed' or 'traditional' sedor.”
107Cf. A.G. Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America, Penguin,H'^orth , 1969.
56
agrarian sector was an integral component of Tsarist capitalist development, the economic 
dynamic and logic of this sector cannot be described as capitalist.108 This will be discussed 
below. Secondly, the important role performed by foreign capital and international trade 
cannot in itself account for the concrete form which class antagonisms assumed in the period 
prior to the revolution. As argued above, this must be understood at the level of state capital 
accumulation, and at the level of the existing relationships between the state and internally 
located social classes.
There are a variety of reasons which account for the retarded structural transformation of the 
agricultural sector, and its failure to substantially increase production. The nobility remained 
attached to the land after Emancipation as rentiers rather than developing intensive, 
commercial estates. Moreover, as noted before, a high proportion of the nobility7s income was 
immediately transferred to the state in order to pay off previously accrued debts. By 1913 the 
nobility had sold off half the land they had retained from the Emancipation Act, while half the 
remainder was rented out to the peasantry.109 In contrast, the percentage of land held by the 
peasantry rose between 1877 and 1917 from 32% to 47%.110 By 1915 only 10% of Russia's land 
was run as estates, while the nobility owned only one-twentieth of the livestock.111 On the other 
hand, 'peasantisatioiT of agricultural production did not reflect higher peasant living standards, 
but rather an increased taxation burden upon the rural community.
While half the national income of Russia was obtained through agriculture, it employed 
two-thirds of the labour force.112 Surplus agricultural labour exceeded demand estimated to be 
anywhere between one-third and two-thirds.113In addition to overpopulation and high taxation 
(which by 1913 had reached 18% of income) other factors which contributed to peasant poverty 
were the pre-mechanical, pre-sdentific and extensive techniques of production, the tenfold 
increase in the price of land in the forty years after Emancipation, the terms of agricultural trade 
(indirect taxation) and a decrease in the average size of farm.
An anomaly in the application of modernisation theory to Russia appears to be that industrial 
'take-off' and the encroachment of market relations in the countryside failed to promote 
sustainable agricultural development. In fact a very strong case can be made for the argument 
that this contact with modernity adversely affected agrarian development. As Shanin notes:
108See Shanin, op. dt.; see also P. Kerblay, "Chayanov and the Theory of Peasantry as a Specific Type of Economy", in 
T. Shanin (ed), Peasants and Peasant Societies, Penguin,VW\»*octVv., 1979.
109Shanin, op. dt., p. 21. The following statistics, unless otherwise indicated, refer to Russia as a whole. They should 
be viewed with the consideration that, not surprisingly in a territory as expansive as the Tsarist empire, there were 
significant regional variations. Discussions of the factors and consequences of these regional variations are found in 
Dobb, op. dt., pp. 46-55; while Keep, op. dt., follows the variations through the revolutionary process of 1917.
u0Wolf, op. dt., p. 65.
m Shanin, op. dt., p. 21. Treadgold has remarked that "if large landholding was the chief culprit of the agrarian 
problem, then the revolution may have killed it, but it was already dying." Quoted in Wolf, op. dt., p. 65.
112Goldsmith, op. d t ,  p. 442.
113Shanin, op. dt., p. 22.
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The peasantry carried a heavy burden  of state expenditure and of forced capitalist 
industrialisation in the towns, while participating to a very limited extent in the benefits of the 
Russian 'economic miracle'. The Russian peasantry was not only poor but also constitu ted  the 
m ajor exploited class which to a great extent, paid the bill for the spectacular developm ent of the 
urban econom y.114
The dialectics of development and underdevelopment were apparent in the guise of 'internal 
colonisation'.
While capitalist relations failed to alter rural relations to any significant extent, the peasant 
economy became increasingly articulated into the Tsarist industrialisation project, and was 
forcing the peasantry to respond to the market.110 A reflection of this articulation was that in 
European Russia in the two decades before 1914 "the production of wheat (the main export 
crop) rose by about 75 per cent, while that of rye (the crop consumed by the peasantry and the 
town workers) increased only a little if at all."116 Rural demand was subordinated to the 
enormous price of primitive accumulation and the development of heavy industry.
The fiscal policy of the state and the exchange relations between town and country do not 
exhaust the forms assumed by the articulation of the peasant social system within the internal 
economy. Migratory labour and army service also exposed the village to the urban milieu and 
to modem ideologies. The distinction made by Russian statisticians concerning the relative 
weights of 'peasant' and 'cadre' workers assists in gauging the importance, not only of the 
growth of a hereditary proletariat, but also of the diffusion of values which 'peasant' workers 
carried back to their villages. Approximately half of European Russia's peasant households had 
a family member who had spent time employed outside the village, and the influence of this 
migratory workforce would have extended beyond the immediate household.117 In his 
Moscow study, Johnson argues that there was a symbiotic relationship in the transfusion of 
values between the urban and rural milieux. "Living in two worlds, the Moscow worker was 
nourished by both , and from this experience developed many of the characteristic traits that set
lu Ibid, p. 23.
ll3As Wolf notes, market relations tend to "cut through the integument of custom, severing people from their 
accustomed social matrix in order to transform them into economic actors, independent of prior social commitments to 
kin and neighbours.” E. Wolf, op. dt., p. 279. For a discussion on effects of changes from traditional rights and sodal 
ogligations to the development of market relations, see E.P. Thompson, "The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in 
the Eighteenth Century”, Past and Present, 50,1971.
u6Dobb, op. dt., p. 38.
n7The tradition was for entire villages to be assodated with a particular urban trade or artel', usually originating from 
an initial contact a village member had cultivated. See Smith, op. dt., p. 15. Such migratory workers would often return 
to their village in times of harvest, recession or infirmity. One of Anton Chekhov's stories, Peasants, written in 1897, 
describes the return from Moscow of a waiter, Nikolay Chikildeyev, to his native village, Zhukovo. "All the lads who 
could read or write were packed off to Moscow and hired out as bellboys or waiters (just as the lads on the other side of 
the river all apprenticed to bakers), and this had been the custom from the days of serfdom, long ago, when a certain 
Luka Ivanych, a peasant from Zhukovo...who had been a bartender in one of Moscow's dubs, would take none but his 
fellow villagers into his service, and these in turn, as they got up in the world, sent for their kinfolk and found jobs for 
them in taverns and restaurants...” The Portable Chekhov, (ed) A. Yarmolinsky, Penguin,iW^erV-W, 1985, p. 320. Shanin 
argues that; "An increasing penetration of market and money relations into the villages, a growing national education 
system, army service, and village to town migration were producing an increasing urban impact on peasant life.” ibid, 
p. 24. In a 1908 study of the Printers Union in Moscow around half its members "kept their families in the villages and 
returned there consistently every summer to engage in farming." Shanin, Developing Society, p. 85.
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him apart from the workers of other countries.'’118 In fact scholars such as Eric Wolf have 
reversed the tendency to view 'cadre' workers as the catalyst for revolutionary activity, arguing 
that: "It is probably not so much the growth of an industrial proletariat as such which produces 
revolutionary activity, as the development of an industrial workforce still closely geared to life 
in the villages."119 Although Wolf does not explore the relationship between the urban and the 
rural milieux in any depth his hypothesis suggests that the articulation of both sectors is 
important in explaining the channelling of peasant movements in modem revolutions. The role 
of urban leadership, ideology and organisation will be examined further in the discussion of the 
revolutionary mobilisation of the classes which bore the brunt of the exploitation created by the 
strategy of capitalist accumulation.
The most significant attempt by the Tsarist state to transform the structure of rural relations 
were the Stolypin reforms. The revolutionary events of 1905-6 led the government to 
reconsider its means of extracting agricultural surplus in order to promote industrialisation. 
Areas where the functions of the traditional mir were still operational and where periodic land 
redistribution was still practiced proved to be the areas recording the highest number of 
peasant disturbances.120 This alerted Stolypin, the Minister for the Interior, to the fact that rural 
social relations would have to be transformed if economic progress was to be maintained, and 
political discontent controlled. The Stolypin "wager not on the needy and drunken but on the 
sturdy and strong" sought as its objective the creation of a wealthy stratum of well-to-do farmers 
which would act as a bulwark of conservatism and rural stability.121 Peasant ties to the mir 
were loosened through abolishing redemption payments and individual landholding was 
encouraged. The persistence of the mir was clearly perceived by the state to be a hinderance to 
peasant differentiation and capitalist development.
The success of the Stolypin reforms is difficult to measure and must remain inconclusive. The 
process of social transformation was cut short by war and revolution. However, by 1914 
around 40% of European Russian peasant households had detached their individual 
landholdings from the village commune. The significance of this figure may be somewhat 
deceptive in the light of Atkinson's reminder that few families had established themselves as 
proprietory units farming their own consolidated and self-contained plots.122 The reasons for
118Johnson, p. 156. Fitzpatrick also notes that "many peasants were in fact living with one foot in the traditional 
village and the other in the quite different world of the modem industrial town.Titzpatrick, op. dt., p. 13.
119Wolf, p. 297.
U0Ibid, p. 66-7.
121The term 'well-to-do' has been prefered here to the more common term bulak, meaning 'fist'. As Shanin notes, the 
term kulak was a pejorative term for those who "prospered not by the sweat and slog of peasant farming but by usury, 
go-between activities, shoddy deals” etc. A distinction should be made between 'productive' and 'unproductive' forms 
of exploitation. For example, those who hired wage-labour (which is conceptualised as exploitation in the Marxist 
sense) were not necessarily viewed as kulaks. It was during the 1920's that the term took on its wider meaning of any 
rich farmer who hired wage labour, or who owned more land than others. Eventually, the term was used to describe 
anyone who questioned Stalin's collectivisation drive. See Shanin, op. dt., pp. 156-8. As the definition broadened, its 
only resemblance to its past usage was its pejorative connotation.
122See D. Atkinson, "The Statistics on the Russian Land Commune: 1905-1914”, in Slavic Review, Vol. 32, No. 4,1973.
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this continued to be land-scarcity, the archaic strip-system of farming and the inadequate size of 
holdings.
Despite this, the operation of market relations, commercialisation and peasant differentiation 
appeared to be developing immediately prior to the war. Whether or not this trend would have 
led to a capitalist transformation of agriculture remains open to speculation.123 It is impossible 
to determine whether or not this prediction and Stolypin's objectives would have been realised. 
As Shanin has convincingly demonstrated, the process of socio-economic differentiation within 
the peasant mode of production was far more complex than most contemporary Marxists and 
liberals envisaged. The centrifugal tendencies promoted by commercialisation and market 
relations were only part of a two-sided equation. They tended to be stressed by commentators 
to the detriment of various centripetal tendencies peculiar to the particular socio-economic 
environment which reinforced the stability of the peasant social structure. Shanin argues that 
reality and the dynamics of the peasant mode of production proved far more stubborn than 
programmes, theories and the reforms of Tsarist ministers and Marxists alike. 124Despite this, in 
terms of the balanced economic development of agriculture and industry, the Stolypin reforms 
were a positive correction to the strategy of industrialisation pursued prior to 1905. It was a 
belated recognition that a sustainable cycle of production and distribution within a socio­
economic formation involves increasing the productive capacity of both the industrial and the 
agricultural sectors, rather than financing industry at the expense of agriculture.125 This had 
assured the basis of capitalist development in the West. If there is any truth in Gerschenkron's 
claim that Russian economic development was entering a Western phase, it lay in this sphere, 
rather than a transformation from state to privately dominated capital.126 Prior to 1905 the 
'traditional' rural sector was the primary source of financing 'modernity'. Therefore, the 
traditional sector cannot be viewed as closed or isolated, as suggested by many proponents of 
'dual' theories of growth. Laclau's comments on Latin America are equally applicable to Russia 
when he argues that:
...the modernity of one sector is a function of the backwardness of the other.... It is...correct to 
confront the system as a whole and to show the indivisible unity which exists between the
123Lenin, writing in 1908, warned of exactly such a possibility, and considered its effect upon the political climate: 
"The Stolypin Constitution and the Stolypin agrarian policy mark a new phase in the breakdown of the old, 
semi-patriarchal and semi-feudal system of Tsarism, a new movement towards its transformation into a middle-class 
monarchy.... If this should continue for any long periods of time...it might force us to renounce any agrarian policy at 
all. It would be empty and stupid democratic phrasemongering to say that the success of such a policy in Russia is 
'impossible'. It is possible! If the Stolypin policy is continued...then the agrarian structure of Russia will be completely 
bourgeois, the stronger peasants will acquire about all the allotments of land, agriculture become capitalistic, and any 
'solution' of the agrarian problem - radical or otherwise - will become impossible under capitalism." Quoted in Ladau, 
op. dt., p. 29.
124See Shanin, op. dt. Shanin remarks that Plekhanov once daimed that the peasantry were "non-existent historically 
speaking", (p. 203) This can only be accepted if applied to all of us, regardless of dass.
125See A. Emmanuel, 'Myths of Development Versus Myths of Underdevelopment", New Left Review, No. 85, 
May/June 1974, pp. 65-7. In a related manner, Goldsmith notes that the not inconsiderable industrial development 
must be seen in the context of the economy as a whole. Thus, "since the weight of agriculture was higher in Russia the 
rate of growth for the economy as a whole was lower.” Goldsmith, op. dt., p. 443.
^ A s  Goldsmith notes: "Industry...remained dependent to a good though declining extent on foreign capital, on 
foreign technical aid, and even more on government initiative and assistance. Russia throughout the pre-revolutionary 
period retained a strong flavor of state capitalism in its economic structure." Goldsmith, ibid, p. 443.
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maintenance of feudal backwardness at one extreme and the apparent progress of a bourgeois 
dynamism at the other.127
This system, prior to Stolypin, retarded the progress of agrarian capitalist development in order 
to promote urban industrialisation. However, the success of the Stolypin reform remains a 
matter for speculation. It is legitimate to conclude that on the eve of the war the 'agrarian 
problem' remained unsolved and that rural society remained in a state of political and 
economic disequilibrium.
2.6. CONCLUSION
This chapter has analysed the structural preconditions of the Russian revolutionary situation 
of 1917. These features of late-Tsarist socio-economic development help explain the inherent 
social conflict within the social formation. The events of 1917 were conditioned by the 
underlying tensions within the Tsarist model of capitalist accumulation. The crisis of state 
industrialisation forged the channel through which the diverse, yet articulated, currents of working class 
and peasant discontent ran. Furthermore, the dominance of the 'modem' capitalist sector assured 
the working class the operative role in the mobilisation against the autocracy.
However, despite the dominance of the capitalist dynamic, the nation continued to contain 
"two permanantly ordered social systems". The 'old' and the 'new', 'tradition' and 'modernity', 
were distinct, yet interrelated phenomena, co-existing in interaction. The pre-capitalist sector 
provided the resources for industrialisation, with the state acting as a conductor. However, 
agrarian productivity had not increased with industrialisation, as it had in the West. This mode 
of surplus extraction from the 'periphery' to the 'metropolis' can be defined as an internal form 
of colonialism. An 'indivisible unity7 existed between social systems operating on distinct 
dynamics. 'Tradition' and 'modernity' can be viewed as 'bipolar' in the sense of being dialectically 
related, rather than moments on a unilinear continuum.
However, the inherent social conflict which can be discerned from the structure of late-Tsarist 
development does not automatically imply the inevitability of revolution. Any structure 
contains a number of possible developments. The possibility of socialist revolution was 
determined by the ability of social movements to channel this discontent. As Trotsky noted, the 
insurrection of 1917 "did not drop from heaven".128 In addition to the 'organic' structural 
preconditions outlined above, it is necessary to examine how the Bolsheviks, as a particular 
challenger, succeeded in mobilising and channelling the matrix of social groups opposed to the 
old regime. This will be the focus of Chapter 4, recognising that socialist revolution involves 
political praxis, conscious and purposive action upon the world-as-given, with the view to 
transcending existing reality.
127Laclau, op. dt., p. 31.
128L. Trotsky, In Defense of the October Revolution, New Park, London, 1971, p. 18.
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Chapter 3
STRUCTURAL FOUNDATIONS 
OF THE
SANDINISTA REVOLUTION
3.1. INTRODUCTION
In the previous chapter it was argued that the Russian model of capitalist development 
contained inherent structural contradictions which must form the basis for understanding the 
demise of the old regime. This chapter complements the previous one through exploring the 
structural dynamics of pre-revolutionary Nicaraguan society. Using the variables from the last 
chapter, it will be argued that similar factors underlay the breakdown of the Somoza regime in 
Nicaragua. Contingent factors, such as the 1972 earthquake, will be viewed as 'accelerators', 
heightening the inherent contradictions within the Somozaist {somocista) model of capitalist 
development.
Beginning with the 'cotton revolution' of the early 1950's somocismo guaranteed the 
reproduction and expansion of a form of capitalist relations which was pregnant with social 
contradictions. Economically, politically and militarily, the somocista state performed a catalystic 
role in post-war socio-economic development. However, the model of development contained 
latent tension between the state and the matrix of social classes. The manifest conflict of the 
late-1970's must be accounted for in terms of the contradictions inherent within the model of 
capitalist development.
Somocismo eventually overcame a lengthy period of disarticulation between the state and 
economic development. In order to substantiate this argument that the somocista state was a 
precondition for the capitalist transformation of Nicaraguan society it is necessary to explain 
why the initial incorporation of the nation within the modem world capitalist economy did not 
correspond to the emergence of a politically dominant propertied class. This crucial structural 
feature of Nicaraguan economic development requires a long-range narrative of the nation's 
rich and colourful political and economic history.
The chapter thus begins with an analysis of the origins of capitalist development in the 
late-nineteenth century. The truncation of this development corresponded with the interference 
of successive U.S. administrations between 1909 and 1933. The debility of the state and 
economic stagnation were the principal features of this period. The transcendence of this 
disarticulation between the state and economic development was overcome through the
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mechanism of a dictatorial state. However, as the somocista state became an economic empire in 
its own right, latent tension evolved between the state and the domestic bourgeoisie. Avoidance 
of manifest conflict between these sectors required continual economic growth, diversified 
development and social peace. This was achieved through the exploitation and repression of 
the popular classes. As the structural pillars of the model of somocista development crumbled 
under the weight of its own contradictions during the 1970's, the dynasty entered a profound 
stage of crisis. However, the logic of the model of development also restricted the options 
available to the non-somocista sectors of the bourgeoisie. The resulting scenario thus revealed 
not only a crisis of the dictatorial form of the state, but, more broadly, the problem of ensuring 
that a post -somocista state would continue to perform the 'function' of realising the conditions of 
capitalist reproduction and development.
As with the Russian Revolution, the structural preconditions of the Nicaraguan Revolution 
were shaped by the specific form assumed by capitalist development, and its incorporation 
within the world economic order. In addition, the effectiveness of challengers to the polity was 
circumscribed by their relationship to a state structure which actively promoted a process of 
capitalist accumulation. Notably, both state structures achieved a large degree of independence 
from the matrix of social classes. In both cases, the effectiveness of the bourgeoisie was 
undermined by its subordinate role in an alliance with the state, thus opening the possibility of a 
radical revolution incorporating classes and groups previously alienated or marginalised from 
the model of capitalist development.
3.2. THE ORIGINS OF CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT AND THE MODERN 
STATE
This section examines the origins of Nicaraguan capitalist development and the incorporation 
of the nation within the world capitalist market. This period at the turn of the twentieth century 
also corresponds with the modernisation of the state structure. However, even within the 
dynamic sector of the economy tied to coffee exportation, production relations remained 
substantively pre-capitalist. Furthermore, development relied upon the fortunes and 
fluctuations of this single commodity on the world market. This form of development will be 
termed 'primitive dependent capitalism'.1 The correlation between state modernisation and 
capitalist development was terminated in 1909 through the intervention of the U.S., which 
perceived the Nicaraguan government as a threat to its regional hegemonistic interests. From 
the analysis of this period, some preliminary hypotheses can be advanced concerning the 
relationship between Nicaraguan economic development, the role of the state and the interests 
of external powers. These will later be applied to the rise and reproduction of the Somoza 
dictatorship.
1This term has been used by T. Walker, "The Nicaraguan Revolution", in J. Goldstone (ed), Revolutions: Theoretical, 
Comparative, and Historical Studies, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich,i>»n 0*^.1986; and S.M. Gorman, "Social Change and 
Political Revolution: The Case of Nicaragua", in S.C. Ropp & J.A. Morris (eds), Central America: Crisis and Adaptation, 
University of New Mexico, Albequerque, 1984.
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Compared with its Central American neighbours, the incorporation of Nicaragua within the 
modem world capitalist market was belated. While its neighbours took advantage of the 
expanding European demand for coffee during the mid-nineteenth century, the Nicaraguan 
economy failed to diversify away from its colonial base, and remained relatively stagnant. This 
was the consequence of a number of factors, among the most important being political 
instability and foreign interest in Nicaraguan territory as a possible location for a trans-isthmian 
canal. The two factors were related. The conflict between Liberals and Conservatives (which 
initially reflected socio-economic interests inherited from the period of Iberian colonisation) 
was more acute in Nicaragua than neighbouring states, adversely affecting economic 
development. The warring parties, often little more than roaming caudillos2- and their bands, 
were able to secure the services of external powers interested in securing control over 
Nicaragua's waterways. The result was economic stagnation and perennial social conflict 
during a period when the rest of the isthmus was becoming increasingly incorporated within 
the world capitalist market.
The Nicaraguan conflict culminated in an acute period of regional unrest during the 1850's 
when the U.S. filibuster William Walker assumed the presidency of the nation. Walker, 
originally called upon by the Liberals to overthrow the Conservative government, was himself 
promptly overthrown by the combined efforts of other Central American states and British 
assistance. While the rest of Central America witnessed a long period of 'liberal' ascendancy, 
the Nicaraguan Liberals suffered from a lack of credibility due to their flirtation with the U.S. 
filibuster. This allowed the Conservatives to hold state power for an unprecedented thirty years 
between 1863 and 1893. A period of relative political calm descended upon the nation.
It was during this Conservative era that a series of economic measures were implemented 
designed to stimulate the production and exportation of coffee. These included the 
transformation of landed property relations (the expropriation of communal indian3 and church 
land), private land grants to locals and immigrants producing coffee (cafetaleros), price subsidies 
on inputs and credit facilities to assist the cafetaleros, and the beginnings of infrastructural 
development, including ports, telegraphs and railways.4 By 1890 coffee had outstripped the 
traditional colonial products, such as cacao, indigo and beef, as the most dynamic export.
While internal political tranquility promoted the success of these socio-economic changes, this 
change itself helped further relieve past colonial political tensions. The expansion of coffee 
production benefited landed elites across traditional political divisions, signalling the beginning 
of the end of colonial ideological boundaries. The terms 'Liberal' and 'Conservative' became 
increasingly obsolete over the next fifty years, more and more reflecting personal and familial 
ambitions rather than class aspirations. The traditional party structures became vehicles used
2Charismahc, military leaders, or chiefs.
3This provoked resistance from the indian community leading to civil war in 1881. See J. Wheelock, Raices Indigenas de 
la Lucha Anticolonialista en Nicaragua, Siglo Vientiuno Editores, Mexico, 1980, pp. 109-118
4See JA. Booth, The End and the Beginning: The Nicaraguan Revolution, Westview, Boulder, 1982, p. 20.
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by caudillos to expand familial power within an overall primitive dependent capitalism 
framework.
Another factor contributing to the political tranquility within the ruling elites was the 
decreased involvement of the U.S. in Nicaraguan affairs. The construction of a transcontinental 
railway through the U.S. diminished the importance of control over Nicaraguan territory, 
while the American Civil War focused U.S. attention upon internal affairs. Furthermore, the 
victory of the abolitionist north undermined the pro-slavery rationale of incorporating 
Nicaragua within the Union in order to increase the numerical strength of the pro-slavery 
states.0
Thus, the acceleration of domestic capitalist development (albeit within a dependent capitalist 
framework) coincided with a loosening of external politico-military ties. This lends only partial 
support to the hypothesis advanced by Frank that "the satellites experience their greatest 
economic development....if and when their ties to the metropolis are weakest."* 6 While 
Nicaragua's economic ties with the world market strengthened during the last decades of the 
nineteenth century, external political and military interference declined. Until the turn of the 
century U.S. relations with Nicaragua were primarily related to diplomatic and commercial 
agreements over canal rights.7 Feasibility studies continued to indicate that the Nicaraguan 
route was superior to the Panamanian route, and U.S. statesmen and entrepreneurs remained 
engaged in a debate over whether the canal should be primarily a public or a private initiative.8 
However, this decline in U.S. intervention was not total. The 1890's witnessed a revival in the 
doctrine of 'manifest destiny7, reaching a climax in the Spanish War of 1898.
Despite the economic changes initiated during the Conservative era, it is generally accepted 
that the consolidation of dependent capitalist development and the modem state occurred 
under the liberal dictatorship' of Jose Santos Zelaya between 1893 and 1909. Under a 
nationalist, anti-U.S. banner, Zelaya formally incorporated the Miskito Coast into the national 
territory, thus ending its status as a British Protectorate. The dictator accelerated the pace of 
economic reforms, further integrating Nicaragua into the world capitalist system of export 
commodity production, and diversifying the nations economic ties by encouraging English, 
German and Japanese investments and loans.9 U.S. capital was also granted generous gold, 
timber, marine and banana concessions on the Atlantic Coast. Economic infrastructure and 
communication networks were expanded, a free national education system was established, the
’This was one of the rationales behind William Walker's expedition. See W. Walker, The War In Nicaragua, University
of Arizona, . 1985.
6A.G. Frank, "The Development of Underdevelopment" in Rhodes (ed), Imperialism and Underdevelopment, Monthly 
Review, N.Y., 1970, p. 10.
7See C. Fonseca, Long Live Sandino, Silvio Mayorga Publication House, Managua, 1984, pp. 26-9.
®See L.A. Gayton, "The Nicaraguan Canal in the Nineteenth Century: Prelude to American Empire in the Caribbean", 
in journal of Latin American Studies, 19,1988.
9For the role of foreigners in coffee production, see R.L. Woodward Jr, Central America: A Nation Divided, Oxford, 
N.Y., 1976, p. 157.
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secularisation of the state furthered and, importantly, an attempt was made to curb the power 
of caudillismo through the establishment of a national army.10
However, while ''Zelaya's 16-year rule had brought much greater economic and political 
integration of the Nicaraguan nation and had markedly modernized and strengthened the 
Nicaraguan state”,* 11 further modifying traditional oligarchical conflict, internal and external 
opposition to his methods, direction and pretensions remained vocal and active. While most 
elites regardless of political persuasion prospered during the Zelaya dictatorship it was the 
zelayista liberals and the emerging cafetaleros tied to external market production who prospered 
more than the traditional Conservative families tied to colonial economic interests. 
Furthermore, national integration and the creation of a single national army were perceived 
with some justification by opponents as attempts by Zelaya to consolidate his personal rule. 
After Zelaya ruthlessly crushed signs of a Conservative coup in 1903 it became increasingly 
clear to his opponents that peaceful internal pressure alone would not remove Zelaya. Their 
resort was the time-tested method of external assistance. Externally, Zelaya's pan- 
centroamericanism also aroused regional suspicions concerning his expansionist pretentions.12 
However, it was his anti-imperialist rhetoric directed against the U.S. which assured his demise. 
As 'dollar diplomacy7 reached its zenith under Roosevelt and Taft, and as the canal issue 
resurfaced as a major U.S. foreign policy concern, relations between the U.S. and Nicaragua 
began to deteriorate. Despite the feasibility studies favouring the Nicaraguan rather than the 
Panamanian route, the U.S. secured control over the Panamanian zone and began construction 
of the Panama Canal in 1903. Zelaya immediately began negotiations with Japanese and 
German consortiums over the construction of a rival canal and secured loans from London 
banks.13 This was viewed by Roosevelt as a threat to the hegemonistic interests of the U.S. in 
the hemisphere, which required exclusive canal rights in Nicaragua in order to ensure precisely 
that an alternative canal would not be built through the Rio San Juan.
A Conservative uprising erupted on the Atlantic Coast in 1909 supported by British and U.S. 
private interests and the U.S. government. It was in this region that foreign capital had 
extracted most of its timber and mining concessions from the Zelaya government. The 
execution of two U.S. mercenaries provided U.S. Secretary of State, Philander Knox, with the 
opportunity to break diplomatic relations with Zelaya and land a contingent of 400 marines in 
order to bolster the Conservative rebels. Zelaya's resignation in favour of fellow liberal Jose 
Madriz failed to appease Knox, who succeeded in August 1910 in elevating his hand-picked 
puppet Juan Estrada to the presidency.14 Conservative rule would now be viewed by successive
10See G. Black, Triumph of a People: The Sandinista Revolution in Nicaragua, Zed, London, 1983, p. 7.
11 Booth, op. dt., p.24.
12See Weber, Nicaragua: The Sandinist Revolution, Verso, Condon , 1981, p. 7. However, Walker has downplayed 
Zelaya's role as a disrupter of regional peace. T. Walker, Nicaragua: The Land of Sandino, Westview,6ouU*<~ 1982, p. 17.
13Weber, op. dt., p. 7; see also Black, op. dt., p. 7.
u For Knox's personal economic stake in Nicaragua, see Black, op. dt., p. 8; and I. O'Malley, "Play It Again Ron", in 
P. Rosset and J. Vandermeer (eds), Nicaragua: Unfinished Revolution, Grove, N.Y., 1986, p. 156.
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U.S. administrations as a guarantee that Nicaragua would abstain from further 'chronic 
wrongdoing' (to employ Theodore Roosevelt's phrase). The US had secured a pliant regime 
which would promote US business opportunities, 'restore order', and refrain from any 
independent transisthmian schemes.
While all historical commentators agree that Zelaya's departure marked the end of an era, 
appraisals of his contribution to Nicaraguan history vary. Many echo Philander Knox's remark 
that he was "a blot on the history of his country", and that his demise rid the nation of a brutal 
petty tyrant of "preposterous vanity".15 However, from a structural perspective, Zelaya appears 
no more 'depraved' than many other 'modernising' statesmen. Once the complexity of the era is 
taken into consideration, it is probably more appropriate to concur with Henri Weber that 
Zelaya was a 'Nicaraguan Bismark'.16 Zelaya's 16-year rule was an experiment in modem 
state-building and state-sponsored economic development. Those who prospered most from 
the liberal dictatorship' were the expanding dynamic cafetaleros. During this period a domestic 
agro-exporting bourgeoisie tied to the world market was established. Industry, however, 
remained artisan-based, and tied to a restricted domestic market. On the other hand, while 
Zelaya encouraged foreign concessions (especially on the isolated Atlantic Coast), foreign 
capital was less represented in Nicaragua than neighbouring territory. The nation was not 
transformed (like Guatamala and Honduras) into a T>anana enclave'.17 External interference 
and attention was focused upon Nicaragua's strategic geographical position more than its 
economic potential.
Politically, Zelaya had succeeded in curbing caudillismo through attempting to centralise 
coercive power in the hands of the state. Although he provoked domestic opposition through 
elevating himself to the status of a 'state caudillo', his strengthening social base weakened 
political challengers. Most commentators agree that the Conservative uprising of 1909 would 
have stood little chance of success had not the military strength of the U.S. intervened.
The articulation between the zelayista state and ascending cafetaleros was an important 
precondition for further socio-economic development. David Close surmises that the state 
could have evolved into a 'constitutional oligarchy'.18 Carlos Fonseca displayed even more 
optimism, arguing that; "Had it not encountered imperial interference, the bourgeois 
democratic social process would have continued its natural evolution, and the superannuated 
obstacles would surely have been overcome in short order."19 Whether or not this degree of
l3Knox is quoted in H. Herring, A History of Latin America: From the Beginnings to the Present, Jonathan Cape,Un<Wi, 
nd, p. 447. Similar appraisals are voiced in J.E. Fagg, Latin America: A General History, Macmillan, N 'C , 1966, p. 798: 
and T. Anderson, Politics in Central America, Praeger, N M . > 1982, p. 150.
16See Weber, op. d t ,  p. pp. 6-7. A similar position is adopted by Walker, op. dt., p. 16.
17See J. Pearce, Under the Eagle: US Intervention in Central America and the Caribbean, Latin American Bureau,
U r t i c o  /1982, p. 18 for regional variations in US investment
18D. Close, Nicaragua: Politics, Economics, and Society, Pinter,Lonicn, 1988, p. 107.
19Fonseca, op. dt., p. 39.
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optimism is warranted, the reality was that any possibility of such a prognosis was "effectively 
blocked".20 Zelaya's experiment revealed that the equation for the capitalist development of 
Nicaragua contained three crucial variables; a strong state prepared to intervene in the 
economy, the economic hegemony of the dynamic sectors of capital and a correspondence of
their interests with the state, and lastly the interests of the United States. As Black observes, the 
Zelaya programme neglected this third variable:
The political aspirations of a class which might have injected dynamic capitalist growth into 
Nicaragua - expressed by the Zelaya Liberal Government - had been shown to be by definition 
incompatible with American interests, and had promptly been aborted. Zelaya's very 
nationalism, given U.S. intervention, only guaranteed the further anti-national development of 
the economy and the debility of the state. 1
The analysis of zelayismo provides indicators pointing to the future success of capitalist 
development under the Somoza regime. Somoza Garcia, another liberal dictator7, assumed the 
mantle of a 'state caudillo', centralised state power, and formed an alliance with the dynamic 
sectors of the bourgeoisie. However, the dynasty avoided Zelaya's fatal error. Anastasio 
Somoza Garcia recognised that a strong dictatorship of this form could only maintain stability 
once it acquired the confidence and support of the region's hegemonic power, the United States.
The structural preconditions for the rise of somocismo and the future contours of Nicaraguan 
class conflict began to take shape during the period of U.S. intervention between 1912 and 1933. 
The following narrative attempts to illuminate the significant social trends which characterised 
this period.
3.3. ECONOMIC STAGNATION AND STATE DEBILITY
This section examines Nicaraguan socio-economic and political developments between 1910 
and 1936. The two objectives of the section can be dealt with chronologically. Firstly, the 
adverse effects of U.S. interference and Conservative rule will be discussed, leading to the 
conclusion that the socio-economic stagnation which characterised the period was a direct 
result of the disarticulation between the state and the dynamic agro-exporting bourgeoisie. 
Secondly, this section explains how the military apparatus of the debilitated state structure was 
able to usurp power. The structural supports of the military ascendancy ensured that the new 
regime would overcome the obstacles Zelaya confronted.
The United States retained a direct military presence in Nicaragua for almost a quarter of a 
century after the downfall of Zelaya. However, until 1927 the presence of the Marines remained 
a symbolic reminder that the U.S. refused to tolerate any more 'chronic wrongdoing7 from 
Nicaragua's factional elites. The exception to this was the dispatch of 2,700 troops in 1912 in 
order to crush a popular rebellion led by the Liberal general Benjamin Zeladon. According to
20A. Bendana, "Crisis in Nicaragua", in NACLA'S Report on the Americas, Nov-Dec 1978, Vol. 10, No. 6, p. 5. 
21 Black, op. dt., p. 11.
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Booth, Zeladon received support from the "coffee grower-export faction" of the elite.22
The effect of U.S. intervention was most directly felt in the economy. Initially, the U.S. 
assumed such tight control over Nicaraguan finances that the nation was effectively reduced to 
the status of a US protectorate. Immediately after Conservative power had been consolidated 
and the 'evil zelayista tradition'23 exorcised, the U.S. Department of State sent Thomas Dawson 
as an envoy to Nicaragua with the purpose of 'ordering' Nicaraguan financial affairs. The 
Castillo-Knox Treaty, which would have formally imposed protectorate status upon Nicaragua 
was never ratified. Despite this, as the following discussion of diplomatic-financial maneuvers 
reveals, Nicaraguans virtually lost control over their nation's destiny.
Brown Brothers Bank of New York became the de-facto treasury of Nicaragua. In exchange 
for a loan of $1.5 million, Nicaragua ceded control over its customs operations in favour of a 
U.S.-appointed inspector. Furthermore, a national bank was established with Brown Brothers 
controlling 51% of the shares. The board of directors consisted of a majority of Brown Brothers 
representatives and nominees, and operated from New York. Nicaragua's national rail and 
steamship lines were offered as collateral to J. & W. Seligman and U.S. Mortgage Trust in return 
for loans negotiated at extortionate rates. As Herring remarks, "a supposedly sovereign republic 
had become the virtual ward of New York bankers."24 Under the pliant Conservative 
governments of Diaz and Chamorro opportunities for commercial plunder abounded. U.S. 
banks bought up British loans contracted under Zelaya and collected at face-value. Moreover, a 
Mixed Claims Commission was appointed by Washington to examine claims by U.S. companies 
relating to damages suffered during the civil conflict. It is estimated that $1.8 million was 
extracted in damages, while total U.S. investments in Nicaragua in 1908 amounted to only $1 
million.25
Apart from ceding financial control, Nicaragua's territorial integrity was violated under the 
Chamorro-Bryan Treaty of 1914.26 For a sum of $3 million rent (which immediately went to 
amortise Nicaragua's debts to U.S. banks) Nicaragua granted 'in perpetuity' proprietary rights 
on the "construction, operation and maintenance of an inter-oceanic canal". Moreover, the 
second clause provided the U.S. with a 99-year lease on the Atlantic Com Islands and a naval
^For this episode, see Booth, op. dt., p. 31. See also E. Crawley, Dictators Never Die, Hurst, London, 1979, pp. 38-9.
^D. Munro, "U.S. Policy Towards Nicaragua", in R.S. Leiken & B. Rubin (eds), The Central American Crisis Reader, 
Summit, N.Y., 1987, p. 79.
24Herring, op. dt., p. 447. See also Black, op. dt., p. 9.
^Booth, op. dt., p. 9.
26As Black remarks, "Rarely can any government have been party to such a humiliating document..." Black, op. dt., p. 
9. The treaty also violated the territorial integrity of Costa Rica, El Salvador and Honduras. Protests by Costa Rica and 
El Salvador were presented before the Central American Court, resulting in favour of the republics. The US simply 
ignored the dedsion, revealing the impotence of this regional arbitration system which had been initially set up with 
the assistance of the U.S. in the face of the perceived threat of Zelaya's expansionism.
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base on the Pacific Gulf of Fonseca.27
While the Nicaraguan government regained a greater degree of financial autonomy after 1916, 
it continued to suffer a severe shortage of working capital as U.S. banks maintained their 
usurious policies. The consequences for domestic social and economic development were 
incalculable. Deprived of essential tax revenues, the public services and infrastructural 
development promoted by Zelaya continued to decline. Furthermore, starved of funds, the 
national army deteriorated, permitting an increase in banditry and the renewed upsurge of 
caudillismo.28 This was ironic given U.S. pretensions that its presence in Nicaragua was justified 
on grounds of preventing civil chaos and disorder. By 1926 a Liberal leader could lament that:
Nicaragua....the past 16 years has gone back at least half a century. Public schools...throughout 
the entire country have been closed wholesale.... Money formerly devoted to public instruction is 
used to subsidize Jesuit and parochial schools...Concessions of utterly ruinous character have 
been given to powerful American concerns, which have merely expoited the natural resources of 
the country for their own benefit without any benefit whatsoever to Nicaraguans.29
In step with 'financial stability' direct U.S. investment progressively rose in Nicaragua. From 
$1 million in 1908, investments rose to $7.3 million in 1919 and by 1929 reached $17.3 million 
(although this remained the lowest in the region).30 Apart from coffee, U.S. investment centred 
upon gold mining, timber concessions, banana and rubber. Trade with Europe declined, while 
the U.S. share in imports and exports increased between 75% and 80%.31
U.S. investment was disproportionately represented on the isolated Atlantic Coast, reducing 
contact with the focal economic and population centres of the nation. Thus, U.S. 'enclave 
capitalism' remained an isolated phenomenon which created few direct or indirect benefits for 
the national economy. Enclave capitalism did not bear as much fruit in Nicaragua as the rest of 
the region, explaining why Nicaragua never became a prototype 'banana republic'. However, 
the period of direct U.S. intervention witnessed the height of enclave capitalism in Nicaragua.32 
Ramirez's comments on the operations of the United Fruit Company apply to most of the U.S. 
concessions operating during the period in Nicaragua: "The banana plantations became 
veritable states, with their own laws, police forces, shops, stores and money; and the countries
^The treaty is reprinted in Leiken & Rubin (eds), op. dt., p. 9. The Chamorro-Bryan Treaty and the question of an 
inter-oceanic canal through Nicaragua continued to be the subject of debate in the U.S. Senate up until the treaty was 
repealed in February 1971. "Since that time, according to informed Panamanian sources, the U.S. has used the canal in 
Nicaragua prindpally to improve its bargaining position with Panama." S. Jonas, "Nicaragua", NACLA's Latin America 
and Empire Report, February 1976, Vol. 10, No. 2, p. 19.
28See Booth, op. dt., p. 33.
^Quoted in Weber, op. dt., p. 10. Fagg presents a different picture, stating that during the period "some progress in 
sanitation and education occurred..." Fagg, op. dt., p. 799.
30See Pearce, op. dt., p. 18.
31 Booth, op. dt., p. 34.
32The largest enclaves in Nicaragua were the Standard Fruit banana operations, Bragman's Bluff Lumber Co. (the 
largest employer in Nicaragua), and gold mining concessions at Siuna, Bonanza and Rosita. All were situated on the 
Atlantic Coast. Barracada International, Nov 5,1987; and Jonas, op. dt., p. 20.
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in which they were located received little benefit, and were on the margins of these empires.''33
This disarticulation between Atlantic Coast enclave capitalism and the local economy centred 
on the Pacific Coast contradicts Fagg's claim that "American investment livened the national 
economy."34 The local economy remained artisanal-based, and coffee production techniques 
stagnated. Jeffrey Paige has directly related this stagnation of the coffee sector to U.S. 
intervention:
In Nicaragua, US intervention prevented the complete expropriation of the peasantry, as in El 
Salvador; the growth of state-sanctioned forced labor, as in Guatamala; or the development of a 
true agrarian bourgeoisie, as in Costa Rica. From the time of the 1909 US intervention until the 
consolidation of control by Anastasio Somoza Garcia in 1936, no stable economic environment 
existed in Nicaragua. Not only did the intervention block a clear liberal revolution, but it also 
prevented the coffee oligarchy from transforming the economy to its advantage".35
Accordingly, coffee production stagnated at a 'manorial' level, which was socially stable, yet
resistant to technological innovation and advancement.
One need not doubt the sincerity of the claims by successive U.S. presidents from Wilson, 
Harding, Coolidge and Hoover, that they desired political tranquility and social stability in 
Nicaragua. The radicalisation of the Mexican Revolution under Calles had provoked U.S. fears 
of a 'bolshevisation' of the hemisphere. However, Nicaraguan tranquility had to correspond 
with a state power recognising the dominance of the U.S. in the region. In a State Department 
memorandum of 1927 Undersecretary of State Robert Olds admitted candidly that; "Until now 
Central America has always understood that governments which we recognise and support 
stay in power, while those we do not recognize and support fail."36 Thus, the U.S. consented to 
a string of weak, minority-supported Conservative governments which pursued retrogressive 
policies inimical to Nicaragua's national interests.37
The U.S. remained suspicious of the coffee bourgeiosie after Zelaya. The tragedy of this 
economically dominant fraction of the bourgeoisie was that it was prevented from influencing 
state power or being allowed to use the state as a vehicle to secure the conditions for its own 
reproduction, expansion and social transformation. State power remained fragmented and 
vulnerable to coups-d'etat and caudillismo. Those who wielded state power recognised the 
strength of their northern neighbour and were succeptible to 'selling out7 the national interests 
to the U.S. in order to cling to power.38
33S. Ramirez, "El Muchacho de Niquinohomo", in A.C. Sandino, El Pensamiento Vivo: Tomo 1, Editorial Nueva 
Nicaragua, Managua, 1984, p. 36.
■^Fagg, op. dt., p. 799.
^J.M. Paige, "Cotton and Revolution in Nicaragua”, in P. Evans, D. Rueschemeyer, E, Huber Stephens (eds), States 
Versus Markets in the World System, Sage, Beverly Hills, 1985, p. 96.
^R. Olds, "The Nicaraguan Crisis", in Leiken & Rubin (eds), op. dt., p. 84.
37This was admitted as such by a U.S. diplomatic representative in Nicaragua during the period, Dana Munro. See 
Munro, op. dt., pp. 78-9.
38The word used by Nicaraguan patriots to describe such poliddans was, and remains, uende-patr&s (literally, those 
who sell the country).
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The debility of the post-Zelaya state and the retardation of socio-economic development 
under U.S. intervention between 1910 and 1925 points to the important role which state 
intervention fulfils in capitalist industrialisation and modernisation. The inability of the agro­
exporting bourgeoisie to secure control over the state apparatus promoted economic stagnation. 
In the Nicaraguan case, truncated socio-economic development and transformation was 
compounded not only by this disarticulation between the state and local capital, but also 
through U.S. fiscal interference. Responding to U.S. interests, and starved of resources for 
accumulation, the state was unwilling and unable to intervene in favour of the coffee exporters, 
or 'substitute' itself as a catalyst for development.
However, the period of truncated development and U.S. interference only provided an 
illusion of the social peace desired by the U.S. Below the surface of appearances social tension 
remained acute. The withdrawal of U.S. support would reveal the 'artificial' nature of 
Conservative rule. It merely highlighted the failure of the U.S. to secure a pliant and stable 
regime acceptable to U.S. interests and enjoying domestic support. The tensions which surfaced 
after the departure of the Marine contingent reflected the effect of U.S. interference more than 
the absence of the Marines.39
These effects would manifest themselves during the period between 1925 and 1936. This era 
brought to the fore the social forces, ideologies and actors which would shape the next forty- 
five years of Nicaraguan history, culminating in the revolutionary situation of 1978-9. In order 
to 'unpack' the complexity of the late-1920's and early-1930's a narrative of events will be 
provided below.
In 1925 a coalition of Liberals and discontented Conservatives assumed power under the 
presidency of Conservative Carlos Solorzano, with Liberal Juan Bautista Sacasa as vice- 
president. Perceiving conditions to be fortuitous for withdrawal the U.S. pulled out its Marine 
contingent in August 1925. It left behind a retired U.S. Army major, Calvin Carter, to head a 
national constabulary which would act as an arbiter of conflict, ideally, a "politically neutral 
referee in mediating future crisis."40 The U.S. had sponsored similar exercises in Haiti, the 
Dominican Republic and the Philippines. Given the fragmentation of political power and 
coercive force, and the disarticulation between economic, political and military power, these 
schemes (as future events demonstrated) were at best naive, at worst, a mechanism for 
maintaining indirect U.S. control through military dictatorship.41
However, before this Guardia Nacional could be effectively tested in its designated role the
39This position contradicts the often repeated argument that the Marines were the guardians of civil peace. For 
example Tom Buckley argues that: "Uprisings had been prevented since 1912 by the presence of the marines. In 1925, 
Wasington, sensitive to charges of imperialism, withdrew them. Nicaraguans, prevented from murdering one another 
for political reasons for 14 years, immediately began making up for lost time." T. Buckley, Violent Neighbors, Time 
Books, N T , 1974, p. 189. The argument developed above suggests that it is a misinterpretation of reality to absolve the 
U.S. from this degree of responsibility for the resulting civil conflict
40On the origins of the Guardia Nacional, see Crawley, op. d t , pp. 47-50.
41 For the former opinion, see Dana Munro, quoted in Booth, op. d t ,  p. 35; for the latter, see Jonas, op. dt, p. 7.
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coalition fell apart. Members of the defeated Conservative faction persuaded Solorzano to 
purge the Liberals from government, then finally in January 1926 Emiliano Chamorro (the 
"irrepressible Conservative plotter"42) resumed the presidency. The Liberals response was to 
seek Mexican support and stage an armed uprising. In August 1926, after an aborted initial 
attempt, the Liberals (declaring themselves the Constitutional Army) began extending their 
control over the country. The U.S., fearing the 'mexicanisation' or 'bolshevisation' of Nicaragua 
returned en masse to assist the thoroughly discredited and beleaguered Conservative caudillos. A 
stalemate was reached by February 1927 with eleven U.S. cruisers and destroyers in 
Nicaragua's harbours and over 5,400 Marines patrolling every major urban centre. As Walter 
Lafeber remarks: "The U.S. Troops had returned in 1927 to protect a Nicaraguan regime that 
had become so addicted to North American dollars and soldiers that it could no longer function 
independently."43
In April Coolidge and Kellogg discharged Henry Stimson to Nicaragua to seek a political 
solution. Relying upon exploiting the personal ambitions of the warring generals, an 
understanding was reached in May. Under the 'Espino Negro' treaty the Conservative 
president Diaz would be allowed to complete his term of office, after which the U.S. would 
supervise free elections (which all parties recognised would bring the Liberals to power).44
Furthermore, the U.S. demanded that the new government organize a "truly non-partisan" 
constabulary to exercise military and police duties, which would replace the 'old' Guardia. 
Chamorro had wasted no time purging and stripping this 'mediator7 of its apolitical character.45 
A contingent of Marines would remain in Nicaragua to organise and supplement the new force 
until it reached operational standard.46
While it is interesting to speculate whether the Liberals under Moncada and Sacasa could 
have introduced social tranquility, recapture the articulation of state and economy missing 
since Zelaya and retain control over the new non-partisan Guardia, events did not follow 
Stimson's script. Moncada's instructions to his Liberal generals to turn in their arms (as 
specified in the Espino Negro Pact) was heeded by all except one, Augusto Cesar Sandino. 
Sandino, an uncompromising anti-imperialist, refused to submit to what he saw as a 
treasonable, U.S.-engineered document which left intact existing power relations, and pledged 
to maintain resistance until the last Marine left Nicaraguan soil. Although labelled by his 
enemies as a bandit, a Bolshevik and a caudillo, Sandino's philosophy was eclectic, though his
^Crawley, op. cit., p. 49.
ÖW. Lafeber, "The Burdens of the Past", in R.S. Leiken (ed), Central America: Anatomy of Conflict, Pergamon, VIA ., 
1984, p. 56.
^It has frequently been claimed that Moncada's participation was secured through a promise from Stimson that 
Moncada would be guaranteed the presidency in return for Moncada's assurance that Nicaragua would not be 
'mexicanised'. See Booth, op. dt. p. 40.
^See Crawley, op. dt., p. 50.
46See Booth, op. dt., p. 43.
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experiences progressively drove him towards a radical nationalism and a populistic conception 
of anti-oligarchical democracy. He recognised that only the working classes and the peasantry 
could be relied upon to depart radically from Nicaragua's past lamentable political history of 
vendepatrismo. Given this, it is hardly surprising that Sandino's Army for the Defence of the 
National Sovereignty of Nicaragua found few sympathisers among any faction of the 
traditional elites.47
Far from terminating the civil war, the Espino Negro Pact merely transformed the nature of 
the war into a form thus far unique in Nicaragua. This was based not upon rival caudillos and 
familial cliques, but rather along radical nationalist line. For the first time, the echo of social 
justice (justicia social) reverberated over the warring factions. Over the next six years the Guardia 
and the Marines received their initiation into guerrilla warfare, fighting against a mobile, 
invisible army, where the enemy chose the terrain and had the passive or active support of the 
local population. Furthermore, in the U.S. successive presidents had to contend with fighting a 
war which was unpopular at home and aroused international condemnation. One Marine 
historian has called Vietnam "a full-scale Nicaragua".48
If the peasantry initially remained indifferent to the renewed outbreak of hostility, it soon 
learned to distinguish Sandinista treatment from that of the Guardia and the Marines, who came 
to loath the 'accursed country' and inflicted cruelty and brutality upon the peasantry at the 
slightest suspicion of support for the rebels. On January 1, 1933, after five and a half years of 
frustration, the Marines departed, no closer to victory and with their reputation diminished.49
U.S. capital had preceded the Marines in the retreat from Nicaragua. Not only did civil war 
fail to attract foreign investment but "U.S.-owned properties became the targets of Sandino's 
forces during the war with the U.S. Marines." Standard Fruit, the prototype enclave capitalist 
firm throughout the region, closed its Nicaraguan operations in 1931 after a Sandinista attack.30 
The demise of enclave capitalism was assured by an outbreak of Panama and Sigatoka disease 
which destroyed Nicaragua's banana crop.31
The withdrawal of the Marines could not guarantee social stability. The Nicaraguan state, 
'addicted' to US support, remained faced with the problem of satisfying competing aspirations 
from armed forces either outside its control, or only nominally under its control. The two key 
forces were Sandino's guerrilla army and Somoza's Guardia.
47For Sandino's collected works, see A.C. Sandino, op. dt., Tomos 1 y 2. See also G. Selser, Sandino: El General de 
Hombres Libres, Editorial Diogenes, Mexico, 1979; I.E.S., General Augusto C. Sandino: Padre de la Revolucion Popular y 
Antiimperialista: 1895-1934, Editorial Nueva Nicaragua, Managua, 1985; and I.E.S., "El Legado de Sandino”, una 
publicadon espedal de Barracuda, 21 Febrero, 1986. One of the few U.S. commentators of the era who attempted to 
understand Sandino was Carleton Beals. His encounter with Sandino is described in J.A. Britton, Carleton Beals: A 
Radical Journalist in Latin America, University of New Mexico Press, A<^<^1986, ch. 5.
“^ Quoted in Jonas, op. dt., p. 8.
49 A Good account of the events between 1927 and 1933 are to be found in N. Macauley, The Sandino Affair, 
Quadrangle, Chicago, 1967.
^Jonas, op. dt., p. 20.
jiSee B. Nietschmann, Between Land and Water, Seminar, N X. , 1973, p. 40.
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With his main objective accomplished, Sandino agreed to enter into negotiations with the 
incoming Liberal president Juan Bautista Sacasa. On Sandino's part, unfavourable internal and 
external conditions forced him to opt for 'national concilia don',52 while Sacasa recognised his 
own fragile hold on state power, caught between Sandino and the powerful Guardia. Despite 
the radically different projections of Sacasa and Sandino concerning Nicaragua's future an 
agreement was reached whereby Sandino's forces would retreat, partially armed, to the 
northern department of Nueva Segovia to resume and consolidate their co-operative agrarian 
experiment.
The agreement provoked outrage amoung the Guardia who had been formed and tested in the 
midst of the struggle against Sandino, and had come to view his eradication as a principle raison 
d'etre. Furthermore, opposition within the Guardia was strong due to the appointment of 
Anastasio Somoza Garcia as Jefe Director, which was viewed by many as a political appointment 
of a man who had not 'earned his spurs' in the military confrontation against Sandino, but 
rather had charmed the American diplomatic delegation.^3 Armed incidents between Sandino's 
forces and the Guardia were endemic throughout 1933 and Sandino was forced to return to 
Managua to demand the cessation of Guardia provocations on numerous occasions. Somoza 
ultimately secured the confidence of the Guardia officers by orchestrating Sandino's murder as 
he left a state banquet in his honour in February 1934.54
Once the radical alternative had been eliminated the struggle for the state revolved around the 
conflict between the civilian government of Sacasa and Somoza's Guardia. The increasingly 
evident debility of Sacasa's government during the years between 1934 and 1936 must be 
explained in terms of the social and structural supports of the Guardia, rather than Somoza's 
machiavellian maneuvers. In particular, it is necessary to explain how Somoza succeeded where 
other caudillos failed. He combined a strong military apparatus with sympathy from the landed 
elites, encouraged a populist image of himself, and secured the passive acceptance of the United 
States. No previous Nicaraguan state-builder had cobbled together such a formidible array of 
preconditions for 'social stability'.
Sandino's murder had demonstrated once more that the government was unable to control its 
own armed force. The reign of terror which the Guardia inflicted upon the peasantry in the 
northern region and the extermination of the Sandinista followers provided a solution to the 
rural discontent brought on by the example of Sandino's agrarian experiment and the increased 
rural exploitation resulting from the slump in world coffee prices. The Guardia solution had 
appealed to the agro-exporting cafetaleros and landowners more than Sacasa's wavering and 
conciliatory gestures towards Sandino.
o2See J. Wheelock, Imperialismo y Dictatura, Editorial de Qencas Sodales, Habana, 1980, pp. 123-4; also see Sandino's 
letter to his friend Gustavo Aleman Bolanos, in A.C. Sandino, op. dt., tomo 2, pp. 330-1.
^For Somoza's elevation to power, see Booth, op. dt., p. 46.
54As Booth points out: "The murder of Sandino thus became the key to the Guard and the Guard the key to 
everything Nicaragua had to offer." Booth, op. dt., p. 52.
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Sacasa had alienated significant sectors of the political and economic elite. His appointment 
of Sonofonias Salvatierra (a Sandino confidant and subsequent mediator between Sandino and 
the government) as Minister for Agriculture and Labour merely fueled suspicions that Sacasa 
was unable to contain the menace of Sandino. Sandino, who recognised the pretensions of 
Somoza towards state power, had given Sacasa repeated assurances of Sandinista military 
support in the event of a Guardia-inspired coup.30 The offers, given in goodwill, did not help 
allay elite suspicions of the relative strengths of the contending forces, and the weakness of 
Sacasa's position.
This weakness of the civilian government, and its conciliatory gestures towards Sandino, was 
especially disconcerting to an agro-exporting elite trying to respond to the changing economic 
conditions of the early-1930's. As Nicaragua's primitive dependent capitalist economy reeled 
under the effects of the world crash and the decline in primary commodity prices, profit 
margins shrank and unemployment rose.06 The cafetaleros responded to the slump through the 
twin measures of heightening the exploitation of the labour force and expanding the volume of 
production through a renewed series of peasant land expropriations. Such a strategy required a 
strong state, unwaveringly sympathetic to the agro-exporting bourgeoisie and prepared to 
restrain labour. By late-1934 Somoza, rather than Sacasa, could openly claim credit for 
exorcising the spectre of rural discontent, Sandino. The spectre of unrest had already risen in 
neighbouring El Salvador, before being crushed by the dictator Martinez, leaving an estimated 
30,000 workers and peasants dead after a Communist uprising led by Sandino's former 
comrade Farabundo Marti in February 1932°7
As Somoza gradually consolidated his control over the Guardia he increasingly came into 
conflict with Sacasa over Guardia subordination to the government. Somoza's open 
proclamation of his presidential aspirations were opposed by Sacasa. Between 1934 and 
mid-1936 the uncle and nephew58 engaged in a trial of strength in which Sacasa progressively 
lost ground and Somoza's assertiveness increased.
Apart from the Guardia and anti-Sacasa Liberal caudillos, Somoza received support from "key 
Conservatives who saw him as capable of calming growing labour unrest."59 He also received 
support from a group of young Conservative intellectuals known as the camisas azules (blue 
shirts), founded in July 1934, who saw Somoza as a Nicaraguan Martinez, Hitler or Mussolini. 
Somoza used the camisas azules to intimidate opponents and provoke civil disturbances, after
"See Crawley, op. dt., pp. 82-5.
56See Booth, op. dt., p. 49; and Wheelock, op. dt., p. 125 &c 207.
57See J. Dunkerley, The Long War: Dictatorship and Revolution in El Salvador, Junction, korvAeo , 1982, pp. 28-9. 
33Somoza had married Sacasa's niece, with resulting sodal elevation.
“9Booth, op. dt., p. 54 and p. 62.
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which the Guardia would place the town or district under Guardia control.60
Under these conditions of intimidation, the destruction of Sandinismo, and elite discontent 
with the weakness of the Sacasa state, Somoza encountered little resistance when he forced 
Sacasa to resign in June 1936, installed an interim 'puppet7 in order to overcome a 
consanguineous constitutional hurdle, and engineered his landslide7 election victory at the end 
of the year.
The role of the U.S. throughout the Somoza-Sacasa confrontation was conspicuous in its 
'non-interventionism7. The U.S. had promoted the establishment of the Guardia as a non­
partisan adjudicator of internal conflict and had actively supported Somoza's appointment as 
Jefe Director of the new force despite Sacasa's reservations. The U.S. continued to maintain 
confidence in Somoza despite his refusals to comply with governmental requests to bring 
Sandino's murderers to trial. Somoza was non-partisan only in the sense that he was 
contemptuous of the existing channels of nominal political authority and obtained cross-party 
support against Sacasa. As Booth notes: "Sacasa's supporters continually pressed for the 
director-in-chiefs ouster, but they failed to obtain the support they wished from (U.S.) 
Ambassador Lane, who firmly adhered to his government7s instructions not to interfere on 
either side."61 In April 1936 the U.S. abandoned its Latin American policy of non-recognition of 
illegal seizures of power, enhancing Somoza's confidence. The 'non-interference7 of Roosevelt7s 
'Good Neighbour7 policy could be interpreted in the Nicaraguan setting as a cynical acceptance 
of the growing strength and unconstitutional behaviour of the Guardia 62 As Black argues, this 
"left a widespread belief among Nicaraguans...that the U.S.A. had created a monster, let it loose, 
then washed its hands of the consequences, knowing very well what those consequences would 
be."63
The weakness of the Nicaraguan state over the previous quarter of a century had been a 
consequence of, rather than a reason for, U.S. interference and occupation. The Guardia Nacional 
it imposed upon this weakened state structure irresistably gravitated towards the vacuum of 
state power. The dominant agro-exporting bourgeoisie also required a strong and stable state 
structure which had been denied since Zelaya's removal. Whether or not, as Fonseca argued, 
Somoza's success signalled 'Mission Accomplished7 for the U.S.64 it did provide a long-sought 
solution of U.S. diplomatic and domestic elite requirements; namely social and political 
quietude. As Winson argues, "United States military intervention and occupation, beginning in 
1912 had a particularly debilitating effect on the economy. Such actions truncated the
60See Crawley, op. dt., p. 92. See also C  Perez-Bermudez & O. Guevara, El Mooimiento Obrero en Nicaragua, El 
Amanecer, Managua, 1985, pp. 71-4.
61 Booth, op. dt., p. 53.
^See Lafeber, op. dt., p. 56.
^Black, op. dt., p. 47.
64See Fonseca, op. dt., p. 129.
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development of the nations agro-exporting bourgeoisie and eventually led to the dictatorship of 
Anastasio Somoza Garcia."65
This section has provided substance to Winson's claim, and has pointed towards the 
structural preconditions necessary to overcome the debilitating effect intervention had upon the 
state and economic development. The prehistory of somocismo demonstrates the necessity of a 
strong state structure corresponding to the developmental requirements of a dominant 
economic class if capitalist development and modernisation is to succeed. In Nicaragua's case 
this was complicated by the additional variable of a correspondence with the interests of the 
region's hegemonic power, the United States.
Throughout the period, Nicaraguan development stagnated at a level of 'primitive dependent 
capitalism'. Under the peculiarities of Nicaraguan history, this 'primitive' form manifested itself 
in six distinct, yet interrelated, ways. Firstly, the economy was integrated within the world 
economy through the fortunes of a single crop, coffee. Secondly, this incorporation failed to 
stimulate a transformation of the nation's industrial base, which remained primarily artisanal. 
Thirdly, relations within the most dynamic sector remained a hybrid of capitalist and pre­
capitalist forms. Fourthly, there was a non-correspondence between the state and the agro­
exporting bourgeoisie. Fifthly, the weakness of the state was compounded by its subordination 
to the interests of a powerful external power. Finally, the state was powerless to arbitrate 
between contradictory pressures, resulting in periodic manifest internal strife.
The rise of Somoza indicated a potential remedy for overcoming many of these problems 
which had held development at a 'primitive dependent7 stage. The remaining sections of this 
chapter will demonstrate the extent to which somocismo transformed the Nicaraguan economy, 
and the inherent social conflicts contained within the model of development.
A period of relative calm was to descend upon the nation. However, "it was to be a stability 
enforced by the tyrant's heel".66 Despite enormous costs to the popular classes, somocismo 
signalled the beginning of the end of 'primitive dependent capitalism'. Both Gorman and 
Walker have labelled somocista restructuring 'modem dependent capitalism'. While agreeing 
fundamentally with this, the description will be modified to 'diversified dependent capitalism', 
for reasons which will become evident as the history of somocista restructuring unfolds.
The rise and demise of somocismo was punctuated by periods of correspondence and conflict 
between the overshadowing power of the somocista state and economic empire on one hand, 
and the nor\-somocista bourgeoisie on the other. Its acceptance or rejection of somocismo would 
depend upon the ability of the state to fulfil the conditions of diversified dependent capitalist 
reproduction and expansion. This was paid for by the popular classes, whose 'cooperation' the
65A. Winson, "Nicaragua's Private Sector and the Sandinista Revolution", Studies in Political Economy, Summer 1985, 
17, p. 72.
^Booth, op. dt.( p. 49.
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state 'guaranteed'. Furthermore, this articulation of interests had to find equal correspondence 
with the hegemonic interests of the U.S. in the region.
3.4. CONSOLIDATING THE DICTATORIAL STATE
As Skocpol argues, and as the foregoing demonstrates, the state is more than an 
epiphenomenon of a given set of economic relations. In the Nicaraguan case, the somocista state 
was far from being a dependent variable reflecting substructural change. The relation between 
the state and socio-economic development was far more complex. In order to appreciate this, it 
is necessary to review the mechanisms forged by Anastasio Somoza Garcia in order to 
consolidate his dictatorial rule. Once this has been accomplished, the socio-political stability 
necessary for diversified dependent capitalist development can be understood. These 
mechanisms formed the basis of the Somoza dynasty, and were bequeathed to Somoza Garcia's 
sons, Luis and Anastasio ]r. Their ability to master their father's machiavellian techniques 
would be an important factor in the stability of the structure of somocismo.
While elements of continuity between zelayismo and somocismo manifested themselves in 
dictatorial strength and support from powerful propertied elites, somocismo also marked a 
transcendence in the relationship between the state and society. There were indicators that 
somocismo was a watershed in terms of the form of conflict which had engulfed Nicaraguan 
society since independence, and which had contributed to retarded economic development.
Firstly, no-one had ever assumed the presidency with such a monopoly on coercion as 
Somoza. The creation of the Guardia had weakened caudillismo further. Somoza's obsession 
during 1933 and the beginning of 1934 over the size of Sandino's arsenal in Nueva Segovia 
indicates Somoza's astute recognition that the monopolisation of coercion was a fundamental 
guarantee for 'stability'.67 This principle was enshrined in the constitution in 1939 which 
declared the Guardia "the only armed force of the Republic".68 To negate the possibility of a 
palace coup Somoza established and cultivated paternalistic control over the Guardia. 
Furthermore, he socially isolated the institution from the rest of society while at the same time 
pervaded all aspects of social life with the eyes and ears of the Guardia.09 Control over a wide 
range of public functions provided Guardia officers with sufficient scope for graft and 
corruption within the overall system, helping to ensure its loyalty and subservience. These 
parasitic administrative and commercial opportunities were the reward for ensuring that 
coercion remained ultimately at the fingertips of Somoza.70
67For this episode, see Crawley, op. dt., Ch. 10.
^Booth, op. dt., p.56.
69The word 'ears' (orejas) became synonomous with a somocista informer.
70The best account of the history of the Guardia remains R.L. Millett, Guardians of the Dynasty, Maryknoll, Orbis, 1977. 
This work is summarised in R.L. Millett, "From Somoza to the Sandinistas: The Roots of Revolution", in W. Grabendorff, 
H-W. Krumwiede &c J. Todt (eds), Political Change in Central America: Internal and External Dimensions, Westview, 
Boulder, 1984.
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Secondly, Somoza displayed shrewd political opportunism in his relations with the U.S. 
Recognising that his Guardia-imposed stability had to conform with the regional strategic 
requirements of the U.S., the Somozas were always quick to discern the winds of political 
change in Washington and act accordingly. Submissiveness to the unswerving and 
unambiguous dictates of the Munroe Doctrine was rewarded with generous military grants 
under the Lend Lease scheme and, later, the Alliance for Progress and the Military Assistance 
Plan. This ingratiating behaviour towards the U.S. also ensured that U.S. military hardware 
would not be channelled directly to Somoza's opponents, thus tightening his coercive 
monopoly and avoiding the mistake of Zelaya. In effect, Somoza was free of external politico- 
military constraints to pursue his restmcturing of Nicaraguan society. Despite the quasi- 
parasitic function of the Guardia and the high socio-economic costs upon the Nicaraguan 
masses, Somoza did succeed in achieving the prerequisites, so long missing, for stable 
dependent capitalist development; a strong state and space to pursue his domestic designs with 
the tacit or active support of the U.S. Somoza was not always free from conflict with the U.S. as 
the events surrounding his dismissal of the Arguello government in 1948 reveal. Moral 
repugnance towards Somoza was frequently heard in the U.S. Congress. However, despite the 
ambivalence of certain U.S. presidents towards Somoza's methods, the final reckoning always 
took into consideration that (to paraphrase Roosevelt and Cordell Hull) even if Somoza was a 
son of a bitch, he was "our son of a bitch".71 Even though relations occasionally deteriorated 
below cordiality the Somoza clan continually promoted the domestic image of U.S. support for 
internal consumption in order to ward off 'political predators'. Millett's assessment of the son 
applies equally to the father: "To most Nicaraguans the message was clear: The United States 
supported Anastasio Somoza Debayle and any effort to topple him would probably produce 
prompt intervention."72
Thirdly, the decline of caudillismo mirrored the demise of the traditional party structures. 
Somoza's accession cross-cut Liberal/Conservative divisions, and it took almost a decade 
before the political spectrum was realigned and transformed along dearer anti-institutional and 
class lines. Somoza adapted his treatment of the opposition according to circumstances. As the 
traditional political structure became increasingly obsolete after Somoza's coup opposition 
forces resorted to a variety of strategies. Anti-Somoza Liberals, recognising that the restructured 
somocista Liberal National Party was a mere figleaf cloaking the coercive/administrative 
apparatus of Somoza and the Guardia, formed the Partido Liberal Independiente (P.L.I.) in March 
1944. The party suffered varying degrees of repression and harassment, the worst following the 
assassination of Somoza Garda in September 1956.73 The Conservatives occasionally adopted 
'abstentionisti tactics, unwilling to legitimate the Gwardia-manipulated elections. However, 
Somoza was usually successful in co-opting a section of the party to 'compete' in the elections,
^Crawley, op. dt., p. 99. 
^Millett, op. dt., p. 39. 
^See Booth, op. dt., p. 103.
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agreeing beforehand to the allocation of seats in the Assembly.74 Thus, the core of the 
traditional political structure was co-opted into the legitimation system of somocismo, though 
dissent could never entirely be silenced. This democratic facade was nothing more than the 
cynical co-optation of dying caudillismo; the velvet glove covering the underlying essence of 
somocista repression, coercion and corruption in pursuit of the interests of dynastic capital 
accumulation. As Booth notes, "...such abuse and manipulation always abbetted by greedy 
insiders willing to abandon principle for personal gain, killed the Liberal and Conservative 
parties as ideological and programmatic organisations. Much of the Nicaraguan citizenry came 
to regard both as corrupt, opportunistic and unworthy of political trust."75
During the mid-1940,s Somoza began to encounter a new form of resistance which would 
manifest itself periodically throughout the dynasty's reign and ultimately contribute to its 
overthrow. The broad-based, through diverse, character of the opposition tested Somoza's 
powers of political manipulation. The process was similar in character to that which overthrew 
Martinez in El Salvador and Ubico in Guatamala. Patricia Flynn describes it thus:
A strong coalition arose in opposition to the exclusive role of the traditional oligarchy. It was 
drawn from the growing professional and middle class, a newly politicised student population, 
an expanding working class, young military dissidents, and a new faction of the economic elite 
whose wealth came from industry and new crops such as cotton and sugar. The demands of this 
coalition included political democracy, economic reforms, and an end to subservience to foreign 
interests.76
Although the 'Jacobin' solution in Guatamala, and the Trussian' solution in El Salvador 
succeeded in toppling the dictatorial state structures of Ubico and Martinez, the traditional 
oligarchies of these states remained intact by the mid-1950's and capitalist industrialisation 
remained subsumed under an oligarchical project. In El Salvador, the concentration of wealth 
within the 'fourteen families' promoted a closer articulation between industry and agro-exports, 
while the closer, broad-based unity of the Guatamalan reform movement under Arbenz led to 
an agrarian reform which exceeded the tolerance of U.S. strategic and economic interests. The 
U.S. reimposed a military solution in 1954, crushing incipient national development.77
It was only in Nicaragua that the dictatorial state emerged unscathed, even strengthened, 
from the regional reform movement of the 1940's. Student riots had shaken Somoza in the 
late-1930's and early-1940's,78 while Somoza's resolution to serve another presidential term had 
galvanised opposition. The same year the P.L.I. was founded, the workers movement founded 
the Moscow aligned Partido Socialista de Nicaragua (P.S.N.), which was tolerated by Somoza in 
the anti-fascist climate of the war and the U.S. alliance with the Soviet Union.
74Factions, such as the Chamorro faction of 1950 and the Arguero faction of 1972 were contemptuously branded 
zandudo (mosquito) by their abstentionist opponents.
^Booth, op. dt., p. 43.
76P. Flynn, "Central America: The Roots of Revolt”, in Burbach <& Flynn (eds), op. dt., p. 36.
'''See Edelberto Torres Rivas, "The Nature of the Central American Crisis", in G. Irvin & X. Gorostiaga (eds), Towards 
an Alternative for Central America and the Caribbean, Allen & Unwin, t c  © n , 1985, pp. 40-5.
78See J.M. Blandon, Entre Sandino y Fonseca, Pub. "Silvio Mayorga”, Managua, 1982, pp. 16-21.
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Somoza co-opted the labour movement through toleration of unions and promulgating a 
progressive labour code. The effect was to weaken the cohesion of the anti-Somoza movement. 
Still, opposition was strong enough to force Somoza to withdraw his nomination for the 1947 
election which was won (with Somoza's blessing) by Leonardo Arguello. Somoza retained 
control over the Guardia and after Arguello emitted signals that he intended to implement 
significant reform, the Guardia stepped in to 'restore the order'. Somoza was quick to recognise 
the prevailing winds of the Cold War and turned virulently anti-communist, ending his brief 
and troublesome flirtation with the socialists and repressing union activity. The new Labour 
Code was never enacted.79
Thus, unlike neighbouring El Salvador and Guatamala, the dictatorial somocista state 
succeeded in dividing the reform movement, before applying selective repression. As Edelberto 
Rivas Torres observes, in Nicaragua "it was within the State itself (under the leadership of 
Somoza) that attempts were made to resolve the political crisis that was spreading throughout 
Central America."80
These three pillars, control over the coercive monopoly of the Guardia, subservience to US 
interests, and fragmenting the opposition, upheld the dynasty's control over the state. 
However, this was merely a means to an end. Somoza-as-Machiavelli was the tool used to 
enhance the power of Somoza-as-capitalist. As Carlos Vilas notes:
Control of the state is in itself an economic power that permits the conversion of fractions which 
were originally defined by politico-ideological features - elements of the bureaucracy, 
professional groups, private armies - into fractions defined structurally by their control of means 
of production and exchange.81
It is this structural definition of Somoza-as-capitalist which must be examined in order to 
explain the particularities of the capitalist restructuring of Nicaragua under the dynasty. This 
restructuring shaped the contours of the class conflict which eventually provoked the demise of 
the dynasty in 1979.
3.5. THE SOMOZA-BOURGEOIS ALLIANCE
Between 1950 and 1967 a series of factors activated a period of extensive capital accumulation, 
promoting the capitalist restructuring of Nicaraguan society and diversifying its economic base. 
This section will describe this restructuring and explain how it affected the relationship 
between the somocista state and the bourgeoisie. It will provide substance to Donald Castillo 
Rivas' claim that:
The long period of dynastic dictatorship that the succession in power of the Somoza family 
brought to Nicaragua reflects, beyond all its negative aspects, a particularly important fact: 
Somoza in the specific framework of pre-revolutionary Nicaragua, was a guarantee of stability 
and consequently of the capitalist development model, at least while that model brought
79This period will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5.
^E. Torres Rivas, op. dt., p. 44.
81 Vilas, The Sandinista Revolution: National Liberation and Social Transformation in Central America, Monthly Review, 
M l  ,1986, p. 51.
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accelerated m odernization w ith it.82
The first condition for understanding this development is the emergence of Somoza-as- 
capitalist. On assuming power Somoza's productive capital consisted of one inherited "ruined 
coffee plantation" (tinea).83 By the time of his assassination twenty years later he was one of the 
richest men in Central America, reputedly worth $100 million.84 The state had served Somoza 
as a rewarding instrument in the enormous expansion of his capital base. The Guardia 
controlled postal services, customs, taxes, railways, foreign concessions and the National Bank. 
Somoza obtained significant advantages over his competitors through utilising public functions 
as if they were his private property. Intimidation of opponents included sale of land under 
duress to Somoza. He also used the anti-fascist sentiment during the war in order to 
expropriate German coffee fincas. By the end of the war Somoza owned 51 cattle ranches and 46 
coffee fincas, making him the single largest landowner and cafetalero in Nicaragua. During the 
war Somoza also expanded his control over gold, timber and rubber in order to profit from 
increased trade generated by the U.S. war effort. Furthermore, he controlled prices in sectors 
where he had substantial interests, profited from contraband, sold permits to import and export 
goods and "every year pocketed $400,000 from foreign companies he had exempted from taxes 
and social contributions."85 The Somoza holdings came to represent one of the three largest 
financial/production conclomerates in Nicaragua. Less structurally definable than the other 
conglomerates, due to the interpenetration of Somoza's capital and state institutions, Jaime 
Wheelock has nevertheless labelled it 'the loaded dice group' (el grupo de los dados cargados).86
Given the accumulation of capital by the Somoza clan through manipulating state levers, 
relations between the various fractions of capital and the Somoza empire were fraught with 
tension. Social peace among the economic elites was only possible given the existence of three 
conditions:
a) the carving up of spheres of industrial and commercial influence between the factions;
b) continual economic growth, expansion, rationalisation and modernisation;
c) control over the aspirations of sectors of Nicaraguan society whose exploitation served as 
the basis for the model of capitalist development.
^Donald Castillo Rivas, "Reasons for the Success of the Nicaraguan Revolution", in Grabendorff et al. [eds], op. dt., p. 
54.
83 Wheelock, op. dt., p. 164.
MFor speculations on the extent of his wealth, see F. Parker, The Central American Re-publics, Oxfordv\f, 0 ^ o4 ,  1965, 
p. 245.
^The above statistics are taken from Booth, op. dt., p. 55; Weber, op. dt., pp. 16-7; Wheelock, op. dt., p. 166; Jonas, op. 
dt., pp. 10-11. Somoza's illegal cattle-running into Costa Rica during the 1940's (with the connivance of his friend Rafael 
Calderon, the Costa Rican president) was espedally notorious. See J.D. Martz, Central America: The Crisis and the 
Challenge, University of North Carolina, C. , 1959, pp. 181-2.
^Wheelock, op. dt., pp. 163-76.
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The analysis below will concentrate upon the first two conditions. The third will be discussed 
in detail in Chapter 5.
The basis of the Somoza-bourgeois alliance was forged in 1950 through the 'pact of generals' 
between Somoza Garcia and Emiliano Chamorro. This pact guaranteed the Conservative 
opposition a minority share of control over the state, and provided commercial and political 
space for non-somocista interests within the overall framework of somocismo. It also guaranteed 
Somoza's tolerance of independent financial institutions representing the interests of 
non -somocista capital. The result was the co-optation of the bourgeoisie under the protective 
umbrella of the repressive Guardia apparatus, allied against the threat of organised labour and 
the spectre of communism.
Consequently, during the 1950's the non -somocista fractions of capital became more 
concentrated around two distinct financial centres. In July 1952 capital associated with 
traditional conservative interests, such as livestock and sugar, formed El Banco de America 
(BANAMER). Two U.S. banks, Wells Fargo and First National City, were major participants in 
the venture. In 1953 the more dynamic capital associated with cotton production and the 
fledgling Managua industrialists created El Banco de Nicaragua (BANIC). Chase Manhatten held 
significant interests in the venture, along with Morgan Guaranty and Multibank and Trust. 
These developments helped accelerate the tendency for foreign capital to be concentrated 
around financial and commercial, rather than productive, concerns.87
The maintenance of the alliance between the dictatorial state and the bourgeoisie required a 
more diversified and dynamic economy than hitherto had existed under conditions of 
'primitive dependent capitalism'. The emergence of the Somoza clan as an economic force 
would have merely highlighted the tension between the state and the bourgeoisie under the 
pre-war economic structure. The short gold boom of the late-1940's failed to alter the fact that 
Nicaragua's established primary commodity exports could not have fetched the world prices or 
expanded to the degree necessary to maintain a dynamic equilibrium satisfying the needs of 
both the Somoza clan and other fractions of capital.88
The socio-economic marriage between the state and capital was consummated through the 
emergence of the cotton boom, and the consequent restructuring and diversification of 
Nicaragua's agro-exporting base. The introduction of cotton, stimulated by high prices on the 
world market in the early-1950's, injected the required dynamism into the post-war economy. 
Socially, it guaranteed a period of cohesion among the propertied classes, allowing both 
partners in the alliance sufficient space for expansion. The planting of cotton expanded 120-fold 
between 1949 and 1955, while the value of cotton exportation rose from $1.84 million in 1950 to
^See Wheelock, pp. 148-63 & 199-200; also Black, op. dt., p. 38.
^Between 1938 and 1949 gold production overtook coffee as the prindpal source of export earnings. See Gorman, op. 
dt., p. 42. By 1945 coffee represented onlt 27% of total export revenue, compared to 62% in 1926. By 1950 coffee had 
again risen to 50%, before cotton cultivation expanded in importance. See Wheelock, op. dt., p. 206; Vilas, op. dt., p. 52.
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$23.57 million in 1956.89
The expanded cultivation of cotton required the rich, flat volcanic plains of the Pacific Coast, 
occupied by small peasant farmers producing cereal for domestic consumption. 180,000 
peasants were forcefully evicted from 400,000 acres of land during the 1950's and transformed 
into agricultural labourers.90 Others ‘ migrated to urban centres or retreated into the northern 
hinterlands to continue self-sufficient or local market production. Cotton eventually occupied 
approximately 40% of Nicaragua's cultivated land. Correspondingly, by 1955 Nicaragua began 
importing major staple food crops, such as com, rice and beans.91 The boom contributed to 
Nicaragua's high rate of GDP growth during the decade, which averaged 5.6%, the highest in 
Central America.92 Unlike coffee, cotton required a continual process of mechanisation and 
rationalisation.93 The new agro-exporting dynamism resulted in greater concentration of capital 
due to the high costs of imputs, such as chemicals, fertilisers and heavy machinery. In the wake 
of the boom, light industries (such as textiles and oils) sprang up around Managua.94 A further 
consequence of the cotton boom was the expansion of commercial capital due to the high costs 
of production inputs in cotton cultivation. U.S. private capital began filling this vacuum, thus 
participating in modem dependent capitalist Nicaragua more in the process of finance and 
circulation than directly in the process of production.90
The socio-political peace which Somoza had purchased with the bourgeoisie through 
cooperation in the cotton boom had the important class consequence of tying the dynamic - 
non-Somoza sectors tighter to the somocista coercive state apparatus. However, the "enrichment 
of these groups did not transform the critical material situation of the working people."96 Thus, 
the new accumulation of capital depended upon Guardia control of rural labour unrest in the 
wake of peasant evictions and the process of proletarianisation. As Petras argues:
The state - the Somoza clan - and foreign capital played a decisive role in implanting capitalism 
and capitalist social relations. The whole process of rapid growth from above was made possible 
by the autocratic dictatorship and its 'free market' and repressive labour policies....Tne very 
terms of success of the autocratic-development ('from above and outside') model prevented the
""After 1950 cotton production expanded exponentially to become the country's major export and, as the National 
Cotton Commission observed, the driving motor (motor invpulsador) of the entire economy." Paige, op. dt., p. 91. The 
figures are from Black, op. dt., p. 37; and Wheelock, op. dt., p. 206
^Black, op. dt., p. 27.
91R. Harris, "The Economic Transformation and Industrial Development of Nicaragua", in R. Harris & C. Vilas (eds), 
Nicaragua: A Revolution Under Siege, Zed,Le»->AoA,1985, p. 38.
^Weber, op. dt., p. 24.
^Paige, op. dt., pp. 102-3.
94See J. Lopez et. al., La Caida del Somocismo y La Lucha Sandinista, Editorial Universitaria Centroamerica, San Jose, 
1980, p. 39.
9aSee Vilas, op. dt., p. 51.
^MIDINRA, "Informe de la Gestion Estatal del MIDINRA para la JGRN (1979-1984)”, in Revolucion y Desarrollo, No. 1, 
Abril, Mayo, Junio, 1984, p. 15. (My translation)
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dom inant forces from any sustained or consequential democratization.97 
As long as somocismo guaranteed social stability combined with economic growth and 
modernisation, the contradictions between the state and the various fractions of capital 
remained secondary, overshadowed by class unity forged under advantageous conditions of 
capital accumulation.98
The 'cotton revolution', therefore, effected the transformation and diversification of 
Nicaragua's dependent capitalist economy during the 1950's. It was also the guarantee of elite 
consensus, which coffee production could not provide. However, Jeffrey Paige has pointed out 
that the cotton revolution also revolutionised the relations of exploitation which formed the 
basis of capital accumulation. The 'manorial' form of coffee production had left the agrarian 
worker more or less tied to the land, substituting labour on the coffee jinca with work on 
subsistence plots during the off-season. Mechanised cotton production, on the other hand 
required a more seasonal agrarian proletariat whose labour was required only for the three 
months of the cotton harvest.99 "Given the capital intensity of production and the 
extraordinarily high yields in the cotton zone, provision of subsistence plots to ensure a captive 
labor force was uneconomical and land rates were far beyond the means of even the wealthiest 
middle-peasant."100 During the off-season peasants, fully exposed to the forces of the capitalist 
market, migrated to the cities. However, the rate of urbanisation far exceeded the rate of 
industrialisation, forcing many into the insecurity of the expanding informal sector. Between 
1950 and 1960 the population of Managua grew from 98,000 to 234,000. Thus, as Paige 
concludes; "To a surprising extent, Nicaragua's agricultural proletariat was urban."101 During 
the 1950's no concerted attempt was made to organise this important sector of the popular 
classes. The outlawed P.S.N. concentrated its meagre resources upon the 'traditional' urban 
working classes. Thus, during the 1950's the Somoza-bourgeois alliance, built upon the 
foundations of repression and exploitation, was never seriously threatened by manifestations of 
organised popular discontent.
However, the fragility of the alliance, and the latent tension underlying collaboration, 
manifested itself through economic contraction during the late-1950's. World market prices for 
cotton and coffee fell sharply after 1955, affecting expanded reproduction. The annual average 
growth rate between 1950 and 1955 of 8.3% fell in the latter half of the decade to 2.3%.102
^J.F. Petras, "The Nicaraguan Revolution in Historical Perspective", in J.F. Petras, Class, State and Power in the Third 
World, Allenheld & Osmun, New Jersey, 1981, p. 267.
98Gonzalez has labelled this model "reform with repression" (see M. Gonzalez, Nicaragua: Revolution Under Siege, 
Bookmarks, U.n<ior>, 1985, p. 17); while Millett observes that: "In the words of a former US military attache, middle- and 
upper-class loyalties were ensured by 'giving them a piece of the pie but not the action'. This meant that they could 
maintain or even improve their economic status if they accepted Somoza domination over the nation. They received 
prosperity but no power, stability in exchange for dignity." (See Millett, op. dt., p. 40.)
"See Paige, op. dt., pp. 103-7; also Close, op. dt., p. 39.
100Paige, op. dt., p. 104.
101 Ibid, p. 107.
102■Bendana, op. dt., p. 13.
86
Another factor contributing to tension was the severe repression following in the wake of 
Somoza Garcia's assassination in 1956 by P.L.I. supporter and poet Rigoberto Lopez Perez. As 
Booth comments:
Rigoberto Lopez had rid Nicaragua of Somoza Garcia, but the assassination instituted a dynasty 
and intensified rather than ended the tyranny. Nevertheless, it catalysed a new form of 
opposition. The wave of repression it unleashed steeled the determination of many of its victims - 
among them those who would bring down the dynasty in 1979.103
In 1959 an employers strike was defeated after the government suspended the import licences 
of the participants.104 Elements within the Conservative party demanded substantial social and 
political reforms, while members of the youth wing of the party, such as Pedro Joachin 
Chamorro, were developing Social Christian 'tendencies'. During this upsurge a multi-party 
united opposition movement (U.N.O.) was formed in addition to the Popular Christian 
Democratic Movement.105 Aborted armed uprisings crosscut the political spectrum. The 
Cuban experience convinced many opponents on the left who were dissatisfied with the 
'quietism' of the P.S.N. that guerrilla struggle and a grass-roots vanguard organisation was the 
only possible path available to those seeking the overthrow of the dynasty. The tradition of 
Sandino synthesised with Castroism and the Leninism of the P.S.N. formed the basis of a new 
guerrilla movement led by young P.S.N. dissidents. This will be analysed in Chapter 5.
While the ideologically diverse and fragmented opposition movement had subsided 
somewhat by 1962, the tremors of discontent shook the dynasty sufficiently for President Luis 
Somoza to decide to stand down in 1963 in favour of a hand-picked candidate Rene Schick. 
However, Guardia control remained firmly in the hands of brother Anastasio Somoza Debayle.
Under the guidance of Luis, the clan's economic empire was streamlined and rationalised. It is 
reputed that Luis envisaged relinquishing direct state power by the family, and favoured 
basing the clan's power upon its economic levers. This would have required injecting greater 
efficiency into their enterprises in order to compete on the 'open market'.
The years between 1960 and 1967 were the halcyon days of dynastic rule. Jose Luis Medal has 
labelled the epoch ‘liberalismo somocismo' , combining "some elements of 'reform' (more on paper 
than in practice) with repression pure and simple of the labour force".106 A combination of 
factors intervened to restore the dynamic equilibrium which had fostered the development of 
the early-to-mid-1950's. These factors included the establishment of the Central American 
Common Market (C.A.C.M.), the Alliance for Progress, stabilisation of Nicaraguan export 
commodities on the world market, and the dispersal of the opposition movement. These factors 
allowed the Somoza-bourgeois alliance to reassert itself without altering fundamentally urban
103Booth, op. dt., p. 71.
104Bendana, op. dt., p. 13.
10SBooth, op. dt., pp. 106-7.
106J.L.Medal, "Politica Economica y Revoludon", Paper presented at 111 Congreso Nicaraguense de Ciendas Sodales, 
October, 1982, p. 4. (My translation)
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and rural relations of exploitation. An Agrarian Reform Law of 1963 remained a paper tiger 
which never threatened the interests of the agro-exporting bourgeoisie, and consequently, the 
Somoza-bourgeois alliance. Growth through redistribution remained a chimera. As Lopez et al. 
remark, this alternative would have "implied a broad project of income redistribution and 
agrarian transformation which the dominant Nicaraguan classes did not have the capacity to 
implement." Development continued to proceed at the expense of the marginalised popular 
classes "without altering the political-economic bases of domination..."107
However, as the analysis below will demonstrate, this epoch merely heightened the social 
tensions inherent within the somocista model of development and clarified the outlines of future 
class conflict.
The conception of a Central American Common Market originated from the experiences of the 
larger Latin American nations which, during the economic downturn of the 1930's, initiated 
programmes of import substitution in an attempt to reduce their external dependence upon 
world market prices for primary products, whose unstable and fluctuating demand accentuated 
domestic economic crises. Economic diversification was perceived as a means of cushioning the 
economy against these effects. E.C.L.A. economists in the 1950's believed that the five Central 
American republics could transcend the obstacle of limited internal demand (resulting partly 
from size and income distribution) through a programme of regional economic integration 
(increasing economies of scale) and regional planning. The authors envisaged the scheme 
leading towards industrialisation, balanced growth and reduction of foreign dependency. With 
certain reservations the scheme was also supported by industrialists of the stronger Central 
American countries (especially El Salvador) who required a reduction in regional tariff barriers 
in order to expand their restricted market.
However, the gradualist approach of E.C.L.A. plus the absence of sufficient funding to bolster 
the project led many to the conclusion that greater external, private financing would be 
required in order to ensure feasibility.108 The economic downturn of the late-1950's 
strengthened the rationale behind integration. Furthermore, U.S. multinational capital began 
taking an interest in the proposal as its external investment portfolio began to shift away from 
primary commodities towards manufacturing. With the incentive of substantial aid, the U.S. 
assisted in framing an agreement to form C.A.C.M. in late-1960. The ratified treaty of 1961 
departed significantly from E.C.L.A.'s original understanding of regional integration. The 
emphasis on regional planning and balanced growth was reduced, while unrestricted free trade 
was promoted, tariff barriers dropped and non-regional foreign capital was assured
107Lopez et. al., op. dt., p. 41. (My Translation)
108N.S. Chinchilla & N. Hamilton, "Prelude to Revolution: U.S. Investment in Central America", in R. Burbank & 
P. Flynn (eds), op. dt., pp. 217-20.
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unregulated movement.109
On the surface the 'development decade7 of the 1960's produced impressive results in 
Nicaragua. Rates of growth in GDP throughout the decade averaged 9%. By 1970 
manufacturing accounted for 22% of GDP. The per capita increase of GNP in Nicaragua for the 
decade was the highest in the region (34%) while the 11% growth in industrial production was 
also the regions highest.110
Foreign, especially U.S., capital performed a catalystic role in Nicaraguan industrialisation. 
U.S. investments in Nicaragua (which had been traditionally low) continued to be low in 
regional comparative terms, although these investments registered one of the highest growth 
rates in the region during the 1960's. By the 1970's the U.S. share in foreign investment 
represented 80% of the total $170 million. In 1960 direct U.S. investments had totalled only $18.9 
million.111 Major areas of investment included food processing, leather, textiles, furniture, 
chemicals, construction materials and metal products.112 The export-oriented light industrial 
sector registered the most impressive growth while the service sector expanded enormously. 
Agricultural exports also diversified with the expansion of the U.S. beef market. Between 1960 
and 1975 the amount of land dedicated to beef doubled, while the decade of the 1960's 
registered a tripling in the relative share of beef in exports.113
While the Somoza clan used the influx of foreign capital to diversify away from its agro- 
exporting base, there was sufficient room for the other banking conglomerates to register 
impressive growth. BANIC in particular received heavy backing from USAID. As Black argues, 
for a time this growth "papered over inter-bourgeois conflicts which might have been generated 
if agrarian reform rather than industrialisation had been the cornerstone of U.S. strategy."114
The influx of foreign capital also accelerated the monopolisation and concentration of 
production. By 1971 there existed 600 plants employing 5 or more workers. Of these, 136 
accounted for 72% of production while a mere 23 accounted for 35%.llj In areas such as
109As the CEDETIM publication, Nicaragua: Du Reve..a la Realite notes: "La position des Etats Unis etait a l'oppose de 
celle de la CEPEL (ECLA) en ce qu'elle preconisait la liberte totale du commerce et l'absence de planification." p. 9. See 
also Lopez et. al., p. 41-2; and T. Barry et. al., Dollars and Dictators: A Guide to Central America, Z e d , 1983, p. 33. 
Costa Rica, which was not party to the original agreement, joined CA.C.M. in 1963, while Honduras ratified the treaty 
in 1962.
n0The statistics are from Weber, op. dt., p. 24; Vilas, op. dt., p. 52; and J.F. Petras and M.H. Morley, "Economic 
Expansion, Political Crisis and US Policy in Central America ”, in M. Dixon &c S. Jonas (eds), Revolution and Intervention in 
Central America, Synthesis, S^.fc(l983, p. 193.
m See Black, op. dt., p. 39; and Pearce, op. dt., p. 26.
112See Harris, ,op. dt., p. 39. See also the lists of foreign operations in Jonas, op. dt., pp. 36-8; and Bendana, op. dt., 
pp. 38-9.
n3For the diversification of export products and markets, see J. Collins, Nicaragua: What Difference Could a Revolution 
Make, Food First, F ,1985, p. 259 and p. 265; for beef, see Vilas, op. dt, p. 51; and Pearce, op. dt., p. 42.
lu Black, op. dt., p. 40.
U;jGorman, op. dt., p. 49, quoting Jaime Wheelock.
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textiles, furniture, leather goods and shoes local artisan production was squeezed out of the 
market by the more efficient activity of monopoly capital. The 13,000 small enterprises which 
accounted for 5% of production received little or no benefit from Nicaraguan industrialisation 
'from above and outside' and formed a willing support basis for the anti-somocista movement 
when it re-emerged.
The economic diversification and development of the decade foiled to alter significantly the 
oligarchical structure of Nicaraguan society. Pearce's conclusion with repect to the effect of 
C.A.C.M. on the region as a whole is especially apt for Nicaragua: "Industrialisation did 
not...involve any rupture in the power of the oligarchy which controlled...exports, but rather an 
extension of their economic interests and those of foreign capital with which they remained close 
allies.”116 This extension of oligarchical interests provided a quick solution to the manifestation 
of state-bourgeois conflict during the late-1950's. Furthermore, it helped avoid placing the long 
neglected issue of land reform on the national agenda, which would have brought to a head the 
conflict between the state and the various fractions of capital.
The absence of significant agrarian reform highlighted the repressive basis of the somocista 
developmental model. Rural repression intensified during the 1960's and into the 1970's as 
peasant land seizures intensified. The somocista state was assisted in pacifying rural relations 
through the Alliance for Progress. This was the reverse side of the 'social peace' of the 
industrialisation programme of the 1960's.
Ostensibly, the Alliance for Progress had been formed in August 1961 with the purpose of 
promoting liberalisation, democratisation, socio-economic development and land 
redistribution. However, as Walter LeFeber points out "the actual target was Castro".117 The 
principles of the Monroe Doctrine could not afford another Cuba in the hemisphere, and thus a 
Latin American 'Marshall Plan' was devised with its "complementary elements of aid and 
counter-insurgency".118 The Alliance was an essential condition for the success of C.A.C.M. as 
U.S. business confidence had been severely shaken after the events in Cuba. The U.S. had to 
assure its businessmen that it wouldn't happen again. The relative importance of economic aid 
and redistribution compared with military assistance was starkly presented in a study which 
pointed out that during the early 1960's U.S. military assistance "gave every member of 
Somoza's National Guard an average of $930 of equipment and training in order to take violent
116Pearce, op. dt., p. 47.
117LaFeber, op. dt.( p. 60.
u8Chinchilla & Hamilton, op. dt., p. 217. Flynn, op. dt., pp. 40-1, has characterised the programme as "counter­
insurgency in disguise". See also D. Horowitz, "The Alliance for Progress", in Rhodes (ed), op. dt., pp. 45-61.
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action against a population whose average per capita income was $205."119
The halcyon years of the Somoza dictatorship between 1960 and 1967 witnessed a renewed 
period of economic reactivation after the slump of the late-1950/s. Growth rates were 
impressive, industrialisation expanded, and foreign capital flooded the nation. However, the 
form which this development assumed hid a number of latent contradictions which would 
reveal themselves in the following period. This form of development supports Teodor Shanin 
and Burach BerberoghTs arguments that within the controlling 'triple alliance' of the state, 
foreign capital and domestic capital under conditions of dependent capitalist development, it is 
domestic capital which acts as the 'junior7 partner. While domestic capital participated in 
reaping the harvest of the 'development7 decade, it remained the most vulnerable to changes in 
the economic environment, and was least able to determine the direction of change. Local 
industrialists would have benefited most from agrarian reform. The model, however, was not 
premised upon expanding internal demand, through income redistribution or agrarian reform, 
but rather through repressing this demand. President Kennedy had warned in 1961 that "those 
who make peaceful revolution impossible will make violent revolution inevitable". In 
Nicaragua, the peaceful industrial revolution which submerged elite conflict below the surface 
was bought at the price of denying significant agrarian reform and intensifying rural 
repression. The contours of future developments were distinguishable: violent revolution in 
the form of a popular coalition which had been excluded and marginalised from the fruits of 
Somoza's peaceful revolution.
3.6. CONTRADICTIONS WITHIN THE SOMOCISTA DEVELOPMENTAL 
MODEL
The previous two sections have analysed the conditions which maintained and reproduced 
the Somoza dynasty. More importantly (for the purpose of this thesis) they have explained how 
a specific form of dependent capitalist development occurred in post-war Nicaragua. It has 
been argued that this model relied upon a number of socio-economic preconditions in order to 
submerge inherent social tension. The final section of this chapter will describe the particular 
manner in which these social contradictions manifested themselves.
By the late 1960's cracks were appearing in the edifice of Somoza's 'peaceful revolution'. 
These cracks revealed deeper structural defects which, within a decade, would contribute to the 
collapse of the entire somocista framework.
The industrialisation strategy pursued during the 1960's brought numerous negative
119Pearce, op. dt., p. 56. The situation remained unaltered during the 1970's, on in the project: "Even aspects of aid 
programmes which appear directed to improvements of the lot of the majority are frequently not what they seem. 
Projects such as the Institute of Peasant Welfare (S14 million loan) in Nicaragua are using as 'target' areas those zones of 
major guerrilla activities ...The AID Director for Nicaragua supervised similar projects in Vietnam from 1966-68. Many 
people fear that (this) operation will, at best, waste tax-payers funds... at worst, it will be used for covert counter­
insurgency activities." Professor Miles Wolpin reporting to the House Sub-Committee on Human Rights in Nicaragua, 
Guatamala and El Salvador, June, 1976. Quoted in Ibid, p. 46.
91
repercussions which had become obvious by the end of the decade. The incentives offered to 
foreign capital and its unregulated and unplanned movement tended to increase rather than 
decrease external dependency. Apart from the lure of cheap labour, foreign capital received 
exemption from foreign exchange purchase restrictions, fiscal incentives, unlimited rights to 
repatriate capital and profits, absolute secrecy of operations, free importation of machinery and 
exportation of profits.120 As a later E.C.L.A. report reflected that "due to the lack of more 
vertically integrated industrial development, the changes in the compositions of imports 
involved in actuality a more vulnerable balance of payments due to the concentration on 
foreign sources of supply in raw materials, parts and components, and in equipment and 
machinery."121
Between 1963 and 1968 the balance of payments deficit for the region as a whole doubled, 
while in Nicaragua foreign debt escalated from $41 million to $206 million. Furthermore, while 
the average rate of growth of GDP in Nicaragua between 1960 and 1967 was 10.7%, between 
1966 and 1970 it declined to 3.8%. The comparison with the latter half of the 1950's reveals the 
risks this entailed for the Somoza-bourgeois alliance.
The absence of regional planning also hindered the pursuit of balanced regional growth. By the 
end of the decade the stronger regional partners, El Salvador and Guatamala, had accumulated 
large regional trade surpluses at the expence of Honduras and Nicaragua. Between 1966 and 
1968 Nicaragua accumulated an average annual trade deficit within C.A.C.M. of $20.3 million. 
As the limited domestic markets became saturated, pressure mounted within the weaker 
nations to protect local production through the raising of tariff barriers. Tension between 
Honduras and El Salvador led to the so-called 'soccer war' of 1969, after which Honduras 
withdrew from C.A.C.M. Somoza began introducing selective protectionism designed to 
support his own fiefdom's interests, provoking regional resentment. As foreign investment 
began to decline, the effective demise of C.A.C.M. drew close.
Furthermore, as foreign productive capital investment declined, Somoza's Nicaragua and 
Arana's Guatamala welcomed the influx of 'sunbelt7 capital. These "aggressive unscrupulous 
speculators" who had made their fortunes out of aerospace, defence contracts and property
120Roberto Incer, president of the Banco Central de Nicaragua, commenting on foreign investment once commented: 
"We don't have the exact figures. We don't impose restrictions on foreign capital by keeping records of it." Quoted in 
Black, op. cit., p. 39.
121Quoted in Harris, op. dt., p. 39.
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speculation required a haven to replace Batista's Havana.122 Nicaragua's service sector 
expanded while industrial employment stagnated. Between 1960 and 1978 the percentage of 
industrial workers fell one percentage point from 16%, while the service sector recorded an 
expansion from 22% to 41%.123 As Black comments: "With the collapse of the Central American 
Common Market's planned growth Sunbelt dollars went into quick-profit service industries: 
hotels, casinos and tourism. The only prerequisite for their investments was the stability which 
military dictatorships could provide."124
However, the crisis within C.A.C.M. and the general economic downturn were only one 
component of an acceleration of a crisis of state or systemic legitimacy which manifested itself 
in ever more assertive forms after 1967. The period, which can be described as the 'crisis of 
late-somorismo', was also directly related to the political style and economic aggression which 
characterised Anastasio Somoza Debayle's rise to power in early-1967.
The period of relative reformism between 1963 and 1966, which corresponded to the halcyon 
years of economic growth and C.A.C.M., and the nominal presidency of Rene Schick,125 
encouraged the opposition movement towards a programme of systemic liberalisation. Thus, 
when Anastasio Jr (Tachito) disappointed these aspirations with the announcement of his 
intention to stand for the 1967 elections the opposition united behind a resurrected U.N.O. and 
called for a demonstration march to the Presidential Palace in support of their electoral 
candidate Dr Fernando Arguero on 22 January 1967. The Guardia responded by opening fire 
upon the crowd leaving an estimated 300 people dead.126
A state of seige was declared and opposition figures rounded up and imprisoned. The 
consequences were a disaster for the 'liberalising' opposition, destroying the faith of many 
sectors of Nicaraguan society in the possibility of reforming somocismo 'from within', and in the 
traditional structures of political representation. Tachito won a 'landslide' 70% electoral victory,
122A detailed study of the relationship between somocista development and sunbelt capital has still to be written. 
Almost all accounts of this period comment upon Howard Hughes' two visits to Nicaragua in 1972. Typically, they 
remain shrouded in mystery. Hughes fled from Bahaman immigration authorities in February 1972, and initially spent 
a month in a Managuan hotel. In appreciation of Somoza's role as host Hughes bought considerable shares in the 
Somoza-owned national airline, LANICA. Somoza then attempted to tempt Hughes further with interests in his 
plywood factory, a pharmaceutical company and local real estate. From the available correspondence, it appears that 
Somoza, not Hughes, was the initiator of their business deals. Hughes appeared more interested in using Nicaragua as 
a brief escape from his inland revenue problems elsewhere. On the eve of his departure Hughes ended a fifteen year 
period of isolation, meeting Somoza and US ambassador Turner Shelton on his Gulfstream jet. (Jim Davis, however, 
claims that Somoza never met his illustrious guest. See J. Davis, Where Is Nicaragua?, Simon & Schuster, N , 1987.) 
Hughes returned to Nicaragua later in the year after a spell in Vancouver, but left immediately after the earthquake of 
December 1972. Claims by NACLA's Report on the America's that Hughes visit was connected with the CIA's Glomar 
Explorer vessel have yet to be substantiated. See Jonas, op. dt. For Hughes correspondence see M. Drosnin, Citizen 
Hughes, Hutchinson,LowAen, 1985, pp. 389-91,443-7.
123Petras & Morley, op. dt., p. 199.
124Black, op. dt., p. 41. See also Booth, op. dt., p. 76; and Pearce, op. dt., p. 85-8.
125Schick died in office in August 1966, and was replaced with an equally malleable Liberal, Lorenzo Guerrero.
l26French Nicaraguan Committees, op. dt., p. 11. Casualty and mortality figures vary between 40 and 600.
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while Luis's death in April provided Tachito with undisputed dynastic control.127 The brief 
political thaw was over.
Opposition to Tachito's dictatorship remained vocal enough for him to have to resort to the 
resurrection of a zancudo faction of the Conservative Party in the February 1972 elections. The 
P.L.I. and the Social Christian Party refused to participate in the fraud, in which the allocation 
of Assembly seats were agreed in advance. A three-man National Governing Council acted as 
executive, including Tachito and Arguero.
By the end of the year Tachito had resumed supreme authority, using a natural disaster to 
proclaim himself President of the National Emergency Committee. On December 23, 1972 an 
earthquake ripped through Managua leaving an estimated 10,000 people dead. Anarchy 
reigned during the following days as the Guardia left its post, attending to family concerns and 
engaging in an orgy of looting.
The earthquake was more than a symbolic beginning of the end of somocismo. In itself it paved 
the way for the destruction of the fragile state-bourgeoisie pact and accentuated the 
pauperisation of the urban popular classes which had grown enormously over the past decade 
with industrialisation, urbanisation and the diversification of Nicaragua's agro-exporting base. 
As George Black remarks: "The importance of the earthquake as a pivotal movement in the 
disintegration of Somocismo can hardly be overstated."128
Somoza generated universal condemnation for his abuse of office to misappropriate the 
international aid and relief funds which flooded into the country after the disaster. Scandal after 
scandal revealed schemes by Tachito and his cronies to profit amidst the scene of general 
misery. The Guardia redirected emergency relief onto the thriving black market, while Somoza 
bought up land surrounding Managua and resold it to the government land purchasing agency 
for housing relocation schemes, reaping extortionate profits.129
In the wake of the earthquake a 'false boom' emerged in the economy, stimulated by the 
construction industry. The rate of GDP growth, which had sunk to 3.1% in 1972, increased to 
5.1% in 1973 and to an extraordinary 12.7% in 1974.130 However, while such booms had 
solidified Somoza-bourgeois relations in the past, those of the 1970's heightened the tension 
between the partners. Somoza Garcia had built the foundations of the dynasty's primitive 
capital accumulation through expropriating opponents agro-exporting concerns while 
providing 'social stability'. Luis Somoza had maintained the alliance through encouraging 
industrialisation and rapid growth which benefited all sectors of monopoly capital. His reign
127The political consequences of 1967 will be elaborated in Chapter 5. 
L28Black, op. dt., p. 59.
129See Jonas, op. dt., p. 23.
130Vilas, opdt., p. 92.
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also witnessed the rationalisation and modernisation of the existing dynastic economic empire. 
However, Anastasio Somoza Debayle continued the reproduction and expansion of dynastic 
capital through encroaching upon the traditional preserves of his capitalist competitors. His 
predatory economic behaviour alienated the other fractions of capital through limiting their 
capacity for expansion, thus breaching the 'gentlemens' agreement' which had underwritten the 
basis for modem diversified dependent capitalist development in Nicaragua. As Black argues:
Greed, theft, corruption and repression may have been the style of Somocismo. But until the 
1972 earthquake the dynasty was not merely the arbitrary exercise of power by a single family. It 
would not have survived so long without recognition from Washington and from Somoza's 
fellow Nicaraguan capitalists that the dictatorship was the most appropriate instrument for 
sustaining the power of private enterprise as a whole.131
As Jarquin and Barreto remark, after the earthquake the alliance deteriorated: "Overstepping
the bounds of capitalist competition, Somoza took over the most dynamic areas of capital
accumulation."132
Somoza began penetrating and monopolising areas such as property speculation, finance, 
insurance and most importandy, construction; precisely those areas which contributed to, and 
benefitted from, the mid-1970's boom. BANAMER, BANIC and other non-Somoza capital 
groups began to denounce Somoza's competencia desleal (disloyal competition); in other words, 
the breaking of the fragile consensus upon which dictatorial monopoly capitalism had rested.
Construction workers, organised by the P.S.N., used their increased economic weight in order 
to wage a series of strikes throughout 1973-74. Industrial conflict on the whole increased. In July 
1974, a broad-based multi-class umbrella organisation (U.D.E.L.) led by respected progressive 
opposition spokesmen was formed. U.D.E.L. was uncompromisingly 'abstentionist' and drew 
increasing support from liberals in the United States. This created a dual headache for 
somocismo, which had traditionally emasculated the opposition movement through 
incorporating vacilating segments into the system, and upheld U.S. support in order to make 
the opposition 'see reality'. The recall of Ambassador Turner Shelton, a personal friend and 
apologist for the dictator, revealed the extent to which Washington's coolness towards Somoza 
had grown.133
Adding to Somoza's problems was an upsurge in guerrilla activity. The F.S.L.N., which the 
U.S. State Department had described as "virtually inactive" in 1972,134 engineered a daring raid 
upon the house of 'Chema' Castillo, an influential somocista, during a party in honour of Shelton 
on 27 December 1974. The success of the operation, and the open demonstrations of support for
131Black, op. dt., p. 62.
132E. Jarquin & P.E. Barreto, "A Dictatorship 'Made in the USA'”, in Rosset &c Vandermeer (eds), op. dt., p. 165. See 
also Lopez et. al., op. dt., pp. 27-30.
lj3The end of the Nixon era spelt disaster for Somoza's relationship with Washington. As Jonas reported, by 1974 
"many inside the State Department regarded (Shelton) as an embarrasment and no longer believed his rosy pro-Somoza 
reports onthe situation in Nicaragua. When another embassy officer, James Cheek, defied Shelton by filing counter­
reports, he was rewarded with a spedal dtation from Kissinger in late-1974." Jonas, op. d t ,  p. 22.
134U.S. Department of State Bureau of Intelligence and Research, 25th Annual Report, World Strength of the Communist 
Party Organizations, Washington, 1973, p. 152.
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the Sandinistas in the aftermath, was used by Somoza as an excuse to unleash a new wave of 
repression upon the opposition movement as a whole. A state of seige and martial law was 
declared, press censorship tightened and rural counter-insurgency stepped-up.
The 33 months of martial law merely galvanised the opposition, strengthening its resolution 
that Somoza's departure was an unconditional platform for negotiating the future of state 
power. Under these conditions somocismo entered the final phase of its legitimation crisis.
Furthermore, Somoza's international prestige fell to an all-time low, as reports filtered out of 
the countryside concerning the condition of human rights under martial law. Reports of 
political imprisonment, torture and massacres of entire villages began receiving international 
media attention. While these incidents were not 'news' to the long-suffering anti-Somoza 
movement, merely an intensification of the repression, the fact that they received such attention 
was a reflection of the extent to which Somoza's international prestige had declined. As Jimmy 
Carter assumed the presidency in the U.S., Nicaragua gradually became a 'case study7 for his 
human rights programme. His coolness towards Somoza reflected the crisis of U.S. state 
legitimacy and the diminished prestige of U.S. foreign policy in the wake of Vietnam as much 
as it did a concern for Nicaragua's domestic environment.130
Yet, at precisely this conjuncture, the U.S. was unable to intervene effectively in Central 
American affairs. The 'industrial revolution' and developmentalism of the 1960's had polarised 
Central American society and heightened underlying contradictions. The effects of past U.S. 
involvement had, by the mid-1970's, weakened rather than strengthened Washington's capacity 
to influence these polarised forces. Radicals viewed the U.S.-sponsored Alliance for Progress as 
a smokescreen for counter-insurgency, and hence treated Washington with suspicion. 
Meanwhile, right-wing dictatorships such as Somoza felt able to act with impunity, secure in 
the knowledge that they represented to the U.S. a bulwark against regional 'instability'. Social 
polarisation merely strengthened their self-perception as 'grandsons of bitches'. Domestically, 
U.S. administrations found their hands tied. If the public did not want 'another Cuba' they were 
also uninspired by the prospect of 'another Vietnam'.136
The U.S. considered the bourgeois opposition an attractive alternative to Somoza. Yet, as this 
chapter has demonstrated, this opposition lacked a solid power base in the nation's socio­
political matrix. Carter's courtship with the opposition bourgeois could only lead to a marriage 
of two partners whose hands were tied behind their backs. Even the blessings of the prestigious 
Catholic Church could not raise this union above the existing realities of Nicaragua's evolving 
social contradictions.137
The outcome of the approaching revolutionary situation would depend upon the relationship
13SSee J.F. Petras, "Carter and the N ew  Morality", Monthly Review, June 1977; and Pearce, op. dt., pp. 54-6. 
136See E. Best, U.S. Policy and Regional Security in Central A m erica ,^  \  , 1987.
137For an appraisal of the domestic bourgeoisie in the late-1970's, see Vilas, op. dt., pp. 127-43.
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between contending internal forces and contradictions. The opposition bourgeoisie could only 
be comfortable in divorcing itself completely from Somoza as long as it felt it had the hegemony 
over the classes which had been marginalised and exploited by the model of dependent 
capitalist development; a model which the domestic bourgeoisie had prospered from. The 
model had been structured along a fundamental cleavage between the state and capital on one 
hand, and the popular classes on the other. As the crisis of the dictatorship assumed 
revolutionary proportions, the possibility of bourgeois hegemony diminished due to the 
growing strength of the Sandinistas, who were able to portray this cleavage as a 
somocista-sandinista contradiction. The bourgeois option was dismissed by the Sandinistas as 
somocismo sin Somoza (somozaism without Somoza). This process will be described in Chapter 
5.
The rise in world coffee and cotton prices during the mid-1970's provides additional evidence 
of the growing irreconcilibility between the state and non-Somoza fractions of capital. While in 
the past economic upturns had disguised latent tension, by the mid-1970's under Tachito they 
merely fueled antagonism. As Baumeister has observed, somocista capital was 
disproportionately represented in areas such as agro-industrial processing (ie. coffee mills, rice 
mills, sugar mills, slaughter houses, cotton mills) and in land, commerce and banking.138 On the 
other hand "the biggest part of agricultural and livestock production was in the hands of the 
sectors with a weak presence in the control of agro-industrial processing, internal and external 
commercialisation and banking or extra-banking finances."139 In Nicaragua's economic 
structure, with its strong agro-exporting base, this lack of integration between productive and 
commercial capital actually resulted in a very real subordination of productive capital to 
finance through the tight process of articulation from the direct producer to the world market. 
Thus, when international prices rose, producers felt that the processor/buyers were not offering 
them prices which reflected the international market, and "that the price bonanza was being 
appropriated exclusively by the large bourgeoisie and that the Somocista state was 
participating actively in this unequal distribution of earnings and losses."140
Thus, as far as capital-state relations were concerned, it was not so much an economic crisis 
which triggered of the 'crisis of late-somocismo' but rather a perception of unequal distribution 
of profit or 'unequal exchange'. The bourgeoisie entered the crisis of state legitimacy 
fragmented. While some fractions profited from the commodity boom, others opposed 
somocismo appropriation, demanding a return to 'fair competition',141 while others demanded a 
complete overhaul of the system.
138See E. Baumeister, "The Structure of Nicaraguan Agriculture and the Sandinista Agrarian Reform", in Harris & 
Vilas (eds), op. dt., p. 14.
139Vilas, op. dt., p. 77.
uoIbid, p. 79.
141 As a representative of INDE (an agrarian reform programme related to BANIQ remarked; "The problem is the 
man. He's taking over our market. We have no quarrel with anyone else or the system. Just get rid of him.” Quoted in 
Black, op. dt., p. 64. See also the American diplomat, quoted in Buckley, op. d t , p. 197.
97
3.7. CONCLUSION
The underpinnings of the Nicaraguan Revolution were generated by deep structural factors 
relating to the specific model of capitalist development pursued in Nicaragua. This model had 
succeeded in diversifying Nicaragua's dependent capitalist economy and had guaranteed the 
expanded reproduction of capital. A powerful dictatorial and repressive state apparatus had 
forged an alliance with the non-somocista bourgeoisie, allowing state and capital to overcome 
Nicaragua's prior disarticulation between the state and capitalist development.
However, latent tension underlay the alliance. This was a result of the Somoza dynasty's 
emergence as one of the main fractions of capital. Manifestations of the tension were 
periodically overcome through a combination of repression and renewed cycles of economic 
growth and expansion. However, increasingly after 1967, this 'dictatorship of capital' became a 
'dictatorship of a fraction of capital', and the deficiencies of the somocista model of development 
became apparent. The fragile consensus upon which the model was premised was broken, and 
the somocista state began to take on the appearance of an institution existing 'above society' 
without an independent social base, and relying more and more upon naked repression. Thus, 
the revolutionary situation which began to emerge at the end of the 1970's can be attributed to 
inherent factors within the model of somocista development. Events, such as the earthquake, can 
be viewed as contingent factors which 'accelerated' the onset of the revolutionary crisis of the 
Somoza regime.
After the earthquake of 1972, the non-somocista fractions of capital were forced into more 
determined opposition as it perceived that the benefits accrued from the alliance were now 
overshadowed by its disadvantages and contracted space. Any desire the bourgeoisie had of 
returning the alliance to its former status, or in maintaining the system without Somoza 
(somocismo sin Somoza) were fraught with contradictions, as the history of the alliance 
demonstrates. For, once the repressive characteristics of somocismo were dismantled the 
bourgeoisie removed its guarantee of 'social stability'. It had been the somocista state apparatus 
which had guaranteed the expansion of capitalism and modernisation at the expanse of 
uprooting, marginalising and proletarianising the rest of society. Thus, the bourgeoisie faced 
the risk of being caught between the maintenance of a broken consensus with Somoza and the 
unknown quantity of the popular classes which had paid for the developmental model and the 
alliance; the working class, the marginalised urban poor, the peasantry and agricultural labour. 
Organised as a anti-imperialist political force, the popular classes could threaten the very basis 
of capital expansion through a far more radical programme of post-somocista development than 
the bourgeoisie envisaged. Democratisation thus held unknown dangers for the reproduction of 
capitalist relations. However, traditionally one of the least organised in Latin America, the 
labour movement required a spearhead organisation which could exploit the crisis of 
late-somocismo and transcend the limits at which the bourgeoisie wished to take post-somocista 
development.
Shirley Christian has lamented that the Sandinista Front "probably would have become a
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footnote in history had a moderate regime been able to assume power in Nicaragua before the 
end of 1978."142 This chapter has demonstrated the structural forces which circumscribed such 
an assumption. Yet, while these forces illustrate the underlying causes of the demise of 
somocismo, its model of capitalist development, and the weaknesses of the domestic bourgeoisie, 
in themselves they cannot account for the success of the Sandinista movement. This requires, 
not a footnote, but a chapter. The structural preconditions of the revolutionary situation of 
1978-9 must be complimented with an analysis of the 'purposive' development of the origins, 
organisation and ideology of the hegemonistic challenger during the revolutionary situation in 
order to render the Sandinista content of the revolutionary movement intelligible.
l42S.Christian, Nicaragua: Revolution in the Family, Random House, NY, 1985, p. 305.
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Chapter 4
PURPOSIVE PRECONDITIONS FOR THE 
BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION
4.1. INTRODUCTION
The previous two chapters analysed the political economy of two pre-revolutionary societies 
and noted the contribution structural factors made to the decline of the old regimes. These 
analyses reveal that the particular configurations of social forces and the modes of capitalist 
accumulation carried within them inherent social tensions which explain the roots of social 
polarisation. These chapters provide support for Skocpol's contention that the revolutionary 
situations themselves are not made by the revolutionary organisations which eventually take 
advantage of the crisis. Yet a fundamental problem remains; why was a particular contender 
able to assume hegemony over the social classes and groups opposed to the existing polity, and 
how was this challenger able to channel the energy of these groups towards the task of taking 
power? While the structural factors outlined in the previous chapters provide the necessary 
preconditions for explaining the crises of the old regimes, they are not sufficient to explain the 
nature and form of the social revolution which marked the transcendence of the revolutionary 
situation. In order to deal satisfactorily with the problem of the causes of socialist revolutions it 
is necessary to also take into account the purposive movement, its development and its 
relationship to its particular environment.
This chapter will explore this problem concretely in the case of Russian Revolution. The point 
which will be emphasized throughout is that socialist revolutions are not the inevitable result of 
the inexorable pressure of 'natural' social progress. Contrary to Skocpol's position, this chapter 
argues that the form the Russian Revolution assumed was to a large extent the result of the 
activities of revolutionary movements. It was dependent upon the conscious intervention of 
organised groups, their methods of organisation and planning, and their perceptions and 
ideology. While structural analyses reveal certain necessary preconditions for understanding a 
revolutionary situation, it is also necessary to analyse the development of the organised 
challenger to the polity which was capable of providing the "thrust" to transcend existing social 
arrangements.1 In the Russian case, it is only half correct, and certainly too simplistic to argue 
that the Bolsheviks "did not seize power....They picked it up. Any group of determined men
1The term is borrowed from C. Wright Mills. See C  Wright Mills, The Causes of Wor/d War Three, Ballantine, ^ ^ . , 
1963, pp. 25-9.
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could have done what the Bolsheviks did in Petrograd in 1917."2 Neil Harding uses a different 
analogy in his discussion of the Bolshevik Revolution, which recognises the role of active 
intervention, or purposive action, in shaping the revolutionary outcome.
The revolution was not like a plum falling into the hand when fully ripe without so much as a 
shake of the tree. It was, to characterise Lenin's account, more like a turnip. It would swell and 
ripen in the ground but would take a stout pull to harvest it - otherwise the action of the elements 
and of parasites would combine to rot it away.3
In Russia during the first two decades of the twentieth century there were numerous 
organisations and parties with different perceptions of the social reality surrounding them, 
ranging from Monarchists to Marxists. Even within these world-views peceptions differed. To 
continue with Harding's analogy, the Marxists disagreed upon the 'ripeness' (even the 
existence!) of the 'turnip' under the surface. The question to be asked is why was it the 
Bolsheviks 'insighti, and the Bolshevik 'arm' which provided the 'stout pull' which uprooted 
the existing polity. This chapter will chart the development of the Bolshevik Party, in order to 
explain how the organisation was able to fulfil the purposive role of mobilising the elemental 
forces within the revolutionary situation into socialist channels.
Parties and fronts which have assumed power with socialist intent, or a socialist vision, appear 
to arrive on the revolutionary stage as small, insignificant actors, which rapidly take advantage 
of social instability. However, this chapter argues that ultimate success is the result of a 
prolonged process of organisational and ideological development of the revolutionary 
movement. While this development is related to the structural environment in which the party 
operates, it is by no means reducible to them. This chapter takes as a starting point James 
Petras' argument that "the study of revolution as a process requires us to emphasize the 
continuity and relatedness of each period. Particular events mark historical moments, with 
particular configurations of forces. But without an understanding of the preceding sequence, 
the molecular processes of accumulation of forces, the end product of socialist revolution, 
cannot be grasped. Each differential moment in the revolutionary process contributes to the 
understanding of the whole. The issue is to understand the relationship between each sequence, 
in determining the final outcome."4 In Russia, this 'molecular' process of development was 
complex, and impossible to measure in simple quantitative terms. The growth of the working 
class (discussed in Chapter 2) was marked by periods of latent tension and manifest conflict. 
This chapter argues that although the Bolshevik Party took advantage of periods of heightening 
conflict in order to increase its influence among the popular classes, this was only one element 
of its molecular development. There was no mechanical determination between the growth of 
the working class and the growth of the Bolshevik Party. On another, ideological, level, this 
molecular development was characterised by transformations and shifts in Lenin's 
understanding of the relationship between the party and the working class, and furthermore,
2A. Lllam, Lenin and the Bolsheviks, F o n t a n a , C o tv , 1975, p. 409.
3N. Harding, Lenin's Political Thought: Theory and Practice in the Democratic and Socialist Revolutions (2 Vols.), Macmillan, 
C o n d o r v .  , 1983, Vol. 2, p. 36.
4J. Petras, "Socialist Revolutions and their Qass Components", New Left Review, 111.
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changes in his understanding of the possibilities inherent within a given revolutionary 
situation. These latter developments informed Bolshevik praxis and provided them with the 
indispensable tools for channelling the elemental forces of the revolution towards its socialist 
October.
This molecular purposive process involved the insertion of the party into the national political 
culture, the establishment of a class basis, the development of an organisational framework 
which corresponded to its sodo-cultural environment and the level at which various classes 
and groups entered and participated in the party and associated themselves with its vision. 
Each of these 'moments' were accompanied by critical reassessments of the organisation, 
ideology and overall strategy of the party in response to particular historical conjunctures. This 
chapter demonstrates how these reassessments informed changes in Bolshevik praxis. 
Combined, these factors determined the legitimacy of the party as a 'revolutionary vanguard'. 
The ultimate test for the Bolsheviks was its ability to achieve a revolutionary osmosis between 
the party and the popular classes during revolutionary situations. Without this purposive 
fusion between reality and possibility, insight and vision, no socialist revolution could have 
occurred. In the Russian case the Bolshevik Party was the "link between the real and the 
possible. " 3  Through explaining the success of the Bolsheviks, and the failures of their 
revolutionary and reformist competitors, this chapter demonstrates that, in addition to 
structural factors, organisation and ideology were necessary concomitants to understanding the 
socialist form which the revolution assumed.
Yet, as the unfolding of events will reveal, there was no inevitability that the party would 
ultimately perform this function. The ideological and organisational development of the party 
was problematic. In other words, at each historical conjuncture, the Bolsheviks were faced with 
tactical and strategic alternatives. Not only had the party to respond to moves by the 
government and other challengers. It also had to overcome internal divisions concerning the 
appropriate action at each historical turn. The decisions adopted, and the paths travelled, by the 
party determined the nature of the revolutionary transcendence as much as the stuctural factors 
which promoted the revolutionary crisis. Without this purposive analysis, the causes of the 
socialist revolution remain unintelligible.
4.2. ORIGINS OF MARXISM IN RUSSIA
This section explores the origins of Russian Marxism and its insertion into the nation's 
political culture. The 'space' which the embryonic movement carved out for itself was a 
consequence of both structural factors and an ideological struggle against alternative 
revolutionary philosophies. The perception of Russian reality which emerged from this period 
would shape the basic tenets of Russian 'orthodox' Marxism up until the eve of the First World 
War.
3V. Serge, Year One of the Russian Revolution, Allen Lane, o t\  ( 1972, p. 61. Serge uses this to describe the role of 
revolutionary leaders during insurrectionary periods. I would argue that it is just as applicable to revolutionary parties.
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The Russian revolutionary scene in the nineteenth century provides a colourful and varied 
assortment of strategies, tactics and revolutionary visions. It was only during the last two 
decades of the nineteenth century that Marxism emerged, within this political kalidascope, as 
the process of industrialisation (outlined in Chapter 2) slowly transformed Russia's socio­
economic environment. Even then, Marxism did not surface as a result of the political 
awakening of the Russian proletariat, but as a trend within the Russian revolutionary 
intelligentsia. In Russia, Marxist ideology preceded the structural basis which justified its 
existence.
Western European history had long been the yardstick by which the revolutionary 
intelligentsia had measured Russia's future. 'Westemisers' and 'Slavophils' had debated the 
likelihood and desirability of the nation following the path of Western capitalism. The diffuse 
populist (or Narodnik) ideology which dominated revolutionary thought from the 1860's until 
the 1880's, argued, that capitalism would fail to take root in Russian soil. The Russian path to 
socialism could be accomplished through the active or passive assistance of the peasantry, 
whose communal form of land tenure (freed from autocratic restrictions) would unleash the 
egalitarian spirit inherent within Russian agrarian social relations. Without rejecting 
industrialisation per se, most Narodniks looked upon Western capitalism with moral revulsion 
due to the destructive and exploitative die it cast upon human relations.
The political passivity of the peasantry, combined with the frustration of the Narodnik 
intelligentsia's alienation from those they sought to emancipate, led to a variety of 
revolutionary strategies designed to overthrow the Tsarist order. The failure of these strategies, 
from the 'to the people' movement of 1873-4 to the terrorism of the early-1880's, generated crisis 
and disillusionment within Narodism.* 6
It was out of this crisis that Marxism began to gain an audience among the revolutionary 
intelligentsia. The 'artificial' or 'spontaneous' form of Russian capitalist development became 
the axis around which Marxists and Narodniks debated.7 Thus, in its inception 'the struggle for 
Marxism' was waged more as a "battle of books and pamphlets"8 than on the terrain of class 
struggle. While, as Walicki notes, "fully-fledged Narodnik thought was shaped in reaction to 
the first wave of Western-based socialist ideas", it is equally true that early Russian Marxism 
was stamped with the birthmarks of its polemics against its Narodnik competitors.9 The early 
Russian Marxists, based around the emigre Emancipation of Labour group, used Marxist theory
“T. Dan goes as far as to argue that revolutionary Narodism received a "mortal would” after the People's Will
organisation assasinated Alexander 111 on March 1,1881. See T. Dan, The Origins of Bolshevism, Schocken, N.Y., p. 138.
7A s Lenin pointed out in 1905; "The entire history of Russian revolutionary thought during the last quarter of a 
century is the history of the struggle waged by Marxism against petty-bourgeois Narodnik socialism." (9; 439). Unless 
otherwise stated, all subsequent quotations from Lenin are drawn from V.I. Lenin, Collected Works, (45 Vols), Progress, 
Moscow, 1977. Volume numbers are followed by page numbers in the reference.
8M. Fainsod, How Russia Is Ruled, Harvard U.P., ri.asv, 1967, p. 34.
9A. Walicki, The Controversy Over Capitalism: Studies in the Social Philosophy of the Russian Populists, Clarendon, Oxford, 
1969, p. 26.
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as a predictive tool for gaining an insight into the future contours of Russian economic 
development, rather than revolutionary praxis based upon an examination of contemporary 
reality. Accusing the Narodniks of adopting a static, ahistorical approach to socio-economic 
analysis, the Marxists argued that a dynamic understanding of historical development revealed 
the inevitability of the spread of capitalism throughout Russia and the irreparable 
disintegration of the rural commune (mir), upon which most Narodniks based their peasant- 
oriented socialism.
The penetration of market and wage-labour relations in the countryside and the rapid process 
of industrialisation provided the early Marxists with concrete evidence that Russia could not 
avoid following the Western path of development. Consequently, rejecting the Narodnik moral 
revulsion of Western capitalist development, the Marxists argued that the inevitable process of 
capitalist economic development should be encouraged. According to Georgi Plekhanov (the 
'father of Russian Marxism') Russia was suffering "not only from the development of capitalist 
production, but also from the insufficiency of that development."10 It was this process which 
would accelerate the advance of socialism through incubating the social force which would 
ultimately signal the demise of capitalism; the industrial proletariat. Although the Marxists 
agreed with the Narodniks' immediate political aim of overthrowing the autocratic order, they 
argued that this would merely eradicate the vestiges of feudalism, rather than herald the 
coming of socialism. Thus, early Russian Marxism was characterised by a 'stage' conception of 
development in which the demise of Tsarism would be followed inevitably by an epoch of 
capitalist development and bourgeois hegemony. This epoch would remove from its path the 
relics of Russia's economic and cultural backwardness and clear the way to the unfettered 
development of the 'objective' conditions which would eventually promote the 'subjective' 
awakening of the proletariat.
Neil Harding has argued that it was precisely due to Russia's 'backwardness' that the Russian 
Marxists were forced to take their study and understanding of dialectics and historical 
development more seriously than their Western counterparts.11 If socialism was not on the 
immediate agenda, then greater effort had to be expended upon plotting the outlines of the 
future through analysis of present trends. Armed with this theoretical approach early Russian 
Marxism concentrated its efforts on analysing the trajectory of development within Russia. Yet, 
despite this use of theory to chart Russia's future, all the major tendencies were characterised by 
a mechanical form of materialism, in which revolutionary possibility was a priori determined by 
'objective' economic conditions. Up until the beginning of the First World War, almost every 
Russian Marxist translated this into the 'self-restrictive' necessity of promoting anti-autocratic 
'bourgeois democratic', rather than socialist, demands.12
10G.V. Plekhanov, Selected Philosophical Works: Vol. 1, Progress, Moscow, 1977, p. 361. 
n Harding, op. d t ,  Vol. 1, p. 36.
12Sapir notes that; "Russian sodal democracy, bom as a party of revolution par excellence, rose on the yeast of the 
self-restrictive theory of the bourgeois character of the coming Russian revolution." B. Sapir, "Notes and Reflections on 
the History of Menshevism", in L.H. Haimson (ed), The Mensheviks, University of C h i c a g o , 1974, p. 364.
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The struggle for Marxism up until 1895 was thus conducted largely upon theoretical grounds. 
In 1897 Lenin would describe it as "the period of stubborn refusal by its opponents to 
understand it, of strenuous efforts to suppress the new trend the moment it arose, on the one 
hand, and of stalwart defence of the fundamentals of Social Democracy, on the other...".13 
Struggle was conducted upon the terrain of 'propaganda',14 involving emigre intellectual and 
university study circles assimilating theory, debating with Narodniks and accumulating 
evidence relating to the development of Russian capitalism. Activity among the working class 
was confined to teaching in basic literary classes, circulating pamphlets among factory workers 
and recruiting the most able and willing for Marxist study circles.10 This work had to be 
undertaken in the face of severe state repression and surveillance, restricting movement and 
organisation. No national organisation existed and local autonomous, clandestine groups were 
unable to co-ordinate national activity. Literature arrived only haphazardly from the 
acknowledged emigre leaders of the movement, such as Plekhanov, Pavel Aksel'rod and Vera 
Zasulich. Furthermore, their theoretical pre-eminence often provided little assistance in dealing 
with the daily practicalities of activity under Russian conditions.
The initial phase of Russian Marxism (1880-1895) was characterised by the implantation of 
Marxist thought within the revolutionary intelligentsia. However, the period highlighted 
difficulties which had to be overcome. Firstly, its ideological encroachments upon Narodism 
were insufficient to motivate activity among the emerging urban working class. Roots had yet 
to be laid among the class which the theory viewed as the bearers of socialism. Secondly, the 
movement required greater co-ordination among its atomised, isolated components. During the 
next decade the striving for efficient co-ordination and organisation were increasingly 
perceived as imperatives if the Social Democratic movement was to transcend the limits of its 
formative phase. It is within this context that Lenin's writings and activities of the period 
(1895-1905) must be placed. Unfortunately, this is seldom recognised by unsympathetic critics 
of Lenin. There is a common tendency to draw the conclusion that Lenin's works of the period 
were a universal blueprint for dedicated revolutionary minorities regardless of time and place, 
and that they contain the germs of future Soviet totalitarianism.16 The development of Leninism 
(which is inseparable from the development of Bolshevism) was the product of a continual 
reassessment and reappraisal of revolutionary praxis in the context of Russian reality. Far more 
so than Marx, a 'textual' reading of Lenin must be related directly to the specific problems 
confronting his political praxis. During the next epoch a number of characteristic features of 
Leninism began to emerge through various polemics within the Marxist movement. Out of 
these polemics Leninism evolved a particular approach to the relationship between 
consciousness and spontaneity, the party and the working class, and an organisational 
prescription for effective praxis.
13Quoted in Harding, op. d t ,  pp. 60-1.
14See ibid., pp. 74-5.
l3Krupskaya's memoirs provide an interesting insight into the work of the St. Petersburg Marxists from 1893 to 1898. 
N.K. Krupskaya, Reminiscences of Lenin, I n t e r n a t i o n a l , 1979, pp. 11-31.
16Cf., Fainsod, op. dt; Ulam, op. dt., esp. pp. 208-282; B.D. Wolfe, Three Who Made A Revolution, Penguin, VW Wt-vW t 
1966, esp. pp. 170-194; and L. Schapiro, The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Methuen, London, 1966.
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4.3. ORGANISATION OF THE PARTY
During the decade between 1895 and 1905 Russian Marxism began to shift from the terrain of 
'propaganda' among the revolutionary intelligentsia to 'agitation' among the urban working 
class. This period also corresponded with the initial spontaneous demonstrations of self- 
awareness among the proletariat, A number of problems arose which had profound 
implications for the future of Russian Marxism. The first problem related to the organisational 
form appropriate to the repressive political climate of Tsarist Russia. The second problem 
concerned the relationship between the party and the working class. In the course of debates 
over these issues, Leninism began to develop as a specific tendency within Russian Marxism, 
leading to the origins of Bolshevism.
The deficiencies in early Russian Marxist practical activities were related to the difficulties of 
operating openly in the restrictive and repressive environment of the Tsarist autocracy. The 
problems beset by autocratic control for the accumulation and organisation of Social 
Democratic forces were highlighted by the claim of a veteran Bolshevik activist that "owing to 
police intervention, the average life of a Social Democratic group at the beginning of the century 
was only three months."17 However, in varying degrees of intensity this environment plagued 
the revolutionary movement up until February 1917. Another difficulty which beset Russian 
Marxism during the period was the fact that proletarianisation was such a recent phenomenon. 
Industrial conflict and class mobilisation were still in an incipient stage. As the previous section, 
noted, theoretical development outpaced practical political involvement. The transformation of 
the Russian Social Democratic movement from its embryonic, intellectual culture to a mass, 
political working class party corresponded with the formative years of industrial conflict in 
Russia. This correspondence raised the importance of mobilisation, organisation and direction 
within the Social Democratic movement. The question of organisation figured as a prominent 
concern of the movement during the period 1895-1903.
The first mass strike movements emerged during the first half-decade of the 1890's, and 
reached their zenith in St Petersburg during 1895 and 1896. These strikes were invariably 
localised, poorly organised and lacking in leadership. The demands which were voiced were 
related to inhumane management practices and limited economic demands, such as hours of 
work and forms of wage payment. However, the strike movement did succeed in forcing the 
government to pass legislation curbing some of the more inhumane features of the Tsarist 
factory system, although compliance with legislation remained inconsistent.18
The upsurge in working class activity forced the Social-Democrats to reconsider and re-orient 
their own activity. Far from emerging at the forefront of the strike movement, local Marxists 
often were caught completely by surprise and were unable to assert significant influence upon
17Quoted m T. Cliff, Lenin: Volume One, Pluto, V-ci^on, 1975, p. 356.
18See R. Pipes, Social Democracy and the St Petersburg Labour Movement: 1885-1897, Harvard U.P., Cambridge, 1963, pp. 
99-116. On labour unrest in the Moscow region, see R.E. Johnson, Peasant and Proletarian: The Working Class of Moscow in 
the Late-Nineteenth Century, Rutgers U.P., N, 3 . ,  1979, Ch. 7.
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its direction. As early as 1894 Yuri Martov began calling for a reorientation in Social Democratic 
activity. His experiences of workers' study circles in Vilno convinced him that the Marxist 
intelligentsia's promorion of educational and cultural development for the proletariat was 
merely making it possible for the workers to "leave the very class whose collective self- 
consciousness they were supposed to express."19 He argued that a shift in tactical emphasis 
was required, from promoting the workers' intellectual development to active participation in 
the day-to-day struggles in which the workers confronted their employers.20 In the parlance of 
the period, this required a shift in activity from propaganda to economic and political agitation 
among the working class. The theory rather mechanically postulated that out of economic 
agitation (activities centred around industrial concerns, improvement of conditions and defence 
of gains) political awareness would emerge (a higher form of consciousness focusing upon the 
nature of the state and power).
Two interrelated problems faced the Social Democrats in their effort to redirect their activity 
towards agitation. During this phase, various differences began to emerge which would later 
distinguish the Bolshevik faction from the Menshevik faction. Firstly, the unco-ordinated 
Russian cells required unification around a central organisation, and the establishment of a 
party organ adhering to a definite programme and analysis of Russian reality. Secondly, the 
movement had to clarify theoretically the relationship between the party and the working class. 
Conflicting perceptions of these tasks aroused controversy which had profound repercussions 
for the party.
Steps were undertaken in March 1898 to overcome the first problem through convening what 
became known as the First Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party (RSDLP). 
While few practical results emerged from the congress in Minsk21 the party's existence was 
declared, a name designated and, importantly, a manifesto adopted. The manifesto (the 
congress's "most substantial legacy to posterity"22) declared that the Russian working class 
lacked the most elementary instruments in its struggle "for their ultimate emancipation - against 
private property, for socialism",23 namely freedom of expression and assembly. The promotion 
of these elementary rights were viewed as the immediate tasks confronting the RSDLP. The 
manifesto ruled out the possibility of an immediate realisation of socialism, and pointed to the 
bourgeois nature of post-autocratic Russia. However, the manifesto recognised that the
19Quoted in L. Haimson, Russian Marxism and the Origins of Bolshevism, Beacon, bcsAon 1966, p. 71. See also A. Kremer 
& Y. Martov, "On Agitation", in N. Harding (ed), Marxism in Russia, Cambridge U.P., Cambridge, 1983.
20Voicing the general concern of Social Democracy, Lenin, in 1895, outlined the change in orientation which the Social 
Democrats would have to follow: "At the present time...the most urgent question, in our opinion, is that of the practical 
activities of the Social Democrats. We emphasize the practical side of Social Democracy, because on the theoretical side 
the most critical period...is now apparently behind us. Now the main and basic features of the theoretical views of the 
Social Democrats have been sufficiently clarified. The same cannot be said about the practical side of Social Democracy, 
about its political programme, its methods, its tactics."Quoted in Harding, op. dt., pp. 60-1.
21 This was partly due to the fact that most of its partidpants were arrested immediately afterwards.
^E-H. Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution: Volume One, Penguin, Wu>crlk, 1977, p. 15.
^P. Struve, "Manifesto of the Russian Sodal Democratic Labour Party", in Harding (ed), op. dt., p. 224.
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practical realisation of this immediate task would primarily fall upon the shoulders of the 
working class, rather than the bourgeoisie. This implied that the inevitable intermediate epoch 
between the demise of the autocracy and socialism would have to be forced upon the 
bourgeoisie. The dilemma of forcing political rule upon a reluctant, hesitating bourgeoisie 
would later manifest itself during the revolutions of 1905 and 1917. As Harding has argued, it 
was precisely this dictum (the leading role, or the hegemony, of the proletariat in the 
forthcoming bourgeois revolution) which characterised 'orthodox' Russian Marxism at the turn 
of the century.24
Although the manifesto laid the theoretical basis upon which to develop the practical 
demands of the RSDLP, the party did not officially advance a programme until the Second 
Party Congress in 1903.25 Lenin's writings during this time repeatedly emphasised the 
importance of clarifying a programme around which the still disparate forces of Social 
Democracy could co-ordinate activity. In a draft programme of 1899 he stressed that a 
programme would serve the "consolidation and consistent activity of a political party", and 
would assist in "uniting for organization" through offering the people "the character, aims and 
tasks" of the movement.26 This preoccupation was a measure of Lenin's insistence that the 
movement transcend the "bookish" theoretical confines of its embryonic phase, towards 
providing practical links with the ascending mass movement. With the aim of ideological and 
organisational consolidation in mind, Lenin conceived of the idea of a widely-distributed by­
weekly newspaper. In December 1900 this was realised with the first publication of Iskra.
The formation of the RSDLP had not prevented a wide interpretation of the practical activity 
arising from the movement's socio-economic analysis. The most contentious issues which 
emerged concerned the nature of the demands which the working class should advance under 
the existing political and economic conditions, the role of the organised proletariat in the 
forthcoming revolution, and the mode of insertion of the party into the class. Parameters were 
drawn around the Iskra group (which upheld the 'orthodox' position of the leading role of the 
proletariat in the Russian bourgeois-democratic revolution) and the younger practical workers, 
or 'Economists' (who argued that the present role of the party was to assist the proletariat in 
presenting its immediate economic demands). The argument centred upon the extent to which 
the proletariat could spontaneously realise its own objective class interests and achieve 
revolutionary class consciousness. Lenin's writings during this period were part of the arsenal 
of the Iskraite group. Implicit within his argument was a rejection of the deterministic thesis 
that the objective contradictions contained within social relations would, by themselves, 
generate the revolutionary self-consciousness of the exploited classes. In other words, to 
employ the terminology of this thesis, Lenin's position was that structural preconditions do not 
'make his to r/. Purposive intervention is required to take advantage of existing possibilities.
24Harding, op. dt., p. 133-4. 
^See Krupskaya, op. dt., p. 90. 
^Lenin (4; 229-31).
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The role of the party was to perform this vanguard, purposive role, and act as the 
organisational focus and ideological mentor of the working class movement.
Lenin and the Iskraites opposed the economists on both practical and theoretical grounds. On 
practical grounds, the economistic tactic of concentrating upon the localised, trade-unionist 
demands of the class would exacerbate the atomisation of the mass movement and hinder the 
co-ordinated class action necessary to confront the centralised power of the state. Furthermore, 
if the immediate task of the movement was the "winning of political liberty", as declared in the 
Minsk manifesto, then the task of the RSDLP was precisely to transcend trade-unionism and 
mobilise the mass movement for its immediate political task of destroying the autocratic fetters 
which restricted the freedom of class organisation. Lenin admitted that the collapse of the 
autocracy would "inevitably call forth such huge changes in political conditions that they would 
compel the party to make essential changes in the formulation of the immediate political 
tasks."27 However, if the party concentrated upon immediate economic objectives under the 
repressive political climate of the autocracy, it would doom the party to impotence and Tsarist 
repression.
Theoretically, Lenin opposed the economists interpretation of the relationship between party 
and class, accusing his opponents of 'tailism' 28 Against this line of supporting the average state 
of consciousness of the class, Lenin argued that the party's role was to represent and support 
the demands of the most advanced, class-conscious elements, and to mobilise the class as a 
whole around these demands. The economistic notion eliminated the vanguard role of the party 
in its relation to the class. This role was to theoretically explain the existing conjuncture of social 
forces, and to provide a higher level of awareness of the struggles in which the class was 
engaged. Only in this way could the organisation be an effective channel for practical activity. 
In return, the economists accused the Iskraites of perpetuating an 'intellectual dictatorship' over 
the class, an argument the Mensheviks would later employ against the Bolsheviks.
While this debate over the relationship between party and class was not unique to Russia, it 
assumed special urgency under the specific conditions of Russian social reality. If the 
bourgeoisie could not be relied upon to lead the democratic revolution then the task of the 
proletariat was to assume hegemony over the democratic movement as a whole, and to represent 
not only the particularistic interests of labour, but the more general democratic revolutionary 
movement, from the peasantry and agricultural labour to the revolutionary elements within the 
petty-bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie. Lenin argued that under existing conditions a Social 
Democrat had to transcend the narrow trade-unionist viewpoint and understand the totality of 
class relationships within Russian society. Only through understanding the material basis of the 
various demands of the diverse classes in Russian society could the proletariat assume 
hegemony over the democratic movement, and formulate a programme compatible with the
^Lenin, (4; 237).
t a i l i s m  was understood as the restriction of party tasks to reflect the existing state of consciousness of the class as a 
whole.
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more general interests of the anti-autocratic movement. Whereas, in the economic struggle 
workers came into conflict exclusively with employers (including the state), in the political 
struggle they came into contact with the entire matrix of social classes contending for influence 
over the state. The role of the party was to provide this holistic framework for action.29
Lenin continued his debate with economism in the pamphlet What Is To Be Done?, and 
elaborated his ideas on the relationship between party and class. Relying upon the authority of 
'the dean of Marxism', Karl Kautsky, Lenin upheld the view that Social Democratic 
consciousness could not emerge spontaneously from 'trade-unionism', and this necessitated the 
presence of a cohesive revolutionary organisation which, under Russian conditions of illegality 
and harassment, would require the strictest discipline and centralism.30
While these theoretical debates between 1895 and 1903 were crucial in outlining the 
immediate as well as the long-term objectives of the party, the Social-Democrats remained 
hampered by ideological disunity and geographic dispersal. The calling of the Second Congress 
of the Party in London in August 1903 was regarded by all as a welcome opportunity to 
overcome these problems. The congress marked an important advance upon the first, in that the 
party structure was formally organised and for the first time a programme was adopted. 
However, disagreements arose over the question of the party statute and conditions for 
membership. Lenin's proposals called for greater accountability and discipline over members 
than Martov's. The repercussions split the party into two factions, inhibiting united co­
ordinated action. However, the theoretical and practical differences between Lenin's Bolsheviks 
and Menshevik tendencies remains insignificant up until the 1905 Revolution.31 Both factions 
continued to hurl personal recriminations at each other, consuming valuable energy and 
resources in a struggle which appeared to many local cells as pedantic, personal and largely 
irrelevant to the practical tasks at hand. However, if the schism appeared at first sight to be 
pedantic, its consequences would later reveal deep and unbridgeable differences. While Lenin's 
theses in What Is To Be Done? were not the subject of controversy at the London Congress, the 
Mensheviks afterwards argued that his organisational prescriptions were the underlying cause 
of their disagreements.32 As this organisational controversy intensified, the Mensheviks 
progressively found themselves praising the virtues of spontaneity, the heresy which they had
29As Lenin argued; "Those who concentrate the attention, observation and consciousness of the working class 
exclusively, or even mainly, upon itself alone are not Social Democrats; for the self-knowledge of the working class is 
indissolubly linked up, not fully with a clear theoretical understanding...of the relationship» between all the various 
classes of modem society, aquired through the experience of political life...." Consequently "..however much we may try to 
'lend the economic struggle itslf a political character' we shall never be able to develop the political consciousness of the 
workers (to the level of Social Democratic political consciousness) by keeping within the framework of the economic 
struggle, for that framework is too narrow.” Quoted in Harding op. dt., p. 163 & p. 165. Also see A. Carlo, "Lenin and the 
Party”, Telos, 17,1973, p. 8.
30See Lenin, (5; 347-529).
31 As Sapir notes, "it is only after the 1905 Revolution that menshevism and bolshevism developed into widely 
different entities." Sapir, op. dt., p. 353.
32Schapiro provides no evidence for his daim that "when the Second Congress met in Brussels on 30 July 1903 serious 
theoretical differences divided Lenin from his colleagues on Iskra.” Schapiro, op. dt., p. 46. As Haimson notes, it was 
only after the Congress that the Mensheviks began searching for some doctrinal grounds upon which to base their 
opposition. Haimson, op. dt., p. 183.
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previously accused the economists of.33 Originally tendencies within a single party’, Bolshevism 
and Menshevism progressively diverged over various fundamental issues, such as the nature of 
the anti-autocratic movement, and the role of the party and the working class in the 
forthcoming revolution. The 1905 Revolution would test the political acumen of both wings in 
practice.
Prior to 1905, Leninism had evolved only one of what Marcel Leibman has defined as "its two 
major features", namely, organisational discipline. During the revolution the second feature 
would begin to manifest itself in practice, namely, flexibility of policy in accordance with what 
Lenin often described as the 'immediate tasks of the day7.34 It was during these periods of 
revolutionary foment that Lenin learned to fashion the Bolshevik organisation into the 
purposive instrument for realising revolutionary possibility.
4.4. THE PARTY AND THE 1905 REVOLUTION
This section examines the ideological and organisational effect of the 1905-7 Revolution upon 
the two main tendencies within the RSDLP. During this period Lenin attempted to forge the 
party into the purposive instrument of revolution. This required the utmost tactical flexibility 
within an overall framework of a theoretical understanding of the structural dynamics of 
Russian social reality. Bolshevism must ultimately be judged in relation to its performance 
during revolutionary situations, for, as Lukacs argued, Leninism was characterised by its focal 
attention upon the /actuality/ of revolution.35 Even during the periods of utmost class 
tranquility Lenin consciously based the tactics of the party upon the predicted re-emergence of 
an insurrectionary revolutionary situation. In his attempt to transform the party into the 
purposive spearhead Lenin, more than any other Russian Marxist, immersed himself in the 
minutest details of revolutionary insurrection and class warfare. While the defeat of the 
revolution signalled a revision of immediate tactics, the experience provided Lenin with 
invaluable practical and theoretical ammunition for future revolutionary situations.
The introspective focus upon factional fighting immediately prior to 1905 had affected the 
party's agitational work. In the year and a half between the Second Congress and Bloody 
Sunday (January 1905) the party lost ground in its relations with the mass movement and 
political agitation diminished alarmingly.36 The party was hopelessly unprepared for the 
events of Bloody Sunday when the autocracy opened fire upon a peaceful demonstration of 
workers demanding an improvement in living standards. This demonstration (which went to
^The Mensheviks redeved theoretical ammunition from the Polish Sodal Democrat Rosa Luxemburg, who upheld 
the belief in the spontaneous self-disdpline which the working dass would acquire in the course of its struggle. See 
R. Luxemburg, "Organisational Questions of Russian Sodal Democracy", in Harding (ed), op. dt. For a discussion on 
Luxemburg's position on the relationship between party and dass, see J. Molyneux, Marxism and the Party, Pluto, 
L o r x i o  rv  ^ 1980, Ch. 4.
34See M. Leibman, Leninism Under Lenin, Jonathan Cape, LonAo c* , 1975, p. 98.
^G. Lukacs, Lenin, New Left Books, London, 1970, pp. 26-9.
36See Cliff, op. dt., pp. 132-36.
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petition the Tsar) was led by Father Gapon, a priest, workers' organiser and police agent. The 
savagery of the Tsarist response, combined with growing discontent over the war with Japan, 
resurrected the mass strike movement and galvanised all sectors of the opposition in their 
demand for the destruction or dismantling of the Tsarist order.
Although it is impossible to gauge accurately RSDLP membership on the eve of 1905 (due to 
the conditions of illegality and the rapidly changing fortunes of the party) a variety of estimates 
provide an idea of its size and social composition. David Lane has estimated that the 
"membership of the Committees of the RSDLP in Russia in 1903 could not have been more than 
a few thousand."37 A higher estimate of 10,000 has been suggested by Robert Service for 1904.38 
In comparison with the neo-populists, Marxist allegiance appears impressive. According to 
Radkey, "Deeply fissured though it was...the Marxian party was much stronger than its 
Narodnik rival, even in point of numbers, not to speak of discipline or solidarity of 
organisation."39 For 1905, a figure of 8,400 was provided by Strumilin for the Bolshevik faction, 
and Lane estimates that Menshevik membership was roughly equivalent.40
Concerning social composition, Lane has argued that the RSDLP was "predominantly a 
working class party" while the social status of approximately one-fifth of the membership could 
be described as petty-bourgeois.41On the basis of the figure of 8,400 members for 1905, the class 
breakdown of Bolshevism reveals that 61% were workers, 27.4% were white collar and 4.8% 
were peasants.42 However, even if the above evidence is accepted, this should not deflect 
attention away from the fact that the RSDLP, or even its Bolshevik faction, was unable to exert 
significant influence upon the growing workers' movement. The numerical presence of a 
majority of workers in the party did not alter the fact, acknowledged by Lenin, that the party 
had yet to insert itself into the class as a dominant political force. Indeed, one Bolshevik activist 
of the period lamented "the remoteness of our organisation from the broad masses and its 
ignorance of the life and interests of these masses."43
The revolutionary turmoil of 1905 and the breakdown of Tsarist authority totally altered the 
political conditions under which the party could operate, and thus necessitated a 
transformation of party organisation and tactics conducive to the new environment. Evidence 
that Lenin's organisational prescriptions were historically specific and subordinated to the
37D. Lane, The Roots of Russian Communism, Martin Robertson,Ur^i.f\,1968, p. 12.
38R. Service, The Bolshevik Party in Revolution: 1917-1923, Macmillan, LorAc>*\. , 1979, p. 25.
39Quoted in Lane, op. dt., p. 15.
^Ibid, p. 12.
41 Ibid., pp. 20-1. Furthermore, the Mensheviks attracted a larger proportion of middle dass members than the 
Bolsheviks. It is notable that Lane's empirical evidence contradicts the oft-repeated, yet unverified, daim that the 
Bolsheviks were primarily a small, conspiritorial sect of dissaffected middle-dass intellectuals, or marginalised elites.
^Ibid, p. 26.
^Quoted in Cliff, op. d t ,  p. 133.
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changing vicissitudes of the concrete class struggle is revealed in the activities of the Bolsheviks 
during the period. Lf this is recognised, then the fact that Lenin's pronouncements during 1905 
departed radically from those outlined in What Is To Be Done? should not come as a surprise. As 
Harding points out, for Lenin the organisational form of the party "had to be appropriate to the 
tasks which each successive phase of development imposed upon the class..."44 While Lenin 
continued to subscribe to the view that the party had to do more than merely reflect the existing 
level of class consciousness, the revolutionary environment revealed to Lenin the fact that the 
party could be out-stripped by the broad masses in a revolutionary insurrection.40 The actual 
material conditions of life and the involvement in actual struggle released the revolutionary 
potential of the masses far more than any amount of propaganda and agitation could ever have 
achieved. Under these conditions Lenin argued that the party had to 'open up' its structure and 
legal fronts in order to absorb, mobilise and direct the revolutionary energy of the masses 
towards the realisation of the immediate task of promoting revolutionary democracy.46
This possibility was enhanced by the de facto conditions of legality which the breakdown of 
Tsarist order had opened. Against the opposition of local apparachiks Lenin demanded the 
recruitment of ever broader numbers of workers not only into the organisation, but also into 
positions of authority.47 Furthermore, in contrast with the sectarian demand of numerous 
leaders in Russia that the newly formed workers councils (soviets) adhere to the Bolshevik 
programme, Lenin demanded that the slogan 'the party or the soviets' be replaced with hoth 
the Soviet of Workers' Deputies and the Party'.48 Bolsheviks, he argued, should incorporate 
themselves within the broad democratic workers' organs and attempt to win them over to the 
party's platform. Only thus could the party gain the confidence of the mass organisations and 
accumulate sufficient material force to lead the civil war against the autocracy.
While the previous 'epochal shifts' which were discussed in the first two sections 
corresponded to the move from the terrain of propaganda to agitation, Lenin recognised that a 
revolutionary situation necessitated another shift onto the terrain of broad-based 
military-political organisation for insurrection. This shift was characterised by tactical flexibility, 
combining open, legal political tasks of explaining the conjunctural situation with underground 
activity in preparation for insurrection. At these moments the purposive role of the party 
assumed paramount importance. This shift corresponded with the "profound changes that had 
taken place in the conditions of life and in the whole mentality of the working class, as well as 
by the fact that increasingly wide strata of the working class were roused to more conscious and
‘‘‘‘Harding, op. dt., p. 235.
45See E. Mandel, "The Leninist Theory of Organization’’, in R. Blackburn (ed), Revolution and Class Struggle: A Reader in 
Marxist Politics, Fontana, CorAo n , 1977, p. 105.
^On the impact of the revolution on Lenin's theory of the relationship between the party and the dass, see Carlo, op. 
dt., pp. 24-5; J. Molyneux, op. dt., pp. 57-63.
^See Leibman, op. dt., pp. 45-9.
■^Quoted in ibid., p. 88.
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active struggle."49 The organisational metamorphosis of the party was a reflection of the 
perceived need to mobilise and direct the energy of the insurrectionary classes during the 
revolutionary situation. While the hegemony of the establishment was substantially shaken, the 
insurrectionary challenge suffered from organisational inexperience. According to Lenin, the 
raison d'etre of Bolshevism was to provide the necessary organisation and coordination to 
overcome this deficiency.
By April 1906 Bolshevik membership had increased to an estimated 13,000 and by 1907 had 
escalated to 46,143.50 By this stage the Bolsheviks could be regarded as a mass working class 
party, not only in terms of social composition, but also in terms of its influence on the direction 
of the broad class movement. It was the Moscow Bolsheviks who led the local Moscow Soviet 
uprising of late-1905.
In addition to demanding the organisational restructuring of the party during the period of 
revolutionary ascent, Lenin continued to argue for clarification of the party programme in order 
to ascertain the limits and realisable goals of the anti-autocratic democratic revolution. Lenin 
stressed that a Marxist insight into Russian reality necessitated a sharp distinction between the 
'immediate' aims of the movement and its 'ultimate' aim. It was on the basis of this distinction 
that Lenin argued in 1905 that Marxist political practice departed from other revolutionaries 
such as anarchists and Social Revolutionaries who sought the immediate introduction of 
socialism.31 The task of the Bolsheviks was to forge "class alliances" around the 'minimum 
programme', thus fully representing the community of forces and demands of the democratic 
revolution as a whole. The Bolshevik programme thus included "the demands of the workers in 
the political sphere, and economic demands within the framework of capitalism in the 
economic sphere."32 On the basis of this distinction between the minimum and the maximum 
programme Lenin continued to adapt practice to the basic tenets of Russian orthodox Marxism. 
This involved recognising the democratic, rather than socialist, nature of the impending 
revolution, the hegemonic role of the proletariat in realising the democratic tasks, and the 
political unreliability of the bourgeoisie.
Six fundamental demands were raised by the party as its "political banner and immediate 
programme". This minimum programme included a constituent assembly of all the people, 
arming of the people, political freedom, complete freedom for the oppressed and 
disenfranchised nationalities, the 8-hour day and the establishment of peasant revolutionary
49Quoted in Harding, op. dt., p. 236.
^Lane, op. dt., p. 13.
51 "Marxism demands that a dear distinction be made between the maximum and the minimum programme. The 
maximum programme is the sodalist transformation of sodety, which is impossible without the abolition of commodity 
production. The minimum programme proposes reforms that are possible even within the Limits of commodity 
production." Lenin, (11; 198).
32Lenin, (10; 24-5).
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committees.^While Lenin had to defend the cautious policy of Bolshevism against leftist critics, 
he increasingly had to defend the basic tenets of Russian orthodox Marxism against a trend 
within Menshevism which mistook the democratic tasks of the revolution for the hegemony of 
the bourgeoisie in the process. As Schapiro notes "One of the casualties of 1905 was the 
menshevik belief in the 'hegemony7 of the proletariat..."54 In Lenin's theoretical and 
programmatic equation the immediate task was to institute the "democratic dictatorship of the 
proletariat and the peasantry", representing the only two classes which could be relied upon to 
realise the democratic objectives of the revolution.
This assessment of the composition of the revolutionary classes distinguished the Bolshevisks 
from the Menshevisks, who retained greater optimism in the revolutionary potential of the 
liberal bourgeoisie.33 Lenin, on the other hand, argued that the bourgeoisie, confronted with a 
proletarian and peasant uprising, had ceased to be a revolutionary class. Despite this appraisal, 
which still incorporated the fundamental tenets of 'orthodox7 Russian Marxism, Lenin's 
characterisation of the revolution was ambiguous. Along with the Mensheviks, he remained a 
prisoner of the overdrawn orthodox Marxist distinction between the bourgeois and the socialist 
stages of the revolution.36
The disagreements between Lenin and the Mensheviks continued to revolve around an axis 
which a priori constrained the movement of the revolution within a mechanical stage theory of 
social development. According to this dogma, the objective conditions of existence limited 
possibilities within a 'bourgeois democratic7 framework. It was Leon Trotsky who recognised 
the theoretical and practical deficiencies inherent within the framework when he argued that 
the "general sociological term bourgeois revolution by no means solves the politico-tactical 
problems, contradictions and difficulties which the mechanics of a given bourgeois revolution 
throw up." The proletariat, being the "chief actor" in the Russian Revolution, would inevitably 
be "impelled towards power, and that once this power had been established it will not give it 
up without a desperate resistance, until it is tom from its hands by armed force."37 While this 
was essentially the position which Lenin adopted in 1917, during 1905 he persevered with the 
immediate task of implementing the 'democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the
53Lenin, (8; 566-7). Defending the cautious nature of the programme against 'anarchistic7 objections that the Marxists 
were putting off the socialist revolution Lenin replied that they "were not putting it off, but are taking the first steps 
towards it in the only possible way, along the only correct path, namely, the path of a democratic republic." Lenin, (9; 
29).
>tSchapiro, op. dt., p. 82. This was especially true of Potresov who, after 1905, aimed "his sharpest darts at the idea of 
the proletariat's 'hegemony7. Sapir, op. dt., p. 359. Plekhanov had sought the views of Kautsky in order to 'dear up' 
this confusion and Kautsky had replied in a manner doser to Lenin's understanding than that of the new tendency 
within Menshevism. In an artide in December 1906 Lenin used Kautsky's authority to berate the Mensheviks. "Of 
course the Russian revolution is not a sodalist revolution. The sodalist didatorship of the proletariat (its 'undivided 
sway') is out of the question. But neither is it a bourgeois revolution, for "the bourgeoisie is not one of the driving forces of 
the present revolutionary movement in Russia". "Whenever the proletariat comes out independently, the bourgeoisie ceases 
to be a revolutionary dass."" Lenin, (11; 372).
“ For variations within Menshevism on the behaviour of the bourgeoisie, see Haimson, op. dt., p. 200-2.
36See M. Leibman, "Lenin in 1905: A Revolution That Shook a Doctrine", Monthly Review, April 1970, p. 67.
^L. Trotsky, Results and Prospects, New Park, London, 1971, p. 199.
115
peasantry7. As Max Shachtman points out, no "polemical attack could compel him to be 
consistently specific about the relationship between the two classes in the democratic 
dictatorship or about the relationships between the political parties that would represent them 
in it. When the revolution finally occurred, the formula proved to be disoriented and 
worthless."53 It took a reassessment of the dynamics of the laws of uneven and combined 
development, stimulated by the events of the First World War, in order for Lenin to discard this 
theoretical straitjacket and dogmatism. This theoretical revision would compel the Bolsheviks 
to discard the old minimum programme of 1905. However, Lenin's polemics with the 
Mensheviks over the nature and class hegemony of the revolution marked an important step in 
clarifying the distinction between the two factions. After 1905, the two tendencies within 
Russian Marxism progressively diverged over these problems.
The epoch between 1895 and 1907 witnessed a quantitative and qualitative transformation 
within the Russian Marxist movement. In organisational terms the movement had succeeded in 
creating a disciplined national structure adhering to a party centre and definite programme. 
While the Second Congress in 1903 resulted in a serious split within the RSDLP, contact 
between local Bolshevik and Menshevik factions (where they existed) remained strong and did 
not inhibit united grass-roots activity during the 1905-6 upheavals. Ideologically, the party was 
able to transcend the debate with the Narodniks over the feasability of capitalist development 
in Russia and concentrate upon the internal debate relating to the nature of the revolutionary 
process in Russia and the relationship between the party and the class. While the original split 
of 1903 appeared to bear little relation to these problems, the experiences of 1905-6 began to 
clarify ideological differences between Bolshevism and Menshevism. Within this ideological 
division Lenin and the Bolsheviks upheld the mantle of 'orthodox7 Russian Marxism, and 
secured their reputation as the more radical wing of Russian Social Democracy in 
programmatic and practical terms.
The revolution also witnessed the quantitative growth of the party and the broadening of its 
working class base. Given the Bolshevik understanding of the party-as-vanguard the 
recruitment of 40,000 members by 1907 reflects the popularity of Bolshevik demands and ability 
of the party to lead the broad movement, such as the events in Moscow in late-1905. The ability 
of the Bolsheviks to expand rapidly and mobilise the forces of revolution reflected Lenin's 
recognition that organisation had to be subordinated to the concrete tasks of the day. The 
party's task was to represent, mobilise and channel the elemental forces of the revolution in the 
direction that the party's theoretical insight into the possibilities of the revolution dictated. In 
other words, it had to fulfil the role of a purposive spearhead. The experience of 1905-6 was an 
important practical lesson for Lenin on the relationship between party and class, and of the 
dangers of the party falling behind the mass momentum. Despite the ebb which followed, the 
movement drew a significant number of workers and cadres into the Social Democratic orbit, 
and the resulting experience provided a historical reference, ideologically and organisationally, 
which would help frame and inform praxis in the future.
38M. Shachtman, The Bureaucratic Revolution, The Donald Press, N.Y., 1962, pp. 179-80.
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During each of the epochs analysed in this chapter, the Bolsheviks were forced to respond to 
specific conjunctural changes in Russia's political and economic climate. These changes were 
problematic, involving different perceptions of Russian reality and the potential, or 
possibilities, inherent in each situation. Conflicting organisational and ideological views 
affected the relationship between the various parties and the various classes, and also the ability 
of a purposive movement to mobilise and channel the elemental forces of the revolution. 
Furthermore, conflicting perceptions of the nature of the revolution affected the willingness of 
the various parties to channel the revolutionary current towards a particular goal. This is not to 
suggest that these purposive factors (or lack of) determined the outcome of the revolutionary 
situation in 1905. Structural factors were crucial in determining its potential. The army 
remained the coercive bulwark of the existing polity. This would not occur in February and 
October 1917. Furthermore, the elemental surge of the revolution reached its climax as a united 
effort of 'society7 against the 'state'. The class heterogeneity of the movement was a blessing in 
disguise for the Tsarist order. Its demands and activity were unco-ordinated, and in the midst 
of this chaos the tottering state was able the diffuse the explosive situation through promising 
piecemeal reforms. The appeasement of the liberal bourgeoisie, the stability of the army, and 
the defeat of the Moscow Soviet uprising, all account for the rapidity with which the coalition of 
the anti-autocratic revolutionary forces disintegrated. During the revolutionary situations of 
1914 and 1917 the coalition of revolutionary forces was more polarised. Never again would the 
liberal bourgeoisie and the intelligentsia be presented with such a splendid opportunity to lead 
society against the old regime.09 Their half-heartedness, and inability to fully capitalise on the 
revolutionary potential led to a more polarised anti-autocratic movement in the aftermath of the 
revolution.
As the social instability of 1914 and 1917 revealed, the working class never recovered this 
same degree of confidence in the bourgeoisie. Yet as a comparison of these years will 
demonstrate, the working class required a purposive organisational centre in order to realise its 
revolutionary potential. In 1914 this purposive centre was absent. In 1917 the Bolsheviks were 
the only organisation willing to break completely with the liberal bourgeoisie (or, as Martov put 
it, to "throw down the gauntlet to the anti-proletarian forces") and were the only organisation 
willing to fulfil the purposive role of leading the movement towards insurrection. They did this 
on the basis of a socialist programme. Chiring 1905 Lenin considered this inconceivable and 
'pre-scientific'. It would take a conceptual shift in Lenin's thought before he argued that the 
Bolsheviks could fulfil this role of leading the revolution in the direction of socialism. This 
transformation will be the subject of the next two sections.
As argued above, Lenin's reading of structural developments during 1905, like the 
Mensheviks', limited its possibilities far more than Trotsky's. However, 1905 provided Lenin
j9See L. Haimson, "The Problem of Urban Stability in Russia, 1905-1917", in M. Chemiavsky (ed), The Structure of 
Russian History, Random House, N.Y., 1970. "For this flickering moment, the intelligentsia, which had emerged as the 
prototype...of this united nation, managed to induce the groups under its sway to bury the long-standing differences of 
interests, outlook, and values that had separated them and to agree on a common set of discrete political objectives, to a 
common vision, however partial and abstracted of Russia's immediate political future, if not her ultimate destiny." p. 
375.
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with important lessons concerning the relationship between the party and the insurrectionary 
classes during an insurrectionary situation. These lessons would be reviewed during 1917 when 
Lenin once more emphasized the purposive role of the party in realising the revolution's 
socialist potential. However, before this occurred, Lenin's flexibility would be tested once more 
in the years of reaction between 1907 and 1911, and the renewed upsurge in the workers' 
movement immediately prior to the First World War.
4.5. REACTION, REVIVAL AND THE MASS MOVEMENT
The reaction associated with the Tsarist Minister of the Interior Stolypin extinguished the 
revolutionary impulse of 1905-6 and reimpossed severe restrictions upon workers' organisation. 
The revolutionary movement was "spectacularly crushed".60 From a total of 150,000 members 
in 1907, the RSDLP dwindled to 10,000 in 1910. The inhospitable political climate forced the 
Social Democratic movement to revise its activity, and assume a pure 'survival' footing. In 
addition to the inevitable disillusionment following the failure of its aspirations during the 
revolution, the Marxist movement remained split, and differences crystalised. Even within the 
tendencies, tendencies emerged. The movement was rent asunder due to conflicting appraisals 
of the past events and current attitudes towards the state. Repression and police infiltration 
continued to hinder freedom of activity and helped to poison the revolutionary atmosphere and 
deplete it of valuable cadres. Despite this, the debates during the reaction were important in 
clarifying the different assessments of reality adopted by the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks. 
These assessments would be tested once the workers' movement revived in 1912.
The disunity within the movement was exacerbated as early as 1906 over the tactics to be 
adopted towards the liberal parties in the Duma. The practical implications of this debate 
would manifest themselves during the revolutionary situation of 1917. Lenin berated the 
Menshevik Duma faction for their conciliatory attitude towards the Constitutional Democrats 
(Kadets). The Mensheviks adopted a rosier appraisal of the potentialities of Russian liberalism, 
revising their pre-1905 position towards the bourgeoisie and liberalism, arguing that the 
bourgeois nature of the revolution required joint action with the liberals in order to dismantle 
the structure of Tsarism and replace it with a democratic order. They pointed to the role of 
liberalism during 1905, when it marched under the anti-autocratic banner in order to wrest 
constitutional concessions from the Tsar.
Once more, the nature of the revolution and the role of the proletariat and the party became 
the axis around which the party debated. However, while at the turn of the century the Iskraites 
had challenged the economists tailism, after 1905 sectors within the Menshevik faction adopted 
a position similar to the heresy of economism. As Harding points out:
It was in the name of the leading role of the proletariat in the democratic revolution that Lenin 
and the orthodox inveighed against the economists at the turn of the century. It was in the name 
of this principle that Lenin excoriated the Mensheviks who, he alleged, moved progressively 
away from 1903 onwards to the point where, in 1905, they were prepared to accept the ignoble
^R. Service, The Russian Revolution: 1900-1927, Macmillan, London ,  p. 18.
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role of m erely 'assisting' the treacherous bourgeoisie in prosecuting the dem ocratic revo lu tion .61
Lenin denounced what he described as a 'liquidationist' trend within the party seeking to 
dismantle the conspiratorial, illegal party structure and convene a workers' congress which 
could take advantage of the legal possibilities opened by the October 1905 constitution. 
Aksel'rod and Potresov argued that the party should take advantage of the concessions wrested 
from Tsarism and develop a party along Western European Social Democratic lines, 
emphasizing more 'gradualist' change.62 The Duma and the formal constitutional guarantees 
ceded by the Tsar in the height of the revolutionary foment were interpreted by many 
Mensheviks as a step along the gradualist, evolutionary transformation of Russia into a civil, 
constitutional regime. Consequently, Marxists had to utilise these openings to improve the 
bargaining position of labour and expand the legality granted in 1905. This necessitated the 
dismantling of, or de-emphasis on, the moribund conspiratorial party structure. Furthermore, it 
was important not to alienate the liberals or drive them into the camp of reaction.
The psychological environment produced by the reaction hit the Mensheviks especially hard 
and contributed to their reconsideration of the restructuring of the party. Potresov admitted at 
the end of 1907 that "I do not think that this disintegration, this demoralisation have anywhere 
manifested themselves so vividly as with us Mensheviks. Not only is their no organisation, 
there are not even elements of one.” Given this appraisal, it was natural for Potresov and 
Martov to argue that it was not even necessary to dismantle the illegal structure, for this 
structure was effectively dead, composed principally of an 'intellectual dictatorship' divorced 
from the life of the working class.63 The former bluntly stated; "Let my readers judge: in the 
summer of 1909, can there exist in sober reality, and not merely the figment of a diseased 
imagination, a school of thought that advocates liquidating what has already ceased to be an 
organic whole."64
On the other hand, Fainsod notes that the Bolshevik faction, reviving the organisational 
principles adopted prior to 1905, adjusted better than the Mensheviks to the Stolypin reaction.63 
This led them to a less negative appraisal of maintaining and emphasizing the underground in
61 Harding, op. tit., p. 47.
^Differences within Menshevism are discussed in Sapir, op. tit., pp. 356-61; and I. Getzler, Martov, Cambridge U.P., 
Cambridge, 1967, pp. 113-32. See also Harding, op. tit., pp. 260-73.
^See Sapir, op. tit., p. 360.
^Quoted in A. Ascher (ed), The Mensheviks in the Russian Revolution, Thames and Hudson, G.B., 1976, p. 70.
^Fainsod, op. tit., p. 45.
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the prevailing conditions.66 Lenin argued that given the democratic revolution had failed to be 
consummated and reaction had set in, the old Iskraite position still retained much validity. To 
dismantle the national underground party and subsume it under an open 'workers' congress' 
(to play at European Social Democracy) would leave the movement unprotected from reaction 
and would blunt the spearhead of the revolutionary movement. The 'realism' of Menshevik 
demands would lead inevitably to its subordination to liberalism and the rejection of the 
revolutionary democratic demands set forth in 1905.
For Lenin, the reaction and demoralisation were merely conjunctural. The experience of 1905 
and its aftermath, while providing the movement with instructive lessons, did not transform 
the nature of existing power and class relations. Consequently, the socio-economic analysis he 
presented remained tied to the orthodoxy of the pre-revolutionary period. His political and 
organisational principles corresponded to this analysis, resting upon an optimism that the 
conjuncture of reaction would merely spawn a stronger and more determined revolutionary 
upsurge. The Mensheviks argued that though the revolution had failed to fulfil its democratic 
objectives, a constitutional process had begun and its consolidation required an alliance with 
liberalism in order to ensure that Russia was granted Western European legal guarantees. 
Organisationally, this corresponded to the need to transform the party along Western Social 
Democratic lines.
Thus, an accumulation of factors deepened the rift between the Bolsheviks and the 
Mensheviks after 1905. These included conflicting appraisals of the revolution and the 
respective roles of the proletariat and the liberals, conflicting attitudes towards internal 
organisational reform and interests relating to the respective social composition of the factions. 
The validity and strength of these respective theoretical insights and praxis were tested as the 
workers' movement re-emerged after 1910.
At the end of 1911 Lenin observed that the bleakest period of reaction appeared to have run 
its course and, as predicted, the workers were "gradually going over to the offensive".67 The 
number of strikes doubled to 100,000 during 1911. Moreover, the Lena Goldfields massacre in 
February 1912 provided fresh evidence that 'gradualist' policies within the confines of the 
autocratic structure would doom the movement to impotency. By mid-1912, strikes and
66In 1920, Lenin recalled that; "Of all the defeated opposition and revolutionary parties, the Bolsheviks affected the 
most orderly retreat, with the least loss to their 'army', with its core best preserved." Lenin, (31; 28). David Lane, op. 
dt., in his analysis of the sodal composition of the RSDLP in 1907, has argued that the greater emphasis which the 
Mensheviks placed upon 'economistic' activity and their less aggressive policy' in general may be attributed to the 
sodal composition of their faction. At the grass roots, he observes, the Bolsheviks were based mainly upon the urban 
proletariat, whereas the Mensheviks had "supporters across dass lines." Furthermore, Menshevik recruitment within 
the proletariat derived from "the better paid and more skilled workers and less from among the poorer peasant urban 
newcomers."(p. 213) Lane also mentions that Menshevik demands for greater decentralisation and local autonomy may 
well have been related to the fad that whereas Bolsheviks were based largely in Russian-speaking areas, the 
Mensheviks had a larger proportion of national minorities.(p. 42.) "The Menshevik demand for more autonomy to local 
units was related to their local factional strength, to their support among the national minorities and across economic 
dass lines. Their demand for a more decentralized form of party, for more 'democracy' in local units were dosely 
related to the sodal structure of the Menshevik faction and to the political interests of its leaders.”(p. 211.)
ö7Harding op. dt., 283.
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demonstrations against Tsarist repression had erupted throughout the empire. While most of 
the strikes during the upturn of 1911 had been of an economic nature, 1912 witnessed an 
increase in political strikes. This was due to the uncompromising response of Tsarism towards 
workers' economic demands, highlighted by the Lena events. Elwood argues that behind "these 
economic and political strikes was a sense of frustration with parliamentary reform and 
moderate trade-unionism".68 It was precisely in these fields that the Mensheviks had targeted 
their activity.69
In a repetition of 1905, this increase in worker militancy found the Social Democrats 
unprepared, still reeling from the years of repression and police surveillance/0 Although the 
Bolsheviks succeeded in establishing a Russian Bureau of the Central Committee early in 1912, 
and a St Petersburg Committee in November of the same year, the development of the 
underground was still plagued by arrests and police inflitration.71 Despite this, their radical 
demands began to strike more of a chord within the growing workers' movement than the 
Mensheviks' gradualism.
In legal areas of activity (such as unions, the Duma and insurance boards) the Bolsheviks 
began to outpace the Mensheviks. As Elwood notes: "By articulating the growing
dissatisfaction of the members of these groups and by offering militant solutions to their long­
standing grievances, the Bolsheviks in particular were able to broaden their appeal and their 
influence."72 In the areas which the Mensheviks had targeted, the Bolsheviks began to win 
spectacular victories. As Getzler notes, the Mensheviks "found themselves harassed and beaten 
in their own areas of activity.”73 The circulation of the Bolshevik paper, Pravda, outstripped the 
Menshevik paper, Luch'7* In union elections the 'pravdists' defeated the liquidationists' 
winning control of 10 of the 13 unions. In the elections for the Fourth Duma in 1912 the nine 
seats allocated to the workers curia were dominated by the Bolsheviks. Furthermore, in the 
elections for workers delegates on the All-Russian Insurance Boards the Bolsheviks took 82.4% 
of the seats.70 Assessing the Mensheviks' position, Martov admitted in September 1913 that: "It 
is altogether likely that in the course of this season, our (union) positions in Petersburg will be
^R.C. Elwood, Russian Social Democracy in the Underground: A Study of the RSDLP in the Ukraine 1907-1914, Van 
Gorrum, Assen, 1974, p. 236.
69As Sapir has noted, "When the workers recovered from their post-1905 apathy, it was the Bolshevik underground 
that caught up with most of the new cadres in the legal organizations that the Mensheviks had created. This began, 
roughly, after the Lena shootings...” Sapir, op. dt., p. 357.
70Noting the upsurge Lenin lamented to Gorky: "...there is no organization - I could simply weep.” Quoted in Elwood, 
op. dt., p. 237.
71d iff, op. dt., p. 356. The Mensheviks and Bolsheviks formally split at the Prague Conference of January 1912. 
^Elwood, op. dt., p. 241.
^Getzler, op. dt., p. 135.
74See P. Kenez, The Birth of the Propaganda State: Soviet Methods of Mass Mobilization: 1917-1929, Cambridge, N V.?1985,
p. 28.
^See Lenin, (20, 381-391), for a compilation of data.
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squeezed even further. But that is not what is awful. What is worse is that from an 
organizational point of view, Menshevism...remains a weak little drcle."76 The respective 
strengths of the two wings of Russian Social Democracy was a reflection of their perceptions of 
socio-political developments moulded during the years of repression. As Haimson notes, the 
anti-autocratic movement had polarised since 1905, and the workers' movement was less 
prepared to compromise with the liberal bourgeoisie.77 One can concur with Ascher that "in 
de-emphasizing illegal organisations the [Mensheviks] had handed the Leninists with a clear 
advantage in waging propaganda and in recruiting supporters among the workers".78
However, the Bolsheviks' capacity for recruiting workers and rallying them around Bolshevik 
demands was not matched by co-ordinated organisation. This absence of sufficient organisation 
became apparent on the eve of the First World War, as the militancy of the workers' movement 
assumed revolutionary proportions. As the previous molecular development of the party's 
organisation and ideology suggested, periods of heightening class warfare required the 
existence of a purposive revolutionary centre capable of co-ordinating underground politico- 
military activity. As Haimson observes, despite the growing correspondence between Bolshevik 
slogans and the workers' spentaneous radicalism the party was unable to organise and 
coordinate effectively the workers' "elemental mood of revolt".79 El wood also notes that "side 
by side with the 'collosal growth of the mass movement' there was the helplessness of the 
underground party and its obvious inability to give direction to the popular unrest...Just as the 
party did not cause the revival of workers' unrest in 1912, so also it could neither lead nor 
restrain the workers in July 1914."80
However, the events of the previous years had revealed that Menshevik 'gradualism' and 
'legalism' was ill-attuned to periods of workers militancy, and that Bolshevism was closer "in 
spirit to the masses",81 as one Menshevik trade-unionist admitted. Despite their organisational 
weakness, Lenin could justifiably reflect on the eve of the war that:
The correctness of the Pravdists' programmatic, tactical and organizational ideas, their 
decisions and line has been wholly and splendidly confirmed by the experience of the mass 
movement in 1912,1913 and half of 1914.82
/6Quoted in Getzler, op. dt., pp. 135-6.
^Haimson, ’The Problem of Urban Stability...”, p. 356.
78Ascher (ed), op. dt, p. 24. An interesting report from the Tsarist secret police confirming this is reprinted in 
L. Trotsky, Stalin, MacGibbon &c Kee, London, 1968, p. 162.
^Haimson, op. dt., p. 356.
^Elwood, p. 240 &c p. 243. Victoria Bonnell comes to a similar condusion. "The Bolsheviks cannot be credited with 
having radicalized workers: the disposition to embrace radical solutions arose out of the workers' own experiences with 
employers and the state. But the party gave tactical and ideological expresion to these experiences, calling for the 
abandonment of a gradualist approach and the adoption instead of revolutionary methods to end tsarist rule.” V.E. 
Bonnell, Roots of Rebellion: Workers' Politics and Organizations in St Petersburg and Moscow, 1900-1914, University of 
California, fcwAA^l983, p. 437.
81 Ibid., p. 242.
^Lenin, (20; 387).
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The epoch between the revolution of 1905 and the First World War revealed Lenin's tactical 
flexibility, and the strength of his organisational theory. His arguments concerning the need for 
a disciplined, underground organisation were confirmed by the 'legal' successes which the 
Bolsheviks achieved once the workers' movement re-emerged after the worst years of 
repression. This conviction was based upon the realisation that Russia had still not embarked 
upon the Western track of development. Therefore, party tactics could not correspond to the 
Western European Social Democratic mould which the Mensheviks wished to insert 
themselves. The experience of the years immediately prior to the war also pointed to the need 
for the party to concentrate its efforts upon developing politico-military activity in order to 
co-ordinate the challenge to the existing polity once a revolutionary situation re-emerged. It 
would require the more open political environment of 1917 in order to provide the link between 
the demands of the mass movement and a purposive organisational centre intent upon 
channelling and realising these demands. During 1917, Lenin drew upon these lessons of this 
molecular development in order to transform the party into the purposive vanguard of the 
October Revolution.
4.6. THE WAR AND THEORETICAL REAPPRAISAL
Russia's declaration of war on the Hapsburg empire and the subsequent engagement of the 
Entente and Alliance partners in the world war had the effect of engulfing Russia under a wave 
of patriotism which extinguished the revolutionary fire in St Petersburg.83
Lenin immediately embarked upon a theoretical explanation for the war and the response of 
the Second International, whose national sections, almost without exception, capitulated to the 
patriotic nationalism of their governments. What emerged from Lenin's endeavour was a 
profound and radical reappraisal of his socio-economic analysis. The application of this analysis 
to Russia's concrete problems resulted in a reassessment of the relationship between the 
objective and the subjective preconditions for socialist revolution. It represented a break with 
Western European and Russian orthodox Marxism. As Lowy notes, this orthodoxy was 
characterised by a 'pre-dialectical' (mechanical, deterministic, evolutionary) form of 
materialism in which the economic base was viewed as the underlying determinant of 
consciousness.84 Lenin's philosophical break with this dogma provided the basis for his 
explanation of the 'degeneracy' of the Second International, and also his analysis of 
imperialism. Ultimately it led to a conclusion fundamentally similar to Trotsky's; namely, that a 
less developed country could, on its own, create a socialist revolution, which could then be 
externalised to the more advanced nations. Without this theoretical shift, Lenin and the 
Bolsheviks' praxis during 1917 cannot be understood. This section will examine this theoretical 
shift.
^The St Petersburg insurrection had been crushed four days before the declaration of war. 
84See M. Lowy, "From the 'Logic' of Hegel to the Finland Station”, Critique, 6,1976.
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The first problem Lenin confronted was the collapse, or capitulation, of Western European 
Social Democracy. It was precisely in the most industrially developed nations, where 
objectively socialist revolution and proletarian class consciousness should have been most 
advanced, that the Social Democrats' subservience to the imperialist designs of the capitalist 
state was most notable. The European Social Democrats' approval of war credits for the 
prosecution of the war effort (which conflicted with their previous declarations of opposition to 
capitalist warmongering) revealed to Lenin the utter and irreparable bankruptcy of the Second 
International. In addition to calling for the foundation of a new International, Lenin provided a 
dialectical explanation for the response of the European parties. Even before the war Lenin (like 
many other Left Social Democrats such as Pannekoek and Luxemburg) had warned of the 
dangers of revisionism within the movement. This trend accepted the liberal parliamentary 
framework as the appropriate vehicle for peacefully introducing socialist measures.85 The long 
period of parliamentary passivity and open, legal pressure upon the capitalist state to improve 
piecemeal the conditions of labour had brought to the fore union leaders and party bureaucrats 
who had lost sight of the ultimate goal of Social Democracy, and had transformed the 
movement into a pressure group within the confines of the bourgeois order seeking to defend 
their achievements through class collaboration. The theoretical consequence was the acceptance 
of the confines of the capitalist state and legal framework as a premise for action. Labour and 
party bureaucrats, with an aristocracy of labour as its social base, had thus truncated Marxism 
as a movement for overthrowing capitalism and instituting the socialisation of production and 
had transformed it into a movement for improving the condition of wage labour. The movement, to 
paraphrase Eduard Bernstein, became everything, while the goal meant nothing. This was 
anathema to Lenin, for whom the goal of transcending the form of wage labour and abolishing 
exploitation was the rationale which justified the existence of the party. It lay at the very heart 
of Lenin's conception of a purposive vanguard.
Neil Harding has argued that Lenin's analysis of the degeneration of Social Democracy bore a 
"striking resemblance" to Robert Michels' analysis in Political Parties, published in 1911.86 
However, these similarities are not as striking as the differences in the two approaches. While 
Michels' analysis rested upon his universalistic 'iron law of oligarchy' (the tendency of power 
and decision-making within large-scale organisations, no matter how democratic, to become 
accumulated into the hands of a few strategically positioned individuals), Lenin emphasized 
the particular socio-economic environment which had spawned the organisational and 
ideological degeneracy of the movement. He argued that:
...decades of a so-called peaceful epoch have allowed an accumulation of petty-bourgeois and 
opportunistic junk within the socialist parties of all the European countries....There is hardly a 
single Marxist of note who has not recognized...that the opportunists are in fact a non-proletarian 
element hostile to the socialist revolution. The particularly rapid growth of this social element of 
late years is beyond doubt: it includes officials of the legal labour unions, parliamentarians and 
other intellectuals who have got themselves easy and comfortable posts in the legal mass
^See Lenin's artide on the thirtieth anniversary of Marx's death. Lenin (18: 582-5). 
^Harding, op. dt., pp. 26-7. R. Michels, Political Parties, Collier, tLN, , 1962.
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movement, some sections of the better paid workers, office employees etc., etc...87
The second difference between Michels and Lenin was that while Michels (in his 1915 
afterword) viewed the Social Democrats' response to the war as a manifestation of the 
bankruptcy of socialism as a living ideology (and its supersession by nationalism),88 Lenin saw 
contemporary Social Democracy as a betrayal of socialism. A new International had to be formed, 
operating on an ideological and organisational foundation which would ensure that the 
movement was protected from the seduction of class collaboration within the capitalist state.
These differences were a reflection of opposing models of social analysis. While Lenin, like 
Hegel and Marx, opposed "making the concept of law absolute"89 and used theory as a guide for 
action, Michels sought a universal determinism which led to an "uncritical treatment of aspects 
of the present, as if they were historically final.”90 Another methodological difference was 
Lenin's more holistic approach to the study of social phenomena, compared to Michels more 
atomistic method. The iron law of oligarchy derived from Michels' treating Social Democracy in 
itself, abstracted from its social environment. The law ' was seen as inherent in the object as an 
isolated entity. Lenin, on the other hand, approached the study through analysing its 
interrelationships in the totality of social relations. This was crucial, because it led Lenin to 
focus not only upon the relationship between the party and society, but also upon the particular 
phase of world capitalist development, namely imperialism. The bankruptcy of Social 
Democracy, Lenin argued, was inseparable from its role in perpetuating colonial plunder. 
Imperialism, Lenin claimed:
meant a sum of super-profits and special privileges for the bourgeoisie. It meant, moreover, the 
possibility of enjoying crumbs from this big cake for a small minority of the petty-bourgeois, as 
well as for the better paid employees, officials of the labour movement etc... In a word, the 
'all-pervading gradualism' of the (last years) has created...an entire opportunist trend based on a 
definite social stratum within present day democracy and linked with the bourgeoisie of its own 
national 'shade' by numerous ties of economic, social and political interests - a trend directly, 
openly, consciously, and systematically hostile to any idea of a break in gradualism.91
Thus, the concept of imperialism and colonial super-profits was not simply an extension of 
Lenin's socio-economic analysis. It signalled an entire theoretical shift in his understanding of 
the dynamics of capitalist development and thus, socialist revolution. This reappraisal brought 
Lenin's analysis closer to Trotsky's position.
As demonstrated above, Lenin's socio-economic analysis up to the world war differed from 
other trends within Russian Marxism. However, all tendencies had been involved in the same 
problematic; namely, the rate of capitalist development in Russia, and the nature of the Russian
87Quoted in Harding, op. dt., pp. 27-8.
^Michels, op. dt., pp. 357-63.
89Lowy, op. dt. p. 10.
90D. Beetham, "From Sodalism to Fasdsm: The Relation Between Theory and Practice in the Work of Robert Michels”, 
Political Studies, Vol. XXV, No. 2, p. 178.
91 Quoted in Harding, op. dt., pp. 28-9.
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Revolution. According to Lenin, the war and the debate over the state and imperialism, 
rendered this national outlook obsolete. His analysis now assumed a more holistic stance, 
concentrating not upon national capitalist development, but the dynamic interaction and 
interrelationship between national capitals on the world-wide scale. The era of imperialism 
("the highest stage of capitalism") made imperative a correct appreciation of the whole world- 
system in order to determine the function and dynamics of the parts.
A consequence of this theoretical shift was that the question of the peasantry assumed a less 
important position in Lenin's political understanding of the revolution. Whereas before, 
peasant differentiation had been a central concern of Russian Marxist analysis, because this 
served as an indicator of the growth of capitalism, its importance now diminished in Lenin's 
general analysis of the dynamics of the revolution. A correct understanding of the dynamics of 
Russia's development and the likelihood of the collapse of the Tsarist order had to take into 
account Russia's integration within the international capitalist order.92Lenin's analysis led him 
to the conclusion that it was possible that Russia, as the weakest link in the chain of capitalist 
states, could provide the spark which would change the form of the world conflagration.
This account of the relationship between Lenin's theory and practice can be contrasted with 
most unsympathetic accounts of Leninism. For example, Plamenatz argues that "Bolshevik 
additions to and distortions of Marxian doctrine were made to justify policies adopted to take 
advantage of Russian conditions."93 This diminishes the importance of ideology in the 
development of Leninist praxis. The account provided here demonstrates that Lenin 
consistently attempted to apply a Marxist analysis of reality in order to inform his praxis. 
Imperialism had stimulated the concentration of capital, fulfilling Marx's prediction concerning 
the growing contradiction between the social nature of production and the private nature of the 
appropriation of wealth. This contradiction had manifested itself in the obscenity of the 
imperialist slaughter in the trenches, as national capitals competed through war in order to 
secure and expand their markets. For Lenin this was evidence than this that capitalism had 
become a fetter upon the further development of history. Consequently, the immediate task of 
socialists was to transform the imperialist war into a civil war between capital and the 
proletariat. This applied to all belligerent nations. The outbreak of civil war in one, single 
country would spur the proletariat of other nations to turn their weapons against their own 
generals and capitalists. The chain of imperialist states would break, ushering in the historical 
task of the hour; the construction of the world-wide socialist order.
On the eve of the February 1917 Revolution, Leninism had evolved, through a molecular 
process of development and transformation, the features which would characterise Bolshevik 
praxis throughout 1917. However, on the eve of the revolution the Bolsheviks remained
92See T. Cox, Peasants, Class and Capitalism, Clarendon, Oxford, 1986, pp. 19-20. As David Lane points out, prior to the 
war "Lenin's focus was always on Russia, whereas Trotsky's vision was of capitalism as a world system. Lenin's 
analysis of imperialism grew out of the First World War." D. Lane, Leninism: A Sociological Interpretation, Cambridge 
U.P.,CdmV>r , 1981, p. 36.
93J. Plamenatz, German Marxism and Russian Communism, Longmans, London, 1963, p. 191.
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structurally weak and disorganised. The molecular development of the party was both 
ideological and organisational. The relationship between the party and class which Lenin drew 
from this experience and theoretical development always had as its focal point the goal of 
leading the revolutionary movement in a revolutionary situation. Its success in harnessing and 
organising these forces and fulfilling the purposive role of channelling the mass movement 
towards a socialist vision was a product of the organisation's ability to draw upon and interpret 
these accumulated experiences of the past. From this experience a particular and unique 
interpretation of the dynamics of social development had evolved. Had the organisational and 
ideological development of Bolshevism been different it is conceivable, indeed probable, that 
there would not have existed a purposive organisation prepared to channel the elemental forces 
of the revolution in the direction of socialism. The revolutionary situation on the eve of the war 
was not caused by the Bolsheviks. Neither did they cause the demise of the Tsarist order in 
February 1917. However, as the next section will argue, the purposive role of the party was 
necessary in order to mobilise the mass movement towards realising its socialist potential.
4.7. FROM FEBRUARY TO OCTOBER: THE SEIZURE OF POWER
The year 1917 is the climax of the Russian component of this thesis. The World War 
heightened the tensions within Tsarist society and accelerated the collapse of the system. A 
situation of multiple sovereignty, or dual power, arose from the wreckage. The immediacy of 
multiple sovereignty was the product of the growing polarisation of the anti-autocratic 
movement since 1905. However, the two centres of authority (the Provisional Government and 
the Soviets) operated in an uneasy peaceful co-existence. As the year progressed, the 
Provisional Government proved itself unwilling or unable to deal with the fundamental social 
dilemmas which promoted the demise of Tsarism. Amidst this disillusionment with the 
government, the Soviets wavered over the question of assuming full governmental authority. 
Throughout the year (or at least since April) the Bolsheviks were the only major part}'’ which 
advocated Soviet power. The triumph of the Soviets in October was not the inevitable outcome 
of a structural crisis. There were many within the Soviets who opposed the transfer of power, 
and even within the Bolshevik Party itself there was dissent over the question of assuming 
power. Throughout the year Lenin repeatedly had to stress that 'revolutionary democracy' 
would not unfold naturally out of the objective environment. Despite growing disillusionment 
with the Provisional Government, he argued, a Soviet victory was not an inevitability. His 
previous experiences had convinced him that revolution was an art, and timing was of the 
essence. The Bolshevik role was to act as the purposive agent mobilising and channelling the 
elemental forces of the revolution. This role was fundamental if the popular classes were to reap 
the harvest of revolution, rather than suffer the consequences of counter-revolutionary 
repression. In revolutionary situations it was essential that praxis be effectively engaged at the 
correct point at the right time. In these moments agency rather than structure determined the 
immediate course of history. As Neil Harding points out, "there was no absolute certainty that a 
socialist revolution would occur, or, even if it did, that it would be successful. The maturation 
of the objective and subjective conditions for a socialist revolution was certainly necessary but 
still not sufficient for its success. To these conditions would have to be added another which
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might be summarised as the purposive organisation of the force that would accomplish the 
revolution."94 In other words, a structural environment can be favorable for socialist revolution, 
but this remains only a possibility, dependent upon the existence of purposive factors. As this 
final section will show, there were many even within the Bolshevik Party who clung onto a 
revolutionary fatalist belief that if they sat tight and allowed events to progress, power would 
inevitably gravitate towards the Soviets. During 1917 Lenin constantly was forced to pull the 
party away from this revolutionary fatalism in order to ensure that it would fulfil the missing 
purposive link of a military-political director of the revolution. For Lenin, the outcome of a 
revolutionary situation was not predetermined. If the Bolsheviks succeeded in their raison 
d'etre of becoming the vanguard force of the revolutionary movement, then the course adopted 
by the party would have a crucial bearing on its outcome. A given correlation of structural 
forces in itself could not determine the outcome. The role of active purposive intervention was 
required. Lenin's argument supports the basic contention of this thesis, namely that a structural 
analysis can account for a revolutionary situation, but it cannot account for the outcome, due to 
its neglect of purposive factors.
The patriotic sentiment of late-1914 proved short-lived. Tsarist Russia, forced to compete in 
the war on the same terms as its more industrialised allies and enemies, rapidly began to 
experience the adverse effects of 'underdevelopment', or relative economic backwardness. This 
was manifested in the breakdown of transport and distribution networks, disturbance of town- 
country trade and a break in international trade, decline in industrial output and shortages of 
fuel, metal and agricultural implements. The general malaise triggered a rise in urban militancy 
and a reluctance on the part of the peasantry to trade. Furthermore, military defeats and 
shortages at the front sapped the morale of the army. While autocratic inefficiency incurred the 
wrath of patriotic liberals and conservatives alike, the underlying reality was that the intensity, 
scale and length of the war vastly overstretched the economic and organisational capacity of a 
nation at Russia's level of socio-economic development. The war simply acted as an accelerator, 
heightening the inherent social tensions within Russia's social structure.
In late-February and early March 1917, amidst a series of strikes, demonstrations and growing 
troop disloyalty, the Tsar abdicated. A Provisional Government was formed, led by members of 
the Fourth Duma. Parallel to this process, Soviets re-emerged throughout the empire, 
representing the interests of factory workers, soldiers and sailors. The uneasy relationship 
between the two spheres of authority was temporarily overcome through the Soviets' 
agreement to provide critical support for the Provisional Government. This resolution of the 
question of 'dual power' was a reflection not only of the Soviets' initial faith that the 
government could, or would, implement the demands of the forces of the 'revolutionary 
democracy',95 but also a reflection of the assessment of the nature of the revolution by the 
leading parties which dominated the early Soviets, the Mensheviks and moderate Social-
^Harding, op. dt., Vol.2, pp. 72-3.
9SThis general term referred to the institutions doser to the Soviets and mass organisations rather than the 
Provisional Government.
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Revolutionaries. These parties perceived the Provisional Government as a temporary step 
towards the convocation of an All-Russian Constituent Assembly which would consolidate a 
democratic order representing all classes.
According to Tilly there are three proximate causes of a revolutionary situation, or multiple 
sovereignty. These are the existence of contenders advancing an alternative claim to 
governmental authority, a commitment by significant sectors of the population to the 
contender's claims, and the incapacity or unwillingness of the polity to suppress the 
contender.96 The third condition was clearly present at the beginning of the reign of the 
Provisional Government. It is contentious whether or not the first two conditions were 
originally present. At the outset it was possible for the population to support the aspirations of 
both the Soviets and the Provisional Government, because the nature of the polity had not been 
tested in practice. Marc Ferro's study of workers' telegrams, petitions and letters reveals that 
during the first month after February, the workers' aspirations were couched mainly in 
economic terms. In the general euphoria coinciding with the overthrow of the autocracy this 
can be interpreted as a sign of workers' confidence in the ability of the polity to satisfy its 
aspirations.97 Furthermore, it was only in April that the Bolsheviks became the first party to 
consistently advance the slogan "all power to the Soviets", which would be a necessary claim to 
fulfil Tilly's first condition. It was much later in the year that the Bolsheviks attained a majority 
in the most important Soviets. However, despite this, it is still possible to speak of a 
revolutionary situation, or multiple sovereignty as early as March, due to the conditional 
support which the Soviets offered the Provisional Government. The most important condition 
was Order Number 1 which stated that the "orders of the Military Commission of the State 
Duma shall be executed only in such cases as do not conflict with the orders and resolutions of 
the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies".98 As the year progressed Tilly's first two 
conditions for multiple soveriegnty began to manifest themselves more acutely. In this sense it 
is possible to speak of a 'creeping' revolutionary situation.
The Bolsheviks' initial response to the relationship between the polity and the contender was 
ambiguous. The February Revolution found the Bolshevik organisation in disarray, due to the 
effects of Tsarist repression and the exile of its leading cadres. Estimates of the numerical 
strength of the party range from 23,000 to 45,000, although, as Service acknowledges, this is 
guesswork, complicated by the maintenance of 'joint' Social Democratic organisations in many 
urban centres, despite the formal Bolshevik-Menshevik split in 1912.99
Between late-February and the party conference of late-March the party grappled with the
%C  Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution, A d d i s o n - W e s l e y ,1978, p. 200
"See M. Ferro, "The Aspirations of Russian Society", in R. Pipes (ed), Revolutionary Russia: A Symposium, Doubleday 
Anchor, N 'i , 1969.
98Quoted in J. Bunyan & H.H. Fischer (eds), The Bolshevik Revolution 1917-1918: Documents and Materials, Stanford,
SUrM ,1961.
"Service, Tne Bolshevik Party in Revolution..., p. 43.
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question of their attitude towards the new form of state authority. Prevailing views were 
altered as authoritative spokesmen and Central Committee members returned from Siberian 
exile. These exiles toned down the initial Bolshevik manifesto100 and replaced it with a more 
conciliatory position towards the Provisional Goverment and more in line with the assessment 
of the Mensheviks.101 Fyodor Raskolnikov, the Bolshevik sailor leader in Kronstadt, recalls that 
during this period "there was rather a lot of confusion in the party. There was no definite 
consistent line... Inside the party there was no unity of thought: vacillation and disunity were 
typical, everyday phenomena especially showing themselves at broad Party and fraction 
meetings."102
The returning Siberian exiles asserted their authority over the more radical, maximalist 
position of the St Petersburg rank and file. The adopted position called for consolidating the 
bourgeois-democratic revolution, and called for a less hostile stance on revolutionary 
defendsm. Thus, if the workers demands had to be presented within the framework of 
capitalist relations, it flowed logically from this premise that Bolshevik praxis should be 
informed by the minimum programme of 1905. At the Seventh Conference in late-March the 
ambiguity of the Bolsheviks' attitude towards supporting the government revealed itself. While 
all speakers agreed upon the need to deepen the revolutionary process, and upon the 
bourgeois, imperialist nature of the Provisional Government, controversy raged over the extent 
to which the Soviets could pressure the government into implementing revolutionary changes 
inimical to its class interests. Stalin's motion, proposing to "support the Provisional 
Government in its activity only in so far as it moves along the path of satisfying the working 
class and the revolutionary peasantry",103 appeased enough to secure a majority. However, the 
'only in so far as' dause evaded the question of the practical Bolshevik response given the 
hypothetical non-compliance on the part of the government with Soviet wishes.
These were the prevailing conditions which Lenin encountered upon his return to Petrograd 
in early-April. He immediately attacked the 'moderates' conciliatory line towards the 
government and adopted the slogan, "all power to the Soviets". Kamenev, speaking for the 
majority of the Central Committee, accused Lenin of misreading Russian reality. "As regards 
Comrade Lenin's general line, it appears to us unacceptable inasmuch as it proceeds from the 
assumption that the bourgeois-democratic revolution has been completed and it builds on the 
immediate transformation of the revolution into a sodalist revolution."104 Kamenev's process 
of deductive logic would have been in line with Lenin's assessment of the 1905 revolution.
100The manifesto was published in Izvestia and is summarised in Carr, op. dt.( pp. 83-5. The more concilia dory 
position is summarised in pp. 85-8.
101Indeed, Leibman has labelled the Bolsheviks a 'Menshevik tending party' during this period. See Leibman, 
Leninism..., pp. 117-24.
102F. Raskolnikov, Kronstadt and Petrograd in 1917, New Park, London, 1982, pp. 22-3.
103See Carr, op. d t ,  p. 87. A transcript of the conference appears in L. Trotsky, The Stalinist School of Falsification, New  
Park, London, pp. 181-237.
104Quoted in M. McCauley (ed), The Russian Revolution and the Soviet State: 1917-1923, Macmillan, London, 1975, p. 55.
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However, as pointed out above, during the war Lenin had shifted his theoretical position on the 
dynamics of Russian development, through incorporating the concept of imperialism. Russia, 
as the weakest link in the chain of imperialist states, had been given an unique opportunity to 
end the war and ignite the torch of international class warfare. Rather than arguing that Russia 
was unripe for socialist revolution, he argued that capitalism on a world scale had entered a 
period of degeneracy, rendering conditions ripe for world revolution. The imperialist nature of 
the Provisional Government would inhibit its ability to solve the fundamental structural 
problems which provoked the demise of Tsarism.
Given this analytical shift, Lenin argued that the old minimum programme of 1905, which the 
conference majority clung to, was obsolete. In his April Thesis he called for an immediate Party 
congress which would change the party programme, chiefly "on imperialism, the state and 
amend the outdated minimum programme."105
Lenin recognised that his slogan did not correspond to the immediate aspirations of the 
majority of the Russian masses. However, his socio-economic analysis predicted their growing 
dissatisfaction with a government tied to the Entente and the logic of imperialism. Given this, it 
remained the task of the party to explain the conjunctural changes to the mass movement and 
become open enough to mobilise and channel the growing militancy which would inevitably 
arise. The experiences of 1905 and the first half of 1914 had sharpened his awareness that 
without a purposive organisation to channel mass dissatisfaction an objectively revolutionary 
situation could be lost and lead to reaction.
In the turmoil of the revolutionary environment it was the emphasis upon 'the tasks of the 
day7, the immediate political demands of deepening the revolution, which brought the question 
of socialist power to the surface of the political agenda, rather than a search for socialism on the 
basis of a dogmatic unilinear conception of social development.
Lenin's April Theses were simultaneously an analysis of the conjunctural socio-political 
reality and an outline of a new minimum programme. It differed from the old minimum 
programme through telescoping the bourgeois and socialist stages. The immediate objective 
was Soviet power and the movement towards socialism. The first four theses outlined the 
attitude that the party should assume towards the most important political issues facing the 
nation; namely, the war, the revolution, the Provisional Government and the Soviets. He 
argued that no concession could be made to 'revolutionary defencism' as long as the war 
remained imperialist in character. Furthermore, the party should relentlessly expose the 
imperialist character of the Provisional Government and deny it support. The current tasks of 
the party derived from his assessment that the "peculiarity of the present moment in Russia 
consists in the transition from the first stage of the revolution, which gave power to the 
bourgeoisie on account of the inadequate organization of the proletariat, to the second stage, which
105’Quoted in Trotsky, op. dt., p. 234-5.
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must give power to the proletariat and the poorest layers of the peasantry.1'106 The task of 
organising the revolutionary forces had been facilitated by Russia's transformation into the 
freest of all belligerent nations. Consequently, unlike the Tsarist environment, the party could 
patiently work within the Soviets and mass organisations to explain to the workers "the 
necessity of transferring the entire power of the state to the Soviets of Workers' Deputies.107 
The main obstacle in realising this task was the "naive confidence of the masses in the 
government of capitalists", and the control of the Soviets by "a bloc o f all the petty-bourgeois 
opportunist elements."108
It would be retrogressive, Lenin continued, to call for a parliamentary republic when power 
lay at the feet of the Soviets. Furthermore, evoking the measures implemented by the 
Communards, he called for the abolition of the police, army and bureaucracy. All officials were 
to be "elected and subject to recall at any time" with fixed salaries not exceeding "the average 
wage of a competent worker."109 Soviets of Agricultural Labourers deputies would oversee an 
agrarian programme which would confiscate all landed estates, nationalise farms and control 
model farms established on large capitalist estates. The theses relating to economic measures 
called for the amalgamation of all banks into a single trust under Soviet control. Production and 
distribution of goods were also to be brought under the control of the Soviets.110
Though Lenin argued that "our immediate task shall not be the 'introduction of socialism', he 
was less clear on the nature of the regime which would introduce these measures. Lenin had 
nothing to say on the relations between capital, labour and the state. This is surprising given the 
attention Lenin devoted to the question of the state during 1917 and his wartime 
correspondence with Bukharin.111 Despite this, the adoption of the April Theses was regarded 
by the moderate socialists as a call for the immediate leap into the realm of socialism, and the 
Bolsheviks became generally accepted as a maximalist party, clearly to the left of the 
'moderates'.
Lenin's maximalism also encountered opposition within his own party. It was only towards 
the end of April that he succeeded in convincing a majority of the party that the old, pre-war 
economic analysis was obsolete, and that their previous understanding of the dynamics of 
Russian development was flawed.112 Lenin's victory was only partly determined by his 
personal authority. He was also assisted by the growing disillusionment of the masses with the 
Provisional Government, and the influx of new party members who were not encumbered with
106Quoted in Trotsky, op. dt., p. 230. (The second emphasis is my own)
107Lenin, (24; 21-6). Subsequent quotations of the April Thesis are from this edition.
108Ibid., pp. 52-3.
109Ibid., pp. 53-4. 
n0Ibid., p. 54.
m See M. Sawyer, "The Genesis of 'State and Revolution'", The Socialist Register 1977, pp. 209-227. 
m Lenin repeatedly labelled this 'old Bolshevism'.
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the old theoretical baggage of pre-war Bolshevism. Throughout the summer and autumn 
Lenin's main obstacle within the party remained the older cadres in the upper echelons of 
authority. He was repeatedly forced to call upon the rank and file in order to carry through his 
demands.
The popularity of the Bolshevik programme and Lenin's assessment can be discerned through 
the growth of the Bolshevik party membership during the ensuing months. As the problems of 
the economy, war and land became increasingly acute during the autumn, the Bolshevik 
programme began attracting ever increasing numbers of workers, peasants and soldiers. Any 
attempt to measure the growth of the party during the year defies mathematical exactitude. 
However, Rigby estimates that from 23,000 in February party membership grew to 46,000 by 
the April conference. By the Sixth Congress Fainsod estimates 177,000, while by October 
Sverdlov claimed 400,000. The social composition of the party consisted of approximately 60% 
workers, 32% salaried staff and 8% peasants in February 1917. One year later the only 
significant difference was an increase in peasant recruitment to 15%. This can be attributed to 
the return by soldiers to their villages. 113Growth also appears to have be constant, if not 
exponential. Even the events of the 'July Days', when Bolshevik fortunes reached their lowest 
ebb, do not appear to have dramatically reduced recruitment rates.114 The 'opening' of the 
party also meant that enrolment "as a Party member was greatly simplified at this time. It was 
enough to give the secretary one or two acceptable recommendations and anyone who wanted 
would be given a party card without delay."115
The growth and success of the party during 1917 had little to do with the popular mythology 
of a closed, conspiratorial sect. As Service's study of Bolshevik organisation reveals, the most 
notable factor in the events leading to the October Revolution was how the party, swollen with 
new, untried recruits, stretching the party organisation almost beyond straining point, was ever 
able to harness its forces for a co-ordinated insurrection.116 The conclusion which must be 
drawn is that it was the Bolsheviks' ability to reflect the demands of the masses and secure 
sufficient support among the mass organisations which lay at the heart of their success. Success 
equalled Bolshevik organisation, ideology and programme fused with the mass 
organisations.117
Marcel Leibman has argued that the opening of the party represented an organisational
n3The above figures are drawn from T.H. Rigby, CPSU Membership History, pp. 59-66; Service, op. cat., pp.43-7; 
Fainsod, op. dt, p. 68; and Bunyan and Fischer (eds), op. dt., p. 19.
n4See Service, op. dt., p. 43.
115Raskolnikov, op. d t , pp. 66-7.
116Ibid„ pp. 37-62.
n7As David Mandel argues: "The growth of support in the working dass for the Bolsheviks was...not the result of the 
party's successful tapping of the workers' irrational impulses but the expression of the growing correspondence 
between the latter's aspirations and the party's programme and strategy." D. Mandel, The Petrograd Workers and the Fall 
of the Old Regime: From the February Revolution to the July Days, 1917, Macmillan,U>r^ cx\ 1983, p. 3.
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metamorphosis, or a 'de-bolshevisation' of the party.1 13 However, if this metamorphosis is 
related to the past molecular ideological and organisational development of Bolshevism it is 
clear that Lenin was acting on the accumulated experience of the party's past. In 1905 he had 
argued for the same opening of the ranks of the party. It was the changing social environment 
which necessitated this flexible change rather than any sudden overall change in Bolshevik 
organisational theory. In July 1917 he warned the party that failure to understand the changing 
environment and change tactics accordingly would consign the party to oblivion. "It happens 
all too frequently that when history makes an abrupt turn, even the most advanced parties are 
unable for a longer of shorter period of time to adapt themselves to new conditions. They keep 
on repeating the same old slogans of yesterday - slogans which were correct yesterday, but 
which have lost all their meaning today, becoming devoid of meaning 'suddenly7, with the 
same 'suddenness' that history makes its abrupt turn."119 In a comment he made after the 
revolution Lenin spelt out the philosophy of revolutionary which he applied during 1917. It 
represented a total rejection of the deterministic revolutionary fatalism which characterised the 
moderate socialists and the 'right7 Bolsheviks, and stressed active, purposive intervention on 
the basis of a correct reading of a conjunctural moment.
You must be able at each particular moment to find the particular link in the chain which you 
must grasp with all your might in order to hold the whole chain and to prepare firmly for the 
transition to the next link: the order of the links, their form, the manner in which they are linked 
together, the way they differ from each other in the historical chain of events, are not as simple 
and not as meaningless as those in an ordinary chain made by a smith.120
In this manner the Bolsheviks succeeded better than any other party in responding to the
immediate situations, and were able to keep pace with the elemental forces of the revolutionary
situation.
Support for Bolshevik resolutions among the mass organisations reflected the growing 
popularity of their the party and the growing association between party and the popular 
classes. It was already in a majority among the more rank and file Petrograd Conference of 
Factory Committes in June 12-16,121 while on June 13 the Workers Section of the Petrograd 
Soviet passed a Bolshevik resolution endorsing the slogan "All Power To The Soviets". In June, 
at the First All-Russian Congress of Soviets the party mustered only 105 of the 777 delegates.122 
However, by 31 August the Bolsheviks had gained a majority in the Petrograd Soviet and on 5 
September repeated this in Moscow.
After the Bolsheviks had weathered the onslaught of the Provisional Government during the 
July Days, August witnessed the spectre of reaction in the form of the Kornilov coup. Bolshevik 
prestige as defenders of the democratic revolution rose during the coup, due to the spirited and
n8pp- 148-57
n9Quoted in Trotsky, Lessons of October, New Park, London, 1973, p. 5. 
120Lenin, (27; 274).
121Sirianni, op. d t ,  p. 55.
122Fainsod, op. dt., pp. 67-8.
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active mobilisation for the defense of Petrograd by party cadres. The event helped to highlight 
the impotence of the Provisional Government and added weight to Lenin's theses.123 Russia's 
continued involvement in the imperialist war and the failure of the summer offensive had 
further exhausted and demoralised the army. Furthermore, in the towns inflation and the 
deterioration of production and distribution led to severe shortages and exacerbated relations 
between employers and workers. The peasantry also demonstrated its lack of faith in the 
government through spontaneous rebellion and unauthorised land-seizures. 124 The 
posponement of elections to the Constituent Assembly added fuel to national disaffection. 
Furthermore, in the wake of the Kornilov coup rumours abounded in Petrograd that the 
Provisional Government was considering abandoning the capital to the Germans, in an attempt 
to emasculate the focal point of the insurrectionary feeling.125
All this manifested itself in growing Bolshevik majorities in the mass organisations at the 
expense of the moderate socialists and for the call for power to be transferred to the Soviets. It 
also confirmed Lenin and the Bolsheviks' argument that the Provisional Government was 
unable to combat the 'impending catastrophe', avert counter-revolution and fulfill the 
democratic demands of the workers and peasants. These events leading up to the Second 
All-Russian Congress of Soviets in late-October convinced Lenin that the time was ripe to 
'grasp the next link in the chain' with or without the support of the Mensheviks and Social 
Revolutionaries; the assumption to power by the Soviets.126
By late-August and early September the revolutionary situation (as defined above by Tilly) 
was reaching its climax. The most prestigeous Soviets in the land were now under Bolshevik 
control and clearly presenting themselves as an alternative contender for sole governmental 
authority, through the slogan "all power to the Soviets". While earlier in the year the popular 
classes could still give their allegiance to both the Soviets and the Provisional Government, the 
events of the intervening months clarified their conflicting interests and aspirations. The 
peaceful coexistence within multiple sovereignty was inherently unstable as long as the 
Provisional Government was unable to satisfy the popular aspirations for land, an end to the 
war, and the convocation of the Constituent Assembly. As the prestige of the Provisional 
Government declined, that of the Soviets rose. Furthermore, even if it had wanted to, the polity 
was unable to suppress the challenge of the Soviets, as the army rank and file began to look 
upon the Soviets as its only salvation for peace. Recognising the acuteness of the revolutionary 
situation, Lenin now argued that the seizure of power by the Soviets was the only way to
123Lenin wrote in late-September: "Experience teaches us that the Bolshevik programme and tactics are correct. So 
little time passed, so much happened from April 20 to the Kornilov revolt." Lenin, (26; 60).
124See J. Keep, The Russian Revolution: A Study in Mass Mobilization, Norton, ^ t ,  1976. Parts 11 and 111 provide an 
account of events in the town and country between March and September.
125See Lenin, (26; 61). See also D. Geyer, "The Bolshevik Insurrection in Petrograd", in R. Pipes (ed), op. cat., pp. 221-2.
126As Mandel notes: "Before July, it had been a question of peacefully exerting pressure on the moderate leaders of 
the Soviet. After July, it could only be a question of armed struggle, and this required planning, organization and 
leadership to have any change of success." D. Mandel, op. dt., p. 180.
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promote the "peaceful development of the revolution."127 Against the procrastination within 
leading party circles, he began arguing for the immediate seizure of power. If the revolution did 
not move forward, he exhorted, it would be crushed by the combined force of bourgeoisie, 
reaction and the imperialist states. "Perish or full-steam ahead. That is the alternative put by 
history."128 Given the precarious balance of social forces and the impending economic 
catastrophe Russia could not remain socially static. It would be treacherous of the Bolsheviks, 
armed with their analysis of the real situation and movement of events, declaring for all power 
to be transferred to the soviets, and assuming a majority in these democratic and hegemonic 
organs, not to forge ahead when power lay prostrate at their feet. "History will not forgive us if 
we do not assume power now."129 "It is impossible to stand still in history in general, and in 
war-time in particular. We must either advance or retreat. It is impossible in twentieth century 
Russia, which has won a republic and a democracy in a revolutionary way to go forward 
without advancing towards socialism, without taking steps towards it."130 At this moment, 
Lenin urged the party to grasp the insurrectionary link in the chain of events. Under the 
conditions of an acute and heightening revolutionary situation it was imperative that the party 
perform the purposive role of a politico-military centre, directing and channelling the forces of 
revolutionary democracy. During September and October Lenin was engaged in a constant 
struggle to pull the party off the reefs of revolutionary fatalism in order to ensure that the 
elemental forces of the revolution were not engulfed under the threatening wave of counter­
revolution. Once more, Lenin was stressing the importance of purposive action in determining 
the outcome of a revolutionary situation.131 It was in his article "Tasks of the Revolution", 
written in late-September, that Lenin gave a clear outline of the Bolshevik programme for 
post-revolutionary society which would serve as a guideline for the early decrees of the soviet 
state.132 The article provided the clearest indication of Bolshevik aspirations and their argument 
that the minimum programme and the advance towards socialism had coincided. 
Implementation was only possible through revolutionary insurrection.
Lenin began by noting the predominantly petty-bourgeois character of Russian society and 
argued that the vacillations of this class were inevitable. However, the horrors of war, poverty 
and hunger could only be overcome through following the "proletarian path". The stark choice 
between the "peaceful development of the revolution" and counter-revolution made it 
imperative that calls for conciliation and agreement with the bourgeoisie be abandoned. For this 
reason Lenin called for a boycott of the Pre-Parliament sponsored by the moderate socialists in
127Lenin, (26;67). 
U8Lenin, (25; 368).
129Lenin, (26; 21).
130Lenin, (25; 362).
131The lesson which Trotsky later drew from this episode was that a party "which pays superficial attention to the 
questions of civil war in the hope that everything will somehow settle itself at the crucial moment, is certain to be 
shipwrecked." Trotsky, op. dt., p. 61.
132Lenin, (26; 59-68). The following quotations are from this edition.
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order to discuss the future Constituent Assembly. All power had to be passed exclusively to the 
Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies "on the basis of a definite programme and 
under the condition of the government being fully responsible to the Soviets."
The programmatic component of the article combined immediate tasks with economic 
measures which would reflect the nature of the post-revolutionary process. As in the April 
Theses Lenin never described the measures to be adopted as socialist, but merely as the 
"peaceful development of the revolution".13,3 The Soviet Government would call for a general 
peace and armistice to all the belligerent peoples. This democratic peace included renunciation 
of annexations, repudiation of secret treaties and the full freedom of cessation for all nations.
The agrarian programme was encapsulated in the call for "Land to those who till it", and was 
influenced directly by the summary of the 242 mandates published in the SR-dominated Soviets 
of Peasants' Deputies' newspaper. It called for the abolition of landed private estates without 
compensation and their transference to peasant committees "pending the solution of the 
problem by the Constituent Assembly". Landowners' stock and equipment were to be placed at 
the disposal of the poor peasantry free of charge.
Regarding production and distribution, Lenin reiterated his call for the introduction of 
workers' control on a nationwide basis.134 Banks, insurance companies, and "the most 
important branches of industry (oil, coal, metallurgy, sugar etc.") would be nationalised. 
Workers' control was considered necessary in order to abolish commercial secrecy, which Lenin 
felt was exacerbating shortages and promoting profiteering. It is evident that he viewed much 
of the economic malaise from the problem of inadequate and democratic regulation of 
distribution, rather than democratically controlling production. "There is plenty of bread, coal, 
oil and iron in Russia; for these products to be properly distributed it is only necessary for us to 
rid ourselves of the landowners and capitalists who are robbing the people." Resistance from 
'delinquent' capitalists could be overcome through "supervision over the exploiters by workers 
and peasants, and such measures of punishing recalcitrants as confiscation of their entire 
property coupled with a short term of arrest..."
While the programme envisaged the "immediate placing of social production and distribution 
of goods under the control of the Soviets", full socialisation was not proclaimed, nor was the 
state to fulfil an all-encompassing role in the economy. In the agrarian sector, the numerical 
preponderence of petty-commodity production was firmly assured, while in the industrial 
sector workers' control in the form of supervision of production left the relationship between 
capital and labour open to wide interpretation, epecially in areas outside the designated 
parameters of nationalisation. Only in the area of distribution and finance did the state appear 
as a monopoliser and unchallengeable regulator.
133The word 'soaalism' does not appear once in the article.
134Workers' control was defined as "unrelaxing supervision by the workers and peasants over the capitalists."
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In the political arena, 'all power to the Soviets' did not appear to translate itself into the 
monopoly of Bolshevik power in Lenin's programme. The Soviets, he argued would ensure the 
"peaceful election of deputies by the people" and the testing of the various party programmes in 
conjunction with power passing "peacefully from one party to another."
It was on the basis of this vision that the Bolsheviks, on the eve of the Second All-Russian 
Congress of Soviets, assumed power in the name of the incoming Congress. The Bolsheviks had 
successfully persuaded the Soviets that their assumption to power was the only option blocking 
reaction. On October 11, the Petrograd Soviet elected a Military-Revolutionary Centre, which 
would act as the operational centre for co-ordinating the insurrection. It was through this body 
that the Bolshevik programme and Soviet power was declared on October 25.
While it is true that the Provisional Government was unable to put up any effective resistance 
to the insurrection due to its virtual disintegration, this is insufficient to account for the 'power 
vacuum' which the Soviets filled. It is also necessary to explain the direction which the Soviets 
took. This chapter has provided evidence for James Petras' claim that the October Revolution 
was "decisively dependent" upon the existence of the Bolshevik Party as a purposive contender 
for power, and as an organiser and channeller of the elemental forces of the revolution. In order 
to determine why the Bolsheviks assumed power through the Soviets and led the revolutionary 
situation to a socialist outcome this chapter has stressed the purposive factor of Bolshevik 
ideology and organisation. As Lenin stressed, the victory of the revolutionary insurrection 
depended upon "art and triple audacity", a reference to Danton, who Marx had called "the 
greatest master of revolutionary policy yet known".130 The revolution could not be 
predetermined through the unfettered evolution of structural relations. While structural 
conditions laid the framework for existing potentialities within the revolutionary situation, the 
actual outcome requires an understanding of purposive choices, decisions and non-decisions.
4.8. CONCLUSION
In Chapter 1 the argument was advanced that structural and purposive theories of revolutions 
are not necessarily mutually exclusive. It was argued that the approaches of Skocpol and Tilly 
were not necessarily in contradiction, but were distinguished more by the different problems 
which informed their analyses. While Skocpol was primarily concerned with the demise of old 
regimes, Tilly was concentrating upon the question of the mobilisation of contenders to the 
existing polity. Chapters 2 and 4 of this thesis have attempted to shed light on the apparent 
contradiction between structural and purposive approaches through a historical analysis of the 
Russian Revolution. Combined, these two chapters demonstrate that the October Socialist 
Revolution cannot be adequately understood without taking into consideration the intertwining 
of both structural and purposive factors. The peculiarities of Tsarist structural development 
explain the form which social contradictions assumed during the revolutionary situation. 
However, in this chapter it has been argued that the Bolsheviks' success in introducing Soviet
135’Lenin, (26; 181).
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power, and in structurally transforming the class nature of state power, was not a mechanical 
reflection of the development of structural contradictions. In order to understand the success of 
the Bolsheviks it is necessary to appreciate its molecular process of ideological and 
organisational development. It is this that accounts for the successful passage in the 
revolutionary situation from mobilisation to socialist revolution.
Analytically then, in order to understand the success of a particular contender in a 
revolutionary situation, a structural analysis must be combined with a purposive analysis. This 
represents what C. Wright Mills labelled the intertwining of historical 'drift' with 'thrust'. In 
Chapter 2, the analysis of the revolution concentrated upon 'drift' ("the consequences of 
innumerable decisions coalesc[ing] and collid[ing] to form the blind and overwhelming events 
of historical fate")136. Yet, while acknowledging the 'inherency' within this social process which 
led to the revolutionary situation, this chapter has argued that the outcome of the revolutionary 
situation cannot be understood as 'fate', or historical inevitability. If we remain upon the level 
of a structural analysis, the revolution resembles a Greek tradegy, with actors playing out their 
predetermined role. It is necessary to complement a structural analysis with a position which 
appreciates the role of human agency, and the decisions or non-decisions made by particular 
groups in strategic positions capable of making history. The ability of a party to take advantage 
of a situation is determined not only by its relationship to various classes and groups, but also 
by its organisational effectiveness and adaptability. Its willingness to perform a historical role is 
influenced by its ideology and its reading of a situation. As the analysis in this chapter reveals, 
Leninism was characterised not only by a particular interpretation of the structure and 
dynamics of Russia and world capitalism. It was also characterised by a profoundly anti- 
fatalistic conception of the dynamics of insurrection. It was for this reason that Antonio Gramsd. 
lauded the Bolshevik insurrection as a 'revolution against Das Capital'.137 Lenin's success in 
bringing the party round to his position decisively influenced the Bolsheviks' insurrectionary 
decision.
This thesis is not primarily concerned with the future consequences of the adoption of this 
decision, but rather the role of structure and agency in generating a revolutionary socialist 
outcome. Within this universe of discourse it is sufficient to register the fact that the decision 
was made and the revolution was carried out. If the Bolsheviks had adopted the non­
insurrectionary option, it remains a matter of speculation (a 'mental experiment') what would 
have occurred in Russia. On the right wing of Menshevism, Potresov continued to argue that 
the bourgeoisie would have ultimately fulfilled its historical role. Accordingly, he considered 
the Bolshevik insurrection an irresponsible, purposive adventure, an aberration of history 
which had deflected Russia off from its destined path of development.138 On the left, Martov 
acknowledged that they were dealing with a 'victorious uprising of the proletariat', but stressed
136C. Wright Mills, op. dt., p. 52.
137A. Gramsd, "The Revolution Against ‘Das Capital'", in Selections From Political Writings: 1910-1920, International, 
to0Ac.n,1977, pp. 34-7.
138See J. Burbank, Intelligentsia and Revolution: Russian Views on Bolshevism, O x f o r d , 1986, pp. 38-43.
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the structural argument that "to impose socialism on an economically and culturally backward 
country is a senseless Utopia."139 The Bolshevik Bukharin, on the other hand argued that 
structural factors were a cause for the ease with which the proletariat assumed power in 
'backward' Russia, although he acknowledged that these structural conditions were 
"dialectically transformed" into the "supreme difficulties" of organising a post-revolutionary 
socialist economy.140 The concept of structure has been subsequently used in most analyses to 
justify or condemn the October Revolution as either an 'inevitability' or a 'tragedy'. On the 
other hand Lenin, at the end of his political life, preferred to approach the revolution from a 
perspective which combined a concrete analysis of Russia's structural peculiarities with the real 
options which were open during the revolutionary situation, or, to adopt the terms of this 
thesis, a perspective which acknowledged the role of both structure and agency in determining 
outcome. Criticising the Menshevik Sukhanov for repeating "the infinitely stereotyped 
argument learned by rote" that the "objective economic premises for socialism do not exist in 
our country", he went on the argue:
It does not occur to any of them to ask: but what about a people that found itself in a 
revolutionary situation such as that created during the first imperialist war? Might it not, 
influenced by the hopelessness of its situation, fling itself into a struggle that would offer it at 
least some choice of securing conditions for the further development of civilization that were 
somewhat unusual.141
The history of socialist revolutions since October 1917 suggests that this 'somewhat unusual' 
development is in actual fact more a rule than an exception. Since then, all socialist revolutions 
have occurred on the periphery or the semi-periphery of the world capitalist system. The next 
chapter will supplement the structural analysis of Nicaraguan capitalist development outlined 
in Chapter 3 with an analysis of the Sandinista movement which led the Nicaraguan Revolution 
in July 1979. Out of this analysis some general conclusions will be drawn concerning the role of 
structure and agency in modem socialist revolutions.
139Quoted in Getzler, op. d t ,  p. 171-2.
140N. Bukharin, The Politics and Economics of the Transition Period, R.K.P., London, 1979, p. 170. 
u lLenin 33: 477-8
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Chapter 5
PURPOSIVE PRECONDITIONS FOR 
THE SANDINISTA REVOLUTION
5.1. INTRO DUCTIO N
In Chapter 3 a long-range historical analysis was used in order to argue that the crisis of the 
Somoza dictatorship was a consequence of structural contradictions inherent within the form of 
Nicaraguan capitalist development. This chapter argues that these structural factors in 
themselves are insufficient to account for the successes and failures of the various contenders 
competing against the dictatorship. While the structural environment circumscribed the range 
of possibilities, there were a number of competing power blocs with conflicting visions and 
interests. The outcome of this conflict was determined by purposive intervention by the 
Sandinistas1 on the political and military level. The dictatorship had encountered opposition 
before, yet this purposive variable was absent or unable to effectively influence political crises. 
Structural analyses of the causes of the Sandinista Revolution have pointed to the position of 
constituent groups in prevailing class and state structures and demonstrated the need for a 
broad-based coalition of classes in order for success to occur. However, this necessity does not 
guarantee its actualisation.2
Despite a rich history of rebellion the Nicaraguan popular classes were traditionally one of the 
least organised in Latin America. The distinguishing characteristic of the Sandinistas was not 
their attempt to organise and mobilise a multi-class popular coalition. Other parties, such as the 
orthodox Marxist Partido Socialista de Nicaragua (P.S.N.), were also engaged in this project. The 
originality of Sandinismo within Nicaragua's political culture was its dedication to overcoming 
the fatalism which pervaded popular consciousness and the left-wing of the political spectrum. 
The organisational and ideological development of Sandinismo was moulded by this 
environment, while at the same time its praxis was aimed at transcending it. Direct action and 
armed opposition were the purposive tools which they used to puncture the inflated image of 
somocista omnipotence and to encourage mass organisation. On the ideological front, the 
Sandinistas challenged the fatalistic stage conception of economic development which 
dominated the Latin American left, and adopted a philosophy of action inspired by Che
1Throughout this chapter the terms Sandinista, F.S.L.N., El Frente, or the Front, will be used interchangeably.
•tf . K. Roberts & M.I. Midlarsky, "Inequality, the State and Revolution in Central America", in M.I. Midlarsky (ed), 
Inequality and Contemporary Revolutions, Vol 22, Book 2, Monograph Series in World Affairs, University of Denver, 
Denver.
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Guevara. As a consequence, the Sandinistas opposed the subordination of an organised popular 
movement to the bourgeois opposition and argued that social liberation could only be 
guaranteed through an armed insurrection led by the popular classes. Ideologically Sandinismo 
was characterised by an anti-fatalistic Marxism, while organisationally they operated as a 
vanguard party aiming to mobilise the popular classes independently of the traditional 
bourgeois opposition.
Sandinismo emerged out of the structural contradictions of Nicaraguan society during the 
late-1950's as a critique of the perennial failures of the traditional moderate opposition. 
Through this critique the Sandinistas developed an organisational and ideological praxis which 
aimed at overcoming the problems of oppositional activity. An entire generation of elitist 
putsches and peaceful demonstrations had only served to consolidate the dictatorship through 
encouraging co-optation and compromise between the opposition and the Somoza dynasty. 
This in turn had engendered a fatalistic sentiment of the futility of revolt. The Sandinistas 
operated on the assumption that it was not revolt in itself which was futile, but the form of 
revolt practiced by the opposition.
As Harry Vanden observes, prior to the development of Sandinismo "Nicaragua was a little 
like Gabriel Garcia Marquez's tragic town of Macondo. It was a place where people could not 
comprehend their present reality because they had lost their sense of history."3 The self- 
conscious role which the Sandinistas assumed within the nation's political culture was to 
reinterpret and reappropriate past struggles in order to provide an awareness of the present, 
and to instil within the popular classes a consciousness of their potential capacity to seize 
power. The Sandinistas never believed that spectacular armed confrontations organised solely 
by a small band of guerrillas could cause the immediate destruction of the dictatorship. While 
the orthodox Marxist P.S.N. rejected Sandinista actions as a form of petty-bourgeois 
adventurism divorced from the real and prolonged struggle between capital and labour, the 
Sandinistas undertook guerrilla action for a different reason, rooted in their understanding of 
the problems which a generation of unsuccessful opposition had created for-collective action 
and politial mobilisation. Armed actions functioned as a demystification of the invincibility of 
Somoza. This myth was powerful not only because Somoza cultivated it, but more importantly 
because decades of defeat had internalised it within the popular consciousness and made it 
self-reproducing. Like the unnamed Caribbean country in another of Garcia Marquez's novels, 
Autumn of the Partiarch, the myth of the dictator merged with reality to produce the picture of a 
gargantuan monster which few dared to confront. In the popular imagination, three successive 
Somozas merged into one dynasty and made 'the man' appear eternal. In a land where the 
average life span was 50 years few by the mid-1970's could recall a Nicaragua without a 
Somoza.
Against this prevailing myth, the Sandinistas constructed the counterveiling myth of Sandino,
3H. Vanden, "The Ideology of the Insurrection", in T.W. Walker (ed), Nicaragua in Revolution, Praeger, N T  , 1982, p. 
41.
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the legendary guerrilla hero of the Segovias, who evicted the U.S. Marines from Nicaraguan 
territory, and was eventually assasinated by el ultimo Marine, Somoza. Sandino became the 
Sandinistas' mobilising myth for popular organisation, national liberation and anti-imperialism.
The construction of this social base was accompanied by a praxis designed to open the 
insurrectionary road through Nicaragua's political landscape. Inspired by Che Guevara, and 
rejecting the mechanistic, economistic determinism of orthodox Latin American Communist 
parties (of which the P.S.N. was a classic representative), the Sandinistas argued that it was not 
necessary to wait until all the objective conditions for revolution matured. The active, purposive 
intervention of a revolutionary vanguard could contribute to the development of these 
conditions through modifying the stakes involved in political activity.
This chapter will demonstrate that the events culminating in the July Revolution of 1979 
cannot be understood without taking into consideration this molecular process of ideological 
and organisational development of the F.S.L.N. The Sandinistas were able to overcome their 
initial weakness during the opening phase of multiple sovereignty in 1978 due to their 
preceding activity among the popular classes and their military experience against the 
dictatorship. These experiences provided the Frente with the insight which informed their 
praxis during the revolutionary situation of 1978-9. This enabled them to take the lead in the 
broad anti-regime coalition and ensure that it propelled itself forward towards a profound 
social revolution. Thus, in order to understand why the Sandinistas emerged as the foremost 
challenger to the dictatorship this chapter will begin by examining the genesis and 
development of Sandinismo. The conclusion which will be drawn is that even through the 
Sandinistas did not make the revolutionary situation, their praxis, developed and tuned through 
almost two decades of direct action and struggle, ultimately moulded the form which the 
revolution assumed.
5.2. THE NICARAGUAN WORKERS' MOVEMENT BEFORE THE F.S.L.N.
The origins of the F.S.L.N. can be traced to a conjuncture of events and circumstances related 
to local and regional political economy of the late-1950's. Flowever, in order to understand 
adequately the political space the F.S.L.N. were able to occupy it is necessary to recognise that 
Sandinismo emerged as a reaction to the entire prevailing range of oppositional strategies and 
philosophies. Sandinismo self-consciously perceived itself to be a transcendence of the 
traditional opposition and its philosophy was moulded by its rejection of this political culture. 
The entire history of the F.S.L.N. up to the revolution of 1979 was an engagement with this 
culture over the means of ousting the dictatorship. This section provides a brief history of this 
culture and the origins of the politics of the Nicaraguan popular classes. Sandinismo eventually 
emerged out of a reassessment of the praxis of the left-wing of this movement.
As noted in Chapter 3, the two traditional political parties, the Conservatives and the Liberals, 
were historically unable to institutionalise mechanisms for the peaceful and orderly 
transference of governmental authority prior to the rise of the Somoza dictatorship. This feature
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of the nation's political culture was conditioned by a variety of factors, including the dispersal 
of the population, the conflicting socio-economic interests of the two colonial cities (Granada 
and Leon), the retention of the tradition of caudillismo, and the ease with which contending 
parties could recruit external assistance.4 Furthermore, although elections were held 
periodically prior to the rise of the dictatorship, limited representation and electoral fraud 
convinced political contenders that violence and force of arms were the most effective, if not the 
only, method of replacing governments.0
As political philosophies, the terms 'Liberal' and 'Conservative' had lost much of their 
traditional meaning even before Somoza arrived on the scene. During the Constitutional War 
of 1925-7, both Somoza and Sandino emerged as self-styled Liberal generals. As early as 1925 
factions of the two parties had created a joint government. The Espino Negro Treaty of 1927 
was a tadt recognition between the elites that the avoidance of manifest conflict between the 
two parties required prior agreement on the composition of the government. It also helped that 
this avoidance of manifest conflict corresponded with the interests of the United States' 
'manifest destiny7. Remaining independent political entities, the core of both parties 
nevertheless became perceived by the population as 'parallel' structures, pursuing the factional 
interests of elites. Towards the end of his life, Sandino, struggling against this parallelism 
which, he argued, had sold the country to American interests, conceived of the idea of an 
autonomista party to break the political monopoly of the Conservatives and Liberals.6 However, 
after his murder and the elimination of his followers, the possibility of this third political force 
disappeared. Somoza's rise to power brought new questions to the political forum.
Somoza Garda elevated the parallelism of the Liberals and the Conservatives to 
unprecedented heights. He transformed the core of the Liberal Party into his own personal 
instrument, and divided the Conservative opposition through offering them the crumbs of 
political partidpation, allocating them a minority share of seats in Congress. This cynical co­
optation of sections of the Conservative opposition provided the dictatorship with a democratic 
veneer, and, as noted in Chapter 3, the necessary degree of political stability needed for post­
war dictatorial capitalist development. Somoza's sodal control was based on the rule of the 
"three political p's", money (plata) for friends, sticks (palos) for the hesitant and bullets (plomos) 
for his enemies. The model agreement for parallelism was the 'pact of generals' signed in 1950 
between Somoza and the Conservative general Emiliano Chamorro.
Sections of the traditional parties which opposed the dictatorial structure contemptuously 
branded the co-opted sectors zancudos, or mosquitos, and formed independent movements in 
order to immunise themselves from zancudismo. The Partido Liberal Independiente (P.L.I.), formed 
in 1944 amidst growing regional unrest against the dictators, emerged as the strongest
S e e  Booth, The End and the Beginning: The Nicaraguan Revolution, Westview, Boulder, 1982, pp. 25-6.
°For data on pre-Somoza elections, see J. Wilkie (ed), Statistical Abstract of Latin America: Vol. 25, U.C.L.A., L K ; 5 
1987, pp. 890-1.
S e e  A.C. Sandino, El Pensiamento Vivo: Vol. 2, Editorial Nueva Nicaragua, Managua, 1982, p. 335.
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contender to the structure of parallelism. While the party attempted to exploit all possible legal 
channels at its disposal, a significant section, especially its youth movement, were more 
attracted to the strategy of returning state violence in kind. Tomas Borge, one of the future 
co-founders of the F.S.L.N. was a notable example of this trend. It was also a young P.L.I. 
supporter, Rigoberto Lopez Perez who assassinated Somoza Garcia in 1956. This act of 
retribution brought the weight of state repression down upon the party, and every known 
leader was arrested in the aftermath.
Throughout the 1940's and 1950's the dictatorship survived a colourful variety of uprisings 
and coups, led by dissident Liberals, Conservatives and disaffected elements within the 
Guardia.7 These actions were elitist in nature and were characterised by their lack of attention to 
organising the growing popular classes excluded from the benefits of capitalist expansion. Their 
defeat symbolised the death rattle of caudillismo (the phenomenon of multiple centres of armed 
bands led by charismatic leaders) which could not survive and adapt to the growing strength of 
the dictatorship, which had developed an overwhelming monopoly over coercion.
The 1950's also witnessed the decline in the organised labour movement, despite the 
numerical growth of the urban and rural proletariat. This decline contrasted with the three 
preceding decades when the initial attempts to independently organise the workers movement 
had culminated in the establishment of an influential Marxist party by the mid-1940's.
The origins of the Nicaraguan workers' movement can be traced to the turn of the century 
when mutual aid societies appeared among urban artisans. During the years of U.S. 
intervention these societies directed their political energy against the most reactionary elements 
within the Conservative party and foreign interference. According to Perez-Bermudez and 
Guevara, these groups were unable to transcend the political and philosophical views of the 
Liberal Party.8 In 1916 the first workers' newspaper, El Obrerismo Organizado was published, 
and in 1920 La Federation de Trabajadores Liberada organised the first celebration of May Day in 
Nicaragua.9
The enclave capitalism which accompanied U.S. intervention attracted the labour force which 
constituted the most important nucleus of the Nicaraguan proletariat during the 1920's. Until 
the decline of the enclaves in the early 1930's this section of the working class remained the 
most militant and confrontationist.10 A series of strikes among workers of the foreign-owned 
banana and timber companies during 1921-2 led to the first violent confrontations between 
labour and capital. It was also in the Atlantic Coast mines that Sandino recruited the nucleus of 
his army which later fought the Marines. However, the enclaves remained isolated from the
7For a history of armed actions against the dictatorship between 1934 and 1961, see J.M. Blandon, Entre Sandino y 
Fonseca, Publicacion Silvio Mayorga, Managua. 1982.
8C. Perez Bermudez & O. Guevara, El Mcrvimiento Obrero en Nicaragua: l e r y ldo  Parte, El Amencer, n.p., 1985, pp. 23-5.
9J. Wheelock, Imperialismo y Dictatura, Editorial de Ciendas Sodales, Habana, 1980, p. 114.
10Bermudez-Perez and Guevara, op. dt., p. 23.
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more populous Pacific Coast which stagnated economically during the years of intervention. 
Despite this, the decade of the Twenties witnessed the first attempts to organise an independent 
workers' movement.
The first recorded attempt to unionise labour occurred in Managua after a shoemakers' strike 
in 1922. In March 1923 Obrerismo Organizado, an extension of the mutual-aid societies was 
founded. Although this movement participated independently in the 1929 elections it "always 
acted as an appendage of the Liberal Party,"11 A second organisation with a more unionist 
orientation, La Federation Obrero Nicaraguense, was also formed during the decade, and had links 
with the American Federation of Labour.12 However, during Sandino's guerrilla war neither of 
these movements were prepared to break from the parallelism of the Liberals and 
Conservatives.
In opposition to this parallelism a broad urban front for Sandino's anti-imperialism emerged, 
La Union Patriotica. Despite suffering repression at the hands of the Managua police 
constabulary and the newly-formed Guardia National, this civic movement attracted a 10,000- 
strong anti-imperialist demonstration in Managua during 1930.13
The first independently organised workers party opposed to parallelism, El Partido Trabajador 
Nicaraguense (P.T.N.), was founded in August 1931. Although most of its founders were 
artisanal or petty-bourgeois in origin, the ideology of the party was overtly socialist and classist. 
Its communist influence was apparent through its links with the Salvadoran Communist leader, 
Augusto Farabundo Marti, who had fought alongside Sandino. The party was uncompromising 
in its position against the U.S.-constructed political settlement and campaigned against the 1932 
elections under the slogan "Against the Elections, in Favour of Sandino." The P.T.N. were 
instrumental in organising a variety of unions, including cobblers, carpenters, tailors, 
construction workers, printers, coach drivers, bakers, brewers and masons, in the face of 
deteriorating economic conditions of the early-1930's. The P.T.N.'s synthesis of Sandino's anti­
imperialism and socialistic anti-parallelism was confronted with governmental repression. 
Their leader, Castro Wassmer, was exiled to Honduras in April 1932, only months after the 
worker and peasant uprising in El Salvador. Thus even prior to the rise of somocismo any 
independently organised workers movement was perceived by the dominant elite as a 
manifestation of bolshevismo.14
The P.T.N. remained in existence until 1939. Its decline was symptomatic of the political 
confusion and realignment within Nicaraguan politics during the consolidation of the Somoza 
dictatorship. As repression intensified many P.T.N. members fled to Costa Rica where they
u Ibid., pp. 25-8. (my translation) 
12Ibid., pp. 29-31.
13Ibid., p. 32-3.
14See ibid, p. 60.
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formed contacts with the newly established Costa Rican Communist Party. Meanwhile, others 
remained inside Nicaragua engaged in reformist unionism within the confines of Somoza's 
tolerance.
It did not take long before a successor was created. During the Second World War broad- 
based opposition to the dictatorship intensified, as workers, students, professionals and 
opposition businessmen took advantage of Somoza's opportunistic support of the Allied cause 
for the preservation of world democracy against the threat of fascism. This provided political 
space for the re-emergence of an independent workers' party. Somoza's support for the Allied 
cause entailed the acceptance of broad anti-fascist fronts which included pro-Soviet 
organisations. Under these conditions, and with Somoza's approval, a successor to the P.T.N. 
was formed in July 1944, the Moscow-aligned Partido Socialista de Nicaragua.15 Somoza's 
tolerance of the party was assured by its identification with brauderismo,16 whereby Soviet- 
aligned parties in the Americas opened a 'united front' with capitalist governments with the 
aim of defeating the Axis powers.
This tolerance however was not based upon the fear of the Axis invading Nicaragua. 
Somoza's populistic demagogy was calculated to divide the anti-dictatorial movement, through 
securing the support of the growing urban proletariat, which had increased substantially 
during the war.17 A labour congress in May 1944 had provided Somoza with a 'qualified vote of 
confidence' conditional upon the dictator promulgating a progressive labour code. Somoza's 
courtship of the workers movement was assisted by the recognition by left-wing labour 
militants that "Somoza offered rights to workers, and the Conservative led opposition seemed 
to offer a return to the dark ages."18 While Somoza recognised that P.S.N. support in mid-1944 
was essential to preserve the dictatorship from the growing opposition, he was forced to 
struggle with the P.SJM. over hegemony over the workers' movement between 1944 and 1947. 
His failure to provide substance to his rhetoric assisted the growth of the P.S.N. which 
dominated the founding convention of the recently reorganized national union federation, the 
C.T.N. which represented 15,000 workers and 140 unions. Gould estimates that by 1946 the 
party numbered around 12,000 members.19 As repression intensified the party initially 
provided support for the anti-Somoza candidate in the 1947 elections. However, after conflict 
with the anti-communist right of the opposition the P.S.N. decided upon electoral abstention.
In the aftermath of the election Somoza regained personal control, turned upon the workers' 
movement and ignored compliance with the labour code. This paved the way for a pact with
l3The manifesto of the P.S.N. is reprinted in ibid., pp. 79-107.
16Named after the US Communist Party leader, Earl Browder.
17See J.L. Gould, "'For an Organized Nicaragua': Somoza and the Labour Movement”, Journal of Latin American 
Studies, Vol. 19, pp. 355-6.
18Ibid, p. 361. See also Booth, op. dt., p. 65; and C  Vilas, The Sandinista Revolution: National Liberation and Social 
Transformation in central America, Monthly Review, ^ T , 1986, p. 86, esp. fn. 18.
19Gould, op. dt., p. 377.
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the zancudo conservatives and provided the political cement for the building of dictatorial 
capitalist development during the ensuing decades. The relatively comfortable conditions in 
which the P.S.N. was bom, its reformist orientation within the structure of somocismo and the 
ideological constraints of brauderismo, combined to leave the workers' movement totally 
exposed to the anti-communist, Cold War repression of the dictatorship. Adhering to the Latin 
American Communist parties' rigid stage theory of development, the socialist movement 
operated clandestinely during the 1950's as a tail to the conservative-led opposition, arguing 
that only the destruction of the dictatorship could accelerate the maturation of social conditions 
conducive to organising the workers for socialist revolution.
Caught between the legalism, passivity and tailism of the P.S.N. and the caudillista 
Conservative opposition, excluded from the benefits of Somoza's 'pact of generals' and the 
cotton boom, and reeling under Somoza's repression exacerbated by Cold War anti­
communism, the Nicaraguan workers' movement lacked direction and organisation during the 
first half of the 1950's.
Violent opposition to the dictatorship increased in the wake of the expansion of cotton 
cultivation and the expulsion of peasants from the Pacific plains. However, organised armed 
uprisings remained atomised, elitist, and lacked contact with those excluded from somocista 
development. In accordance with its ideological predisposition, the P.S.N. continued to 
renounce armed struggle as adventurism, whether in the form of dissident elements within the 
National Guard, the Air Force, conservative caudillos or remnants or successors of Sandinismo.
The principle feature of 'the period of decline' between Sandino's death and the late-1950's 
was not so much popular passivity in the face of somocista repression and development, but the 
dispersal and atomisation of popular struggle, combined with the lack of any strategy for 
independently organising the popular classes against the dictatorship. The P.S.N., unlike its 
predessessor the P.T.N., totally opposed the Sandinista armed tradition. This belief 
predominated despite the feet that the traditional political culture had become increasingly 
delegitimised in the eyes of the popular classes. The 'tailism' of the P.S.N. discouraged 
independent popular initiatives and direct action. While Fonseca argued that the "principle 
character of the period" was the "interruption of the traditional armed struggle as a systematic 
tactic to fight the ruling regime",20 it would be more accurate to say, given Jesus Blandon's 
documentation of armed struggle during the period,21 that the principal characteristic was the 
lack of coordination between a focus of armed struggle and an independently organised
"°C Fonseca, "Zero Hour", in T. Borge et al., Sandinistas Speak, Pathfinder, N.Y., 1984, p. 32. 
21Blandon, op. dt.
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popular opposition.22
The beginning of the period of revolutionary ascent, and the immediate preconditions for the 
emergence of the Sandinista National Liberation Front, was the outcome of a number of internal 
and international factors. Firstly, the assassination of Somoza Garcia in Leon in 1956 unleashed 
a period of intensified repression which confirmed that the dictatorship had established itself as 
an entrenched dynasty. Secondly, the slump in international coffee and cotton prices adversely 
affected the fragile dependent capitalist development strategy upon which Somoza had based 
his co-optation of the bourgeoisie. The dictatorship cushioned the effects of the slump from the 
elite through lowering living standards. The result was an increase in middle and lower class 
opposition. Workers responded through broadening unionisation. In 1958 alone, the number of 
unions increased from 5 to 18.23 More than twenty armed uprisings occurred across the 
political spectrum between 1956 and 1960. Student militancy and organisation also increased, 
and national indignation towards the dictatorship was provoked in July 1959 when the 
National Guard opened fire upon a peaceful student demonstration in Leon.24 Numerous 
student groups began to reconsider the Sandinista heritage of armed struggle. The connection 
between the student movement and the reappropriation of the Sandinista heritage had begun in 
the mid-1950's when a group of Leon university students had formed a Marxist study group, 
and attempted to inject activism into the P.S.N. The popular upsurge and the reappropriation of 
the tradition of armed struggle by socialists dissatisfied with prevailing approaches to social 
change provided the context within which a group emerged aiming to synthesize popular 
aspirations with armed revolt. Concrete evidence of the efficiacy of popular armed struggle 
was provided by the example of the Cuban Revolution. The July 26 Movement in Cuba had 
proved that it was possible for a small guerrilla army to mobilise the popular classes and 
overthrow a dictatorship.
By the late-1950's, after a quarter of a century of dynastic dictatorial rule, the range of 
strategies and philosophies across the oppositional political spectrum had proven unequal to 
the task of democratising Nicaraguan society. The traditional Conservative opposition had 
demonstrated a willingness to accept a minority role within the dictatorial structure in order to 
reap the benefits of somocista capitalist development. Those Conservatives who refused co-
22In their May 1977 document, the F5LN outlined ten characteristic features of the period. They were 1) lack of 
revolutionary leadership; 2) absence of a vanguard revolutionary organization; 3)indpient armed spontaneous revolt of 
the masses; 4) popular leftist organisations, weak and in the gestation stage; 5) unorganized, heterogeneous student 
struggle; 6) disorganized activities abroad by exiled Nicaraguans, consisting mostly of periodic denunciations; 7) 
uninterrupted bloody repression of the people; 8) political hegemony in the anti-Somodsta struggle will be in the hands 
of the conservative bourgeoisie, dragging the people behind pseudo-popular leaders; 9) the masses will be 
'conservative' because they are fundamentally anti-somodsta and because they lack a revolutionary vanguard; 10) 
Yankee imperialism's unconditional economic, political, diplomatic, and ideological support, and unrestricted military 
support of the dictatorship by way of advising and equipping the National Guard. See F.S.L.N., "General Political- 
Military Platform of the F.S.L.N. for the Triumph of the Popular Sandinista Revolution (May 1977), in J. Valenta <$c 
E. Duran (eds), Conflict in Nicaragua: A Multi-dimensional Perspective, Allen & Unwin, v, ,1987, pp. 293-4.
^However, this still only induded 3.4% of the EAP, 16,000 workers, and less than 1% of rural workers. Black, op. dt., 
p. 31.
24The demonstration had been called as a reponse to somocista repression against a guerrilla column in Chaparral, 
Honduras.
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optation were unable to transcend a strategy based on elitist putschism. The P.L.I. fared little 
better, oscillating between participating in fraudulent elections and individual acts of terrorism. 
These upper and middle class responses to the dictatorship would remain substantially 
unaltered in the following two decades. The popular classes remained even more atomised and 
disorganised during the 1950's. After an impressive growth during the 1940's the P.S.N. 
survived on the margins of legality and acted as a support, or a tail, to the anti-Somoza 
opposition. The philosophy of the P.S.N. amounted to a mechanical form of materialism which 
in practice rejected popular initiative and armed struggle. According to the P.S.N. objective 
socio-economic circumstances underscored the need for a bourgeois-democratic revolution, and 
it was the task of the working class to assist the bourgeoisie to implement capitalist democracy. 
However, if this was the necessary task, the necessary agent, the local bourgeoisie, appeared 
unwilling or unable to take the neccesary steps to realise it. This dilemma of the absence of a 
revolutionary bourgeoisie was the product of the same unilinear philosophy of history which 
had plagued the Russian Mensheviks.
Within this political and ideological environment there was sufficient space for the emergence 
of an alternative anti-dictatorial strategy. This vacuum was filled by a group of P.S.N. 
dissidents and radical students who attempted to synthesise the lessons of national history with 
an undogmatic interpretation of Marxist theory. The negative lessons of a quarter of a century 
of opposition were analysed in the light of two positive historical events. This circle of heretics 
invoked the spectre of Sandino while finding inspiration in the Cuban Revolution.
5.3. THE IDEOLOGY OF THE F.S.L.N.
The preceding section explained that by the end of the 1950's the political environment w*as 
conducive to the emergence of an alternative oppositional strategy to the dictatorship. The 
existing political spectrum provided space for a strategy and programme which aimed at 
mobilising the broadening sections of the population which were excluded from somocista 
development and alienated by the ineffectiveness and collaborationism of the existing parties.
Sandinismo arose from the growing disenchantment with the orthodox mechanical Marxism 
of the P.SJM. The Sandinistas rejected the cautious, conservative praxis of the P.S.N. based upon 
bourgeois leadership over the anti-dictatorial struggle and a distaste for petit-bourgeois 
adventurist armed struggle. The Sandinistas called for direct armed action against the 
dictatorship and the hegemony of the popular classes over the vacillating bourgeoisie. In 
contrast with the P.S.N. the direct objective of the F.S.L.N. was the seizure of power.25 Through 
armed struggle and direct action it was possible for a vanguard party to seize the initiative and 
transform the conditions of political participation. In order to ensure the complete destruction 
of the dictatorship and its links with imperialism, the hegemony of the popular classes over the 
anti-autocratic movement was required.
25As Tomas Borge pointed out, one major difference between the Sandinistas and the P.S.N. was that: "From the very 
beginning we always had a nose for power, and we went on developing that instinct and translating it to our cadres, 
even when we recruited them through struggles for immediate demands." T. Borge, "The F.S.L.N. and the Nicaraguan 
Revolution", in B. Marcus (ed), Nicaragua: The Sandinista People's Revolution, Pathfinder, N.Y., 1985, p. 110.
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These views on political action brought young P.S.N. members into conflict with the party 
leadership. Carlos Fonseca, Tomas Borge and Silvio Mayorga, who founded the F.S.L.N. in 1961 
as an organisation independent of the P.S.N., originally considered it possible to transform the 
conservatism of the P.S.N. from within. However, by 1962 they concluded that the party was 
irretrievably lost in the rigid theory and practice of the orthodox Latin American Communist 
parties. From this moment on they concentrated upon building an armed organisation outside 
all existing political institutions.26
Although they emerged as an activistic trend within Marxism, Sandinismo received its 
inspiration from the reappropriation of Nicaragua's pre-Marxist vernacular revolutionary 
tradition.27 It was Sandino's guerrilla experience which opened the eyes of the Sandinistas to 
insurrectionary praxis. As the Sandinistas acknowledge, "Sandino was not a theoretician, but a 
man of action."28 However, this praxis gave the Frente the strategic politico-military insights for 
overthrowing a military/economic dictatorship aligned to external interests.
The Sandinistas borrowed four basic premises from Sandino which distinguished them from 
the orthodox Marxism of the P.S.N. Firstly, their praxis was based on Sandino's belief "that 
freedom is not conquered with flowers but with bullets". Under existing socio-political 
conditions "the armed struggle was the only road that would lead to the transformation of 
society."29 The existence of an armed movement with roots among the popular classes had been 
absent from Nicaragua's political spectrum since Sandino's guerrilla war. The Sandinistas 
argued for the mobilisation of popular discontent and its articulation with the armed struggle. 
In contrast, the P.S.N. argued that armed struggle was a form of petit-bourgeois adventurism. 
Secondly, the Sandinistas appropriated Sandino's statement that "only the workers and 
peasants will go all the way; only their organised forces will bring about the triumph."30 
Sandino did not consciously apply a class analysis to inform his actions, but he intuitively 
recognised through his own experience that the bourgeoisie and landowners would vacillate 
over the realisation of national liberation and were unreliable allies in the struggle against social 
injustice and foreign interference. It was necessary that the aspirations and organised force of 
the popular classes remain at the helm of the anti-dictatorial movement. In contrast, the P.S.N. 
were content with their vision of the bourgeoisie fulfilling their historical mission of 
establishing a bourgeois-democratic order. Thirdly, the Sandinistas rejected the parallelism of 
the existing political structure. For Sandino, this political arena was a stage for contesting who
26See C. Fonseca, op. dt. p. 34; T. Borge, Carlos: The Dawn Is No Longer Beyond Our Reach, New Star, Vancouver, 1984, 
p. 18; D. Nolan, The Ideology of the Sandinistas and the Nicaraguan Revolution, University of Miami, Miami, 1984, pp. 22-4.
^For a discussion on the relationship between Marxism and vernacular revolutionary traditions, see T. Shanin, 
"Marxism and the Vernacular Revolutionary Traditions", in his Late Marx and the Russian Road: Marx and ‘the Peripheries 
of Capitalism', R.K.P.,\-©n^oc* , 1984.
28See the Epilogue to A.C Sandino, El Pensiamento Vivo: Tomo 2, Editorial Nueva Nicaragua, Managua, 1981, pp. 
433-4.
^See Borge, "The F.S.L.N...", p. 110. One of Sandino's most famous announcements was that "The sovereignty and 
liberty of a people are not to be discussed but rather defended with weapons in hand."
30Sandino, op. dt., p. 72.
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would bare "the caress of the foreign whip".31 The Sandinistas consciously perceived 
themselves as the 'third force' signalling a radical departure from the nation's traditional 
political culture. They argued that Sandino's enterprise had failed due to the prevailing socio­
economic conditions under which he fought.32 Again, the P.S.N. rejected this as a form of 
voluntaristic sectarianism which ignored the objective limitations of Nicaraguan reality. 
Fourthly, the Sandinistas reappropriated the centrality of Sandino's anti-imperialism. The 
struggle for national independence was the primary contradiction present in Nicaraguan 
society, and revolutionary nationalism required an awareness of imperialism as a world order. 
Revolutionary praxis had to be linked to solidarity with all oppressed peoples subjugated by 
imperialism and praxis could be enhanced from lessons of other anti-imperialist struggles.
The sterility of the P.S.N/s interpretation of Marxism was exposed further through the success 
of the Cuban Revolution. The strategy of the July 26 Movement reaffirmed the heretical tenets 
which the Sandinistas had adapted from Sandino. The inspiration which the Sandinistas drew 
from this event cannot be understated. Borge recalls that:
The victory of armed struggle in Cuba, more than just delighting our hearts, was the parting of 
innumerable curtains, an explosion that showed the naive and boring dogmas of these times for 
what they really were. The Cuban Revolution sent a terrifying chill through Americas ruling 
classes and shattered the suddenly outmoded relics with which we'd begun to adorn our political 
alters. For us, Fidel was the resurrection of Sandino, the answer to our doubts, the justification of 
our heretical dreams of just a few hours before.33
If history had absolved Fidel Castro, then Castro had vindicated the Sandinistas, emancipating 
them from their heretical guilt of synthesising Marxism with the vernacular revolutionary 
tradition of Sandino. Fonseca wrote that through the Cuban Revolution "the rebellious 
Nicaraguan spirit recovered its brilliance. The Marxism of Lenin, Fidel, Che, Ho Chi Minh was 
welcomed by the Sandinista Front of National Liberation."34
Thus, originating as a tendency within the P.S.N. the Sandinistas incorporated a number of 
Sandino's beliefs (anti-imperialism, the centrality of the workers' and peasants' struggle, 
rejection of existing political institutions and armed struggle) with a universalistic, class theory. 
From within the Marxist paradigm, the Sandinistas analysed Nicaraguan reality, and on the 
basis of this insight outlined a political strategy and vision which demanded the 
reappropriation of the Sandino heritage. As Borge argued, the ideas and lessons of Sandino:
were brought together with the revolutionary theory that synthesizes the experiences of all 
revolutions. And it was the application of this notion, without dogmatism, that led to a handful 
of revolutionaries to found the F.S.L.N. in 1961.... Sandino's cause had indeed gone on living, and 
the Sandinista Front did no more than take it up again under different material conditions and 
with the guidance of a revolutionary theory.35
The stamp which the Sandinistas impressed upon this revolutionary theory was a rejection of
31See S. Ramirez, "The Relevance of Sandino's Thought", Tricontinental, No. 94,4-1984, pp. 15-7.
32See Fonseca, op. dt., p.30.
^Borge, Carlos, p. 28.
■^Quoted in Vanden, op. dt., p. 49.
^Borge, "The F.S.L.N...., p. 111. Ramirez also argues that the ideology of the FSLN "is based simultaneously on 
Sandino's thinking and on the sdentific concept of history, on universal sdentific concepts.” Ramirez, ibid. p. 17.
152
the mechanical materialism characteristic of the P.S.N. This interpretation of Marxism justified 
political passivity, arguing that praxis could not transcend the objective conditions of social 
existence. The Sandinistas, drawing upon the Cuban experience, and reviving the Leninist 
notion of a vanguard, replied that it was possible for people, guided by a revolutionary theory, 
to influence decisively the terms of political struggle, and contribute to accelerating the 
approach of a revolutionary situation.
Their struggle against the P.S.N. bore many similarities with the Bolshevik struggle against 
Menshevism. Both the Sandinistas and the Bolsheviks rejected the tailism of their rivals and 
argued for the hegemony of the workers and peasants in the struggle against the existing 
regime. Both also upheld a vanguard conception of the relationship between the party and the 
class. This made both far more uncompromising than their rivals in their relations with other 
parties on the oppositional spectrum. Furthermore, the Sandinistas openly adopted Lenin's 
conception of imperialism as a theoretical tool for assessing the potential inherent within the 
political struggle.
However, in their ideological struggle against the P.S.N. the Sandinistas self-consciously 
borrowed maxims from the vernacular revolutionary tradition. This contrasts with the 
Bolsheviks who never directly appealed to the Narodnik tradition in their struggle against the 
Mensheviks' interpretation of Marxism. The pre-Marxist revolutionary tradition in Russia was 
richer and more diverse than in Nicaragua. Marxism in Russia had originated as a direct 
ideological challenge to the peasant-oriented Narodniks. In order to secure political space, the 
Bolsheviks not only had to reject Menshevism, but also the descendants of the Narodnik 
tradition, the Social Revolutionaries. There were ideological and practical reasons why the 
Bolsheviks were unable to use elements of the vernacular as a mobilising myth against the 
autocracy. These problems were absent in the development of Sandinismo. No organised 
political descendant of Sandino had survived the quarter of a century of dictatorship, and he 
bequeathed no coherent philosophy. The Sandinistas were able to borrow various tenets from 
Sandino's experience in order to create space within the existing political spectrum and present 
themselves as a real alternative challenger. Sandino's martyrdom in armed struggle made him 
an ideal myth around which a radical anti-dictatorial and anti-imperialist movement could 
mobilise.
While the political conditions, combined with the socio-economic environment of the 
late-1950's, were conducive to the emergence of the F.S.L.N. as an ideological and 
organisational alternative, the early years of its existence corresponded with conditions less 
conducive to its growth. From its foundation in 1961 throughout the decade of the 1960's, the 
Sandinistas remained a small, embryonic organisation, vulnerable to repression. These years, 
(especially prior to 1967) corresponded with the halcyon years of the somocista model of 
dictatorial capitalist development, and a significant downturn in oppositional activity. 
Consequently, immediately after its emergence the organisation was faced with an environment 
conducive only to a survival footing, and the protection of its ideological distinctiveness, rather 
than development and the accumulation of forces among the popular classes.
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5.4. ASSESSING THE TERRAIN: PROBLEMS OF APPLIED SANDINISMO
The initial phase of Sandinista development described above was characterised by the 
formation of a politico-military organisation and corresponding ideology dedicated to working 
outside the boundaries of the existing political structure. During its second phase of 
development the Sandinista movement experimented on a number of political terrains in an 
effort to forge links with the popular classes. The problems involved in this process bore many 
similarities to the problems the early Russian Marxists faced in their transition from the realm 
of propaganda to the realm of agitation. In the Sandinistas case the problem of translating 
ideology into political activity coincided with a questioning on the part of the Latin American 
left of the conduct and timing of revolution. The success of the Cuban guerrillas appeared more 
spectacular in the light of the sterility and stagnation of the orthodox Latin American 
Communist parties. Yet, to what extent could the Cuban lesson be generalised throughout the 
continent? While Castroism and Guevaraism broadened the options available to the 
revolutionary left, the choices of strategy were often formulated and presented in terms of two 
incompatible lines; urban or rural activity, mass party or guerrilla foco, political or military 
strategy. Between 1961 and 1967 the Sandinistas faced and explored each of these options.
As the last section demonstrated, Sandinismo was not a derivative of the Cuban model and 
strategy. They discovered armed struggle and Marxism independently of Cuba. They merely 
received some justification and moral inspiration -from the Cuban success. Likewise, early 
Sandinista activity did not attempt to emulate the Cuban guerrillas. Through a multi­
dimensional praxis which chartered all political paths they were able to assess what worked 
and what didn't work under Nicaraguan conditions. On the basis of this experience the F.S.L.N. 
was able to adapt Che Guevara's philosophy of action to Nicaraguan reality.
As this review of early Sandinista praxis will reveal, it is oversimplistic to argue that between 
1961 and 1967 the Frente attempted to "transplant" the Cuban foco strategy onto Nicaraguan 
soil. This is a common reading of Sandinista activity between 1961 and 1967 which appears in 
authoritative accounts of Henri Weber and David Nolan, among others.j6 On the basis of 
Sandino's experience and the failures of opposition putsches, the Sandinistas affirmed 
Guevara's lesson that in "underdeveloped America the countryside is the basic area for armed 
struggle”.37 The Sandinistas never elevated foquismo to the status of a theory. Rather, it was 
considered one important element in a more general theory of mass insurrectionary warfare. In 
contrast, in many other areas of Latin America the elevation of the foco principle to a general 
theory led to a spate of guerrilla defeats and subsequent disillusionment in guerrilla warfare by 
the late-1960's. These movements had emphasized armed struggle in the countryside to the 
detriment of urban mass struggle. The Sandinistas survived this general crisis of the Latin 
American guerrilla movement through their more multi-dimensional application of Guevara's 
theory. As Guevara himself pointed out in 1963:
36See H. Weber, Nicaragua: The Sandinist Revolution, Verso, p. 41; Nolan pp. 22-6. 
37C. Guevara, Gurerrida Warfare, Penguin, , 1969, p. 13. (my emphasis)
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In debates on the subject criticism is usually levelled at those who wish to wage a guerrilla war, 
on the grounds theat they forget mass struggle; as if the two methods were incompatible! We 
reject the concept this position involves. A guerrilla war is a people's war, and it is a mass 
struggle. To attempt to conduct this type of war without the support of the populace is a prelude 
to inevitable disaster. The guerrilla force is the people's fighting vanguard, located in a specific 
point of a given territory, and it is armed and ready to carry out a series of military actions 
tending towards the only possible strategic aim: seizure of power. It is supported by the masses 
of peasants and workers of the region and the entire territory in question. Except on this basis, 
guerrilla warfare is unacceptable.3®
The rural guerrilla foco neither created the objective conditions for revolution nor did it retain 
dominance over the entire pre-revolutionary process. It merely engaged the enemy on the most 
suitable terrain in the opening sequence of the struggle.39 Between 1961 and 1967 Sandinista 
praxis was characterised by its attempts to combine the methods of guerrilla warfare and mass 
struggle, urban and rural activity, and legal and clandestine operations.
From its inception the Sandinistas organised guerrilla squadrons of workers and students in 
the urban centres of Leon and Managua, and peasant squadrons in the vicinity of Chinandega, 
Matagalpa, Esteli, Somoto and Ocotal.40 In 1963 the F.S.L.N. were active in the stevedore strike 
at the port of Corinto and also in Somoza's textile plants.41 Other early urban activities 
included numerous bank raids (known as acts of 'economic recovery7) and a high profile in the 
students movement through el Frente Estudiantil Revolucionario (F.E.R).
In mid-1963 the F.S.L.N. initiated its first major armed confrontation with the National Guard 
in clashes along the Rio Coco and Bocay. The attack was launched from Honduran territory and 
villages were occupied with little prior politicisation and exposure of the inhabitants to the 
F.S.L.N. While Fonseca later described the actions as a "dry run for the revolutionary sector”,42 
the costs were high in terms of Frente casualties. The Frente would never again engage in rural 
armed confrontaion with the Guardia without prolonged, patient political exposure of the local 
population to the aims and character of the movement.43However, the historical significance of 
the actions lay in the fact that "the guerrilla of 1963 represent(ed) the emergence of the first 
armed organisation with a homogenous ideological character and the raising of a revolutionary 
programme for the construction of a socialist society, and the unity (combination) of the 
dispersed combatants identifiable with this programme and establishment."44
^C, Guevara, "Guerrilla Warfare: A Method”, in J. Gerassi (ed), Venceremos! The Speeches and Writings of Che Guevara, 
Macmillan, VTY» , 1968, p. 267.
39See C  Guevara, "Cuba: Exception or Vanguard", in ibid., p. 137.
40See Borge, Carlos..., p. 39.
41See B. Arce, El Papel de las Fuerzas Mortices Antes y Despues del Triunfo, Centro de Publication es 'Silvio Mayorga', 
Managua, 1980, p. 19.
^Fonseca, op. dt., p. 34.
43As the Frente later admitted: "The limitations of the guerrilla of 1963 stems from the erroneous conceptions with 
respect to developing a revolutionary war and, above all, to the abscence of a strategy of Prolonged Popular Warfare." 
Unidad de Combate 'Juan Jose Quezada', A: El Pueblo Nicaraguense, 27 Dedembre 1974. Reprinted as an appendix to 
J. Wheelock, Frente Sandinista: Hacia la Offensiva Final, Editorial de Qendas Sodales, Habana, 1980, p. 103. (my 
translation)
44Ibid., p. 103. (my translation)
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The Frente survived this confrontation and future rural military defeats due to the 
maintenance of strong urban links through workers and student cells. As Borge notes:
Carlos (Fonseca) always said in his writings that the guerrilla experiences at Bocay and Rio 
Coco weren't focos and that the F.S.L.N. was bom in the defense of the exploited classes and was 
linked to them through the placenta.... Proof of this, Carlos argued, was the fact that the F.S.L.N. 
survived the terrible setbacks of 1963 and 1967, as opposed to other guerrilla efforts in Latin 
America, most of which disappeared once they were defeated militarily leaving only the 
memories of their heroic footsteps. The F.S.L.N., on the other hand, was able to strengthen itself, 
in political terms, after each of its military defeats. It is impossible to analyse the survival and 
development of the Sandinista organisation unless we understand the clear architecture of its 
roots in the socially oppressed and exploited sectors of our society.45
The lessons of Bocay and Rio Coco coincided with a general downturn in oppositional activity 
throughout Nicaragua. Somocista capitalist development entered its halcyon years between 1961 
and 1967 through a combination of economic factors including the rise in world cotton and 
coffee prices, the establishment of the Central American Common Market and the Alliance for 
Progress. The boom years also corresponded to a period of superficial political liberalisation 
under Luis Somoza. The presidential ascendancy of Rene Schick was a reflection of better 
relations between capital and the dictatorship during the boom. The period after Bocay and Rio 
Coco also coincided with less hostile relations between the orthodox Communist Parties of 
Latin America and guerrilla movements.46 With human resources depleted after their rural 
adventures, all these factors had to be considered by the F.S.L.N. in reassessing their methods 
and terrain of struggle.
During the following two years the Frente reoriented its activity towards collaboration with 
the P.S.N. and other sectors of the left in legal reformist activity within a broad front 
organisation, the Partido Movilizacion Repubicana (M.R.). In contrast with the general 
misconception that the Sandinistas activity between 1963 and 1967 was mainly an application of 
clandestine rural armed struggle, one Sandinista account of the period has labelled it the "legal 
interval" {el interualo legalista).47
One important initiative which emerged from the M.R. was the encouragement of comites 
civicos populäres (popular civil committees). These loosely structured broad-based groups were 
formed as a vehicle to press for improvements in basic living standards within the barrios of 
Managua. These were the first real attempts by the left to mobilise the growing marginalised 
sectors of the population uprooted by somocista capitalist development. Previously, the left had 
oriented its attention towards the industrial proletariat and the comites civicos populäres were 
able to attract sectors of the population whose subordination to the dictatorship was just as real 
as the proletariat proper, even though they were not exploited in the formal Marxist sense of the 
word. The subsequent success of the Sandinistas during the 1970's to mobilise broad popular 
support was based on their understanding of this relationship between somocista capitalist
■^Borge, op. dt., pp. 41-4.
46See R. Gott, Rural Guerrillas in Latin America, Penguin, 1973, p. 28.
47P. Arias (ed), Nicaragua: Revolution: Relatos de Combatietes del Frente Sandinista, Siglo Vientiuno Editores, Mexico, 
1981, pp. 34-41.
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development, urbanisation and proletarianisation. As Lopez et el. point out, "...the industrial 
development had not produced an urban working class proportional to the quantity of 
personnel that the consequent process of urbanisation had produced in Nicaragua."48 This is a 
feature, it should be noted, of many other peripheral capitalist societies.
However, during the intervalo legalista F.S.L.N. agitation within the popular movement 
generally met with indifference. Despite formal collaboration, the Frente competed with the 
P.S.N. on the basis of piecemeal economistic demands in worker and peasant organisations. In 
their attempts to lead the mass reformist organisations, the F.S.L.N. were often accused of 
ultra-leftism and adventurism from the orthodox left, who warned workers that the Frente 
were "leading the workers to a certain death, through an adventurist method of struggle".49 
The industrial boom and the relative liberalism of the Rene Schick period engendered 
confidence within the legal organisations that peaceful reformist demands could gradually 
improve the condition of the popular classes. The Frente consequently made little headway in 
their attempt to instil their fundamental maxim of armed struggle into the fronts initiated by 
the M.R.
As the M.R. followed the P.S.N. in mobilising behind the traditional opposition for the 1967 
elections, the Frente were forced to reconsider the effectiveness of collaborative work with the 
orthodox left.50 Carlos Fonseca, reflecting on the period between 1964 and 1966, argued that 
the contradiction between the Frente's terrain of struggle and its underlying ideology had led to 
vacillation and confusion.
Although it raised the banner of anti-imperialism and the emancipation of the exploited classes, 
the Front vacillated in putting forward a clearly Marxist-Leninist ideology. The attitude that the 
traditional Marxist-Leninist sector had maintained in the Nicaraguan people's struggle 
contributed to this vacillation...(This) sector in practice has openly played the game of the 
Somoza clique. This factor, together with the ideological backwardness prevailing in the 
revolutionary sector of the country, led to vacillation in adopting an ideology that was rooted in 
compromise. It can be said at that time that there was a lack of clear understanding that it was 
only a question of time before the youth and people of Nicaragua would begin to distinguish 
between the false Marxists and the true Marxists.51
As a consequence of their experiences during the intervalo legalista the Frente refocused 
attention upon "insurrectional-type tasks" and by "the end of 1966 they began speaking again of 
preparations for armed struggle."02 These preparations for opening a rural guerrilla front
^J. Lopez et al., La Caida del Somocismo y la Lucha Sandinista ert Nicaragua, Editorial Universitaria Centroamerica, Costa 
Rica, 1979, p. 105. (my translation)
49Arce, op. cat., p. 19. See also O. Cabezas, Fire From the Mountain: The Making of a Sandinista, ]. Cape, , 1985,
p. 16; and the testimony of Gloria Baez, in M. Randall, Sandino's Daughters, New Star, Vancouver, 1981, esp. p. 175. This 
continued to be a subject of controversy between the P.S.N. and the Frente throughout the 1960's and 1970's. Omar 
Cabezas speaks of P.S.N. activists at the university in Leon quoting passages from Lenin's "Left-Wing Communism: An 
Infantile Disorder" at the Frente.
°°The Frente later reflected that the period engendered ”an exagerated illusion of legal possibilities and in the role of 
the 'traditional left'''.Unidad de Combate 'Juan Jose Quezada', op. dt., p. 103. (my transition)
31 Fonseca, op. dt., p. 35.
32Ibid, p. 35; see also the testimony of Jacinto Suarez, in Arias (ed), op. dt., p. 39.
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centred upon the Matagalpa region where Pablo Ubeda had been successfully conducting 
propaganda and agitation since 1963. This preparatory rural work marked an important 
advance over the guerrilla of 1963, when the Frente had initiated armed action from foreign 
territory with minimal political preparation.
While these preparations were advancing the Frente were calling for a boycott of the 1967 
elections. The M.R. and the P.S.N. on the other hand had decided to support the Conservative 
opposition candidate, Fernando Aguero. The opposition called for a peaceful mass 
demonstration in its support through Managua on January 22. However, a sector of the 
bourgeois opposition planned to exploit the situation by provoking an armed confrontation 
with the Guardia, in the hope of stirring a brief insurrection and encouraging an O.A.S.-type 
intervention similar to the Dominican Republic experience. However, events did not follow this 
ill-prepared script. The Guardia crushed the provocation, leaving approximately 300 people 
dead. In the aftermath, the Guardia rounded up opposition spokesmen and manufactured 
another fraudulent election, bringing Anastasio Somoza Debayle to power.
In another tragic repetion of history, the demoralised opposition accepted a minority share of 
government. The dictatorship appeared as omnipotent and eternal as ever. The generation of 
1967 had only helped to perpetuate the fatalistic appearance that history merely repeated itself, 
that opposition was futile and destined to end in the ignominy of collaboration.
However, the F.S.L.N., which had consistently condemned the strategy of the bourgeois 
opposition, used the defeat to advertise their strategy as the only viable alternative to the 
tragedy of repeated failure. The events of January refuted the reformist claim that somocismo 
could be peacefully transformed from within. Furthermore, the elitist putschism of sectors of 
the bourgeoisie had played openly into the hands of the Guardia. The Frente maintained their 
position that the dictatorship could only be overthrown through an armed struggle which 
actively involved and the popular classes and mobilised them for the seizure of power. This 
seizure could only be achieved through a prolonged period of agitation and accumulation of 
popular forces into organisational channels untainted with the brush of collaborationism. This 
lesson, resulting from the Sandinistas own praxis, was similar to the Vietnamese conception of a 
"prolonged peoples' war".
Although "the treachery and cowardice of the opposition leaders resulted in the historical 
liquidation of the Conservative Party and the confirmation of the duality and opportunism of 
the traditional left",53 this in itself was insufficient for popular sympathy to be mechanically 
transferred to the Frente. The F.S.L.N. had to demonstrate through their own purposive action 
that they represented the only force capable of effectively confronting the dictatorship. The 
objective lessons of the immediate past did not throw the popular classes into the arms of the 
Sandinistas. The prolonged period of accumulating forces could only proceed on the basis of 
purposive intervention by the Sandinistas in the politico-military arena. The lessons of 1967
^Unidad de Combate 'Juan Jose Quezada', op. dt., p. 104.
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may have 'dosed the horizon'54 on the possibility of peaceful reform and opened people's eyes 
to the necessity of armed popular insurrection. But it still had to be demonstrated that this form 
of change was possible.30
The F.S.L.N. embarked upon a series of high-profile urban and rural actions in mid-to-late 
1967 aimed at heightening the awareness of the possibility of confronting the Guardia through 
violence. The twin objectives of the actions were to remove the aura of omnipotence 
surrounding the dictatorship and to advertise the uncompromising and popular form of 
struggle being conducted by the Frente. As Jacinto Suarez recalls, "The very same day that the 
bourgeois opposition decided to go along with Somoza and accept seats in the National 
Congress, that same day, May 1, 1967, we began a campaign of bank raids, of bombings, with 
the result that the Sandinista National Liberation Front began to be felt as a political reality.’06 
This urban terror campaign against the most feared and hated symbols of the dictatorship 
culminated in September with the ajusticimiento (bringing to justice) of Gonzalo Lacayo, one of 
the Guardias most notorious torturers.57
The Frente also opened its rural guerrilla campaign in Ausust at Pancasan. Heavy fighting 
caught nationwide attention. Although Guardia casualties were heavier, the losses suffered by 
the Frente were qualitatively graver. Among their leaders killed were Silvio Mayorga and 
Pablo Ubeda. The Frente claimed a political and moral victory at Pancasan. The events of 1967 
had provided the masses for the first time since the formation of the Frente with a concrete 
lesson on the validity of the Frente's ideology within the context of Nicaragua's political 
culture. As Borge claims:
Despite the military defeat Pancasan had immense significance for the revolutionary 
movement. The armed struggle was reaffirmed, while the impossibility of overthrowing the 
military dictatorship through peaceful methods was demonstrated. When I say this, I mean that 
the Nicaraguan people became conscious that only armed struggle was capable of defeating the 
somocista dictatorship. (Pancasan) managed to consolidate the F.S.L.N.'s influence among the 
Nicaraguan people. It convinced the people that ours was the only organisation truly able to 
represent the people's interests, the only force capable of seriously confronting the somocista 
dictatorship. This elevated the moral authority and the political standing of the Sandinista 
National Liberation Front.58
The strategy pursued by the F.S.L.N. from Bocay to Pancasan is often portrayed as a classical 
adaptation of rural foquismo, inspired by Che Guevara. According to this view the experiences 
of military defeat in 1963 and 1967 convinced the Frente that the Guevarist model could not be 
mechanically transplanted into Nicaraguan soil. Pancasan was the end of an era. Symbolically, 
Pancasan coincided with the capture and death of Che Guevara in Bolivia, and a period of crisis
^R. Morales, quoted in F.S.L.N. (May 1977)., op. dt., p. 299.
“ Michael Lowy, in his discussion of Guevara's theory of revolutionary warfare, notes that its subjective conditions 
indude not only an "awareness of the necessity for a revolutionary change of regime", but also an "awareness of the 
possibility of this change". See M. Lowy, The Marxism of Che Guevara, Monthly Review Press, N Y , , pp. 91-2.
^J. Suarez, quoted in Arias (ed), op. dt., p. 41. (my translation)
3'See Borge, op. dt., pp. 49-50; see also the U.S. intelligence report quoted in Gott, op. dt., p. 564.
S8Borge, T he FSLN...", p. 114.
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and reflection within the Latin American guerrilla movement. However, this neat picture fails 
to highlight the richness and diversity of the Frente's praxis during the era. It concentrates on 
its two most spectacular actions and eclipses the more mundane urban agitation which 
preoccupied the movement between the actions. It also tends to abstract the rural actions from 
the concrete circumstances surrounding them. If these are taken into consideration, Pancasan 
can be said to have opened, rather than closed, an era.
This section has argued that the F.S.L.N.'s understanding of the relationship between guerrilla 
warfare and mass struggle was more complex and flexible than that of most other guerrilla 
movements inspired by Che. The period was characterised by the Frente's initiation into 
agitation among both the urban and rural popular classes, and through this agitational 
experience and military confrontation they confirmed their initial hypothesis that the 
dictatorship could only be overthrown through a popular armed insurrection outside the 
confines of the traditional opposition. The electoral farce of 1967 provided additional evidence 
for this.
While other guerrilla movements throughout the Americas were unable to withstand the 
blows of counter-insurgency, the Sandinistas' more multi-dimensional application of 
Guevaraism helped them overcome conjunctural defeats and learn from failures.09 In the face 
of the fatalistic, defeatist myth of the invincibility of somocismo the Sandinistas burst onto the 
political scene to advertise the only possible alternative, armed popular insurrection. Thus, 
Henri Weber oversimplifies the history of the Frente's development when he argues that they 
abandoned focjuismo after Pancasan. After Pancasan the Sandinistas continued to be inspired by 
a multi-dimensional interpretation of Che Guevara's theory of guerrilla warfare. Che continued 
to be a source, not only of moral inspiration, but theoretical insight and political guidance. The 
Sandinistas continued to 'kneel before his alteri because his strategy continued to be confirmed 
in Sandinista praxis. In 1969 Carlos Fonseca (by then the undisputed leader of the F.S.LJM.) 
maintained the validity of the "fundamental lessons" of Che's theory on guerrilla war, arguing 
that under Nicaraguan conditions, "as well as in most countries in Latin America, the centre of 
action of revolutionary war has to be the countryside." However, the "most developed cadres" 
of the revolutionary movement continued to be provided by the cities.60
Ideologically reinforced through their own experiences, and confident of the correctness of 
their anti-dictatorial strategy, the Frente turned their attention to the relationship between their 
small cadre organisation and the popular classes. The fundamental problem was developing a
59See ibid., p. 115; Fonseca, op. dt., p. 37; and P. Ross, "Theory and Practice of Revolution: What Works in Central 
America", in J. Levy (ed), Crisis in Central America, U.N.S.W., Sydney, 1984, p. 46. A similar condusion is also drawn in 
an artide much less sympathetic to the Sandinistas; see A. Hoehn & j.C. Weiss, "Overview of Latin American 
Insurgendes”, in G. Fauriol (ed), Latin American Insurgencies, N.D.U., U.S.A., 1985, p. 19.
“ Fonseca, op. dt., p. 39; see also Cabezas, op. dt., pp. 11-2. It is also significant to note that in his influential 1974 
work on the general theory and practice of armed revolutionary insurrection, the four authorities dted by Humberto 
Ortega in support of his position were Marx, Engels, Lenin and Che. See H. Ortega, "Generalidades Teoricas y Practicas 
de la Insurrecdon Armada Revoludonaria en el Proceso de la Guerra Popular Revoludonaria”, in his collection Sobre la 
Insurreccion, Editorial de Ciendas Sodales, Habana, 1981.
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means to "bring the mass and the vanguard into a closer relationship".61 Remaining faithful to 
Guevara's philosophy of praxis, the Sandinistas recognised that the realisation of this 
relationship could not be brought about through sitting tight until the objective conditions for 
insurrection matured. It required the purposive intervention in the political arena, and a large 
degree of organisational ingenuity and tactical flexibility. Without this purposive intervention 
the experiences of the past pointed only to a tragic repetition of the cycles of oppositional 
failure.
5.5. THE SILENT ACCUMULATION OF FORCES
This section analyses Sandinista praxis during the period between 1968 and the mid-1970's. 
The period corresponded with the end of somocista liberalism and the ascendancy of Anastasio 
Somoza Debayle. The possibilities of exploiting legal opportunities diminished and the Frente's 
cadre structure was reduced after losses at Pancasan. In their attempts to fuse the vanguard 
with the mass movement the Frente was forced to employ all its resources of political ingenuity 
and innovation. The strategy adopted was labelled 'the accumulation of forces in silence'. This 
strategy operated on three levels of activity. Organisationally, the cadre structure of the F.S.L.N. 
operated increasingly underground; militarily, the Frente avoided direct combat with the 
Guardia, except when this was unavoidable: and mass work was undertaken through a host of 
'intermediary organisations', not manifestly associated with the Frente, yet not subordinated to 
the traditional opposition.
Despite the political space which the Frente had acquired within the nation's political 
culture,62 cadres, supporters and sympathisers all recognised the dangers Frente membership 
entailed under conditions of Guardia repression. The leadership of the organisation was often 
forced to spend prolonged periods of time outside the country, while militants within the 
nation were forced underground or spent time in the 'wilderness' (la montana). The
organisational method adopted under these conditions was 'compartmentalisation'. This 
involved decentralising cadres into small cells, with complex, limited links between each unit. 
As a consequence "none of the companeros knew the details of the organisation as a whole."63 
This decreased the possibility of the Guardia destroying the entire party network in the case of 
one strategically placed militant being captured. It also made the Frente appear larger than life, 
given the disparity between the small size of its cadre underground membership on the one 
hand, and its high national profile and growing prestige on the other. This disparity, provided a 
psychological boost to Frente militants during the phase of silently accumulating forces. 
'Economic recoveries' and ajusticiamientos, combined with their amplification by Somoza's 
official press organs, were like "the sweetest, most delicious candy”, injecting morale and
61H. Ruis, "The Guerrilla Era", in R.S. Leiken and B. Rubin (eds), The Central American Crisis Reader, Summit, U , 
1987, p. 154.
62See J. Wheelock, "The Great Challenge", in Marcus (ed), op. cat., p. 130.
^Cabezas, op. dt., p. 14.
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psychological energy into the compartmentalised companeros operating under conditions of 
physical deprivation and mortal danger.64 Omar Cabezas and Jaime Wheelock both admit 
being initially dismayed at finding out exactly how small the organisation was once they 
became cadres.60 In an epoch when the dawn appeared beyond reach, individual acts of 
heroism and martyrdom, and national attention, provided a psychological charge which ran 
through the cells. This helps account for'the almost religious reverence the F.S.L.N. held, and 
still holds, for its fallen combatants.
The story of Julio Buitrago's death became legendary throughout Nicaragua, and it 
illuminates how the Sandinistas' praxis demystified Somoza's invincibility while constructing 
the image of their own indes tractable force. In July 1969 the Guardia discovered the 
whereabouts of a Sandinista safehouse in Managua. Troops blocked and saturated the entire 
barrio. Somoza broadcasted the entire seige on television. Initial attempts to take the house 
were repelled by a hail of bullets from the windows. Believing themselves caught in a stalemate 
with a large Sandinista battalion, the Guardia brought in two Sherman tanks and fired into the 
house at point-blank range. As the dust settled the Guardia confidently advanced towards the 
house, only to be sent fleeing for cover again by another hail of bullets. Finally, the Air Force 
was brought in and demonished the building with an aerial attack. Buitrago suddenly emerged 
from the house and charged at the Guardia firing his machine-gun until he fell to the ground. 
Somoza could hardly claim a great military victory. But Cabezas notes that acts like these 
"forged the great legend of the invincibility of the Frente among the Nicaraguan people. Or I 
should say the people themselves forged that legend around the Frente. It was based on 
concrete historical acts...."66
Organisational links between city and countryside were maintained through ensuring that 
underground workers and students spent periods of time in the rural wilderness and in 
guerrilla columns. Here combat experience was gained and urban recruits often experienced 
their first encounter with the conditions of peasant life. It was also in the mountains, through 
the privations of guerrilla life, that the Frente attempted to cultivate 'the new man' Che 
revered.67 Work among the workers and peasants since 1963 had assured the Frente a 
permanent and concealed presence among the population. This patient clandestine political 
work was not only essential for preparing the basis for guerrilla fronts, but also for establishing 
intergenerational continuity in the Sandinista struggle. While veterans of Sandino's initial 
struggle, such as Santos Lopez, were important in framing the original ideology of the Frente, 
only prolonged patient exposure of the Frente could convince members of the rural population 
who remembered Sandino's struggle that the F.S.L.N. were Sandino's inheritors. Once contact 
with such sympathisers was established, rural networks and safehouses could expand more
^See ibid., p. 13-20.
^Ibid., p. 17; and Wheelock, op. dt., p. 130. 
^Cabezas, op. dt., pp. 21-3.
67See ibid., esp. pp. 94-5; Fonseca, op. dt., p. 38.
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freely.68
Militarily, the silent accumulation of forces forced upon the organisation "a new strategic 
withdrawal aimed at recuperating energy for new confrontations with the enemy."69 Based 
upon the rural experiences of previous phases, and assimilating lessons of Vietnam, the 
Sandinistas developed the 'prolonged peoples war' strategy, engaging in combat "not when the 
enemy wanted to, but when the vanguard considered it appropriate."70 Encounters with the 
Guardia occurred during 1969 and 1970 at Zinica and Bijao. The Guardia was unable to destroy 
the guerrilla units in these combats and were forced to heighten rural repression against the 
peasantry. Significantly, the Zinica guerrilla column consisted primarily of peasants, revealing 
an increase in peasant sympathy for the Frente. It also hampered the Guardia's 'surround and 
destroy' tactic which had been successfully applied in previous campaigns. The Guardia 
responded with a less discriminate policy of rural repression, further isolating the dictatorship 
from the rural population. Capitalising upon this deteriorating relationship the Frente 'brought 
to justice' 14 local judges in the five years after 1969.71 While this rural vertebral column of the 
revolution was developing its own momentum the Frente was also devoting attention to urban 
mobilisation.
Severe repression, illegality and underground existence made the development of open 
workers' and students' Sandinista organisations impossible. On the other hand past experience 
had also suggested that a truly revolutionary movement could not be mobilised in conjuncture 
with the traditional parties on the left of the political spectrum. As Arce notes, the intervalo 
legalista between 1963 and 1967 convinced the leadership that:
a revolutionary organisation such as the F.S.L.N. could not look for the organisation of the 
exploited classes of our people in the country in alliance with vacillating political organisations 
with dubious ideological firmness. It signified the F.S.L.N.'s own development of its own mass 
organisations, to develop its own mass political organisations, seek its own methods of 
organisation of the working class of our country and its incorporation into the revolutionary 
project which we led.72
This dilemma between illegality and the need to develop its own organisations was overcome 
through creating 'intermediate organisations', nominally independent, yet connected to the 
Frente. Networks were created linking militants to 'pre-militants' and 'collaborators'.73 These 
organisations brought the Frente into contact with a broad cross-section of social groups 
subordinated to the dictatorship. While the Sandinistas continued to engage in organising
60Omar Cabezas' book is full of fascinating expressions of this intergenerational continuity, ranging from peasants 
leading the Sandinistas to stores of bullets they had hidden since the 1930's, to veterans asking the cadres where they 
had hid the old arms from the war against the marines. See Cabezas, op. dt. See also G. Black, Triumph of the People: The 
Sandinista Revolution in Nicaragua, Zed, London, 1983, pp. 79-80.
^Unidad de Combate 'Juan Jose Quezada', op. dt., p. 104. (my translation)
^Borge, op. dt., p. 116.
71 Uni dad de Combate 'Juan Jose Quezada', p. 106.
72Arce, op. dt., p. 21. (my translation)
^On this distinction, see the testimony of Nora Astorga, in Randall, op. dt., p. 120.
163
workers' committees, their efforts at mobilisation transcended this traditional terrain of left- 
wing activity. As the adverse effects of Nicaragua's development decade began to manifest 
themselves during the latter part of the 1960's the Frente recognised the importance of 
mobilising those sections of the population which could not be attracted to purely unionist 
demands. This coincided with the establishment of contact between the Sandinistas and radical 
Christians operating in rural communities and the poorest urban barrios. The Church performed 
a catalystic role in rural and urban mobilisation, and Guardia repression forced many radicals to 
seek political direction in order to defend their efforts. In 1968, a group of Nicaraguan priests, 
with the blessing of their bishopric, established the Centre for Agrarian Advancement (CEPA) 
aimed at helping the peasantry to independently improve their conditions. Priests and 
Christian lay workers often acted as intermediaries between the campesinos and the guerrillas 
and many CEPA organisers themselves eventually became active members or collaborators of 
the Frente. By the late-1970's Christians were prominent in helping the Sandinistas form the 
first nationwide agricultural workers' union, the A.T.C.74
A similar dialogue developed in the urban areas in the early-1970's. Radical Christians active 
in improving living conditions within the barrios were drawn towards Sandinista intermediary 
organisations for the release of political prisoners and campaigns against rural repression. The 
earthquake of 1972 accelerated the co-operative links between Christian Base Communities and 
the Frente. Monica Baltadano, who joined the Frente in January 1973, recalls the importance of 
the Christian movement for the Sandinistas organisational efforts:
...the whole Christian movement was being oriented in one way or another by the Front. There 
were many, many of us who belonged to the Front. The FSLN was very conscious that without a 
strong and broad-based movement it would be impossible to carry out armed struggle and 
achieve victory. They knew the Christian movement could facilitate this. The Sandinista Front 
couldn't work openly; it was an underground organisation. But the Christian movement had a 
broader base of operations. We were less subject to repression. We could go to the barrios talking 
politics and still be protected by the mantle of Christianity. That's one reason the movement w'as 
so important in the history of the revolution here.75
The Sandinistas also regained the initiative in the student movement, through the rejuvenated 
F.E.R. The Social Christians had dominated the National University Student Council (C.U.U.N.) 
between 1963 and 1967. However, in 1970 'El Gato' Munguia "was the first C.U.U.N. president 
to be elected by going from class to class repeating over and over that he was a communist, a 
Sandinista, and a member of the F.E.R."76 Bayardo Arce claims that "there did not emerge a 
single popular or workers organisation with revolutionary content that was not organised by a 
militant or cell of the F.S.L.N."77
Another important characteristic of the period was the Frente's recognition that in order to
74See J. Collins, What Difference Could a Revolution Make?, Food First, California, 1985, pp. 24-7; see also the tesimony of 
Leonel Espinoza in El Jicaro with the Christian 'Delagates of the Word', in Arias (ed), op. dt., pp. 97-8.
^From the testimony of Monica Baltadano, in M. Randall, Christians in the Nicaraguan Revolution, New Star, 
Vancouver, 1983, p. 166.
76Cabezas, cp. dt., p. 25.
77Arce, op. dt., p. 30. (my translation)
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capitalise upon its increasing prestige and political space it was imperative that the organisation 
outline its project of post-Somoza society. In Hora Cero, Fonseca had argued that "at the present 
time, and for a certain period to come, Nicaragua will be going through a stage in which a 
radical political force will be developing its specific characteristics. Consequently, at the current 
time it is necessary for us to strongly emphasize that our major objective is the socialist 
revolution, a revolution that aims to defeat Yankee imperialism and its local agents, false 
oppositionists and false revolutionaries."78 With this aim in mind, the Directorate of the 
F.S.LN1. outlined its vision of post-revolutionary society. The importance of the 'Historic 
Programme' and its lasting significance cannot be overemphasized. It outlined the 
characteristics of Sandinista socialism and, in all its essentials, provided the framework for the 
revolutionary decrees of 1979 onwards.79
The programme began by defining the F.S.L.N. as a "politico-military organisation" which 
arose from the Nicaraguan peoples' need for a "vanguard organisation", capable of directly 
confronting the military and bureaucratic apparatus of the dictatorship.80 The strategic 
objective of the Frente was the destruction of this apparatus and the "establishment of a 
revolutionary government based on the worker-peasant alliance and the convergence of all 
patriotic and anti-imperialist and anti-oligarchical forces in the country." This could only be 
achieved through confronting the dictatorship "arms in hand" and through "the development of 
a hard-fought and prolonged peoples war."
The revolutionary government would promulgate a full range of political and cultural 
freedoms, including "full participation of the entire people on national and local levels, respect 
for human rights, freedom of ideas and organisations" (including unions, peasants, youth, 
students, women, cultural and sporting groups), and guarantee asylum of citizens persecuted 
for involvement in revolutionary struggles in other countries. However, persons compromised 
by association with the somocista regime would be either "severely punished" or stripped of 
their political rights.
Economic measures proposed included the expropriation of "the landed estates, factories, 
companies, buildings, means of transportation and other wealth" usurped by the Somoza 
family and their political, military and financial associates. Other concerns targeted for 
nationalisation included "the wealth of all the foreign companies that exploit the mineral, forest, 
maritime and other kind of resources, the banking system and foreign trade." The mass 
transport system would also be 'centralised'. Furthermore, the government would "plan the 
national economy, putting an end to the anarchy characteristic of the capitalist system of 
production." Workers' control would be established "over the administrative management of
78Fonseca, op. d t ,  p. 41.
79In late-1986, seven years after the triumph, 25 years after the founding of the Frente and ten years after Fonseca's 
death, the Sandinista paper Barricada International ran a check-list, comparing post-revolutionary performance against 
the 1969 programme.
80The programme is reprinted in Borge et al, op. dt., pp. 13-22. All subsequent references are taken from this 
translation.
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the factories and other wealth that are expropriated and nationalised.”81
Although the nature of the post-revolutionary social formation was not explicitly stated, it 
was apparent that the Frente recognised that a variety of modes of production would coexist 
alongside (or beneath) the revolutionary state sector. The state itself would function in varying 
capacities as a productive, distributive, administrative and regulative body, responsible for 
directing and planning the development of the economy. This can be implied from the 
restrictive nature of nationalisation and the sectors of the programme dealing with 'the agrarian 
revolution'.
An authentic agrarian reform would be instituted involving a massive redistribution of land 
in favour of small producers. Capitalist and feudal estates would be "expropriated and 
abolished", although provision was made (as in the industrial sector) to "protect patriotic 
landowners who collaborated with the guerrilla struggle, by paying them for their landholdings 
that exceed the limit established by the revolutionary government." The land would be given to 
the peasantry free of charge "in accordance with the principle that the land should belong to 
those who work it." However, no mention was made concerning the management of the 
expropriated somocista capitalist estates.
The state would also guarantee the peasantry agricultural credit, marketability and technical 
assistance, as well as the planning of livestock raising. Furthermore, it would "stimulate and 
encourage the peasants to organise themselves into cooperatives" with the view to their taking 
"their destiny into their own hands". Thus, the tendency would be towards creating a large 
petty-commodity producing mass of small rural proprietors, with the state controlling market 
and credit facilities. Through the former somocista estates and cooperatives the state would 
provide the peasantry with concrete examples of a more social form of agrarian production.
Other sections of the programme included a new labour code, reincorporation of the Atlantic 
Coast into the national economy, the emancipation of women, respect for religious beliefs, an 
independent foreign policy, solidarity with anti-imperialist struggles and the replacement of the 
Guardia with a "patriotic, revolutionary, and peoples army." The state would "establish 
obligatory military service and will arm the students, workers and farmers who - organised in 
people's militias - will defend the rights won against the inevitable attack by the reactionary 
forces of the country and Yankee imperialism."
The development of the Historic Programme fulfilled an important function in the prevailing 
political climate. Given previous experiences, there was a danger that concentration upon 
immediate barrio and workers' demands would disperse the Frente's cadre resources and play 
into the hands of the traditional opposition. However, the programme functioned as a unifying 
beacon, channelling the diverse activities within intermediate organisations inspired by the
^The focus of planning would be "industrialisation and electrification", which appears to be a somewhat outmoded 
reference to Soviet development planning at the 8th Soviet Congress in December 1920.See V.I. Lenin, Collected Works: 
Vol. 31, Progress, Moscow, 1977, pp. 532-3.
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Frente. As Borge recalled, "we differed from other groups that made immediate demands their 
final aims. For us they were instead a means for seeking out the best individuals among the 
people and instilling in them the notion that they must organise for the taking of power."82 The 
programme provided cadres and intermediate organisations with a unifying vision of the 
content and form of this power, and stressed that its realisation was contingent upon a popular 
insurrectionary war.
j
These military, political and ideological activities during the late-1960's and early-1970's were 
consistent with the strategy of a prolonged people's war. Rejecting both putschism and 
economism, the Sandinistas engaged in developing covert organisational links with the popular 
classes. The accumulation of cadres and sympathisers proceeded silently, while instilling the 
intermediate organisations with the necessity of armed popular uprising. Clandestine 
operations, conducted under the cover of these groups, widened the influence of the Frente in a 
manner which belied its small underground nuclei of cadres.
However, by 1974 serious questions began to emerge over the effectiveness of a prolonged 
and silent accumulation of forces. Since Pancasan, the Frente had concentrated its attention 
upon work among the popular classes. As the traditional opposition re-emerged after the 
earthquake of 1972, the Frente was forced to reconsider the appropriateness of silent 
accumulation, and the need to develop an appropriate purposive response to the growing 
discontent across the political spectrum.
The insurrectionary timetable envisaged on the basis of a prolonged peoples war could 
accommodate a clandestine and gradual accumulation of forces for a distant and unspecified 
future popular insurrection. However, unforseen events triggering political crises force 
revolutionary movements to immediately reappraise the historical conjuncture and develop an 
aprropriate response. As Lenin stressed in 1917, sudden historical turns can make yesterday's 
slogans and yesterday's praxis obsolete overnight. Unless the revolutionary party can adapt to 
the change, they will inevitably be unable to keep up with events. In 1974 the Sandinistas were 
faced with this same 'suddenness' and were forced to reconsider the effectiveness of then- 
previous strategy. A number of conflicting evaluations of the historical conjuncture emerged 
provoking an acute organisational and ideological crisis.
5.6. THE CRISIS OF THE MID-1970'S
Through their silent accumulation of forces the Sandinistas had created organic links within 
the popular classes. Yet, despite these links the Sandinistas were unable to lead the anti- 
dictatorial movement as it re-emerged after the earthquake. As observed in Chapter 3, Somoza's 
direct assumption of power after the disaster, moral revulsion over his misappropriation of 
international relief and his encroachment into the traditional commercial pastures of the 
bourgeoisie, provoked a revitalisation of the traditional opposition.
“ Borge, "The FSLN...", p. 115.
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In late-1974 this opposition once more coalesced into a united front against the dictatorship 
under the umbrella of the Democratic Union of Liberation (U.D.E.L.). Basing themselves on past 
experience the Frente refused to support the coalition, perceiving the dangers of a historical 
rerun of previous bourgeois initiatives such as the Arguero-led U.N.O. in 1967. On the other 
hand, the P.S.N. which had led a series of construction worker strikes throughout 1973, 
participated in U.D.E.L. The Frente argued that U.D.E.L.'s platform fell short of a revolutionary 
government led by the popular classes and sought only the democratisation of the existing 
structure. If U.D.E.L. became the hegemonic centre in the mobilisation against the dictatorship, 
the Sandinistas feared that their rejection of armed struggle and popular initiative would lead 
only to another episode in Nicaragua's tragic political history, another round of co-optation and 
the reaffirmation of the myth of dictatorial omnipotence.83
This political conjuncture called for an active response from the F.S.L.N. in order to promote 
the armed option as the only viable alternative to the dictatorship. This need to reassert 
themselves in the national political arena was made more imperative by a series of military and 
organisational setbacks during 1973 and 1974. While the traditional opposition gained 
momentum throughout 1974 in the cities, the Sandinistas' guerrilla front was being forced back 
upon defensive rearguard actions to protect their rural footholds in the face of increasing 
Guardia counter-insurgency. While most accounts of the period claim that somocista repression 
escalated after December 1974, this was only true for urban areas. In the countryside, as the 
F.S.L.N. communique the nation in late-1974 stated, since "the month of September 1973 the 
Guardia National and the jueces de mesta have intensified the repression and persecution of the 
peasantry".84 The Guardia was acting less discriminately in the rural areas due partly to their 
inability and unwillingness to distinguish between guerrillas and peasants. The Sandinistas, 
learning from past experiences of peasant recruitment, had developed a network of irregular 
peasant guerrillas (guerrillos de medio tiempo) who remained on the land supplying sanctuary 
and military reinforcements for the regular guerrilla force.85
Furthermore, the policy of accumulating forces in silence had been undermined by Guardia 
imprisonment of invaluable cadres and sensational urban shootouts at discovered safehouses. 
In one shootout in Nadaime in 1973 the Frente had lost four leaders, Gonzales, Turcios, Morales 
and Quezada.86 Although campaigns by intermediate organisations to release political 
prisoners and a series of hunger strikes were launched, they failed to provoke any response
83See the analysis of the opposition spectrum in S. Jonas, "Nicaragua", in NACLA'S Latin America and Empire Report, 
Vol. 10, No. 2, Feb. 1976, pp. 29-34.
34El Frente Sandinista de Liberadon Nadonal, "A El Pueblo Nicaraguense", reprinted as an appendix in Wheelock, 
Hacia..., pp. 90-1. (my translation) A chronology of rural repression between September 1973 and December 1974 
appears in pp. 92-8.
^This was first suggested by Fonseca in "Cero Hora”, written in 1969. See also Bayardo Arce's tesimony in Arias (ed), 
op. dt., p. 92.
86See Alida Bends' testimony in Arias (ed), op. d t ,  pp. 88-9.
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from the dictatorship.87
Consequently, in order to regain the urban initiative, relieve pressure upon the rural armed 
front, and secure the release of incarcerated cadres, the F.S.L.N. finally decided to break with 
their silent strategy through a proactive initiative against a core symbol of the dictatorship. On 
December 27, 1974, the 'Juan Jose Quezado' Combat Unit of the F.S.LJN. gate-crashed a party 
held by Somoza confidant 'Chema' Castillo in honour of the U.S. ambassador Turner Sheldon, 
and held the entire company hostage. Eduardo Contrares, the commander of the unit, later 
recalled the objectives of the action:
Besides the concrete motives of obtaining the liberation of 18 imprisoned Sandinistas, the 
operation had other objectives: to deal a shattering blow to the somocista dictatorship and to be 
able to communicate to the world the tragic situation which Nicaragua endured as a consequence 
of governmental repression, administrative corruption and other equally serious matters....The 
action is a response of the people to the constant intensive repression that the enemy conducts in 
the mountains in the north of Nicaragua, the countryside and the cities...We consider this 
political action as the initiation of a war of liberation in which broad popular sectors will come to 
participate.88
Somoza was forced to concede to the immediate demands of the group89, including the 
publication of two Sandinista communiques in Somoza's press. This gave the population its 
first opportunity to freely listen to, and read, the programme, philosophy and strategy of the 
Frente. The action not only reaffirmed the prestige of the movement in the eyes of the popular 
classes, it also provided concrete evidence of the effectiveness of audacious armed action, 
exposed the vulnerability of the dictatorship, and deflated the myth of its invincibility. As 
Black observes; "After taking the brief initiative in 1973 and 1974, the P.S.N. could hardly deny 
that the Chema Castillo operation had done more to radicalise the working class, by directly 
linking major wage increases to a political document denouncing the crimes of the dictatorship, 
than any number of strikes and peaceful forms of 'civic action'."90
The response from the dictatorship was to decree a state of emergency and intensify and 
extend repression into the urban arena. This further accelerated the international isolation of the 
regime, polarised the opposition and further legitimised the armed solution. The repression in 
the northern regions of Matagalpa and Jinotega was particularly severe. Church workers and 
international organisations began to inform the world of rural human rights conditions. The 
increase in urban repression and the severity of counter-insurgency in the mountains combined 
with international attention resulted in the incoming Carter administration in the U.S. using 
Somoza as a test-case for its 'human-rights' policy.
87See Wheelock, Hacia..., pp. 77-8.
^Quoted in ibid, pp. 78-9. (my translation)
89The Frente presented Somoza with six main demands: 1) liberation of the political prisoners; 2) five million dollars 
in low denomination and numerically indiscriminate bills; 3) immediate decree of a law raising the minimum salary of 
the most exploited Nicaraguan workers, including the soldiers of the National Guard; 4) total suspension of repressive 
measures; 5) immediate publication of the FSLN communiques in the principal press outlets; 6) complete freedom of the 
press. Unidad de Combate 'Juan Jose Quezada', op. dt., pp. 111-3.
^Black, op. dt., p. 88.
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While the Chema Castillo operation was designed partially to take heat off the northern 
guerrilla front and counteract accusations from Somoza that the Sandinistas had been 
crushed,91 the resulting repression forced even more legal' militants underground or abroad, 
and dealt heavy blows to the leadership in the mountains. Guerrilla columns lost contact with 
each other and were forced upon a survival footing. In addition, a number of leading cadres 
were killed in combat during 1975 and 1976, including Fonseca, Contrares, Rivera and 
Munguia.
The Castillo operation and subsequent repression opened up an intense period of debate over 
the tactics to be adopted in overthrowing the dictatorship. As Fonseca noted, this debate was 
"no more than an updated and expanded version of the earlier one"92 concerning the 
relationship between the vanguard and the masses, urban and rural activity, underground and 
legal work and alliances with the traditional opposition. The silent accumulation of forces was 
premised upon a prolonged and gradual period of mass mobilisation which would eventually 
prepare the subjective conditions for popular revolt. On the other hand, the Castillo operation 
stressed the purposive role of the revolutionary vanguard in accelerating these preconditions. 
The philosophy behind the action was more overtly Guevarist, arguing that it was not 
necessary "to wait until all conditions for making revolution exist; the insurrection can make 
them". The Sandinistas were forced to ask themselves: to what extent can the revolutionary 
vanguard force the pace of events?
Conflict between various tendencies became acute during 1975. This was exacerbated by the 
disarticulation of the Frente's division of labour. The symbiotic relationship between guerrilla 
columns and mass urban work was undermined and the component parts became isolated 
entities unable to communicate and coordinate action.93 While this form of debate had been a 
constant source of tension since the formation of the Frente, the increased repression, 
disarticulation of activity, the necessity of an immediate response in the current political 
conjuncture and the existence of a strengthened traditional opposition, combined to heighten 
the tension and divide the F.S.L.N. into three tendencies pursuing separate tactics.
During 1974, an urban-based tendency, the Proletarios (T.P.), arose which criticised the 
leadership for its handling of the struggle. Led by Jaime Wheelock, Luis Carrion, Carlos Nunez 
and Roberto Huembes (with initial sympathy from Humberto Ortega and Eduardo Contrares) 
the Tendencia Proletario advocated a reorientation of activity towards the urban sector, based 
upon patient and prolonged mobilisation of the proletariat. Wheelock's book, Imperialismo y
91 US Department of State intelligence had virtually written off the Frente in 1973, claiming that: "Since 1970 the FSLN 
has had little success and in 1972 it was virtually inactive. It presents no threat to the security forces, although its 
estimated 50 activists do retain limited terrorist capabilities." US Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and 
Research, World Strength of the Communist Party Organizations: 25th Annual Report: 1973 Edition, Wahington, July 1973, p. 
152.
^See C  Fonseca, "Last Testament", in Leiken & Rubin (eds), op. dt., p. 165.
93As Borge recalls, "Various perceptions of reality emerged, based upon different experiences, conditioned by this 
division of labour and their isolation." Borge, "The FSLN...", p. 118.
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Dictatura had demonstrated that capitalist relations had accelerated since the World War to the 
extent that the proletariat had to be considered the "director of the revolution". The T.P. laid 
claim to a more consistently Marxist approach based upon the need to develop a class-based 
vanguard party. The F.S.L.N. had to project a more consistent class programme of action 
designed at "organising, educating, mobilising and directing the mass struggle for socialism 
and national liberation." The T.P. accused the national leadership of maintaining in essence a 
Toco' approach, which assigned the guerrilla, supported by the peasantry, as the subject of 
history. According to the T.P., "the F.S.L.N. link to the masses seeks not so much to strengthen 
the popular organisations as to reinforce its own internal infrastructure." Wheelock also 
criticised the Chema Castillo raid, arguing that 'putschism', 'adventurism' and 'senseless 
offensives' were no substitution to the difficult, patient process of urban mass organisation and 
the development of class consciousness through the workers' direct experience.94
In October 1975 the National Directorate decided to expel the T.P. on disciplinary grounds. 
The focal point of T.P. criticism up to this point had been directed against the members of the 
National Directorate who remained closest to the strategy which had been elaborated between 
1970 and 1974; the strategy of a prolonged peoples war. As demonstrated above, this strategy 
was based upon a particular interpretation of Guevara's theory of guerrilla warfare which 
argued that in Latin America the countryside was the main arena of armed struggle. Those who 
retained this emphasis became known as the G.P.P.Gwerra Popular Prolongada. The articulation 
of rural armed struggle with urban mass mobilisation had been a constant practical dilemma 
for the Frente and under current conditions the guerrilla had been disconnected from its urban 
lifeline. Remaining close to the idea of a prolonged peoples war, Fonseca admitted that the 
military and political conjuncture of forces had created serious problems for the Frente. 
However, he accused the T.P. of undermining unity and distorting the position of the majority. 
The T.P. "deviation" was the consequence of 'a state of veritable desparation' caused by the 
difficulties the Frente was encountering due to the Guardia offensive.90
The deaths of leading cadres, and the imprisonment of Borge, had reduced the National 
Directorate to 6 members by the beginning of 1977. A clear majority within the Directorate 
began elaborating a strategy throughout 1977 which was critical of both the T.P. and the G.P.P. 
This third, or tercerista tendency (known as the 'insurrectionists') based their appraisal of events 
upon the need to maintain mass mobilisation through a combination of audacious attacks upon 
the Guardia and broad-based internal and international pressure upon the dictatorship. 
According to the insurrectionists, the T.P. had merely adapted the strategy of passively 
accumulating forces from the rural to the urban arena. The F.S.L.N. could not accumulate forces 
in silence while "standing on the sidelines".96 Despite the weaknesses of Frente organisation
94See "FSLN-Proletarian Tendency", in Leiken & Rubin (eds), op. dt., p. 161-4. See also P. Hernandez, "Inside the 
F.S.L.N.", ibid, pp. .158-60.
95"Fonseca, op. dt., p. 165.
%See M. Hamecker, "Nicaragua - The Strategy of Vidory: Interview with Humberto Ortega", in Borge et al., op. dt., 
p. 58.
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and numerical strength, it was essential that it transcend its defensive strategy. The vanguard 
should be compelled to take the military initiative against the dictatorship in an attempt to 
accelerate the insurrectional potential of the popular classes. The defensive had to be overcome 
"while avoiding the twin pitfalls of adventurism and an overly conservative analysis of this 
difficult and precarious situation."97 The 'conservatism' of the G.P.P. and the T.P. was 
attributed to their inability to analyse the totality of social relations during the existing 
conjuncture. Concentrating upon organising the proletariat or the peasantry was no guarantee 
of success if the vanguard was unable to correctly assess the strength of the enemy, whether 
Somoza or the traditional opposition. In other words, the accumulation of forces had to be 
premised upon a more dialectic analysis of the contending forces within the matrix of class 
relations; not merely the 'passive', gradual strengthening of the popular classes (whether led by 
the peasantry or the proletariat) but also upon the degree of unity within the bourgeois camp 
and its relationship with the dictatorship. As Daniel Ortega pointed out: "We measured 
accumulation not merely in material terms but also in terms of the dynamics of the enemy's 
decomposition."98 Given the current conjuncture of forces, unless the Frente was able to 
transcend the narrowness of the social perspective pursued by the T.P. and the G.P.P., the 
opposition bourgeoisie would assume hegemony over the movement. More than either of the 
other two tendencies, the insurrectionists stressed the purposive role of the revolutionary party 
in heightening and promoting a revolutionary situation.
The conflict between the three tendencies was centred on the tactics the Frente should adopt in 
the climate of Somoza's repressive offensive. All tendencies retained the twin tenets of armed 
struggle and popular insurrection. The distinguishing characteristic of the insurrectionist 
tendency was its stress on the purposive role of the vanguard in heightening the social and 
political contradictions within the social system. Unless the Frente actively intervened on the 
national political level, the traditional opposition would continue to present itself as the only 
viable challenger to Somoza through dressing itself up in new clothes. The insurrectionists 
were more acutely aware of the danger that the heightening social tension could be defused if 
the anti-dictatorial coalition remained under the hegemony of the traditional opposition. To 
combat this possibility the insurrectionists devoted more attention to weakening the moderate 
challenge of the traditional opposition, and attracting the most uncompromising opponents of 
Somoza towards the popular insurrectionary strategy. The tendency also appealed to foreign 
Social Democrats in the effort to isolate Somoza. This emphasis on the purposive intervention 
of the vanguard and the exploitation of contradictions within the traditional opposition led to 
charges by the T.P. that the insurrectionists represented "the most retrograde positions of the 
petit-bourgeoisie" within the Frente. Yet, despite its stress on broad-based coalition-building 
and voluntarism, the insurrectionists retained the same strategic vision of the nature of the 
revolutionary process and the nature of the post-Somoza state as the other tendencies. This was
^Ibid, pp. 57-8.
98Quoted in Black, op. dt., p. 95.
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demonstrated in their May 1977 General Military-Political Platform."
In this document the insurrectionists maintained that "our most general strategy is that of the 
Popular Sandinista Revolution or Prolonged Popular War, which will lead us to national liberation 
and social liberation, towards socialism". The present phase, they argued, involved "the stem 
preparations of the minimum basic conditions for leading the people to insurrection by means of 
a process of Revolutionary Civil War." In terms of class, the document argued that "the working 
class is the fundamental force of the revolutionary process and that we should always depend on 
it above all else. Its force, development and organisation will be the guarantees of achieving the 
much desired socialist society." However, they also emphasized the role of coalition-building, 
claiming that "unless it has the tight support of all other popular sectors, especially the peasants 
and the petit-bourgeoisie, composed of intellectuals and students", the working class could not 
achieve its revolutionary goal.
The insurrectionists philosophy bore a resemblance to Lenin's understanding of the 
relationship between the party, class and revolution. The insurrection and revolution were 
necessary steps towards the transition to socialism, and this possibility could only be realised if 
the revolutionary forces were mobilised by a vanguard operating under the guidance of 
Marxist -Leninist theory.
To break the chains that bind our country to the yoke of foreign imperialism is the determining 
factor in our struggle for national liberation. Breaking the yoke of exploitation and oppression 
imposed by the dominant reactionary forces over our masses determines our process of social 
liberation. Both historical enterprises will advance together, indissolubly, if their exists a Marxist- 
Leninist cause and a solid vanguard to direct this process.
The present struggle against tyranny should lead us to a true democracy of the people (not a 
bourgeois democracy) that will form an integral part of the struggle for socialism. Our struggle 
should never be left midway, even if conciliatory bourgeois forces should strive for such a goal.
The popular-democratic phase should be, for the Sandinista cause, a means used for 
consolidating its revolutionary position and organising the masses, so that the process moves 
unequivocally toward socialism. The necessary popular-democratic revolutionary phase, to be 
fulfilled once the tyranny is toppled, should not lead us to capitalism, reformism, nationalism, or 
any other development.100
It is therefore inappropriate to view the insurrectionists as a 'social democratic7 or moderate 
wing within the Frente.101 Their emphasis upon coalition-building was premised on the 
hegemonic role of the Frente and the acceptance of armed popular insurrection.
The insurrectionists were placed in a more favourable position to accomplish the reunification 
of the three tendencies. Their capacity and willingness to strike spectacular military blows
"While this document is not signed by any particular tendency, it was dearly written by the insurrectionists. 
Humberto Ortega daimed responsibility for writing it in an interview with Martha Hamecker, and it appears in a 
collection of his military writings. See Ortega, op. dt. Nolan, op. dt., pp. 66-7, Valenta &c Duran (eds), p. 286; and 
D. Qose, Nicaragua: Politics, Economics and Society, Pinter, U>«Aoo, 1988, pp. 112-3, all attribute the document to the 
insurrectionists.
100F.S.L.N., (May 1977), op. dt., p. 302.
101See Black, op. dt., p. 92; See also J.F. Petras, "Whither the Sandinista Revolution?”, Monthly Review, Odober 1979, p. 
14.
173
could relieve pressure on the beleaguered Northern guerrillas, and their strengthening 
international diplomatic links could exert pressure on the dictatorship to relieve the repression 
which was hindering mass mobilisation. As the broad-based political pressure mounted against 
the dictatorship, the Sandinistas could only present themselves as a viable challenger to the 
polity if they succeeded in achieving greater coordination and effecting a "practical division of 
revolutionary labour".102
If the conflict between the three tendencies within the Frente had been over fundamental 
issues, then it would be expected that any tactical agreements between them would have 
simply papered over disagreements which would resurface at a future point in time. However, 
as will be discussed in the last section, once each tendency came to the recognition that a 
revolutionary situation had emerged the process of reunification proceeded relatively 
smoothly. This was due to the fact that the principle reason for disagreement had been lifted; 
namely over tactical preparations for a revolutionary situation and its timing. Once this obstacle 
to unification had been removed, the tendencies were able to operate as divisions of 
revolutionary labour on their specialist terrains in pursuit of their strategic goal; the transition 
to socialism through popular insurrection.
5.7. TOWARDS THE SEIZURE OF POWER
The revolutionary situation in Nicaragua proceeded through three phases, and was 
complicated by the existence of two main challengers to the polity. The first period was 
characterised by the hegemony of the traditional bourgeois opposition over the anti-dictatorial 
movement. The second phase was characterised by the changing fortunes of the two 
challengers. The bourgeois opposition was unwilling and unable to take the purposive initiative 
against the dictatorship, and began to look towards the United States for an ally against 
Somoza's intransigence. However, as the bourgeoisie began to lose the initiative the anti- 
dictatorial movement did not automatically fall under the hegemony of the alternative 
challenger, the F.S.L.N. In order to emerge as the legitimate challenger to the polity, the Frente 
had to grasp the political initiative through a series of audacious military assaults on the regime 
and activate the the organic links which it had established with the mass movement during the 
preceding period. Furthermore, each move had to be calculated to inflict the greatest possible 
damage to the moderate challenge and counteract attempts to save the polity. In these 
calculations the Sandinistas applied insurrection as an art. The third phase of the revolutionary 
situation involved the undisputed hegemony of the Frente over the anti-dictatorial movement. 
This period, beginning in the early months of 1979 introduced a condition of dual power and 
the transformation of the Frente's accumulated political forces into the co-ordinated military 
body which accomplished the popular insurrection.
The Nicaraguan Revolution supports the claim of this thesis that once a revolutionary 
situation has emerged, its revolutionary outcome is determined by military and political factors.
102Lopez et al., op. dt., p. 176.
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It is at this stage that structural theories must give way to the purposive role of revolutionary 
parties in conditions of multiple sovereignty.
No single event brought on the revolutionary situation in Nicaragua. As demonstrated in 
Chapter 3 the social tension which was inherent within the structure of somocista development 
manifested itself during the late-1970's through Somoza's encroachment on the traditional areas 
of non-somocista entrepreneurship. As well as isolating the bourgeoisie Somoza had also 
incurred the wrath of the Catholic Church hierarchy, which was not unwilling to communicate 
its distaste of the dictatorship's repression to the public. The Carter administration had also 
distanced itself from the U.S.'s most loyal ally, and attacked Somoza for his human rights 
record. Although the popular classes remained relatively disorganised, and the F.S.L.N. was on 
the military defensive, this provided little comfort to Somoza. Appearances suggested that a 
powerful variety of factors were favourable for the success of the moderate solution.
Under the impression that the Frente had been crushed, and under domestic and international 
pressure, Somoza lifted the 33 month state of seige and martial law in September 1977. The 
immediate result was an upsurge in oppositional activity. Throughout October the traditional 
opposition, led by U.D.E.L., took advantage of the lifting of censorship in order to mount a 
campaign for a 'national dialogue' to negotiate the conditions for Somoza's departure.103 While 
the P.S.N. added their voice to the chorus calling for a dialogue, the F.S.L.N. tendencies rejected 
it on both historical and programmatic grounds. Historically, the Frente pointed back to the 
long line of U.D.E.L. descendents which had clammered loudly for reform only to be silenced 
by co-option and repression. Programmatically, the Sandinistas argued that U.D.E.L.'s 
programme fell short of the real democratisation of Nicaraguan society, calling for the 
departure of Somoza while leaving the structure of somocismo substantially intact. No solution 
to the social and political crisis was possible without the direct participation of the popular 
classes.
Acknowledging both the mobilisation of the traditional opposition and the weakness of the 
popular forces, the insurrectionists embarked upon a political and military offensive in mid- 
October. The aim was to reassert the existence of an alternative challenger to the polity and 
frustrate any intensions the moderate opposition may have had for establishing somocismo sin 
Somoza (somozaism without Somoza). The insurrectionists recognised that without mass 
participation, a spectacular military action (golpe) would be primarily a propaganda exercise 
aimed at advertising the fact that 33 months of intense repression had failed to destroy the 
Sandinistas. Basing themselves upon an active rather than a passive political strategy, they hoped 
that a purposive action which gained national attention could signal an opening volley in the 
popular insurrectionary phase.
Between 13-15 October the guerrillas co-ordinated three hit-and-run raids on Guardia barracks 
in Masaya, Ocotal and San Carlos. The T.P. and the G.P.P. denounced the attacks as adventurist
103See Lopez et al., op. dt., pp. 140-63.
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acts which would be used by Somoza as an excuse to intensify repression against the popular 
classes.104 The insurrectionists responded by pointing out that a popular movement without 
revolutionary leadership would, in all likelihood, support the moderate challenge initiated by 
the bourgeois opposition. In order to prevent this possibility, it was necessary for the Frente to 
intervene in the political arena and announce their challenge through a military blow at the 
dictatorship. Humberto Ortega, in a later interview, claimed that if the insurrectionists had 
accepted the charges of adventurism this would have meant "falling prey to the big show the 
imperialists were mounting with all the talk about the bourgeois-democratic way out, in which 
the trade-union movement was to participate. For us, it was preferable that such a castrated 
trade union movement not be formed."105 Thus, while being sensitive to the charges of 
voluntarism, the insurrectionists acted with the purpose of widening the political choices open 
to the population. Basing themselves on existing political conditions their praxis was directed at 
creating new conditions.
Immediately after the attacks, the insurrectionists organised a declaration, issued from Costa 
Rica and signed by twelve Nicaraguans with "impeccable professional credentials", calling 
upon all "socially conscious Nicaraguans to solve our country's anguishing national problem 
with the participation of the National Sandinista Liberation Front".106 The purpose of this 
group, Los Doce, was to maintain pressure upon the moderate opposition and ensure that no 
solution could be reached which excluded the F.S.L.N.
By the beginning of 1978 the bourgeoisie still appeared to be the strongest challenger to the 
dictatorship. However, it found itself incapable of taking the struggle beyond proclamations 
and manifestos calls for dialogue. This peaceful and 'responsible' strategy was partly based 
upon their fear and respect for the United States. U.D.E.L. wanted to avoid being portrayed as 
violent insurgents taking the law into their own hands.
It was the Guardia itself which provided the accelerating impulse which brought the first 
phase of the revolutionary situation to a climax through assassinating Pedro Joachim 
Chamorro, the editor of the opposition newspaper, La Prensa, on January 10, 1978. This 
cataclysmic event culminated in spontaneous popular demonstrations throughout Managua 
and resulted in the symbolic destruction of somocista property.
The response of the bourgeoisie is informative, and brings into question Henri Weber's claim 
that "the bourgeois opposition itself opened up the crisis of the Somoza regime and actually led 
the first phase of the revolution."107 While it is accurate to say that the bourgeois opposition 
was the best organised challenger at this moment, its reponse to the uprisings of January and
104See the communiques of both factions in Lopez et al., op. dt. pp. 158-9.
10SHamecker, op. dt., p. 62.
106On the creation of los Doce and its manifesto, see S Ramirez, "Interview", and Los Doce, "Manifesto", in Leiken & 
Rubin (eds), op. dt., pp. 170-3.
107Weber, op. dt., p. 33.
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February demonstrated that they were unwilling to transcend their traditional strategy and take 
the initiative of mobilising the popular sectors. Thus, at the very outset of the revolutionary 
situation the bourgeois alternative proved to be ineffective and hesitant. Its proclivity towards 
elite mobilisation and formal negotiation immediately placed itself at a distance from the 
popular classes. In contrast, the Sandinista's response was directly interventionist, harassing the 
Guardia and activating the organic links it had established with intermediate organisations. 
Neither the bourgeois opposition nor the Sandinistas led the first phase of the revolution, just as 
neither the bourgeoisie nor the Bolsheviks led the February Revolution. In both cases the 
insurgent population initially looked towards the moderate reponse, and in both cases the 
moderate reponse was hesitant. In the face of this hesitancy, the Sandinistas and the Bolsheviks 
had to demonstrate through purposive action that they were a legitimate challenger. The 
Nicaraguan case is complicated by the fact that the condition of multiple sovereignty involved 
three, rather than two, centres of power. Nevertheless, this does not alter the fundamental 
similarities in the process of mobilisation.
Thirteen days after Chamorro's murder, the bourgeoisie responded with an employers' strike. 
The attempt to keep it within peaceful channels was undermined as workers, students and 
popular organisations were provided with the time and space to organise and co-ordinate their 
specific demands. Furthermore, Somoza's stake in production and distribution undermined the 
economic effectiveness of the employers' action. Within a week divisions emerged over the 
prolongation of the dispute, as the bourgeoisie recognised that the militancy of the popular 
sectors had transcended the limited demands of the traditional opposition. Meanwhile, the 
insurrectionalists held the cities of Rivas and Granada for a number of hours, and the G.P.P. 
launched military offensives in the North. In late-February, as U.D.E.L. was losing credibility 
due to its unwillingness or inability to lead or direct the increasing militancy, the barrio of 
Monimbo in Masaya erupted in open insurrection after provocation from the Guardia during a 
demonstration marking the anniversary of Sandino's death. The uprising was spontaneous, 
although the Frente attempted to support it through infiltrating members into the besieged 
area. However, the isolated character of the rising allowed the Guardia to concentrate its 
ferocity upon the area, and after a week of aerial assault and troop reinforcements, the district 
was pacified. As this occurred, the indian barrio of Subtavia in Leon (a Sandinista stronghold 
since the early-1970's108) rose in arms. U.D.E.L., recognising that events were overtaking the 
moderate solution, called for a one-day strike, which only received a minimal response.
In the months following the Monimbo insurrection the bourgeois challenge to the polity 
remained characterised by elite mobilisation, while the Sandinistas took the initiative in 
strengthening its challenge through moves towards internal unification and popular 
mobilisation. Despite the fact that the dictatorship was unable to overcome its crisis of 
legitimacy, the bourgeoisie was unable to innovate an effective strategy to confront the polity. It 
continued to prefer negotiating power, and baulked at any means to seize power. After 
Chamorro's murder, Alfonso Robelo, president of I.N.D.E., formed the M.D.N., a party which
108See Cabezas, op. dt., chs 4 & 5.
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simply reiterated U.D.E.L.'s platform, and providing more evidence that the traditional 
opposition were wasting their time pouring old wine into new bottles. In May, U.D.E.L. and the 
M.D.N. united the traditional opposition under another broad front, the Frente Arnplio Opositor, 
(F.A.O.).109 The P.S.N. and Los Doce decided to participate in the venture. The insurrectionists 
supported the presence of Los Doce as an opportunity to develop a tactical alliance with the 
more militant sectors of the opposition. Robelo immediately tied the movement to the treadmill 
of Nicaraguan tragic political history by arguing that he was convinced that Somoza and his 
family could be persuaded to leave peacefully by the end of the year.
On the other hand, the F.S.LJM. exploited the lull in open insurrection in order to politically 
maneuver itself into the position of the legitimate challenger to the polity. The spontaneous 
popular uprisings of February had removed most of the obstacles blocking the path to 
reunification. Contrary to most expectations, it had been the masses which had led the events, 
leaving the politico-military 'vanguard' unprepared. All tendencies recognised that a prolonged 
period of consciousness-raising could not correspond with the immediate tasks of the moment. 
Through renouncing the insurrectionary option, the bourgeoisie presented the F.S.L.N. with a 
unique opportunity to propagandise its ideology throughout the popular movement and 
provide it with direction. The conjuncture gave the Frente the time and space to seize the 
initiative and accumulate the popular forces around an alternative front and highlight the 
distinction between the bourgeois option and the Sandinista project for popular social 
revolution.
The three tendencies began a process of uniting their forces into a more harmonious division 
of labour which would act as a co-ordinating politico-military centre for the ultimate assault on 
the dictatorship. They were able to regroup and activate the organic links which they had 
developed through the intermediate organisations during the prolonged period of silent 
accumulation. While the spontaneous nature of the upsurge in urban militancy cannot be 
denied, it was also influenced to a large degree by the numerous nuclei of popular 
organisations which assisted the co-ordination and channelling of activity. The T.P. had been 
active in organising workers' cells and the student youth. The Sandinistas' links with radical 
Christians also facilitated the establishment of local barrio defense efforts, and these efforts later 
spawned the more structured Civil Defense Committees, which acted as alternative forms of 
local government during the final offensive. As noted before, by late-1977 the Sandinistas had 
also created a nationwide rural workers' association, the A.T.C. which published its first 
national newsletter, El Machete, in April 1978. Also in 1977 a women's movement associated 
with the Frente, AMPRONAC, was founded which addressed the grievances of all women 
opposed to the dictatorship. Many of these women had been initiated into the anti-Somoza 
struggle through their involvement in campaigns to release political prisoners.110 Patricia
:09The programme of the F.A.O. is reprinted in Lopez et al., op. d t , pp. 357-9.
110While Black claims that AMPRONAC was formed 'spontaneously', Lea Guido, an FSLN militant argues that the 
initiative came from a note she received from Wheelock in April 1977. The FSLN had failed in two previous attempts to 
mobilise women. See Randall, Sandino's Daughters, op. dt., p. 2.
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Flynn estimates that women represented 30% of Frente membership by 1979, although Vilas has 
provided much lower figures based on a sampling technique and concludes that during the 
final offensive women's participation "seems to have taken place fundamentally in support 
tasks: as message carriers, providing safe houses, providing food and medicines, hiding and 
moving arms, clandestine hospital attention, and the like."111 However, as Linda Reifs analysis 
of women in Latin American guerrilla movements points out, the role of women was 
exceptionally high in relation to other guerrilla movements, and taking into consideration the 
structurally subordinate role of women in Latin American society.112
Apart from these worker, peasant, women and barrio organisations each of the three 
tendencies had recruited students, although the G.P.P. was the strongest due to its links with 
the prestigious F.E.R. However, the main role of the G.P.P. within this new division of labour 
remained the vertebral column of guerrilla struggle in the countryside. The insurrectionists on 
the other hand performed an important role mobilising support among the radicalised 
Christians, academics and the middle class. Apart from organising armed combat units in the 
urban areas, they also linked the Sandinistas diplomatically to the outside world.
Numerically, membership remained small. Weber estimates that by 1977 cadres numbered 
200,113 while Booth estimates that by mid-1978 "all three F.S.L.N. tendencies probably 
numbered between 500 and 1,000 armed regulars."114 The F.S.L.N. retained a strict distinction 
between militants, pre-militants and sympathisers. Due to clandestinity, open proclamation of 
F.S.L.N. membership remained impossible. Legal workers and sympathisers operated through 
channelling the activities of the intermediate organisations and other organisations towards the 
strategic vision of the Frente. This organisational strategy gave the appearance that the 
Sandinistas were both everywhere, yet nowhere. Under these conditions Guardia repression 
became increasingly indiscriminate and the outward spiralling target of violence soon 
contributed to a situation in which Somoza appeared to be at war with an entire nation.
As support for the Sandinista platform grew it became necessary to establish a broad front 
organisation which would challenge the F.A.O. on the national level for hegemony over the 
struggle against the polity. With this object in mind the Sandinistas formed the Movimiento del 
Pueblo Unido (M.P.U.) in July. The movement, which eventually incorporated 23 political and 
civic organisations was designed to facilitate the unification of the revolutionary sectors. Its 
programme, in all the essential details, reflected the Sandinistas' Historic Programme of 1969.110
By the beginning of August a delicate political balance had emerged. As in all conditions of
m See P. Flynn, "Women Challenge the Myth", in NACLA'S Report on the Americas, M arch/April 1980, p. 37; Vilas, op. 
dt., p. 109.
n2L.L. Reif, "Women in Latin American Guerrilla Movements", Comparative Politics, January 1986.
113Weber, op. dt., p. 55. 
lu Booth, op. dt., p. 145.
usThe programme is reprinted in Lopez et al., op. dt., pp. 360-72.
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multiple sovereignty, this balance was inherently unstable. The Somoza polity was aligned 
against the twin challenge of the F.A.O. and the M.P.U. In this tension a single initiative can 
disturb the delicately poised balance, and the difference between victory and defeat depends 
primarily upon purposive action informed by an artful understanding of insurrection. The 
Sandinistas feared that the Guardia was planning to seize the initiative through a coup which 
would remove Somoza and install a civil-military junta with the most unprincipled sectors of 
the F.A.O. Throughout August rumours circulated around Managua. Weighing up its political 
implications the Sandinistas feared that it could demobilise the popular challenge and decided 
to take pre-emtive measures to block it.
On August 22, in a perfectly executed operation, 26 Sandinistas stormed the National Palace 
in Managua and held the entire House of Deputies hostage.116 Their release was conditional 
upon a sum of money, the release of 85 Sandinista prisoners and the publication of an F.S.L.N. 
communique which reaffirmed the M.P.U. programme. After two days of seige, Somoza was 
forced to concede to the demands and the insurgents, with their released prisoners, flew to 
Panama. The Guardia were unable to prevent the Caraterra Norte from being paved with red and 
black flags demonstrating support for the F.S.LNI.
The episode provoked an immediate response from all contending parties. Somoza purged 
and reorganised the army, confirming the existence of elite discontent within his coterie. On 
August 25,*the F.A.O. attempted to regain the initiative through repeating a call for a national 
stoppage, designed to force Somoza to negotiate over the F.A.O. programme. Support for the 
strike had been strengthened by growing opposition from the bourgeoisie to Somoza's 
intransigence. On the other hand, calls from the F.A.O. for people to stay at home while they 
negotiated were immediately disregarded by the mass movement, indicating the extent to 
which the bourgeoisie had lost the initiative since February.
As the mass movement rejected the calls for a mediated solution, the Sandinistas were faced 
with a dilemma. They did not consider themselves organisationally prepared to lead to mass 
insuurection at this moment, yet the movement was showing signs of transcending the 
bourgeois solution. In their palace communique the Sandinistas revealed their unpreparedness 
when they wrote: "The hour of unity of the revolutionary forces must not be delayed: the path 
to be taken by the popular democratic process depends upon Sandinista unity." The dilemma 
the Sandinistas faced was similar to the Bolsheviks dilemma during the July Days in 1917. As 
Humberto Ortega recalled:
We issued a call for the uprising. A series of events, of objective conditions, came up all of a 
sudden that prevented us from being better prepared. We could not stop the insurrection. The 
mass movement went beyond the vanguard's capacity to take the lead. We certainly could not 
oppose that mass movement, stop that avalanche. On the contrary, we had to put ourselves at the
116The plan had been conceived by Eden Pastora, the leader of the commando unit, in 1970. See the interview with 
Pastora in I. Gonzalez Jansen, Esto Paso En Nicaragua, Extemporaneos, Mexico, 1980, pp. 25-8. For accounts of the details 
of the raid, see G. Garcia Marquez, "Sandinistas Seize the National Palace", New Left Review, 111; and O. Ignatiev &c 
G. Borovik, The Agony of a Dictatorship: A Nicaragauan Cronicle, Progress, Moscow, 1980, pp. 11-19.
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forefront in order to lead it and channel it to a certain extent/*17
The uprising began in Matagalpa at the end of August, and by early-September Esteii, Leon 
and Masaya had been lost by the Guardia, barricades were erected, and authority was placed in 
the hands of local committees of defense. Due to problems of terrain, the uprising in Managua 
was contained by the Guardia. The insurrection resembled the Monimbo uprising on a national 
scale and this characteristic made it vulnerable to repraisal. Its spontaneous, unco-ordinated 
character offered the Guardia the opportunity of pacifying the cities individually. The numerical 
weakness of the guerrillas, combined with the lack of arms and the inability to open rural 
fronts, forced the Frente to assign its cadres to the isolated insurgent cities in a 'war of position'. 
By the end of September, Somoza had retaken each city through concentrating the Guardias 
force upon each town one by one. However, the Frente was able to retreat from the urban areas 
in order, with their ranks swollen by thousands of the most combatant youth fleeing from 
Guardia revenge and reprisals.
The Sandinistas drew an important lesson from the September uprisings. Under Nicaraguan 
conditions, the popular insurrection could not succeed through a war of position which statically 
defended urban strongholds. It was imperative to co-ordinate a mass urban uprising and a 
general insurrectionary strike with armed rural guerrilla assaults. This war of maneuver would 
strain the Guardia through diverting their concentrated forces away from the insurgent cities. 
Once the guerrillas had broken through the Guardia curtain surrounding the cities they could 
enter and liberate the besieged insurgents. The success of this strategy demanded a joint 
politico-military command in order to synchronise urban and rural work. After the September 
uprisings the process of Sandinista unification accelerated.
Although the Guardia was able to pacify the urban revolts by the end of September, Somoza 
was unable to undermine the revolutionary situation. The ferocity of the Guardia only served to 
increase the alienation of the polity, and the population remained mobilised behind the twin 
threat of the F.A.O. and the M.P.U. Somoza also found it increasingly difficult to appeal to the 
United States through using alarmist anti-communist propaganda.
The September events had also demonstrated the extent to which the relationship between the 
two challengers had changed. The F.A.O. had clearly lost the initiative, while the Sandinistas 
had succeeded in articulating an alternative vision corresponding to the active mobilisation of 
the masses.
The F.A.O., increasingly aware that its moderate challenge lacked both a militant social base 
and an effective strategy for getting rid of the dictator, eagerly consented to a proposal by the 
Carter administration to participate in an O.A.S.-sponsored Tri-National Commission for 
Friendly Co-operation which would attempt to negotiate a settlement with Somoza. Both the 
U.S. and the F.A.O. were now actively seeking a moderate solution to the crisis which would
117Hamecker, op. dt., p. 66.
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isolate the growing Sandinista challenge. Both Somoza and the F.A.O. believed that their 
victory was contingent upon the support of the U.S. Neither now possessed the sufficient social 
support or military capacity to overcome the revolutionary crisis on their own.
The unintended consequence of the negotiating process was the further polarisation of the 
political spectrum. The spectacle of the traditional opposition planning Nicaragua's future with 
Somoza under the paternal gaze of the United States provided additional credence to the 
Sandinista charge that the F.A.O. project only sought to remove the man, rather than destroy 
the system. Somoza's intransigence also helped to heighten the awareness that the realisation of 
the F.A.O. project rested on a 'Dominican-type' intervention from the U.S. or the O.A.S.118 The 
Sandinistas exploited this spectacle by presenting themselves as the authentic vehicle for 
national liberation and social transformation. In late-October Los Doce withdrew from the 
negotiations. Their withdrawal precipitated a mass exodus from the F.A.O. during the 
following two months by left and centre organisations wanting to flee from the accusation of 
collusion with the polity. By the end of the year the erosion of the F.A.O. had significantly 
reduced the weight of the bourgeois challenge. It was no longer capable of presenting itself as a 
viable challenger and was restricted to choosing between the alternatives of the polity or the 
Sandinistas. Their dilemma reflected the extent they had been outmaneuvered during the year, 
and their inability to initiate any purposive advance.
Their only available means to pressure Somoza were civic stoppages and U.S. pressure. Yet 
the efforts of January/February and September/October had demonstrated the ineffectiveness 
of this dual strategy. Furthermore, disregarding calls to stay at home, the popular classes had 
used the opportunity to demonstrate their intention to go beyond peaceful means, and to take 
matters into their own hands. Civic stoppages had merely provided them with the time and 
space to organise independently of elite mobilisation. Thus, as protracted negotiations reached 
a stalemate with Somoza, the bourgeoisie's middle ground between the dictator's intransigence 
and the mobilised mass movement was as secure as quicksand. By December they recognised 
that if they were to retain any influence over the course of events they would have to throw 
themselves into the arms of either the dictatorship or the popular classes under the hegemony 
of the M.P.U. and the F.S.L.N. However, if it adopted a policy of compromise with Somoza 
(which the Carter administration desired) it ran the risk of elimination in the event of a popular 
insurrection. Unwilling to accept this moderate solution, the MPU-led mass movement would 
direct its energy toward the destruction not only of somocismo but also capitalism itself. On the 
other hand, if it submerged itself in an alliance under the hegemony of the M.P.U.-F.S.L.N. it 
could not guarantee that its privileged social status and power would be maintained after the 
dictatorship was overthrown. However, given the determination of the popular urban classes 
to destroy the dictatorship and the awareness of, and hostility toward, any negotiated form of 
somocismo sin Somoza, the bourgeois opposition began abandoning the sinking F.A.O.
118The U.S. had considered this. A State Department official said candidly that "We've been looking for another 
Balaguer but we can't seem to locate him." Quoted in A. Bandana, "Crisis in Nicaragua", NACLA Report on the Americas, 
Vol. Xll, No. 6, Nov-Dec, 1978, p. 35.
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By early-1979 it is possible to replace the concept of multiple sovereignty with the more 
restrictive concept of dual power. Yet, even at this moment, despite the fortuitous run of events, 
it is inadmissable to speak of the popular social revolution as inevitable. In addition to the 
necessary social structural preconditions for revolution, the successful seizure of power was 
dependent on the effective purposive action of the revolutionary party which had assumed 
hegemony over the mass movement. It is impossible to understand the success of the popular 
revolution without taking into consideration the premeditation, planning, organisation and 
timing which was required in preparation for the final military offensive. Successful revolution, 
as Lenin and Trotsky repeatedly emphasized in 1917, is an art which cannot be reduced to the 
'objective scientific laws' of social development. While the possibility of socialist revolution is 
dependent upon a set of advantageous structural preconditions, an explanation of its realisation 
must involve exploring the conscious intervention of agency, and its role in transcending a 
given matrix of social relations.
The success of the Sandinistas final offensive, which began in May, was dependent upon the 
fulfillment of three tasks; winning over the left and centre parties which had fled the F.A.O., 
preparing the military strategy, and maintaining a state of mass mobilisation. The first 
preparatory task involved completing the building of a loose "negative coalition"119 under the 
hegemony of the Frente. As the flight from the F.A.O. continued the Frente accepted a coalition 
between the M.P.U. and the F.A.O. dissidents and created the Frente Patriotico National, (F.PJSf.). 
This coalition formalised the political polarisation in the revolutionary situation through 
drawing the lines of demarcation between the challenge of the popular classes and the 
wreckage of the polity. A 21-point programme was adopted which reiterated the demands of 
the M.P.U., and a National Directorate was formed in which Los Doce, the M.P.U. and the 
F.S.L.N. predominated.120 Despite reservations from sectors of the left that the F.P.N. reflected 
a weakening of the independence of the mass movement and the popular classes,121 the 
establishment of a popular front with bourgeois representation reflected the sensitivity of the 
F.S.L.N. to the threat of a resurrected dictatorial system without fundamental social change. It 
signalled a moment in the process of the 'decomposition of the enemy7 through splitting the 
most advanced and respected sectors of the bourgeoisie from the moderate solution. Marx and 
Engels had given similar advice to would-be insurgents in their writings on the German 
Revolution; ..."rally those vacillating elements to your side which always follow the strongest 
impulse, and which always look out for the safer side."122 By securing the passive collaboration 
of the bourgeois opposition, the F.P.N. sealed the fate of any U.S. negotiated solution involving 
the maintenance of the National Guard and other scrmocista institutions. From this moment on 
the path of compromise was effectively closed. The alternatives confronting the population
1I9Robert Dix argues that the ability of a movement to construct a broad "negative coalition" from the opponents of a 
government is an underlying condition for success. R. Dix, "Why Revolutions Succeed and Fail”, Polity, 16,1984.
120The full text of the programme is reprinted in Lopez et al., op. dt., pp. 372-78.
121See F. Amador & S. Santiago, "Where Is Nicaragua Going?”, Intercontinental Press, June 11, 1979, pp. 579-84.
122K. Marx, Revolution and Counter-Revolution, Unwin,  ^ 1971, p. 90.
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were clear; either a Sandinista-led mass insurrection, or the restoration of the dictatorship. 
Having raised the stakes in the political contest through polarisation and a programme for mass 
insurrection, the Sandinistas were now obliged to act immediately by transforming their words 
into deeds.
Again, a comparison with the Bolshevik Revolution is useful. During September and October 
1917 Lenin was arguing that it was criminal for the Bolsheviks to repeat the slogan 'All Power 
to the Soviets' and refrain from acting once the party found itself in an advantageous position. 
"History", wrote Lenin on the eve of the insurrection, "will not forgive revolutionaries for 
procrastinating when they could be victorious today...while they risk losing much tomorrow, in 
fact, they risk losing everything.... To delay action is fatal."123 Like Lenin, the Sandinistas 
recognised the importance of timing. It was impossible to maintain an active state of mass 
mobilisation indefinitely without making moves towards the seizure of power. Failure to 
proceed to the revolutionary offensive would inevitably result in the passing of the 
revolutionary situation and the restoration of the old order.
Within weeks of the formation of the F.P.N. the Frente gave indication of its preparedness for 
the offensive through announcing its "irreversible and unbreakable unity", and assigned a joint 
National Directorate representing three members from each tendency. In April the Frente 
released an announcement which called the F.P.N. the "legitimate atemative to the oppressive 
regime of the Somoza's."124 The lessons of September had demonstrated that insurrectionary 
warfare required the complete unity of the 'revolutionary centre' in order to achieve national 
co-ordination between a general strike, urban insurrection and rural armed struggle. The joint 
command finalised military preparations for the opening of seven guerrilla fronts spread 
throughout the country, designed to disperse the Guardia in rural confrontations. These fronts 
would divert the Guardia from the urban arena once the Frente had issued the call for the 'final 
offensive'.
The third preparatory task, maintaining a state of mass mobilisation and alert was simplified 
by Somoza's intransigence. The broad cross-sections of the population which had been inspired 
by the intermediate movements played a crucial role in preparing the urban areas for mass 
insurrection, and even many of the less politically inclined were drawn along by the sentiment 
that the sacrifices of the past year made any alternative to Somoza desirable. This explains the 
journalistic accounts of the time which observed that 'every Nicaraguan is a Sandinista'.
Diversionary attacks were staged throughout the North in April in an attempt to drive the 
Guardia north. By May the Frente considered objective conditions ripe for the final offensive. 
The devaluation of the cordoba, and a consequent upsurge in prices, had further isolated 
Somoza, while diplomatic isolation increased as numerous Latin American nations suspended
123Lenin, op. dt., (26; 235).
124See F.S.L.N., "Bases Programaticas del Frente Sandinista de Liberadon Nadonal para la democrada y la 
reconstrucdon de Nicaragua", in CO.S.C.C.A.N., Nicaragua en Lucha, No. 1, Julio-Agusto 1979, Barcelona, pp. 19-22.
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diplomatic relations with Somoza and granted the Sandinistas 'belligerent7 status. The 
Sandinistas began planning the establishment of a provisional government on their 'southern 
front7, preferably the town of Rivas close to the Costa Rican border from where they could 
receive international recognition. Furthermore, digust with the role of the U.S. was heightened 
through the U.S. vote for a $US66 million IMF loan to Somoza.
In late-May the Sandinistas opened their northern and southern fronts, and on the last day of 
the month issued their call for a national insurrection; the final offensive.125 On June 4, a 
general strike began which immediately paralysed the nation and instituted a situation of dual 
power between the regime and local self-defense committees under the direction of the Frente. 
On the same day the F.S.L.N. entered Leon. On the 9th the insurrection began in the eastern 
region of Managua even before the F.S.LNJ. issued their general call.126 Throughout the month 
town after town fell into F.S.L.N. hands and a five-person Junta of National Reconstruction was 
named from Costa Rica, in which the F.S.L.N. carried a majority due to its relations with Los 
Doce and the F.P.N.
Despite the fact that the Sandinistas were forced to abandon Managua at the end of June and 
retreat 30 kilometers south to Masaya they had once more surrounded the capital by July 10. A 
last ditch effort to contain the revolutionary process by the U.S. met with local and international 
rebuffal. The Carter administration received one of its greatest diplomatic setbacks on June 22 
when the O.A.S. rejected the U.S. proposal that a peace-keeping force be sent to Nicaragua. 
Venezuela responded by pushing through a motion that Somoza resign. By July 8, the U.S. had 
secured Somoza's resignation but retained it as an instrument to pressure the resistance to 
accept a role for the National Guard and the National Liberal Party in future politics. As barrio 
after barrio was recovered in Managua by the F.S.L.N. Somoza resigned and fled to Miami on 
July 17. Somoza's designated replacement refused to fulfil his role in the US-orchestrated plan 
to negotiate a ceasefire and hand power over to the Junta. By ordering the Guardia to fight on, 
he effectively assured its total destruction as an institution. The F.S.L.N. entered Managua from 
all fronts on July 19, and proclaimed the victory of the Sandinista Popular Revolution.
5.8. CONCLUSION
This chapter has argued that the reason why such a rapid and fundamental socio-political 
transformation occurred in Nicaragua in July 1979 was due to the purposive initiative of a 
revolutionary party, the F.S.L.N. It is interesting to speculate what would have transpired had 
this movement been absent from the political spectrum. The historical precedents which have 
been analysed in this chapter suggest that the traditional opposition would have been unable 
and unwilling to lead such a profound regime transformation; in other words, social revolution
^ G ood  accounts of the final offensive are found in Black, op. dt., pp. 142-180; and Gonzalez Janzen, op. dt., pp. 
30-54.
126The insurrection in Managua and the Central Front "Camilo Ortega Saavadra” is described in C. Nunez, Un Pueblo 
en Armas, Centro de Publicadones 'Silvio Mayorga', Managua, 1980.
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would not have occurred. What has been described in this chapter as the 'traged/ of past 
opposition mobilisation had only led to the strengthening of the dictatorship, and the 
cultivation of the myth of dynastic invincibility. To a large degree this was due to the absence of 
an alternative political challenger. As the revolutionary situation intensified at the beginning of 
1978 the traditional opposition emerged at the forefront of the challenge against the polity. And 
true to historical form, it lack the requisite combativeness, initiative and social base to maintain 
the challenge.
The structural underpinnings of the revolutionary situation in themselves cannot explain the 
social revolution. This outcome was determined by the political and military preparedness of 
the F.S.L.N. The existence of advantageous conditions, or the maturation of objective social 
circumstances did not automatically result in a broad-based coalition aimed at radical social 
transformation. While structural analyses are able to point to the necessary shape this coalition 
had to take in order to be successful, this in itself does not guarantee that the necessary agents 
will be on the spot ready to fulfill their 'historical role'.
The reasons why the Sandinistas were able to assume the hegemonic position over the anti- 
dictatorial movement, and its capacity to lead the movement towards a popular revolutionary 
insurrection, can only be explained through appreciating its organisational and ideological 
development, and its molecular accumulation of social forces. This practical historical 
experience dictated the form which the political and military praxis of the Frente assumed 
during the revolutionary situation.
The Sandinistas were the only party which had consistently advocated the path of armed 
struggle and the only one which argued that the popular classes had to seize power in order to 
democratise Nicaragua. The prolonged and arduous process of agitation among the popular 
classes throughout the 1960's and 1970's enabled them to immediately take the political 
initiative after the bourgeois opposition began to falter early on in the revolutionary situation. 
Furthermore, the accumulated experience of twenty years of military confrontation and mass 
agitation gave the Frente an unequalled ability to assess what worked and what didn't work in 
Nicaraguan conditions.
However, this accumulation of forces and experience is insufficient to account for their 
success. Apart from consolidating its position as the vanguard of the popular classes, the 
Sandinistas political praxis was also characterised by an ability to maneuver, taking into 
consideration the dynamics of the enemy's contradictions. As this chapter has shown, each 
political move was calculated to take full advantage of the decomposition of the polity and the 
bourgeois challenge and heighten the preparations for popular insurrection. The Sandinistas 
may not have caused the decomposition, but their success demanded that they actively use it to 
their advantage.
While this chapter has analysed the development of Sandinista praxis and the purposive role 
it performed in determining the revolutionary outcome, it is also important to note the
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philosophy of praxis which informed Sandinismo. It has been argued in this chapter that the 
Sandinistas' understanding of the role of agency in the process of social development was 
influenced most directly by Che Guevara. The Cuban Revolution provided the Sandinistas with 
a justification of their heretical synthesis of Sandino and Marx. Through Guevara, the 
Sandinistas discovered a Leninism which was absent from the praxis of the orthodox Marxist 
party, the P.S.N. Guevara emphasized the dialectic between structure and agency arguing that 
"a vanguard...increasingly influenced by Marxist-Leninism, is capable of consciously 
anticipating a whole series of steps leading towards realizing and hastening the course of 
events, but hastening them within the limits of what is objectively possible."127 While the 
origins of Sandinismo were the product of given conditions, its development was based upon 
intervening purposively in this environment, understanding the potential within the 
conditions, with the object of ultimately achieving the transcendence of the conditions.
It has also been noted that the controversy between the Sandinistas and the orthodox P.S.N. 
bore striking similarities with the debates btween the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks in Russia 
which were discussed in Chapter 4. These similarities will be discussed in greater detail in the 
conclusion.
12/C. Guevara, "Socialist Planning", in Gerassi, op. cat., p. 404.
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Chapter 6
TOWARDS A THEORY OF SOCIALIST REVOLUTIONS
The evidence presented in the previous two chapters reveals the importance of purposive 
factors for any attempt to theorise socialist revolutions. In order to explain why a societal 
condition of multiple sovereignty was transcended by a socialist seizure of power it is essential 
to understand the origins and development of the revolutionary party which assumed 
hegemony over the mobilised mass movement. Theorising socialist revolutions requires 
assigning a more independent status to revolutionary parties than structuralist analyses allow.
However, as Chapters 2 and 3 demonstrated, structuralist analyses provide an insight into the 
socio-economic conditions which generated revolutionary situations. They also point to factors 
which constrain the options available to states, classes and other social groups, and also to the 
possibilities of coalitions between different classes. In terms of the thorny dilemma in the social 
sciences between structure and agency, and constraint and choice, the evidence presented here 
points away from any /either/or/ dichotomy and towards the interdependency of structural 
and purposive variables.
This chapter draws together the two historical case studies of Russia and Nicaragua. No two 
revolutions are ever identical, and the sociology of comparative revolutions must constantly 
retain respect for national peculiarities while at the same time attempt to uncover the general 
features which transcend individual cases. As Michael Lowy notes, world revolution "has 
unfolded during the twentieth century through an uneven process resulting from the 
contradictions of capitalism as a world system, yet these contradictions have always 
materialised in one particular country and at one particular time.nl For this reason, the thesis up 
until this point has emphasized the national peculiarities of the development of revolutionary 
events in Russia and Nicaragua, while drawing upon the lessons from the theoretical critique of 
the existing literature on revolutions which introduced this thesis. This chapter analyses the 
similarities and differences between the two case studies and demonstrates that the similarities 
are more fundamental for understanding the nature of the revolutionary processes than the 
differences.
'M. Lowy The Politics of Uneven and Combined Development: The Theory of Permanent Revolution, New Left Books, 
Lo.\^or\( 1981, p. 104.
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6.1. STRUCTURAL SIMILARITIES AND CONTRASTS
6.1.1. The Development of Capitalist Relations
The departing point for any understanding of the generation of a revolutionary crisis resulting 
in a socialist seizure of power must be the process through which capitalism emerged as the 
dominant mode of production within the social formation. It is this mode of production which 
gives rise to the matrix of class relations and social contradictions which generate the inherent 
conflict culminating in the revolutionary situations examined in this thesis. For this reason 
Wallersteinian World Systems Analysis is a useful theoretical point of departure for situating 
both pre-revolutionary Russian and Nicaraguan society.
Both nations were located outside the core of the world capitalist system, and their linkages to 
this system were based primarily upon the exportation of primary commodity products for the 
world market, and the importation of manufactured, and other value-added, products from 
core nations. In both cases, the periods of greatest expanded capitalist reproduction 
corresponded with high prices for their principal commodity exports upon the world market. 
High grain prices on the European market were exploited by the Tsarist state at the turn of the 
century, while Nicaragua's most sustained periods of growth were associated with high world 
market prices for gold, cotton and coffee. While this international economic articulation created 
an external dependency with negative socio-economic repercussions during periods of foreign 
market and credit contraction, it is undeniable that this linkage was essential for the particular 
form which capitalist development assumed. Although growth rates depended upon this 
fluctuating and erratic external linkage, both countries registered exceptionally high rates of 
growth by regional and even international standards.
In the case of Tsarist Russia capitalism (through state inducement and foreign capital and 
trade) began to emerge as the dominant mode during the 1880's. It progressively expanded up 
until the First World War. However, the dominance of capitalism within the social formation 
was complicated by the existence of a large rural sector which remained essentially pre­
capitalist. Despite growing articulation between the two sectors of the economy, it was still 
appropriate to speak of a 'dualistic' relationship within the socio-economic formation. This 
dualism would have important repercussions for any political movement attempting to channel 
and harness the energies of the anti-autocratic classes. Although both the proletariat and the 
peasantry increasingly directed their discontent against the prevailing system, their contrasting 
matrix of social relationships made the co-ordination of their divergent demands problematic. 
It is in this sense that Moshe Lewin speaks of two currents temporarily drawn together into a 
single stream, yet destined to diverge once the immediate objective had passed.2 Capital was 
highly concentrated around urban centres, such as St Petersburg and Kharkov. This geographic 
concentration was intensified through the scale of industrial enterprises, with Russia registering 
one of the highest concentrations of workers per plant in the world. Heavy industrialisation
2M. Lewin, Russian Peasants and Soviet Power, Allen & Unwin, London, 1968, p. 132.
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predominated, reflecting the state's concern with maintaining international military 
competitiveness. This concentration of labour and infrastructure was also associated with a 
high level of monopolisation of capital.
The two principal differences between Russian and Nicaraguan capitalist development 
involved the bonds of articulation between the urban and rural sectors of the economy, and the 
contrasting strengths of urban capitalism. It was only during the early-1950's, with the 
emergence of Nicaragua as one of the largest cotton producers in the world market, that 
capitalism began to revolutionise social relations. Prior to this, capitalist development had 
proceeded haltingly, firstly through the truncated process of 'manorial' coffee production, and 
then through foreign-based enclave capitalism. However, this later process was isolated and 
disarticulated from the main population centre of the nation and contributed little to the 
capitalist transformation of the nation as a whole. It was not so much the penetration of foreign 
capital or the links with the world capitalist system which caused this truncated development, 
but foreign political intervention in the form of the geo-political interference of the United 
States. In association with the expansion of cotton cultivation after the Second World War 
(which required greater proletarianisation of rural labour than coffee) urban industry began to 
expand. This expansion and diversification further increased (albeit in an unbalanced manner) 
during the 1960's under the guidance of the Central American Common Market. However, the 
development of urban capitalism remained tied to light industry and inputs for agricultural 
production. Furthermore, cotton cultivation created a large semi-proletarian initerant 
workforce, increasing the indicators of urbanisation at a quicker pace than proletarianisation. 
Foreign capital and trade fulfilled an important role in supplying the inputs for cotton 
production, while finance and value-added production in cotton was highly monopolised.
Consequently, while the gestation period between the emergence of the dominance of 
capitalism and the revolutions were temporally similar in Russia and Nicaragua, there were 
differences associated with the form capitalist development assumed. In Nicaragua there was a 
stronger bond of articulation between the rural and the urban economy through the emergence 
of cotton production. This type of production also encouraged a more complete severance of the 
direct producer from land-ownership than in Russia. In Tsarist Russia a more 'dualisti yet 
articulated relationship existed between the rural and the urban economy. The extraction of 
surplus from the predominantly pre-capitalist rural economy was channelled into a process of 
industrialisation, through the mediation of the Tsarist state and foreign capital and trade. Thus, 
it can be argued that in Nicaragua, capitalist relations had secured a more predominant role in 
the totality of the social formation than in Tsarist Russia, where peasant solidarity and 
community remained stronger and, relatively speaking, more autarkic.
Both forms of capitalist development resulted in large-scale population movements and urban 
migration. However, the rise of heavy industry in Russia created a more stable urban industrial 
workforce with consequent opportunities for worker mobilisation. In Nicaragua on the other 
hand, the requirements of an itinerant rural proletariat for the cotton harvest produced a more 
mobile and less easily organised proletariat. Between harvests rural workers were forced to find
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employment in a saturated urban labour market. This situation explains the extremely large 
'service' component of the Nicaraguan workforce, which concealed a large informal petty- 
merchant sector. Any attempt to organise the population against the scmocista model of 
capitalist development required greater sensitivity to the 'real' rather than 'formal' exploitation 
and subordination of the popular classes to capitalism. In other words, a socialist movement 
based primarily upon a factory-based proletariat would be unable to strike at the heart of 
Nicaraguan capitalist accumulation. The critical position afforded to the Russian urban 
proletariat in the dynamic of capitalist development did not apply to the same degree in 
Nicaragua.
As Malcolm Alexander notes, the theoretical utility of the structuralist approach of World 
Systems Analysis lies in its ability to explain "not why certain world-historical events occur, but 
rather why they occur in particular regions of the world-system at particular historical 
junctures."3 The implication for the study of modem revolutions is that if analysis ends on this 
situational level, then revolutionary theory loses its explanatory power. Unless this world 
framework is supplemented with a concrete analysis of the specificity of the class struggles 
within nation states, then World Systems Analysis remains (to quote from Jean-Paul Sartre's 
critique of abstract Marxism) "an arbitrary limitation of the dialectical movement, an arresting 
of thought, a refusal to understand".4 In order to render modem revolutions intelligible, it is 
necessary to explore the particular processes of class confict and the role of the state in 
reproducing the specific model of capitalist development.
6.1.2. The State, Development and the Popular Classes
In both Russia and Nicaragua capitalist development was premised upon the state performing 
an active and interventionist role in the economy. From the emancipation of the serfs until the 
1880's the Tsarist state's laissez-faire attitude towards the economy brought only limited, light 
industrial expansion. It was the utilisation of fiscal pressure upon the mral sector that promoted 
state-sponsored rapid heavy industrial development from the 1880's onwards. The state 
performed a crucial articulating role between the archaic rural structure and the world 
economy through measures including taxation, manipulation of tariff barriers and the 
encouragement of foreign capital and loans. Apart from encouraging private domestic and 
foreign capital the state also performed a role as direct owner.
The Nicaraguan experience provides even stronger support for the importance of an 
interventionist state to promote capitalist development in the periphery of the world capitalist 
system. The relationship between a dynamic coffee-exporting bourgeoisie and the state had
3M. Alexander, "Structure and Process in the Modern World System: The World System Theory of Immanuel 
Wallerstein and its Predecessors", in An Introduction to Marxist Theories of Underdevelopment, Research School of Pacific 
Studies, A.N.U., Canberra, 1980, p. 121.
4J-P. Sartre, Search for a Method, Vintage, N.Y., 1968, p. 57. Again to paraphrase Sartre, Russia may have been a 
semi-peripheral nation, but not every semi-peripheral nation was Russia. The same logic applies to Nicaragua's 
peripheral status.
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been undermined after the overthrow of the Zelaya administration, resulting in the stagnation 
of the internal economy under the auspices of U.S.-directed financial control. It was only after 
the Somoza dictatorship consolidated its base and appeased U.S. concern for its geo-political 
hegemony that Nicaragua achieved the political and social 'stability" crucial for sustained 
capitalist development. As Chinchilla and Hamilton argue; "Contrary to the ideology of free 
enterprise and free trade...state intervention is, in fact, essential for capitalist development.'0
The Tsarist and the somocista states performed roles beyond mere regulation of the economy. 
Both states were owners and controllers of capital in their own right, and manipulated 
economic levers for the purpose of promoting their own vision of development. In Russia this 
involved promoting heavy industry to bolster the military strength of the regime. In Nicaragua, 
the state functioned as a personal appendage to the somocista entrepreneurial empire, which 
eventually grew to become one of the largest in Latin America.
It is this role of the state-as-capitalist which justifies the utility of Skocpol's 'autonomy of the 
state'. However, once the state undertakes to directly own and control the most dynamic sectors 
of production and exchange in a model of capitalist development its autonomy is restricted by 
certain 'structural imperatives' of capitalist accumulation. This in turn elevates the state into a 
direct participant in class conflict. Under these conditions, the liberal notion of the state as an 
arbiter of social conflict is undermined. In Russia and Nicaragua the economic role of the state 
precluded the institutionalisation of mechanisms of arbitration perceived by the popular classes 
as independent from the conflicting social classes. For this reason strikes and demonstrations 
often assumed a more directly political flavour. Furthermore, economic crises were 
transformed more immediately into crises of state legitimation. Corporativist experiments with 
unionism in both Russia and Nicaragua were undermined once workers' demands exceeded 
the limits of state tolerance. Zubatovism, the experience of Bloody Sunday, Somoza's 
demagogic populist experiments with unionism in the mid-1940's, all ended with the 
recognition by workers of the need to built organisations independent of, and against, the state. 
These embryonic ventures of workers' self-organisation met the full force of state coercion. In 
both cases state-sponsored capitalist development heightened the political stakes through 
undermining the utility or effectiveness of workers' economistic demands, and their 
replacement with fundamental political demands for deeper structural transformations. This 
role of the state-as-capitalist also accounts for its inability to transcend autocratic, dictatorial 
mechanisms of rule, and its ultimate reliance on overt coercion against economic or political 
demands by those sectors of society which paid for the model of state-sponsored capitalist 
development.
3N.S. Chinchilla & N. Hamilton, "Prelude to Revolution: U.S. Intervention in Central America", in R. Burbach & 
P. Flynn (eds), The Politics of Intervention: The United States in Central America, Monthly Review, 'A T . , 1984, p. 232.
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6.1.3. The State And The Bourgeoisie
Given the importance attached to the state and capitalist development in this explanation of 
the preconditions for modem socialist revolutions, attention must also be paid to the 
relationship between the state and the bourgeoisie. In the Russian and Nicaraguan cases a rigid 
'stage' theory of development is an inadequate theoretical tool to predict the nature of any crisis 
of autocratic, dictatorial state legitimation. The possibility of a bourgeois revolution was 
undermined by the relationship between the state and the bourgeoisie.
In the Russian case, this relationship lay at the heart of Marxist polemics concerning the 
nature of the anti-autocratic revolution. Optimistic predictions of a classic bourgeois revolution 
based upon a suprahistorical interpretation of Marx were soon tempered by the empirical 
realisation of the 'cowardly7 and 'niggardly7 nature of the Russian bourgeoisie. There were 
structural underpinnings explaining this behaviour. For reasons associated with the absolutist 
nature of the Tsarist state the bourgeoisie was unable to develop an independent social base 
prior to the emancipation of the serfs. Once the state had embarked upon its ambitious model 
of heavy industrialisation and depressed internal demand, the bourgeoisie had little option 
other than to prefer state patronage rather than lead an anti-autocratic revolution. As the 
experience of 1905 demonstrated, the mass popular movement was capable of transcending 
bourgeois demands and interests. During the First World War the crisis of state legitimation 
experienced by the Tsarist state was, in terms of bourgeois interests, one of incompetence and 
corruption rather than a perceived need to restructure fundamentally the system. However, the 
articulation of the Russian economy with the world market (which had been a cornerstone of 
Russian state-sponsored capitalist development) was interrupted during the war, resulting in 
rapid economic disintegration and social crisis. Once the Tsarist state had collapsed, the 
Provisional Government (composed of sectors of the bourgeoisie and moderate socialists) was 
unwilling or unable to implement fundamental structural changes to combat an impending 
socio-economic catastrophe. The crucial questions concerning participation in the war, agrarian 
reform and industrial relations were left unattended or were shelved. This inactivity, combined 
with democratisation at the political level, led rapidly to the intensification of conflict between 
two structures of dual power, or multiple sovereignty, and opened the path for a popular 
revolutionary solution to the structural catastrophe.
In the Nicaraguan case, while the relationship between the dictatorial state and the 
bourgeoisie was fraught with more tension, ultimately the bourgeoisie was unable to provide a 
solution to the structural crisis of somocismo. As noted above, the immediate pre-history of 
somocismo was characterised by U.S. interference in domestic political economy, economic 
stagnation and the inability of a potentially dynamic export-oriented bourgeoisie to influence 
the direction of state policy. It was only during the early-19507s that stable political and 
economic conditions were secured for the somocista model of capitalist development. This 
model was premised upon a number of pacts between the Somoza clan on one hand and the 
most dynamic fractions of non -somocista capital on the other. This promoted political stability 
through prior electoral agreements which left the ultimate structure of dictatorial authority
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intact. These pacts also delineated sectoral spheres of economic influence. However, they also 
revealed the latent conflict underlying the relationship between the somocista state and other 
dynamic fractions of capital. Manifestations of this conflict could only be controlled through 
continual capital expansion, modernisation, diversification and the repression of the popular 
classes. For this reason, periods of economic contraction, such as the late-1950's and late 1960's, 
were periods of heightened opposition from the bourgeoisie. The non-somocista bourgeoisie 
could tolerate administrative corruption and Somoza's abuse of state power as long as 
expansion continued and labour was held in check. Thus, despite periodic opposition, 
bourgeois ties to the dictatorship were strong, and Somoza was recognised as the guarantor of 
Nicaraguan capitalist accumulation.
The crisis of late-somorismo began to manifest itself acutely after the 1972 earthquake when 
Somoza started to encroach upon the traditional pastures of his bourgeois competitors. 
Non-somocista capital perceived this breach of convention as 'disloyal competition' and 
coalesced into a broad-based movement demanding the democratisation of the system. 
Although initially in the forefront of the anti-Somoza movement, the bourgeoisie hesitated as 
soon as popular action exceeded the limits of bourgeois authority and control. Throughout 
1978, the bourgeoisie attempted to defuse the explosive social conflict as the popular classes 
assumed greater independence. As the pace of events escaped them, the bourgeois front 
(F.A.O.) became more amenable to U.S.-sponsored negotiations with the dictatorship. The 
Sandinistas denounced this maneuver as a desire on the part of the bourgeois opposition to 
resurrect the structure through removing the figurehead (somozaism without Somoza). By 
early 1979 the aspirations of the popular classes (under the hegemony of the Sandinistas) had 
clearly gone beyond any 'moderate solution'. This, combined with Somoza's intransigence, 
placed the bourgeoisie on the horns of a political dilemma; with the popular classes, or with 
Somoza. They had lost any independent base upon which to negotiate. While a substantial 
proportion of the bourgeoisie was attracted to the moderation and conciliation of the 
Sandinistas, their participation in the revolution was one of hesitant support and apprehension. 
By May 1979 the choice facing the bourgeoisie was to follow the Sandinistas or loose 
everything. Acceptance of the Sandinista terms of compromise was the only means available of 
retaining any influence in post-Somoza society. The bourgeoisie was neither the hegemonistic 
partner in the revolutionary leadership, nor in the eyes of the popular classes. This role 
belonged to the Sandinistas through their ability to mobilise and maneuver the mass popular 
movement into a contending position for the assumption of power.
6.1.4. Conclusion
An adequate understanding of the preconditions of socialist revolutions must begin with an 
analysis of the variables referred to above; namely, the incorporation of the nation within the 
world capitalist system, the specificity of the model of capitalist development, the form of 
exploitation and articulation of the popular classes within this model, the nature of the state 
and its relationship to the model and the relationship between the state and the bourgeoisie.
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While these structural variables can account for the generation of a crisis in a model of 
development, they are not sufficient in themselves to render the outcome of the crisis 
intelligible. From within these structural constraints and opportunities there must emerge a 
purposive social movement capable of harnessing, mobilising and channelling the forces of the 
popular classes, whose exploitation and compliance was essential for the maintenance and 
expansion of the particular model of capitalist development. The manner in which the various 
components of the popular classes are articulated into the revolutionary movement determines 
the success or failure of the socialist revolution.
6.2. PURPOSIVE SIMILARITIES AND CONTRASTS
For the Bolsheviks in 1917 and the Sandinistas in 1979 the necessity of revolution was not 
argued in terms of inevitability, but its desirability. For Lenin, although imperialism and state 
monopoly capital had created the preconditions for the transition to socialism, it did not follow 
that socialism would arrive as a matter of due course out of the structural contradictions which 
had contributed to Russia's social catastrophe. Both the Sandinistas and the Bolsheviks 
recognised the existence and threat of conflicting class projects, such as the repetition of a 
Komilov-type coup or the German occupation of St Petersburg in the Russian case, and 
somozaism without Somoza or a U.S.-backed O.A.S. peace-keeping force in the Nicaraguan 
case. In order to secure social conditions more favourable for the popular classes both 
movements demanded the destruction of existing channels of authority and their replacement 
through the seizure of power by the mass organisations. Socialism was not perceived primarily 
as an inevitable step on the historical ladder, but as an opportunity which had to be grasped.
The factors contributing to a socialist seizure of state power out of revolutionary crises cannot 
be mechanistically derived from the structural factors which contributed to the revolutionary 
crisis. While these structural factors inform an analysis of the conflict and interests of the 
various social groups within a social formation, socialist revolutions have been "decisively 
dependent" upon the existence and development of revolutionary movements.
In this thesis the argument has been advanced that the development of the revolutionary 
movement is in itself a complex process which must be given greater independent status than 
most structural analyses allow. Consequently, any notion of structural determination must be 
removed from an adequate theoretical explanation of the success of socialist revolutions. This 
section highlights the crucial factors which contributed to the emergence and development of 
the 'purposive' revolutionary organisation.
6.2.1. Political Culture And Political Space
An assessment of the nature and significance of a revolutionary social movement must begin 
with an understanding of the political culture from which the movement emerged. Derived 
from this is an understanding of the political space a movement carves for itself within that 
culture, the praxis it adopts and the interests it attempts to serve.
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In both Russia and Nicaragua, vernacular revolutionary traditions had existed prior to the 
emergence of the Bolsheviks and the Sandinistas. These traditions reflected the predominantly 
pre-capitalist nature of the social formations, although in Nicaragua's case it also incorporated 
an anti-imperialist response to U.S. intervention in domestic affairs. Both the Bolsheviks and the 
Sandinistas emerged as social movements which stressed the centrality of understanding the 
development of capitalist relations in order to gain an insight into the dynamics and trends of 
social change. Their praxis was premised upon this insight.
In the Russian case, Marxism emerged as an intellectual competitor to the Narodnik tradition. 
The acceleration of urbanisation and industrialisation during the last decades of the nineteenth 
century provided empirical support for the Marxist contention that capitalism was an 
unavoidable path along historical development. However, as the Russian Marxist movement 
moved from the terrain of intellectual 'propaganda' to mass 'agitation' differences surfaced 
within the movement over the relationship between class and party, and the limits of, and 
potential within, the forthcoming revolution. The Bolsheviks emerged out of this debate as the 
more radical wing of Russian Marxism. Their position included a less compromising attitude 
towards the liberal bourgeoisie, the leading role of the proletariat in the revolution and the 
conception of the vanguard role of the party in relation to the proletariat. In turn, their 
Menshevik opponents accused the Bolsheviks of reappropriating the 'pre-scientific' Narodnik 
and Anarchistic traditions derived from political thinkers such as Tkachev and Bakunin.
The Sandinistas arrived at similar political conclusions as the Bolsheviks through an inverted 
relationship to the vernacular tradition. The movement emerged as a tendency within the 
Marxist Nicaraguan Socialist Party, which had adopted a hostile attitude towards the 
nationalist revolutionary tradition of Augusto Cesar Sandino. On the basis of a Marxist critique, 
the Sandinistas incorporated a number of basic tenets of Sandino's thought and practice in 
order to adapt their praxis to the concrete reality of Nicaragua in the late-1950's. As one of then- 
founders Carlos Fonseca argued, in doing so, they 'embraced' the Marxism of Lenin. Central to 
the ideology of the Sandinistas was an uncompromising stance towards the 'parallelism' of the 
traditional anti-dictatorial opposition, the leading role of the workers and peasants in the 
forthcoming revolution, the vanguard role of the movement in relation to the popular classes, 
and the adoption of armed struggle to fulfil the goal of overthrowing the dictatorship. As in the 
case of the Bolsheviks, the Sandinistas were accused of employing 'ultra-leftist' and 
'adventurist' tactics by their Marxist opponents, and of ignoring the objective limitations of the 
level of socio-economic development.
In contrast with their opponents within the Marxist movement, both the Bolsheviks and the 
Sandinistas adopted a less rigid and less suprahistorical conception of social development than 
their Marxist rivals. This determined their insight into the nature of the anti- 
monarchical/dictatorial movement. Both movements argued that the revolution would or 
should transcend the limits of bourgeois revolution. However, it was only during the First 
World War that Lenin and the Bolsheviks began to argue that the transition towards socialism 
was the fundamental task of the day. This occurred once the concept of imperialism was
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introduced into their theoretical schema, providing a more world-holistic approach to Russian 
national development. The Sandinistas, on the other hand, used the concept of imperialism from 
their inception, despite the fact that it had remained "conceptually dormant"6 since Lenin, and 
had been dropped by the orthodox Marxist movement during the period of Stalinisation. 
Discarding the rigidity of the Latin American Communist parties conception of development, 
and drawing upon the experience of the Cuban Revolution, the Sandinistas reappropriated the 
imperialist framework. The link between imperialism, capitalism and the state led them to call 
for a popular-socialist rather than 'bourgeois-democratic' solution.
Thus, both the Bolsheviks and the Sandinistas initially emerged as intellectual currents within 
their national political cultures. Structural, ideological and organisational factors contributed to 
their emergence as a distinct movement. In the Bolshevik case, the rapid development of 
capitalism and industrialisation, the consequent numerical growth and militancy of the urban 
proletariat and the crisis within Narodnik thought all contributed to open the political space for 
the emergence of a Marxist alternative. In the Sandinista case, the consolidation of the Somoza 
dynasty and its model of development, its links with imperialism, the consequent rapid social 
change and economic growth during the 1950's and the impotence of the traditional opposition, 
all contributed to open the political space for an alternative to the P.S.N. which incorporated 
the vernacular tradition of Sandino. Their insights into social reality led both the Bolsheviks and 
the Sandinistas to stress the manner in which the bourgeoisie was tied to autocratic/dictatorial 
capitalist development. This offered a vision of revolution led by the popular classes, rather 
than the bourgeoisie.
6.2.2. The Party And The Popular Classes
In the most general sense the success of the revolutionary movement is dependent upon its 
capacity to unite and direct the energy of the various subordinate classes who are the subjects of 
exploitation within the model of capitalist development. Thus far, socialist revolutions have 
occurred on the periphery or the semi-periphery of the world capitalist system. The retention of 
an important agricultural exporting base, and the retention of pre-capitalist relations linked to a 
specific capitalist model of development, has forced socialist movements to recognise the need 
to orient their attention towards a corresponding articulation of activity between the various 
subordinate classes. These models of development affect not only urban classes but also rural 
class relations. For example, in Russia the Bolsheviks recognised the imperative of a 
'revolutionary alliance of the proletariat and the peasantry^ while in Nicaragua the Sandinistas 
recognised the importance of the unity of the 'popular classes'. In both cases what was involved 
was a recognition that the conditions of capitalist reproduction in the social formation 
transcended the 'formal' conditions of capitalist exploitation by drawing in other independent 
or intermediary classes affected by this real subordination to the model of development. It is 
this real subordination to the conditions of capitalist accumulation which defines the term 
'popular classes'.
‘’See T-Shanin, "The Third Stage: Marxist Social Theory and the Origins of Our Time: Remembering Mark Bolch", in 
Journal of Contevrporary Asia, p. 295.
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In order to determine whether a revolution transcends 'populism', or 'anti-imperialism', it is 
imperative not only to analyse the organisation of the revolutionary movement and its 
relationship to the popular classes, but also the ideology of the movement. As Henri Weber 
points out, an adequate definition of a revolutionary movement must go beyond its social class 
composition and determine the interests the movement projects:
...a party cannot be characterised mainly in terms of the social origin or composition of its 
members - unless one is to postulate a relation of mechanical determination between class origin 
and class position. The relationship between a political organisation and its social base, whether 
actual or potential, is much more complex in reality, for it involves both a temporal dimension 
(the political tradition and perspectives) and a spatial dimension (the mode of insertion in the 
international class struggle)....A political party that sets out to mobilise, organise and represent 
the proletariat, equipping itself with a programme, strategy, ideology and organisational 
structure corresponding to that objective, cannot be defined as 'petty-bourgeois'. This is true even 
if, as often happens, intellectuals of bourgeois or petty-bourgeois class origin form a large 
proportion of its ranks at the beginning of the revolutionary process.7
Given this, the origin and development of revolutionary movements cannot be treated as mere
epiphenomena of structural determinants.
The spatial dimension of Sandinista praxis was broader than the Bolsheviks, who directed 
their energy more exclusively towards organising the urban workers and petty-bourgeois 
intelligentsia. Although Sandinista cadres were predominantly urban workers and petty- 
bourgeois in origin, the organisation supported (at least up until 1975 when the Frente split into 
three tendencies) the Guevarist premise that in Latin America the countryside was the terrain 
best suited for armed confrontation with dictatorships. Much greater effort was consequently 
invested in agitation among the peasantry and agricultural labour. Furthermore, this was the 
terrain upon which Sandino had succesfully conducted his anti-imperialist guerrilla warfare. 
Thus while the Sandinistas never lost sight of the strategic significance of mass urban activity, 
the tactical requirements of rural armed struggle widened the spatial dimension of their praxis. 
The notion of urban recruits transforming themselves through encountering the conditions of 
peasant life, while simultaneously winning over the peasantry to the Sandinista cause, bears 
some similarity to the 'to the people' movement inspired by the Naradnik philosophy of Peter 
Lavrov in the mid-1870's.8 The Sandinistas were undoubtedly more successful than their 
Russian counterparts, as the peasant guerrilla columns of Zinica and Bijao in the late-1960's 
reveal. This was assisted by the roots implanted by the vernacular revolutionary tradition. 
Furthermore, by the late-1960's sectors of the church had begun organising the peasantry in a 
manner which questioned the legitimacy of the structures of somocismo, and led to a more acute 
awareness on the part of the Nicaraguan peasantry concerning the nature of the state. During 
the 1870's in Russia on the other hand, the Narodniks encountered indifference from the 
peasantry, and reverence towards the Tsar.
7H. Weber, Nicaragua: The Sandinist Revolution, N ew  Left Books, b o f ' Ä c n ,  1981, pp. 58-9.
®See the introduction to P. Lavrov, Historical Letters, University of California Press, U.S.A., 1967.
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6.2.3. Clandestinity And Legality
Organisationally, both parties premised action upon a vanguard conception of their role in 
relation to the popular classes. Furthermore, due to the constraints of operating within a 
repressive political environment, both adopted, or were forced to adopt, underground 
measures in order to avoid state surveillance. The repressive political environments of Tsarism 
and somocismo created practical dilemmas for Bolshevik and Sandinista praxis, which were 
reflected in internal debates concerning their mode of insertion into the class struggle. In both 
cases, enforced clandestinity forced the leadership of the movements to spend prolonged 
periods of time in exile. This hindered the co-ordination of national activity. Furthermore, the 
publication and distribution of literature was problematic. These communication difficulties 
often exacerbated theoretical differences within the parties and hindered immediate tactical 
reponses to conjunctural situations.
The extent to which 'legal' opportunities were to be exploited often provoked virulent debate 
within both movements, on questions such as the relationship between the vanguard 
organisation and the day-to-day activities of the popular classes. In the Russian case, the 
Marxist movement was divided at the turn of the century between legal Marxists' and 
'Economists' on one hand and Iskraites on the other concerning the nature of the demands to be 
advanced. After the October 1905 Constitution had been proclaimed the legal versus 
underground debate resurfaced into a bitter polemic not only between Mensheviks and 
Bolsheviks, but within Bolshevism itself. Menshevik calls to liquidate' the underground 
movement were opposed by Lenin, although his position on exploiting electoral channels was 
less abstentionist than many of his fellow Bolsheviks. The revived workers' movement after 
1911 was more receptive to the Bolsheviks than the more legalistic, union-oriented Mensheviks, 
although the Bolsheviks were unable to channel this radicalism which came to a head on the 
eve of the war. Organisationally, the Bolsheviks remained unco-ordinated after the darkest 
years of repression. It took the more democratic and open political climate of 1917 for the 
Bolsheviks to harness and channel popular discontent towards the revolutionary seizure of 
power.
One of the fundamental tenets of Sandinismo was the rejection of the parallelism of the 
traditional political spectrum, which was becoming increasingly delegitimised in the eyes of the 
popular classes due to its compromising and subservient relationship with the dictatorship. 
Consequently, from its inception the Sandinistas effectively placed themselves outside the 
parameters of legality. Their commitment to armed struggle sealed their illegal status. 
However, during the period between 1961 and 1967 debates centred upon the priority of urban 
mass work over armed struggle. After early military setbacks, the Frente concentrated upon 
strengthening its urban base through working in broad-based organisations in association with 
various left and centre-left anti-dictatorial parties. However, after 1967 the Frente began 
operating more clandestinely after experiencing the limitations of working within broad 
organisations, the electoral farce of 1967 and their 'moral success' at Pancasan. Between 1967 
and 1974 the Frente attempted to 'accumulate forces in silence', and urban activists spent
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prolonged periods living in exile, underground or in la montana. Once again these conditions 
affected the Sandinistas' spatial dimension of praxis, making it broader than Bolshevik praxis.
6.2.4. The Party And Alternative Power Structures
Working within repressive political climates, both movements rejected the possibility of 
democratising the structure of the state through the existing channels of political representation 
or institutions, and were dedicated to the destruction of the state apparatus. This necessitated 
the existence of an underground, clandestine organisational structure. Bolshevik support was 
drawn primarily from the urban proletariat, although prior to the First World War the appeal of 
Bolshevik demands was unable to be translated into alternative channels of power. It was only 
during the upheavals of 1917, where two competing power structures coexisted, that the 
Bolsheviks were able to combine their organisational capacity with a popular alternative 
structure of power, demanding that all power be transferred to the Soviets. The Bolsheviks 
were able to harness a spontaneously created mass organisation to their conjunctural demands 
and convince a majority within the Soviets that their assumption to power was the only path 
open for Russia's salvation. Had this alternative power structure not existed, the Bolsheviks 
may well have been faced with a repetition of the immediate pre-war situation where their 
growing mass appeal among the urban proletariat did not correspond with any organisational 
mechanism to advance their demands.
The Sandinistas on the other hand were never able to harness their activity to any pre-existing 
mass alternative power structure which threatened the existing state political institutions. 
Rejecting any political pact with the traditional opposition the Sandinistas began after 1967 to 
create 'intermediate organisations' as a preparatory condition for the assumption of power by 
the popular classes. Due to the wider spatial dimensions of Sandinista praxis, and this absence 
of any potential alternative power structure, conflict over prioritising activity was consequently 
more acute. During the mid-1970's, as somocista repression intensified, the division of sectoral 
responsibilities led to a virtual split within the organisation concerning the relationship 
between the Frente and the various classes it drew upon, and over the tactics for overthrowing 
the dictatorship. The proletarios stressed the organisation of the urban proletariat, and their 
activity centred upon urban 'intermediate organisations'. The G.G.P. stressed the politicisation 
of the peasantry as a pre-condition for prolonged armed confrontation in the countryside. The 
'insurrectionists' stressed immediate confrontationary blows against the dictatorship as a 
'spark' igniting mass insurrection.
Once it had become clear that the uprisings of February 1978 had gone beyond the demands 
of the bourgeoisie, and that further conflict between the delegitimised state and society was 
imminent, the Sandinistas acted promptly to regroup their unco-ordinated spheres of activity. 
The creation of the M.P.U. under the hegemony of the three tendencies represented the 
embryonic origins of an alternative structure of power. It unified a heterogeneous mixture of 
'intermediate organisations' whose only common allegiance was their links with the various 
sections of the Frente. A variety of parties and unions on the left of the political spectrum also
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participated, recognising the hegemony of the Frente. Significantly, in contrast to the Bolshevik 
case, the M.P.U. represented a much wider network of social groups based primarily upon 
neighbourhood and community, rather than the workplace. This, as suggested by the structural 
factors above, was the result of the specificity of capitalist development in Nicaragua, which 
created a more dispersed and heterogeneous popular class movement. On its own, the 
industrial proletariat could not have fulfilled the role of the Russian Soviets, and the 
heterogeneity of the popular classes necessitated a more general revolutionary centre than 
workplace-situated councils could have provided. In the months leading to, and during, the 
September 1978 uprising the M.P.U. performed an important role in civilian defence, creating 
committees which acted as alternative structures of popular power.
It was only after the Sandinistas had decisively consolidated their hegemony within the 
M.P.U., and with their political profile heightened from the September events, that they opened 
the doors of compromise to anti-Somoza sectors of the bourgeoisie and parties of the political 
centre. The creation in March 1979 of the F.P.N. signified a recognition on the part of the Frente 
that now its hegemony had been consolidated over the mass movement it was essential to 
accelerate the 'decomposition' of the enemy through fracturing any potential alliance between 
the bourgeois opposition and the Somoza state apparatus and create a broad-based 'negative 
coalition' under Frente hegemony. The weakness of the negotiating position of the U.S. and the 
bourgeoisie was not primarily due to the ideological confusion of the Carter administration (as 
many future Ttawks' maintained)9 but rather to the fact that the middle ground had subsided 
under the feet of the bourgeois alternative. The growing strength of the organised popular 
movement and Somoza's intransigence assured this.
Thus, in Russia, the crucial revolutionary class, the urban proletariat, was more homogenous, 
and with the assistance of discontented soldiers and sailors, was quickly able to construct 
organs of power representing their demands. These organs quickly emerged as alternative 
structures of state power due to the inability of the Provisional Government to deal decisively 
with issues affecting the subordinate classes. This provided the Bolsheviks with a 'ready-made' 
organ of workers' self-government which corresponded to their vision of post-revolutionary 
society. The Bolsheviks 'only' needed to convince the Soviets of transforming their de facto 
authority into state power. In Nicaragua, on the other hand, due to the peculiarities of capitalist 
development, the popular classes were more heterogeneous. Consequently, the emergence of an 
alternative power structure was more problematic. Without the intervention of a military- 
political organisation capable of providing unified direction to this heterogeneous anti-Somoza 
movement, and channelling it towards revolutionary transformation, the moderate solution of 
somozaism without Somoza would have been the most probable result. The Bolsheviks had to 
politically compete for hegemony over the organs of mass representation; the Sandinistas 
played a more active role in creating and consolidating the mass organisations. The political 
rationale behind the Sandinista organisation of the mass movement was its assumption of 
revolutionary power; the Bolsheviks had to convince the Soviets to seize power.
9See J. Kirkpatrick, "Dictatorships and Double Standards”, Commentary, Nov. 1979.
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An additional complexity in the Nicaraguan case created by this heterogeneity was the role of 
the bourgeoisie. While the structure of Soviet power was more exclusive in the sense that 
franchise was determined by, and limited to, workplaces and the armed forces, the Sandinista- 
led coalitions were more open-ended. This allowed them to co-opt the bourgeois opposition 
parties as minor partners within the F.P.N. power structure. This multi-class issue did not 
surface in Russia, where the traditionally politically weak bourgeoisie was more committed to 
the existing Provisional Government and its goals. Furthermore, the structure of the Soviets 
excluded their political participation in any revolutionary alliance led by the Soviets. In 
Nicaragua, the ultimate inclusion of the bourgeoisie in the F.P.N. ensured the bourgeoisie legal 
opportunities for dissent and opposition in the post-revolutionary political representative 
structure. This opportunity was never presented to the Russian bourgeoisie, due to the 
structure of the alternative power and their role in the competing structure.
6.2.5. Conclusion
Despite these differences, the revolutionary outcome was dependent upon a revolutionary 
party assuming hegemony over an organised mass movement which had developed a potential 
alternative structure of power. This role of the revolutionary party was acknowledged by Trotsky 
in his reflections on the October Revolution. After outlining the 'organic7 historical prerequisites 
necessary for the success of the revolution he pointed out that:
...all these conditions, which fully sufficed for the outbreak of the Revolution, were insufficient to 
assure the victory of the proletariat in the Revolution. For this victory one condition more was 
necessary...The Bolshevik Party.
To be able to take the power firmly and securely into its hands the proletariat needs a Party, 
which far surpasses other parties in the clarity of its thought and in its revolutionary 
determination. 0
Similarly, in addition to the two structural factors contributing to the triumph of the Sandinista 
Revolution, Vilas adds that there had to exist:
A vanguard organisation, forged in two decades of struggle, which was receptive to popular 
demands, articulated current struggles with the anti-imperialist tradition of the people, organised 
them and projected them to higher levels of consciousness and efficacy, and which knew how to 
capitalise on the internal contradictions of the dominant groups to the benefit of the popular 
project.11
It was the existence and praxis of these revolutionary organisations which determined that 
regime transformation would be led by the popular classes, that it would be fundamental, and 
also that future social transformation would be informed by a socialist project.
The reintroduction of the role of the revolutionary movement into a theory of twentieth 
century revolutions does not signify an antithetical response to Skocpol's structuralist 
approach. As the analysis above demonstrates, Skocpol is correct to emphasize that 
revolutionary crises are not caused by revolutionary movements. They are the result of deeper,
10L. Trotsky, In Defense of the October Revolution, New Park, London, 1971, pp. 18-9.
n Vilas, The Sandinista Revolution: National Liberation and Social Transformation in Central America, Monthly Review, 
, 1986, p. 91.
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ongoing social processes which may escape the cognition of social agents. However, once a 
crisis is generated and manifests itself in the national consciousness, the profundity of social 
change is determined by the existence of a purposive movement capable of organising the 
subordinate classes, and instilling in them the consciousness that their discontent can only be 
transcended through breaking with the existing political and economic order. In both the 
Russian and Nicaraguan cases, the existence of such a movement was crucial for the success of 
the profound regime transformation led by a mobilised mass movement. This approach does 
not seek to glorify the Bolsheviks and the Sandinistas. It is simply a recognition that the origins 
and development of the movements were problematic. Options were available, and alternative 
interpretations of the dynamics of social reality could have led to alternative forms of praxis. A 
specific response was required to the revolutionary crises, and these were provided by the 
Bolsheviks and the Sandinistas.
6.3. CONCLUSION
There were two objectives in drawing this comparison. Firstly (to sum up the argument of this 
thesis) it demonstrates that in order to render intelligible the outcome of both the Bolshevik and 
Sandinista Revolutions it is necessary to explore variables on the purposive level, and also that 
the development of a revolutionary organisation and its role in leading a mobilised mass 
movement cannot be reduced to, and explained solely by, structural factors. The second 
objective of the comparison was to illustrate the fundamental similarity between the nature of 
the two revolutions. Both parties adopted a similar philosophy and praxis, and possessed a 
similar vision of post-revolutionary society. For both structural and purposive reasons, both 
revolutions must be classified as socialist. Both revolutions were generated by inherent 
structural contradictions within their respective models of capitalist development, and both the 
Bolsheviks and Sandinistas acted as vanguard organisations channelling the activities of an 
alternative power structure 'from below', representing formerly subordinate class interests.
As discussed in the theoretical introduction to this thesis, socialist revolutions do not achieve 
their objective on the morrow of the regime transformation. The assumption of socialist power 
secures the necessary instrument (the state) for moving towards the transformation of social 
relations. However, this does not guarantee the success of the socialist project, as the history of 
the twentieth century illustrates. As Ralph Miliband notes, the "exercise of socialist power 
remains the Achilles' heel of Marxism".12 In order to understand the development of post­
revolutionary societies it is important to retain an awareness of the project which lies at the 
basis of revolutionary transformation. It is this project which informs (or should inform) the 
praxis of the post-revolutionary socialist state in its attempt to transcend existing structural 
constraints inhibiting the realisation of the transformation of social relations. These structural 
constraints have severely limited the options available to extant socialist states, yet they must be 
understood in terms of the "needle's eye" through which praxis must pass in order to pursue
12R. Miliband, "Lenin's 'The State and Revolution'”, in The Socialist Register, 1970, p. 309.
203
the socialist goal, rather than the fundamental determinants of the behaviour of socialist 
states.13 For this reason the sociological dilemma of structure and agency retains all its 
importance in analyses of post-revolutionary society. However, this engrossing subject goes 
beyond the scope of this thesis.
l3For an interesting discussion of structure and praxis in Bolshevik Russia, see J-P. Sartre, "Socialism in One Country", 
in New Left Review, 100,1975.
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Chapter 7 
CONCLUSION
Social development in the twentieth century, like its predecessors, has been punctuated by 
revolutionary crises. Few regions have been immune from the phenomenon of alternative lod 
of power challenging existing polities. These crises are overcome either through the polity 
undermining the threat of the power contender, or through the contender overthrowing the 
polity and establishing a new administrative monopoly over the state. One feature which has 
distinguished this century has been the emergence of socialist states from a number of 
revolutionary crises. Although this phenomenon has occurred only irregularly throughout the 
century, its consequence for world politics cannot be underestimated. The aim of this thesis has 
been to contribute to a greater understanding of the causes of these modem socialist 
revolutions. The method adopted has been a comparative historical analysis of two cases, the 
Russian and the Nicaraguan Revolutions.
The conclusion which has been drawn from the research is that any attempt to render socialist 
revolutions intelligible must include 'bringing the party back in'. This conclusion must be 
understood in the light of the existing research literature on revolutions because the question 
immediately arises, who threw the party out in the first place?
Forest Colburn has lamented that the study of comparative politics tends to be "faddish and 
non-cumulative". The effort to differentiate academic products, he claims, often results in 
"professional amnesia". As a consequence, "What is novel for some is not novel for others."1 The 
study of revolutions cannot be absolved from this charge. Jack Goldstone has charted the 
development of the enormous scholarly inquiry of revolutions through three successive 
'generations', the natural, the general and the structural. It is the structural paradigm which 
currently dominates the field.
The position adopted in this thesis is that structural analyses cannot adequately account for 
the success of the socialist revolutions which have emerged from various modern revolutionary 
crises. Their models are necessary in order to account for the factors which contributed to 
revolutionary crises of old regimes, and they are useful for explaining the coalitions of social 
forces necessary for overthrowing old regimes, yet this in itself does not explain how such a 
necessary correlation of forces was realised or actualised. In order to render intelligible the
^.D . Colburn, "Review Article: Statism, Rationality and State-Centrism", in Comparative Politics, July 1988, p. 485.
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process from necessity to possibility to realisation it is necessary to explore variables on the 
purposive level.
The most influential of the modem structuralist approaches to social revolutions, Theda 
Skocpol's States and Social Revolutions, emerged as a response to purposive approaches within 
the 'general' category of theories of revolutions, such as Charles Tilly's From Mobilization to 
Revolution. Skocpol argues that the central problematic in the study of social revolutions is the 
emergence of a revolutionary situation, rather than its making. The framework of this controversy 
is the perennially knotty problem of the role of structure and agency in social change.
However, this thesis suggests that in relation to theories of revolutions, this problem is not as 
formidable as it first appears. Through taking one generational step backwards, it is possible to 
move forward and transcend the above-mentioned inadequacies of the dominant structural 
approaches. The apparent incompatibility between Skocpol's approach and Tilly's approach 
can be discovered in the questions which underlie their problems. While Skocpol's underlying 
research problem concerns the conditions which promote the crisis of old regimes and generate 
revolutionary situations, Tilly's underlying research problem is how contenders are able to 
mobilise and successfully challenge old regimes during revolutionary situations. As Tilly 
himself acknowledges, the answer to the problem of explaining revolutions depends much 
upon the time-scale adopted. In the long-run structural variables dominate, while in the short- 
to-medium-run purposive variables must recieve greater attention. No understanding of 
socialist revolutions can be complete unless both research problems are addressed. It is this 
reading of the existing research literature which has informed the analysis of the Russian and 
Nicaraguan Revolutions throughout this thesis, and 'brought the party back in.'
The first problem which emerged was to discover the underlying dynamics of the two pre­
revolutionary societies. Through such an analysis it is possible to determine whether a 
revolutionary situation was inherent within a social structure, or whether it was primarily 
precipitated by contingent factors external to the dynamics of the structure. In Chapter 2 this 
problem was examined in the case of pre-revolutionary Russia. It was observed that the 
inherent/contingent 'problemation' was dependent upon the level of abstraction adopted. 
Gerschenkron's analysis of the dynamics of Russian reality presented a picture of a society 
overcoming the problems of 'late-development' and gradually institutionalising class conflict. 
Had it not been for Russia's involvement in the First World War, he argues, revolution would 
have been avoided. This 'contingent' analysis of the Russian Revolution was criticized on both 
theoretical and empirical grounds, and an alternative interpretation of the structure and 
dynamics of Tsarist Russian society was advanced. The key structural variables analysed in 
this interpretation were Russia's position within the world capitalist system, the interventionist 
role of the state in promoting capitalist development, the level of conflict between the state and 
the urban proletariat, the stagnation and exploitation of agriculture, and the weakness of the 
bourgeoisie. The conclusion reached was that on the eve of the war Tsarist Russia remained a 
social system fraught with class tension and potential social revolution.
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These variable were then applied to the Nicaraguan case, and a similar conclusion was 
reached. It was argued that the dictatorial somocista state performed a vital role in post-war 
Nicaraguan capitalist development. The avoidance of conflict between the state and the 
bourgeoisie demanded the securing of conditions for expanding capital accumulation, 
favourable commodity prices for Nicaragua's export products and the subservience and 
repression of the classes excluded from the benefits of somocista capitalist development. The 
inherent tension within the social structure periodically manifested itself during times when 
these conditions failed to be met. Furthermore, as in the Russian case, there were structural 
reasons why the revolutionary situation would be characterised by the twin phenomena of the 
inability of the bourgeoisie to mobilise the popular classes, and the rejection by the popular 
classes of the role of the state as arbiter of social conflict.
However, inherency does not imply inevitability, just as potential does not automatically imply 
realisation. As Skocpol states, revolutionaries do not make the revolutionary situations which 
they eventually exploit. Yet, it is impossible to understand the socialist regime transformations 
which have occurred without exploring the role performed by socialist parties during periods 
of multiple sovereignty. Without the purposive and conscious intervention of revolutionary 
organisations, the outcome of multiple sovereignty would not have led to socialist seizures of 
power. While structural factors circumscribed the range of possibilities inherent within the 
revolutionary situation, particular outcomes are dependent upon the political and military 
praxis of the revolutionary party, and the ideology which informed this praxis.
Chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis were therefore devoted to explaining how the Bolshevik Party 
and the Sandinista National Liberation Front were able to mobilise the popular classes, and 
channel their energy towards the socialist seizure of power. It was argued that revolutionary 
parties, like revolutionary situations, do not 'fall from heaven'. The role performed by parties 
during revolutionary situations depends upon a preceding process of ideological and 
organisational development. In both the Bolshevik and the Sandinista cases, this process 
spanned two decades of political activity. In both this process was problematic, involving a series 
of political options at each historical conjuncture which influenced the relationship between the 
party and its class basis. In other words, the growth of the vanguard party' was not simply a 
mechanical reflection of the development of class contradictions within the social structure.
This problem was illustrated through exploring not only the relationship betweeen the party 
and the popular classes, but also the relationship between the vanguard party and other 
challengers to the polity. Neither the Bolsheviks nor the Sandinistas had a monopoly on the 
opposition, or even a monopoly claim over the Marxist challenge. Neither were they the only 
parties with an objective of organising and mobilising the classes 'from below'. In order to 
explain the successes and failures of the various alternatives it was necessary to explore the 
organisational and ideological distinctiveness of the Bolsheviks and the Sandinistas. The role of 
ideology was crucial in transforming possibility or potentiality into actuality through praxis. 
The Bolshevik and Sandinista alternatives were distinct alternatives because their interpretation
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of reality perceived possibilities which others rejected.2
Once the Bolsheviks and the Sandinistas had transcended the initial phase of embedding 
themselves within their respective political cultures and opening space for themselves within 
the political spectrum, the next phase involved a prolonged process of agitation among the 
popular classes, and the establishment of the organisational relationship between the party 
structure and the mass movement. At each conjuncture the effectiveness of this relationship 
was tested and revised in the concrete practice of political and class conflict. Although neither 
the Bolsheviks nor the Sandinistas emerged as the hegemonic contender at the outset of the 
revolutionary situation, this prior process of development was decisive for their successful 
mobilisation of the popular classes, and for informing the direction in which it channelled the 
movement. Also, while fortuitious circumstances may have been important in providing both 
parties with the opportunity to mobilise, their ability to take advantage of these conditions was 
determined by this organisational and ideological development. It is at this moment that 
political and military variables assume decisive importance, and that the role or the 
revolutionary agent determines the possibility of the transcendence of existing social 
conditions. Every socialist revolution which has thus far occurred has been achieved through 
popular insurrection. The possibility of regime transformation has been determined by the 
ability of the hegemonic party within the mass movement to act decisively, treating the task as 
an art form to be applied with the maximum audacity.
Both the Bolsheviks and the Sandinistas premised the necessity of the insurrectionary seizure 
of power upon its desirability rather than on its inevitability. Both were fully aware that in the 
inherently unstable conditions of multiple sovereignty, failure to act decisively would be 
tantamount not only to a lost opportunity but to counter-revolution. Thus, both stressed that 
popular insurrection was the only means to safeguard the gains, and realise the aims, of the 
popular classes. If neither party had purposively intervened to lead the insurrection, and had 
waited for the social tension to 'work itself ouf, then neither outcome would have been a 
socialist revolution.
In conclusion, explanations of socialist revolution need to acknowledge that the development 
of revolutionary organisations are complex processes which must be given greater 
independence than most structural analyses allow. The evidence presented in this thesis 
demonstrates that the existence of a revolutionary agent, or a purposive revolutionary centre, 
decisively influenced the nature of regime transformation in Russia and Nicaragua.
2The relationship between ideology and praxis has been discussed in another context by Alec Nove who wrote that 
often "one or more alternatives may not be seen to be alternatives, because they conflict with strongly held beliefs or 
prejudices. Thus to eat a cheese sandwich or a ham sandwich represents alternative choices for most (people) but not 
for an orthodox rabbi.” A. Nove, "Some Observations on Criteria foe the Study of the Soviet Union", in Political Economy 
and Soviet Socialism, Allen <& Unwin, London, 1979, p. 221.
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